This chapter paper assesses Germany’s security engagement with the Indo-Pacific in the five years since the publication of the 2020 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, asking how this engagement has evolved and to what extent Germany’s stated strategic objectives are matched by its observable behaviour and material commitment. The paper begins by situating Germany’s Indo-Pacific security engagement in context. As a non-resident power with no territorial presence in the region, Germany’s approach to the Indo-Pacific was historically defined by trade and economic relations, predominantly with China, while security played a marginal role. The publication of the 2020 Guidelines marked a paradigm shift, acknowledging the region’s centrality to Germany’s prosperity and security and outlining aspirations to diversify and deepen bilateral relations, expand security and defence cooperation, broaden its maritime presence, and protect the rules-based order. The analysis examines Germany’s security engagement along three empirical dimensions. First, at the level of strategic thinking, it traces three successive shifts – the 2020 Guidelines, the 2022 German Zeitenwende, and the changed geopolitical landscape of 2025 under the Trump 2.0 presidency and the Merz government – that have progressively sharpened Germany’s threat perceptions and advanced the understanding of European and Indo-Pacific security as being interconnected. Second, at the level of partnerships and cooperation, it documents a substantial diversification of security ties, including the establishment of 2+2 consultations with Japan and Australia, a deepened defence-industrial partnership with India, and newly formalised defence cooperation with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Third, at the operational level, it examines how Germany employs defence diplomacy and military deployments to deepen its security engagement with the region: two major naval deployments, regular participation in multilateral exercises, the stationing of liaison officers and military attachés, and capacity-building initiatives under the Enable and Enhance framework. Finally, a brief excurses surveys German arms transfers to the Indo-Pacific. The paper concludes that Germany has achieved a notable expansion of its security engagement across all three dimensions, yet remains operationally a symbolic actor in the Indo-Pacific, constrained by resource limitations and competing security demands in Europe. Its engagement is best understood as defence diplomacy, political signalling, partnership-building, and gaining operational experience, rather than as a bid for hard-security influence. Drawing on these findings, the paper offers lessons for Italy as it considers whether to develop its own Indo-Pacific strategy.
Introduction
Germany´s 2020 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific marked a watershed in Berlin´s engagement with the region. Until then, German policy in the wider Indo-Pacific had been primarily trade-focused and overwhelmingly China-centric, with security policy playing a marginal role even in long-standing bilateral relationships such as those with Japan, India, and Indonesia. The Guidelines reframed the region as central to Germany´s prosperity and security, set out a strategic framework spanning seven policy fields, and committed the Federal Government to expanding its security policy engagement, deepening defense cooperation with regional partners, and increasing its maritime presence. This shift reflected a growing recognition that Germany´s deep economic exposure to the region, combined with the risks of overdependence on China, required a broader and more diversified pattern of engagement.
The strategic environment into which the Guidelines were launched has since been transformed. The Indo-Pacific´s post-Cold War security architecture, organized around the United States hub-and-spokes alliance system, is increasingly under pressure from intensifying great-power competition between Washington and Beijing, Chinas growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, persistent tensions on the Korean peninsula, and the ever-present risk of escalation around Taiwan. Each of these flashpoints carries direct implications for Germany, whose maritime trade routes, supply chains, and broader economic security are tied to regional stability. Alongside these regional dynamics, a series of structural shocks has progressively transformed the global context of German engagement: the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the German Zeitenwende it triggered, the changed global security environment since 2025 marked by the second Trump administration and fundamental challenges to the rules-based international order have placed new demands on German and European defense resources.
This combination of expanding ambition and tightening constraints raises the central question of this article: how has Germany´s security engagement in the Indo-Pacific evolved since the publication of the Guidelines, and to what extent have the security aspirations set out in 2020 been met under conditions that have changed fundamentally since? The article examines this question through three analytical dimensions: strategic thinking, partnerships and security cooperation, and operational engagement.[1] The first part traces the evolution of German strategic thinking through three successive inflection points: the 2020 Guidelines, the Zeitenwende, and the post-2025 security environment. The following section maps the expansion of Germany´s bilateral and multilateral partnerships, with particular attention to Japan, Australia, India, and Singapore. The third subchapter assesses operational engagement, including the two Indo-Pacific naval deployments, German participation in bi- and multilateral exercises, liaison officer placements, and capacity-building under the Enable and Enhance Initiative. The analysis draws on a selected sample of primary sources, including key strategy documents, landmark speeches, parliamentary debates, and government press releases. The focus throughout is on hard security; soft security initiatives such as crisis prevention, climate cooperation, and arms control, although also part of the Guidelines, fall outside the scope of this article.
The conclusion brings the three dimensions together to assess the overall coherence of Germany´s engagement and the value of the Guidelines as an instrument of foreign and security policy. On that basis, the final section turns to the lessons of Germany´s experience for Italy, which currently faces the question of whether to develop its own Indo-Pacific guidelines.
Strategic Thinking and Political Discourse
This section examines Germany´s security objectives and threat perceptions in the Indo-Pacific: why and how the region features in German strategic thinking, what rationale underpins Germany´s security engagement there, and how that thinking has evolved over the past six years in response to changing domestic and international security conditions. The analysis draws on a selected sample of primary sources; key strategy documents, landmark speeches, press releases, and parliamentary debates, to trace the evolution of political discourse on Germany´s security role in the Indo-Pacific since 2020.
Three major inflection points structure the analysis: the publication of the German Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2020, Russia´s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in response to which then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared the German Zeitenwende, and the changed global political and security environment from 2025 onwards, characterized by challenges to the rules-based international order, great power competition, claims of an emerging multipolar order, and increasingly challenging transatlantic relations.
Regional engagement before 2020
Prior to 2020, German foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific was heavily China-focused. Germany saw China´s rise primarily as an economic opportunity and, as with Russia, pursued a change through trade[2] strategy. Bilateral relations across the region, including with Japan, India, and Indonesia, were predominantly trade-driven. Security policy played a marginal role throughout this period.
