As widely known, in International Relations, the regions of the world are not geographically fixed, but are a social construct: the very idea of a region defines its boundaries. Since the beginning of the 21st century, following an insight from the Japanese government[1], a new vision of East Asia – expanded to encompass the area stretching from the coasts of India in the east to the Western Pacific – has gained ground, not only amongst policy-makers but also in academic studies[2]. It is a vision that includes Australia, New Zealand and the islands of Oceania too.
Previously, the region was defined as the “Asia-Pacific”, reflecting an era in which the United States, through bilateral alliances (hub-and-spoke), engaged partners within the vast network of institutions and regimes that defined the liberal order established at Bretton Woods in 1944. Against a backdrop characterised by Washington’s relative distraction – as it was engaged on the Middle Eastern front with the “War on Terror” – and by the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Tokyo’s initiative aimed to strengthen ties with India, with a view to maintaining free and open trade routes linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans via the South China Sea – the waters of which are disputed between China and its South-East Asian neighbours. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the proposal for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) was perceived in Beijing as an attempt to contain China’s rising power. Indeed, the very reconfiguration of the region reflects a growing “securitisation of the area”, in which there is a risk of ‘threat inflation”[3].
In a context characterised by the need to reduce economic dependence on China by diversifying trading partners, and to reassure the neighbours of this formidable Asian neighbour, the new social construct of the Indo-Pacific was gradually but firmly embraced and adopted by the region’s most significant players. The United States, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea adopted a foreign policy strategy for the Indo-Pacific. By the early 2020s, the reconfiguration of the Asian region within foreign policy planning had come to involve, through the adoption of a formal policy document, the United Kingdom and Europe as well – understood both as EU institutions[4] and as individual member states, first and foremost France and Germany.[5]
For Italy, East Asia – and, today, the Indo-Pacific – has never been a foreign policy priority; nevertheless, the perception within national institutions has now changed. Even in academic circles, some voices argue for the need to increase political investment in the region.[6] In March 2025, the Indo-Pacific Committee of the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign Affairs Committee, following a lengthy fact-finding inquiry, concluded that “the development of an Italian national strategy for the Indo-Pacific appears appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, it would streamline the efforts undertaken, at times independently, by the various components of the national system. Secondly, it would highlight Italy’s multilateral approach to its allies and regional partners, making it more recognisable and better structured. Furthermore, it would take account of recent geopolitical developments, moving beyond a European Union strategy that appears outdated in several respects. Finally, a formalised strategy would provide a framework for government action over the medium term, discouraging ad hoc or contingent initiatives”.[7]
With a view to the possible formalisation of an Italian strategy for the Indo-Pacific that is coherent, effective and sustainable (given the scarcity of resources and the need to deploy them in closer theatres), it is necessary to begin by defining the region from our country’s perspective. Defining the region in social terms is a prerequisite for taking effective action that is coherently integrated into the broader framework of Italian foreign policy. It is also necessary to compare this vision with that of international partners, since the courses of action taken by individual states are inspired not so much by “a battle for influence within the region” as by “concerns about influence and power driving a battle to define what the regional space should or could be”.[8] The Franco-German Observatory of the Indo-Pacific – a joint initiative of Sciences Po in Paris and the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, with which some of the researchers involved in this project are affiliated – has published a series of conceptual maps on this subject. In these, for each national perspective, it has highlighted the geographical boundaries of the Indo-Pacific, first-, second- and third-tier partners, destabilising actors, areas of greatest interest and theatres of greatest concern.
What geographical area does Italy have in mind when it refers to the Indo-Pacific? According to the aforementioned fact-finding survey, for example, “the eastern section of the wider Mediterranean is also part of the Indo-Pacific, which is considered the focus of our country’s most important national interests” because “it is now difficult to separate the two areas, given the common dynamics that affect them”.[9] What role does our country intend to play in the region? Research conducted by Anna Caffarena and Giuseppe Gabusi has revealed that Italian governments over the last twenty years have developed as many as nine conceptions of their role in the world:[10] from a transatlantic ally to a “responsible stakeholder” within multilateral dynamics; from a “bridge” between different worlds to a promoter of economic openness and free trade (globalisation surfer); from a cultural power to a defender of the rules-based order and human rights.[11] Given the aforementioned scarcity of economic and human resources, it has been suggested that, to ensure the effectiveness of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific, Italy should select the roles in which to invest and the partners on whom to rely.[12]
This research aims to address these questions and to formulate a number of policy recommendations, with a view to Italy’s possible adoption of a formal strategy, through a comparative analysis of the Indo-Pacific strategies of at least two of Italy’s key partners in the European Union: France and Germany. Taking the Indo-Pacific strategy drawn up by the EU institutions as a reference point, and starting from an analysis of the founding documents of the respective national strategies – and, therefore, the social construction of the Indo-Pacific – we examine their evolution and implementation, following three main strands: security, economy and development.