First Inflection Point: the 2020 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific
The publication of the Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2020 marked a paradigm shift in Germany´s strategic thinking, explicitly acknowledging the region´s centrality to Germany´s prosperity and security. The document provided a strategic framework for Germany’s broad engagement with the Indo-Pacific across a broad range of policy fields, from multilateralism and climate policy to economics, trade, human rights, and security.[3]
A central driver of this reorientation was the recognition that Germany´s narrow focus on China had led to a neglect of the wider region. The Guidelines emphasized the growing political and economic importance of the Indo-Pacific to Germany as a trading nation[4] and articulated the country´s interest in closing “ranks with democracies and partners with shared values in the region” and in diversifying its relations “to avoid unilateral dependencies.” [5] This was a clear, if diplomatically understated, acknowledgement of the risks of overdependence on China. Notably, however, Germany did not frame the Guidelines as a tool to balance China. Instead, it adopted an inclusive regional definition, describing “the Indo-Pacific to be the entire region characterised by the Indian Ocean and the Pacific” [6] and thereby including China. This distinguished Germany´s approach from that of other actors such as the United States, which framed the concept of the Indo-Pacific concept in more explicitly competitive terms.[7]
The rationale underpinning German security engagement in the Indo-Pacific set out by the Guidelines was closely linked to Germany´s economic security interests. The document established a direct nexus between European and Asian prosperity and security, pointing to Germany´s significant trade exposure to the region and the vital importance of open maritime trade routes and maritime security. On this basis, the Federal Government committed to expanding its security policy engagement in the Indo-Pacific through a broad range of initiatives.[8] Among others, Berlin intended to deepen “its security policy engagement”, “expand its security and defence cooperation”, and increase its maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region.[9] Soft security measures such as civil crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding and arms control measures also featured in the Guidelines[10] but fall outside the scope of this chapter, which focuses on hard security initiatives.
It is also worth noting that the Guidelines did not set out overly ambitious security objectives; Germany did not aspire to become a major security actor in the Indo-Pacific or to alter the regional security architecture. The stated goals were to deepen cooperation, diversify partnerships, and contribute to the stability of a rules-based regional order. Whether and how these goals have been met is examined in the following subchapters.
Second Inflection Point: Russia´s Invasion of Ukraine and the German Zeitenwende
The second major inflection point fundamentally reshaped German strategic thinking and security policy. Following Russia´s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Chancellor Scholz declared the German Zeitenwende, a historic strategic turning point that called for Germany to shift from its role as a civilian power to a guarantor of European security, to reverse decades of low defense spending and rearm, and to adapt to a new era of confrontation and geopolitical rivalry.[11]
This reorientation necessarily led to a renewed focus on national and European defense. The 2023 National Security Strategy made clear that “national and collective defense is the core task of the Bundeswehr, with all other tasks subordinate”;[12] the Indo-Pacific featured only in passing.[13]
Yet the war did not lead to retreat from Germany´s Indo-Pacific commitments, but impacted Germany´s assessment of its bilateral relations and security interests. Notably, it accelerated an already-underway shift in Germany´s perception of China. The failure of the change through trade doctrine, now demonstrated not only by Russia´s invasion but increasingly applicable to China, the vulnerabilities in Germany´s supply chains and trade routes, and China´s role in sustaining Russia´s war economy all contributed to a recalibration. While China remains one of Germany´s most important trading partners, official German strategic thinking has shifted from an emphasis on partnership toward one that gives greater weight to rivalry and competition, a change reflected in the 2023 Strategy on China.[14] This gave further urgency to diversify partnerships with other countries in the Indo-Pacific so as to reduce the dependency on the Peoples Republic.
The war also deepened the argument, already latent in the 2020 Guidelines, that European and Indo-Pacific security are interconnected. The economic framing of 2020 centered on trade routes and supply chains was now accompanied by an explicit security framing in the political discourse. The Guidelines had noted the EU Global Strategy´s observation that “there is a direct nexus between prosperity in Europe and security in Asia,” [15] but this was primarily an economic argument. From 2022 onwards, the security dimension became more central in the official discourse; Beijing´s direct and indirect support of Russia through its continuation of political and economic relations enabled Moscow to continue the conflict and propped up the Russian war economy and the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea were regularly cited as evidence that the two theatres could not be treated in isolation. As Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated in 2024: “I have come in the firm conviction that the challenges and crises of the world are interconnected. Today more than ever before. We cannot separate the security challenges of the Indo-Pacific from those in Europe. And if we want to address the strategic issues of our time successfully, we need strong partnerships. “[16]
One could of course also champion the somewhat cynically hypothesises, that the framing of both security theatres being inextricably linked may be at least in part a strategy to keep the political focus on the Indo-Pacific and justify resources being spend on missions abroad despite competing domestic demands. Germany´s continued security engagement with the Indo-Pacific has not been without domestic contestation. While the governing coalition parties so far have supported the security components of the Guidelines, the far-right opposition party AfD called for an end to military deployments to the region, advocated for a new Indo-Pacific strategy based on economic interests, and questioned the added value of measures such as the naval deployments.[17]
Despite these domestic pressures, the Zeitenwende did not lead to an abandonment of the Indo-Pacific Guidelines at the level of strategic thinking: Germany´s security interest in the region was if anything further elaborated during this period. [18]
Third inflection point: the changed security environment since 2025
Germany´s current strategic outlook reflects a third, ongoing shift. Foreign Minister Wadephul characterized the emerging global environment in stark terms: “The law of the strongest seems to be increasingly replacing the strength of the law. Rules that we considered the backbone of our international order are being called into question. The international order itself – as we have known it since after the Second World War – is under pressure.””[19] Chancellor Merz was even more frank: “… the international order, which was based on rights and rules, is in the process of being destroyed. I fear we must put this even more bluntly: this order, as imperfect as it was even at the best of times, no longer exists.”[20]
While this paradigm shift is multi-causal and more diffuse than the other two inflections points, the author of this piece has decided on the re-election of US president Donald Trump as the temporal marker. The third inflection is defined by challenges to the rules-based international order, heightened great power competition, unstable transatlantic relations and a fundamental questioning of American reliability as a security partner in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. In response, Germany has amended the constitution to allow for a substantial increase in defense spending: Germany´s NATO contribution is set to rise to 2.8 percent of GDP in 2026 and to 3.5 percent by 2029. [21] This signifies a fundamental paradigm shift in German security policy.
Against this backdrop, the argument for diversifying and deepening partnerships with “like-minded” middle powers, already present since 2020, has become ever more prominent and more explicitly tied to strategic self-interest. German officials have continued to emphasize the interconnected security theaters and framed deeper engagement with partners in the Indo-Pacific as a response to an environment of diminished reliability.[22] Defense Minister Pistorius, speaking in Australia in early 2026, argued that in a world of greater unpredictability, it had become more important for like-minded partners such as Australia, Germany, Japan, and Singapore to remain committed to the rules-based order and to one another.[23] Addressing the issue of American reliability, the Defense Minister noted that the Trump administration´s demands had accelerated European rearmament and underscored the need to broaden and deepen alliances with partners who share a stake in the rules-based order. Germany´s primary geographic responsibility, as articulated in official statements, remains Europe, but, as Pistorius stated, “in an interconnected strategic environment, geographic distance must not be mistaken for strategic irrelevance. A truly comprehensive European security approach must comprise Indo-Pacific security as well. To Germany, partnerships beyond Europe are a strategic necessity”.[24]
At the same time, German officials have been careful to avoid the impression that Berlin was distancing itself from Washington and repeatedly reiterate the importance of the transatlantic partnership,[25] the need to keep the US engaged in NATO[26] and US centrality to security in the Indo-Pacific: “Without a strong US presence, the Indo-Pacific would be less safe. For us and for our allies.” [27]
Interim conclusion
Germany´s strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific has evolved substantially since 2020. Three successive inflection points have impacted threat perceptions, deepened the rationale for security engagement, and expanded the range of interests that Germany links to the region.
What began in 2020 as a primarily economics-driven case for diversification has developed into a broader security argument in which European and Indo-Pacific security are understood as being linked. This shift has been reinforced rather than reversed by the intensifying demands on European defense and the shifts in the international order and security environment. Despite growing resource constraints and domestic political contestation, Germany has in rhetorical terms expanded its commitment to the region. The following two subchapters examine whether and to what extent this evolution in strategic thinking has been matched by observable behavior on the diplomatic level through the development and deepening of partnerships and security cooperation´s and through operational engagement and defense diplomacy measures by the Bundeswehr.
While the invasion of Ukraine and the growing security demands at home could have led to a complete refocusing on Europe and abandoning the goals set out in the relatively new Indo-Pacific guidelines, this was not the case. In fact, the logic of why the Indo-Pacific mattered to German security was further developed in the official political discourse over the last years.
Partnerships and Security Cooperation
The 2020 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific set out several concrete objectives in the realm of security partnerships: to expand security and defense cooperation with partners in the region, to pursue bilateral defense cooperation in line with export control commitments, to expand cybersecurity dialogue and cooperation with like-minded partners, and to support ASEAN´s security cooperation formats.[28] This subchapter examines whether, and to what extent, these goals have been met. It traces the expansion of Germany´s network of bilateral security agreements, consultation mechanisms, and defense industry cooperation since 2020, and assesses the overall trajectory of Germany´s partnership-building in the region up to early 2026.
As the previous section showed, the strategic rationale for engaging with the Indo-Pacific deepened considerably across the three inflection points. What follows examines whether that shift in strategic thinking was accompanied by a corresponding expansion of Germany´s partnership infrastructure. It does so by taking a closer look at four bilateral relationships -Singapore, Japan, Australia, and India – which reflect the diversity of Germany´s partnership-building in the region: Japan and Australia are established US treaty allies with whom Germany has developed 2+2 consultation formats and defense-industrial ties; Singapore represents Germany´s most institutionalized bilateral defense partnership in Southeast Asia, underpinned by longstanding submarine cooperation and a recently elevated strategic partnership; and India, a major power that has traditionally pursued strategic autonomy rather than formal alliance commitments, represents a newer but deepening relationship driven in part by growing Indian demand for German defense equipment. These four cases are followed by a broader overview of Germany´s expanding engagement across the wider region.
Singapore
Germany´s security relationship with Singapore predates the Guidelines and is one of the most sophisticated bilateral defense partnerships in the region. Since 2009, Singaporean Armed Forces personnel have conducted regular joint military training exercises with the Bundeswehr in Germany, and in 2018 both countries signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement covering high-level visits, military-to-military exchanges, professional training, and defense technology collaboration. [29] Singapore has procured German submarines since 2019, with their crews undergoing training with the German Navy in Kiel. [30]
In 2024, the relationship was elevated to the status of a Strategic Partnership.[31] In March 2026, Defense Minister Pistorius´s visit to Singapore produced two further agreements. ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and ST Engineering Marine signed a MoU to establish a Joint Service and Maintenance Centre in Singapore. The agreement for this regional submarine maintenance hub covers platform delivery, technology transfer, crew training, maintenance, repair, logistical support, and armed forces exchanges in the areas of maritime security and strategic capabilities. The hub will be accessible to the Singaporean, German and all other navies operating TKMS submarines, and is therefore of clear operational relevance for future German naval deployments to the region. [32] In addition, a Supply Chain Resiliency Arrangement was signed to strengthen both countries´ defense supply chains against unforeseen disruptions. [33] Cooperation in cybersecurity is also set to expand, with a new agreement between the two countries´ cyber intelligence authorities scheduled for June 2026. [34]
Singapore imposed sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine.[35]
Japan
Bilateral security cooperation with Japan has expanded steadily since the publication of the Guidelines. In 2021, both countries established 2+2 consultation format which brings together their foreign and defense ministers[36] and signed the German-Japanese Agreement on the Security of Information, enabling the exchange of classified material and more intensive cooperation on security issues.[37] The first German-Japanese government consultations took place in 2023.[38] In 2024, both countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), facilitating the provision of supplies, ammunition, and logistical support between the Bundeswehr and Japan´s Self-Defense Forces. [39]
Defense Minister Pistorius´s visit to Japan in March 2026 aimed to further deepen interoperability and defense industry cooperation. Both sides agreed to strengthen defense-related communication through regular security consultations in peacetime and crisis situations, and committed to consulting on “appropriate responses” to threats to their security and regional stability. Both governments have also expressed interest in concluding a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). On the defense industrial side, longstanding cooperation, including Airbus and Kawasaki Heavy Industries´ 50-year collaboration and Japan´s observer status in the Eurodrone program, is set to expand.[40]
Australia
Australia is Germany´s most important security partner in the southern Indo-Pacific. The two countries established a Strategic Partnership in 2013. After the publication of the guidelines, the relations were elevated to an Enhanced Strategic Partnership with 2+2 consultations in 2021.[41] A MoU on defense science and technology was signed in November 2023 to expand research cooperation. [42] The following year, a Strategic Raw Material Partnership was agreed between Australia and the EU, and Foreign Minister Wadephul indicated during his 2026 visit that further cooperation in this area is being explored.[43]
Defense Minister Pistorius´s visit to Australia in March 2026 yielded further concrete outcomes. Both sides announced plans to seek a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to facilitate military cooperation and remove barriers to operational collaboration, and signed a joint letter of intent on space cooperation. [44] Defense industry cooperation is one of the most important areas of bilateral security engagement. The German defense manufacturer Rheinmetall´s facility in Brisbane now manufactures Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles for the Australian Army, with an additional 100 units to be exported to Germany from 2026, which represents Australia´s largest defense export to date. A further letter of cooperation with TDW, a German defense company specializing in missile systems, was also signed during the visit.[45]
Australia´s status as the largest military supporter of Ukraine outside NATO[46] reinforces the argument, made repeatedly in German political discourse, that the two security theatres are connected.