On the security front, it is necessary to investigate which initiatives and partnerships have been developed in the region, at what level of engagement, and in response to which potential threats. As regards trade and investment, it is necessary to analyse whether dependence on the PRC is actually being reduced through a meaningful risk diversification strategy. Finally, this part of the world, which is particularly vulnerable to the consequences of the climate crisis, is still characterised by a significant, albeit patchy, development gap compared with Europe: along what lines are European countries moving to engage Indo-Pacific governments and societies in a virtuous cycle of growth and adaptation to the ecological transition?
The research draws on the experience and insights of researchers at the Franco-German Observatory of the Indo-Pacific, as well as other colleagues who attended a workshop hosted by INALCO in Paris in January 2026. It also prompts reflection on the potential coordination and possible synergies between the actions of individual European states, with a view to enhancing their effectiveness. Against a backdrop of a changing international order, characterised by economic and security tensions on a global scale, there is an even more urgent need for the European Union and its member states to assume a renewed role beyond their immediate neighbourhood, in order to contribute to the reshaping of the future international order, rather than remaining at the mercy of change.
This book is divided into four sections and thirteen chapters. Section one examines the historical evolution of the concept of the Indo-Pacific and its current relevance to the European Union and its Member States. In the first chapter, Raimondo Neironi outlines the concept’s five dimensions: geographical, International Relations theory, security, discourse, and ideology. By combining these perspectives in various ways, the author identifies five core features common to all Indo-Pacific strategies and visions. However, the concept of the Indo-Pacific still remains rather fluid, which has both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, this helps to explain its widespread endorsement in national foreign policy design; on the other hand, it risks a lack of coherence and coordination, which ultimately undermines its effectiveness. A similar challenge can be seen in the European context, where the EU has adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy, but its concrete definition and implementation depend on the actions of its Member States. By comparing the French and German visions of the Indo-Pacific, Giuseppe Gabusi and Enrico Fassi’s chapter reflects on whether national strategies strengthen or weaken the EU’s approach in the region. They argue that a dispersion of roles can generate confusion and a lack of credibility, rendering foreign policy ineffective. In contrast, a more coordinated effort could have a significant impact, particularly at a time when Indo-Pacific partners are diversifying their relations.
Section two focuses on France and the myths and realities surrounding its engagement with the Indo-Pacific. Paris exercises sovereignty over its overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making France a “resident power”, which, as Paco Milhiet argues in chapter three, is the first pillar of French ambitions in the region. The second pillar involves robust engagement with “like-minded” countries. Milhiet looks particularly at relations with Southeast Asian nations, arguing that a more significant Italian presence in the area could contribute to the addition of an Indo-Pacific dimension to the Quirinal Treaty, which marks institutionalised and structured cooperation between the two countries. Despite being a resident power in the Pacific, Oceania has never been at the centre of the French Indo-Pacific strategy. In fact, territories such as French Polynesia and New Caledonia have traditionally been treated as domestic issues. However, Céline Pajon highlights in chapter four how, as seen in the 2025 update of its strategy, Oceania is now an influential factor in the design and implementation of French policies in the Indo-Pacific. However, at the crossroads between “grand strategy and domestic politics”, and with a “gap between ambitions and limited means”, the myth of a “resident power” collides with the reality of limited resources and political capital with which to deal with the many internal (e.g. in New Caledonia) and external, multifaceted challenges. The section ends with a chapter by Elsa Lafaye de Micheaux examining development aid. She argues that the withdrawal of USAID from Southeast Asia — a sub-region where Chinese aid and investment has constantly increased over the past few decades — has created an opportunity for Europe to become more engaged. Both the EU and its Member States should seize this historical opportunity to demonstrate the practical benefits of their approach.
Section three analyses the evolution of Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategy and policies, and includes a chapter on the Dutch Indo-Pacific posture. Traditionally, foreign economic policy, particularly with regard to China, has formed the core of Berlin’s vision of its role in the Indo-Pacific. However, due to a changing strategic environment, Germany’s security engagement with the Indo-Pacific has increased significantly in recent years. Clara Hörning analyses the expansion of defence diplomacy in the area in detail and argues that German successes and shortcomings could provide Italy with valuable insights as it moves beyond the traditional economic dimension of its relationship with East Asia. As China has become more assertive in its foreign endeavours and continues to export overcapacity to Europe, endangering the future of German manufacturing, Linda Liang illustrates how Chancellor Friedrich Merz has adopted a tougher stance on China while diversifying partnerships under a de-risking strategy and multiplying issues of cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels. According to the author, this shift does not represent a “fundamental strategic change”, but rather a “gradual adaptation”. In conclusion, Liang suggests that German interests would be best served by taking joint European action. However, it seems that the current government is not interested in assuming a leadership role in this necessary coordination effort. Gudrun Wacker’s contribution highlights the “China factor”. She emphasises that Germany has never viewed the Indo-Pacific as a social construct intended to contain China. Instead, Berlin has always adopted an inclusive approach, and the 2020 Guidelines were conceived as a “building block” for the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy. However, growing tensions between the West and Beijing, as well as industrial crises (especially in the automotive sector), have led Berlin to become more critical and sceptical of China, while simultaneously “upgrading” the partnership with Taiwan. Wacker argues that it remains to be seen whether Germany can reduce its companies’ overdependence on China and implement an unequivocal de-risking strategy. Chapter nine by Patrick Köllner and Oliver Schramm considers all the elements outlined in the previous chapter and assesses Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategy so far. They stress that the 2020 Guidelines broadened Berlin’s Asia policy beyond an excessive focus on China and helped the federal government coordinate different ministries and agencies more effectively. The guidelines also generated proactive policies at the bilateral and multilateral levels. While the authors argue that Germany’s experience offers some “strategically relevant lessons” for Italy and other EU Member States, they believe that European interests would be best served by “prioritisation” of activities, political and budgetary commitment, and — above all — a renewed EU Indo-Pacific framework that is convincingly supported by key states. In the final chapter of this section, we examine the Netherlands, a middle power whose economic prosperity hinges on global free trade. Gul-i-Hina van der Zwan presents the Dutch Indo-Pacific strategy as an example of the reorganisation of existing policies and organisational practices rather than the launch of new initiatives. Drawing on the example of the Netherlands, the author offers a lesson in humility to other middle powers, such as Italy: while the development of formal guidelines for an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy is a positive step, it should be viewed primarily as a means of enhancing Italy’s contribution to the EU Indo-Pacific policy across the Mediterranean–Red Sea–Indian Corridor, which is of vital importance to Italy.