India
While 2025 marked 25 years of the India-Germany Strategic Partnership and biannual intergovernmental consultations have been held since 2011,[47] Indian-German defense and security relations have only in recent years substantially deepened, driven by an increased Indian interest in German defense equipment.
A significant signal of the growing importance Germany attaches to this relationship was the publication of the Focus on India strategy paper in 2024.[48] A subchapter on security and defense policy sets out concrete initiatives, including placing cooperation between the Bundeswehr and the Indian armed forces on a more permanent footing through regular deployments and joint exercises, concluding a Reciprocal Logistics Support Agreement, seconding a liaison officer to the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in New Delhi, and expanding arms cooperation with Indian defense companies.[49]
Tangible progress toward these goals has been made. In 2025 a High Defense Committee Meeting took place, focusing on military-to-military cooperation, defense industrial partnerships, and co-development and co-production of equipment.[50] Signaling the growing importance placed on the bilateral relations, Chancellor Merz chose India as the destination for his first official visit to Asia in January 2026. During the visit, the Chancellor and Prime Minister Modi signed 19 joint declarations of intent, most notably a joint declaration of intent to develop a Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap to promote long-term industry-level collaboration, including technology partnerships, co-development, and co-production. Progress was also recorded toward an MoU on peacekeeping training, the Reciprocal Logistics Support Agreement, and knowledge exchange in advanced defense technologies between India´s Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Germany´s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment (BAAINBw). On the industrial side, cooperation continues in the fields of submarines, counter-UAV systems, and helicopter obstacle avoidance, and India´s participation in the Eurodrone MALE UAV program has been confirmed.[51]
Other developments
Beyond these four partnerships, Germany has expanded its security engagement across the wider region. Ministerial-level defense talks were held for the first time with Vietnam and Malaysia in 2022, while defense policy talks were resumed with Indonesia (2022), Thailand (2023)[52], and the Philippines (2024)[53]. In 2025, Germany and the Philippines signed an agreement concerning defense.[54] Germany also participated as an observer at the 2025 ASEAN Defense Ministers´ Meeting Plus, the first time it attended this forum at ministerial level.[55] In August 2021, Germany acceded to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). [56]
Germany´s engagement with the Pacific Island states has also developed since 2020. A Special Envoy for the Pacific Island States was appointed in 2022 and the first embassy in a small Pacific Island state was opened in Fiji in 2023[57], accompanied by the launch of military-political cooperation with Fiji in September of that year[58]. Furthermore, Berlin recognized Niue as a state in 2025[59], and has indicated its intent to upgrade the existing dialogue partnership with the Pacific Islands Forum to a strategic partnership.[60]
Expanded cooperation with the region can also be observed at an increase of high-level visits from German government members to the region.[61] This trend was continued in 2026, with the leading government figures, chancellor, foreign minister and defence minister all visiting the Indo-Pacific aiming to deepen security cooperation and defence industry collaboration, promote trade, and diversify supply chains. [62]
Interim conclusion
On the level of partnerships and security cooperation, Germany has met the broad aspirations set out in the 2020 Guidelines. Bilateral security agreements, consultation mechanisms, and defense industry partnerships have expanded substantially, not only with established US allies Japan and Australia, but also with India and, at a lower level of institutionalization, with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Pacific Island states. Cybersecurity cooperation has been extended with Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and India. Germany has joined ReCAAP, engaged with ASEAN security formats, and developed dedicated relationships with Pacific Island states. Defense industry cooperation has become a structurally significant element of several partnerships.
The wave of high-level visits in early 2026 underscores that this momentum has been maintained under the Merz government. At this level, the rhetorical commitments made in the Guidelines and reinforced through successive inflection points have been translated into concrete political and diplomatic infrastructure. How the Bundeswehr has operationalized this partnership framework through deployments, exercises, liaison officer placements, and capacity-building will be examined in the following section.
Operational Engagement and Military Deployments
This subchapter examines what operational resources Germany has allocated to implement the 2020 Guidelines, and how German defense diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific has been conducted in practice. It assesses the scope and character of the Bundeswehr´s regional engagement, including its deployments, participation in bi- and multilateral exercises, liaison officer placements, and capacity-building initiatives, and asks how the successive inflection points impacting the strategic thinking have shaped the observable German behavior in the region.
German Defense Diplomacy
According to the 2023 Defense Policy Guidelines, the Ministry of Defense defines defense diplomacy (Verteidigungsdiplomatie) as an instrument of international cooperation and partnership that includes strengthening partners´ security structures, building and maintaining bilateral security and military relations, and supporting arms control and capacity-building measures. In practice, defense diplomacy takes the form of exchanges between Bundeswehr personnel and foreign counterparts. Its main instruments include the secondment of exchange officers and military attachés, official port visits by naval vessels, and participation in NATO, EU, OSCE, and UN formats[63]. The most relevant examples of German defense diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific are outlined below.
Indo-Pacific deployments and participation in exercises
For several decades prior to 2021 the German Navy had been absent from the Indo-Pacific. The two naval deployments undertaken since the publication of the Guidelines therefore carried considerable symbolic weight and were read in the region as evidence that Germany intended to follow through on its stated ambitions. The pattern that has emerged between 2021 and 2026 is one of alternating years of high and low activity. 2021, 2022, and 2024 saw major naval deployments and multiple exercise firsts, while 2023 and 2025 were markedly quieter. 2026 saw a return to the regional deployments, though through a maritime patrol aircraft rather than a naval vessel, a considerably smaller operation than the two previous missions.
The first naval mission to the region, Indo-Pacific Deployment 2021 (IPD21), consisted of the frigate Bayern, which traversed the Indo-Pacific from August 2021 to February 2022. The frigate took part in approximately 30 individual exercises with naval forces from 17 nations, most of them short passing exercises,[64] with participation in ANNUALEX 2021, a Japan-led multilateral maritime exercise, [65] representing the operational highlight. Port calls during the deployment included Pakistan, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and India, and gave the Bundeswehr the opportunity to build and deepen bilateral relationships.[66] While the deployment was intended to demonstrate Germany´s commitment to upholding a rules-based regional order, its actual contribution to this goal has been questioned. The Bayern avoided geopolitical hotspots, most notably the Taiwan Strait, and its contribution to monitoring UN sanctions against North Korea was of limited operational significance.[67] The deployment nevertheless effectively signaled the new German security interest to regional partners and succeeded in its defense diplomacy objectives.
Beyond the naval voyage, 2022 also marked the first major air force deployment to the region through the multi-stop exercise Rapid Pacific. German air force units participated for the first time in both Kakadu 2022 and Pitch Black 2022, hosted by Australia. Further stops included joint exercises in Singapore, a visit to South Korea, and a landing in Japan, the first of its kind by a German military aircraft in Japanese territory.[68] Germany also took part in RIMPAC 2022, though only with personnel.[69] By contrast, 2023 was a quieter year operationally, with the main operational implementation of the Guidelines being Germany´s first-ever participation in the Australian-led multinational exercise Talisman Sabre 2023, to which it contributed over 200 personnel from the army and navy.[70]
The following year was the most active of German operational engagement in the region. The second major naval mission, Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 (IPD24), ran from May to December 2024 and comprised the frigate Baden-Württemberg and the replenishment vessel Frankfurt am Main. Germany participated for the first time with navy ships and air force assets in RIMPAC 2024, a significant deepening of its contribution compared to its prior participation with troops. IPD24 also included participation in the Pacific Security Maritime Exchange (PSMX), a multilateral partnership monitoring UN sanctions against North Korea, [71] bilateral exercises with the navies of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and India, and port calls to Goa, Port Klang, Singapore, Jakarta, Manila, Incheon, Tokyo, and Hawaii. [72] In contrast to the Bayern, the Baden-Württemberg transited the Taiwan Strait, deliberately signaling that Germany, in accordance with international law, considers the Strait as international waters. [73] The government framed the deployment´s goals as maintaining a regional presence in defense of the rules-based international order and the freedom of the seas, advancing defense diplomacy and security cooperation, and improving the operational readiness of the crew and interoperability with partner forces. The 2024 deployment therefore addressed several of the limitations that had been identified in the Bayern voyage.
Alongside IPD24, the air force conducted Pacific Skies 24, a coordinated set of exercises with the air force of France and Spain. Within this framework, German fighter aircraft trained for the first time in Japanese airspace during Nippon Skies 2024, took part in Pitch Black 2024, joined RIMPAC 2024, and contributed with French and Spanish counterparts to Tarang Shakti 1, the first occasion on which German and Indian forces exercised in Indian airspace together. These firsts underscored the growing operational ambition of the air force in the region and the deepening military cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners. [74]
Germany´s most visible security cooperation with the Indo-Pacific in the following year was the participation in the multilateral exercise Talisman Sabre 2025, alongside the reciprocal landing of two Japanese Air Force fighter jets in Germany during Operation Atlantic Eagle, which reflected the increasing depth of the German-Japanese defense relationship. [75] In early 2026, Germany returned to the region with the deployment of a Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft as part of IPD26. The aircraft participated in Exercise Milan on 16 February 2026 following its deployment from India and undertook further bi- and multilateral exercises and training across the wider region. The Federal Government has framed IPD as having three core missions: deepening cooperation with regional partners, contributing to the security of maritime and trade routes through maritime presence, and demonstrating that Germany remains a reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific even in light of the war in Ukraine. [76] However compared to prior Indo-Pacific Deployments, IPD26 was fairly limited in scope and fell short of the expected biannual major naval deployments.
Outlook: sustained exercise participation, uncertain naval deployments
The Federal Government has confirmed continued participation in bi- and multilateral exercises across 2026 and 2027. Planned contributions include Pitch Black 2026, to which Germany will send nine Eurofighters and refueling aircraft, [77] Tarang Shakti and Keen Sword in 2026, Talisman Sabre in 2027[78] and participation in RIMPAC is foreseen for 2028[79]. However, no major naval mission is planned for 2026, and a 2027 deployment has not yet been confirmed either. [80] The initial expectation of a biannual German naval presence in the region therefore appears unlikely to be sustained.
In 2025, the Bundeswehr´s operational focus was primarily on the Baltic region, reflected in Exercise Quadriga 2025, Germany´s leadership of the multinational NATO battlegroup in Lithuania, the permanent deployment of a brigade there, and the NATO mission Baltic Sentry. While the government has stated that Indo-Pacific participation does not formally compete with other commitments, the finite capacity of the Bundeswehr and the limited size of the German naval fleet impose material constraints on current and future Indo-Pacific deployments. These constraints are linked to the from the structural shifts traced in the strategic thinking section.
Liaison officers, UN Command, and capacity-building
Beyond deployments and exercises, Germany has extended a limited permanent presence in the region. A German liaison officer has been stationed at the Information Fusion Centre in Singapore since 2020[81] and the liaison officer post at the Enforcement Coordination Cell in Yokosuka, Japan, which monitors UN sanctions against North Korea, was made permanent in 2024, extending an earlier temporary secondment. [82] In 2025, Berlin announced that a further liaison officer would be stationed at the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region in New Delhi. Germany also joined the United Nations Command in Korea, a multinational force that monitors the Korean Armistice Agreement. [83]
Germany also conducts security capacity-building activities in the region under the Enable and Enhance Initiative, which designated the Indo-Pacific a partner region in 2023. Under this framework, Germany supports the coast guards of the Philippines and Malaysia in maritime surveillance and capacity-building, and has launched military capacity-building pilot projects with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam in areas including medical care, military engineering, and UN peacekeeping training.[84] As part of its support to the Philippine Coast Guard, Germany delivered two Trinity F90+ reconnaissance drones in 2022 and four additional drones in 2024, bringing the total to six, together with operator training and support in developing operational guidelines.[85]
Interim conclusion
At the operational level, Germany´s engagement has expanded substantially since 2020. Regular deployments, participation in a growing number of bi- and multilateral military exercises, the stationing of liaison officers, accession to the United Nations Command, and the inclusion of the Indo-Pacific in the Enable and Enhance Initiative together represent a clear operationalization of the aspirations set out in the Guidelines. The two naval deployments illustrate a qualitative evolution. The 2021 Bayern voyage avoided geopolitical hotspots and was largely symbolic, while the 2024 Baden-Württemberg deployment transited the Taiwan Strait, participated in sanctions monitoring, and engaged a wider range of partners through exercises and port calls.