Finally, the perceptions of the renewed European presence in the Indo-Pacific are examined from the perspective of three key regional partners: Japan, Indonesia and South Korea. Gianluca Bonanno highlights how Tokyo now considers European involvement in the region to be a “structural component” of its FOIP vision. While Brussels’ normative stance aligns with Japan’s defence of a rules-based international order, renewed partnerships with individual member states — notably Italy — are fostering economic and industrial diversification. However, the author points out that ongoing uncertainties in the international order, particularly within the framework of the alliance between Tokyo and Washington, could still pose a challenge to the honeymoon period between Europe and Japan. In the twelfth chapter, Marie Kwon analyses Southeast Asian perspectives from the perspective of Jakarta. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays a crucial role here. The principle of ASEAN centrality, widely accepted in diplomatic circles of the sub-region, means that European actions are most effective when they involve ASEAN-related institutions in a non-discriminatory regional effort. This would prevent Europe from being seen as just another player in the long game of great-power competition, which would be a necessary achievement considering the burden of its colonial past. In the final chapter, In Young Min evaluates how Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategy is perceived in South Korea. While, similar to Tokyo, Seoul should in theory welcome Berlin’s defence of an open liberal order, the twin realities of South Korea’s unclear Indo-Pacific strategy and Germany’s lack of visibility in Northeast Asia prevent the partnership from reaching its full potential.
Acknowledgements and references can be found in the full PDF of the report.
[1] Abe, S. (2007) Confluence of the Two Seas, Speech at the Parliament of the Republic of India, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 22 August, available online.
[2] For example, see Kratiuk, B., Van Den Bosch, J., Jaskolska, A., Sato, Y. (2023) Routledge Handbook of Indo-Pacific Studies, London: Routledge, available online.
[3] For example, see Higgott, R. (2024) From Globalisation and the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to Geopolitics and the ‘Indo-Pacific’, London: LSE Ideas, available online.
[4] European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2021) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, JOIN (2021) 24 Final, 16 September, available online.
[5] Gouvernement Français (2025) France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Paris: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 12 December, available online; The Federal Government of Germany (2020) Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific: Germany–Europe–Asia. Shaping the 21st Century Together, Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, available online; The Federal Government of Germany (2023) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2023, Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, available online.
[6] Abbondanza, G. (2024) “Italy’s quiet pivot to the Indo-Pacific: Towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy”, International Political Science Review, 45(5), 669–679.
[7] Chamber of Deputies (2025) Indagine Conoscitiva sulle Tematiche Relative alla Proiezione dell’Italia e dei Paesi europei nell’Indo-Pacifico,12 March, Roma: III Commissione Permanente (Affari Esteri e Comunitari), 70, available online.
[8] Breslin, S. (2018) Conceptualising Asian Regionalism, T.note no. 73, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, available online.
[9] Chamber of Deputies (2025) Indagine Conoscitiva sulle Tematiche Relative alla Proiezione dell’Italia e dei Paesi europei nell’Indo-Pacifico, 5, available online.
[10] Holsti, K. J. (1970) “National Role Conceptions in the study of foreign policy”, International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), 233–309.
[11] Caffarena, A., Gabusi, G. (2017) “Making sense of a changing world: Foreign policy ideas and Italy’s National Role Conceptions after 9/11”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica/Italian Political Science Review, 47(2), 125-147; Gabusi, G., Caffarena, A. (2024) “Changing and yet the same? Italy’s foreign policy ideas and National Role Conceptions in a populist age”, Contemporary Italian Politics, 17(3), 314-335.
[12] Chamber of Deputies (2024) Audizione di Giuseppe Gabusi del Comitato Permanente sulla Politica Estera per l’Indo-Pacifico, 19 September, available online.
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