The operationalization also reflects the partnership architecture traced in the last subchapter. Cooperation with Japan, Australia, India, and Singapore, each the subject of a formal consultation or cooperation framework, has been materially underpinned by joint exercises, training in partner airspace, and port calls. In this sense the rhetorical commitments set out in the first subchapter and the diplomatic infrastructure mapped in the second find their concrete expression here.
Important constraints are nevertheless evident. Germany´s presence remains operationally modest. Naval deployments have not become routinised, the expected biannual rhythm appears unlikely to be sustained, and the war in Ukraine combined with the Bundeswehr´s deepening commitments to NATO´s eastern flank impose structural limits on further expansion. Germany remains a valued political and defense-industry partner in the region, but its operational role is primarily symbolic and does not meaningfully affect the regional balance of power. A rhetoric-action gap becomes most visible at this level. Strategic thinking has continued to deepen and partnerships have expanded, but operational realities are increasingly shaped by finite resources and competing domestic and regional commitments.
Conclusion
This chapter asked how Germany´s security engagement in the Indo-Pacific has evolved since the publication of the 2020 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, whether the goals set out in that document have been broadly met, and, by implication, whether the act of publishing the Guidelines has been an effective instrument of German foreign and security policy. The analysis across three dimensions yields a differentiated answer.
At the level of strategic thinking, the three inflection points traced above have progressively deepened rather than diluted Germany´s commitment to the region. What began in 2020 as a primarily economics-driven case for diversification has developed into a broader security argument that treats European and Indo-Pacific security as connected theatres. The German Zeitenwende could plausibly have redirected political attention fully to Europe, but instead reinforced the logic for continued engagement in the Indo-Pacific by sharpening the perception of China and making the interconnectedness of the two theatres a recurring theme of official discourse. The changed security environment since 2025, shaped by the return of the Trump administration and challenges to the rules-based international order, has further elevated the importance Germany attaches to middle-power partnerships in the region.
At the level of partnerships and security cooperation, this evolution in strategic thinking has been matched by observable behavior. Germany has institutionalized and deepened ties with Japan, Australia, India, and Singapore, expanded bilateral defense consultations with Southeast Asian partners, broadened cybersecurity cooperation, joined ReCAAP, engaged with ASEAN security formats, and developed its dedicated relationships with Pacific Island states. Defense industrial cooperation continues to become a significant element of several bilateral partnerships. The sequence of high-level visits in early 2026 under the Merz government underscores that the political momentum has been maintained across changes of administration. At this level, rhetorical commitment and observable action broadly cohere, though a strict causal attribution to the Guidelines themselves is difficult to establish.
At the operational level, the coherence between aspirations and action becomes more strained. Germany has achieved a substantive expansion of its operational presence compared to the pre-2020 baseline: two naval deployments, an increasing range of bi- and multilateral military exercises, newly permanent liaison officer posts, accession to the United Nations Command, and capacity-building under the Enable and Enhance Initiative. The qualitative shift between the 2021 Bayern voyage and the 2024 Baden-Württemberg deployment, including the transit of the Taiwan Strait and participation in sanctions monitoring, demonstrates growing ambition. At the same time, the expected biannual rhythm of naval deployments is unlikely to be sustained, no major deployment is planned for 2026, and the Bundeswehr´s deepening commitments to NATO´s eastern flank imposes structural limits on further expansion. Germany´s operational role in the region remains primarily symbolic. It is best understood as a form of defense diplomacy, political signaling, partnership-building, and operational learning rather than as a contribution to hard deterrence or to the regional balance of power.
Taken together, the Guidelines have served as an effective instrument for anchoring Germany´s Indo-Pacific engagement. They have provided continuity across successive administrations and changing security environments, kept the region on the German political agenda despite growing domestic and European security demands, and signaled to regional partners that Germany is committed to sustained engagement. Most of the hard security aspirations set out in 2020 have been at least partially met by early 2026. This does not mean that Germany has become a consequential hard-security actor in the region; the geographic and resource constraints on such a role are unlikely to be overcome. The Guidelines´ achievement lies in institutionalizing a pattern of engagement that would likely not have developed in their absence. Their future, however, remains unclear: no updated implementation report was issued for 2025, breaking a four-year sequence of annual reporting. The strategic environment has changed substantially since 2020, and a reformed framework would better reflect current threat perceptions, clarify priorities, and set a more realistic operational horizon. For the present, however, such an update does not appear imminent, leaving a document conceived for a different strategic moment to govern an engagement whose underlying rationale has since evolved.
On this basis, the final section of this article turns to the lessons of Germany´s experience for Italy.
Recommendations for Italy
Italy is currently weighing whether to develop its own Indo-Pacific guidelines. On the basis of the preceding analysis, this chapter argues that a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy can be a valuable foreign and security policy instrument, helping to anchor the region on the political agenda and to provide a measure of continuity in the face of geopolitical shifts and changes in government. At the same time, the German experience also illustrates the importance of tailoring such a document to a country´s own strategic priorities and capacities. Rather than emulating any existing model, including the German or French approaches, Italy should design an Indo-Pacific strategy that reflects its specific interests, alliance profile, and resource constraints. With this in mind, and focusing on the security dimension of the Guidelines, Germany´s experience offers five concrete lessons for Rome.
First, clarify the intended security role. The German Guidelines succeeded in providing continuity and political anchoring because they were overall realistic in their security ambitions: defense diplomacy, partnership-building, and a limited maritime presence, rather than going so far as to claim to alter the regional balance of power or act as a hard-security guarantor. Italy should avoid setting out aspirations it cannot sustain. The central question for Rome should be what kind of security role is realistic given the concurrent demands of the Mediterranean, the Sahel, NATO´s southern flank, and continued deterrence in Europe.
Second, align ambition with geographic and capability constraints. Germany´s experience illustrates the limits of what a non-resident European power can sustain in a theatre located roughly 10,000 kilometers from home. Germany has managed two major voyages in six years, and the expected biannual rhythm has not materialized. For Italy, whose navy is significantly larger than Germany´s but which also carries substantial Mediterranean, Red Sea, and North African responsibilities, the constraint is not fleet size in absolute terms but the logistical, political, and opportunity costs of sustaining a persistent presence at distance. Any Italian framework should address this trade-off explicitly rather than leave it for future governments to resolve politically.
Third, prioritize partnership architecture and defense-industrial cooperation over operational presence. The most durable element of German engagement since 2020 has not been its naval deployments but the expansion of bilateral agreements, consultation formats, and defense-industry links with Japan, Australia, India, and Singapore. An Italian framework should place these at its center.
Fourth, frame Indo-Pacific engagement around direct Italian interests. German political discourse has increasingly linked European and Indo-Pacific security, and this framing has proven politically effective in the German context. As a communication strategy, however, it carries risks: abstract security arguments can prove difficult to sustain domestically when used to justify commitments far from home. Rome would therefore be well served by anchoring its engagement in concrete national interests such as trade dependence, maritime security, and critical supply chains, rather than relying primarily on a broader security interdependence narrative.
Fifth, build in regular implementation reporting from the start. Germany´s four annual progress reports (2021–2024) served as a key mechanism of accountability, coordination, and external signaling. An Italian framework should include a defined reporting cycle and a scheduled review point at which the strategy could be updated rather than quietly abandoned.
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[1] This chapter extends and complements the analysis developed in Heiduk, F., Hörning, C. (2026) Zeitenwende in the Indo-Pacific? Assessing Germany’s Regional Security Engagement, German Politics, 1–25, available online, which examines the impact of the Zeitenwende on German regional security engagement in depth.
[2] Wandel durch Handel or “change through trade” describes a longstanding strategic doctrine underlying German foreign policy vis-à-vis non-democratic or non-Western states like China and Russia, that was based on the assumption that close trade relations and economic integration would eventually lead to democratization in these countries.
[3] The official policy fields set out in the Guidelines are: (1) strengthening multilateralism, (2) tackling climate change and protecting the environment, (3) strengthening peace, security and stability, (4) promoting human rights and the rule of law, (5) strengthening rules-based, fair and sustainable free trade, (6) rules-based networking and the digital transformation of regions and markets and (7) bringing people together through culture, education and science. So, while the Guidelines have a security chapter, security policy is just one of several priorities. See: The Federal Government, Germany (2020) Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Germany – Europe – Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together, Berlin, 21, available online.
[4] Ibidem.
[5] Ibidem.
[6] Ibidem.
[7] Heiduk, F., Wacker, G. (2020) From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, SWP Research Paper, Berlin, available online.
[8] The Federal Government, Germany (2020) Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Germany – Europe – Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together, Berlin, 35, available online.
[9] Ibidem, 35-36.
[10] Ibidem, 16.
[11] The Federal Government, Germany (2022) Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag, 27 February 2022 in Berlin”, Berlin, available online; Scholz, O. (2022) “The Global Zeitenwende: how to avoid a new Cold War in a multipolar era”, Foreign Affairs, 101(2), available online.
[12] The Federal Government, Germany (2023) National Security Strategy. Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany, Berlin, 32, available online
[13] Ibidem, 23.
[14] China’s conduct and decisions have caused the elements of rivalry and competition in our relations to increase in recent years.” The Federal Government, Germany (2023) Strategy on China of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, 11, available online; and “Increasing competition and systemic rivalry with China require new efforts in Germany and the EU to strengthen our economy, competitiveness and technological sovereignty, as well as to protect our open societies and assert our interests vis-à-vis China.” Ibidem 34.
[15] The Federal Government, Germany (2020) Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Germany – Europe – Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together, Berlin, 35, available online.
[16] Ministry of Defence, Germany (2024) Partner für den Frieden: Pistorius am Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, available online.
[17] German Bundestag (2025) Umsetzung der Indo-Pazifik-Leitlinien der Bundesregierung, Bundestagsdrucksache 21/2138, 21st electoral term, Berlin, available online; German Bundestag (2023) Kleine Anfrage, Bundestagsdrucksache 21/2138, 20th electoral term, Berlin, available online; German Bundestag (2024) Plenary debate on “Vertiefte Zusammenarbeit mit den Partnern des Indo-Pazifiks zur Lösung globaler Herausforderungen”, Plenarprotokoll 20/181, Berlin, 23530, available online.
[18] See also Heiduk, F., Hörning, C. (2026) Zeitenwende in the Indo-Pacific? Assessing Germany’s Regional Security Engagement, German Politics, 1–25, available online.
[19] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2026) Speech by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul at IISS Raffles Lecture in Singapore: Security, Freedom, Prosperity: Foreign Policy in the Era of Uncertainty, Singapore, available online.
[20] The Federal Government, Germany (2025) Speech by Federal Chancellor Merz at the Munich Security Conference “We Are Asserting our Freedom with our Neighbours”, Munich, available online.
[21] Ministry of Finance, Germany (2025) German Government Intensifies its Investment Drive: 2026 Federal Budget and Fiscal Plan to 2029 Adopted, Berlin, available online.
[22] “We can choose to together adapt to the new realities. We can choose to preserve our values – together as partners. We can choose to recognise the sense of urgency. And to work together as an international community and to strengthen multilateralism. That is precisely why I am here. Because I am convinced that the Indo-Pacific is of decisive importance for Germany, for Europe. And vice versa. And because we – as Germans and as Europeans – want to build and strengthen partnerships that are solid, reliable, and capable of shaping a shared and prosperous future.” Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2026) Speech by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul at IISS Raffles Lecture in Singapore: Security, Freedom, Prosperity: Foreign Policy in the Era of Uncertainty, Singapore, available online.
[23] Australian Government, Department of Defence (2026) Joint Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 March, available online.
[24] Ibidem.
[25] Pistorius, B.: “[…] we don’t want to imagine a world without the United States as a reliable partner”. Ibidem.
[26] Pistorius, B.: “Our American allies want to see a European-led NATO. And we have acted and are acting to build a more European NATO. A NATO in which Europeans bear the brunt of conventional deterrence and defence. In other words: NATO has to become more European to stay transatlantic.” Ministry of Defence, Germany (2026) “Speech by Federal Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius at the National Press Club of Australia – “Germany and Australia: Partners in an Era of Strategic Competition””, Canberra, available online.
[27] Ibidem.
[28] The Federal Government, Germany (2020) Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Germany – Europe – Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together, Berlin, 15-16, available online.
[29] Ministry of Defence, Singapore (2026) Singapore and Germany to Step Up Defence Cooperation, Singapore, available online.
[30] Ministry of Defence, Germany (2026) Pistorius in Singapur: Bessere Wartung von U-Booten am strategischen Knotenpunkt, available online.
[31] In the Joint Work Plan 2025/2026 the two countries set out to “Deepen military-to-military cooperation in the areas of digitalisation and cybersecurity, Research & Development/Innovation, Armament – based on our already successful cooperation in the fields of main battle tanks and submarines –exercises, training, education, and exchanges. Explore further collaboration opportunities between our navies, armies, air and cyber forces, building upon the existing cooperation on armour-related training exercises and in submarine-related areas.” The Federal Government of Germany and Government of the Republic of Singapore (2024) Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Singapore, available online.
[32] Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (2026) TKMS and ST Engineering sign MoU in Singapore, available online; Ministry of Defence, Germany (2026) Pistorius in Singapur: Bessere Wartung von U-Booten am strategischen Knotenpunkt, available online; Ministry of Defence, Singapore (2026) Singapore and Germany to Step Up Defence Cooperation, Singapore, available online.
[33] Ibidem.
[34] Ministry of Defence, Germany (2026) Pistorius in Singapur: Bessere Wartung von U-Booten am strategischen Knotenpunkt, available online.
[35] Monetary Authority of Singapore (2026) Financial Measures in Relation to Russia, Singapore, available online.
[36] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2021) Foreign and security policy consultations between Japan and Germany, Berlin, available online.
[37] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2021) Sign of Mutual Trust: Japan and Germany Sign Agreement on the Security of Information, Tokyo, available online.
[38] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2023) Germany and Japan: Bilateral Relations, Berlin, available online.
[39] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2024) Entry into Force of the Agreement between the Government of Japan And the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Tokyo, available online.
[40] Ministry of Defence, Germany (2026) Tokyo: Pistorius Engagiert Sich für Engere Zusammenarbeit mit Japan, available online; Ministry of Defense, Japan (2023) Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting, Tokyo, available online.
[41] The Federal Government of Germany and Government of Australia (2021) Erweiterte strategische Partnerschaft zwischen Australien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Canberra/Berlin, available online.
[42] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2024) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the Year 2024, Berlin, available online.
[43] Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Australia (2026) Press conference, Canberra, available online.
[44] Department of Defence, Australia (2026) Joint Statement, Australia–Germany Defence Ministers’ Meeting, Canberra, available online; Australian Government, Department of Defence (2026) Joint Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 March, available online.
[45] Department of Defence, Australia (2026) Australia and Germany to Closely Cooperate on Guided Weapons Components, Canberra, available online.
[46] Australian Government (2025) Australia Stands with NATO Partners in Support of Ukraine, available online.
[47] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2025) “Germany and India: Bilateral relations”, Berlin, available online.
[48] The only other comparable single-country document is the Strategy on China dedicated to relations with China.
[49] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2024) Focus on India, Berlin, 8-9, available online.
[50] Outcomes: further augment bilateral defense cooperation including institutionalized services Staff Talks and visits of Service Chiefs, commitments to deepen military-to-military cooperation through joint exercises, training and exchanges of senior officials.
[51] Government of India, Press Information Bureau (2025) India – Germany Joint Statement, New Delhi, available online; Ministry of External Affairs, India (2026) India–Germany Joint Statement, New Delhi, January 12, available online.
[52] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2023) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the Year 2023, Berlin, 5, available online.
[53] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2024) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the Year 2024, Berlin, 9, available online.
[54]Ministry of Defence, Germany (2025) Deutschland und die Philippinen vereinbaren engere Zusammenarbeit, Berlin, available online.
[55] Philippine News Agency (2023) ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting accepts Türkiye, Germany as Observers, Manila, available online.
[56] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2021) Progress Report on the Implementation of the German Government Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region, Berlin, 5, available online.
[57] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2023) Germany and Fiji: Bilateral Relations, Berlin, available online.
[58] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2024) Progress report on the implementation of the Federal Government’s policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the Year 2024, Berlin, 25 September, available online.
[59] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2026) “Deutschland und Niue: Bilaterale Beziehungen”, Berlin, 19 March, available online.
[60] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2025) “Germany’s cooperation with the Pacific Island States”, Berlin, available online.
[61] Heiduk, F., Hörning, C. (2026) Zeitenwende in the Indo-Pacific? Assessing Germany’s Regional Security Engagement. German Politics, 13, available online.
[62] Chancellor Merz first visit to Asia was to India in January 2026, Foreign Minister Wadephul visited Singapore, New Zealand, Tonga, Australia and Brunei in February 2026 and Defense Minister Pistorius made a military policy trip to the Indo-Pacific visiting Japan, Singapore and Australia in March 2026.
[63] Ministry of Defence, Germany (2023) Defence Policy Guidelines 2023, Berlin, available online; Bundeswehr, Germany (2024) Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024, available online.
[64] Bundeswehr, Germany (2022) Indo-Pacific Deployment: “Bayern” Back Home, available online.
[65] Bundeswehr, Germany (2021) Naval Exercises: the “Bayern” at ANNUALEX 2021, available online.
[66] Bundeswehr, Germany (2024) Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 der Marine Beendet, available online.
[67] Sakaki, A., Swistek, G. (2022) Return from the Choppy Waters of the Indo-Pacific: Implications of the Deployment of the Frigate Bayern, SWP Comment 2022/22, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, available online.
[68] Bundeswehr, Germany (2022) Pitch Black 2022, available online; Bundeswehr, Germany (2022) Rapid Pacific Teil 4 – Die Besuche, available online.
[69] U.S. Navy (2022) “RIMPAC 2022 concludes”, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, 4 August, available online.
[70] Bundeswehr, Germany (2023) Talisman Sabre 2023: Großübung in Australien Feierlich Eröffnet, available online.
[71] Bundeswehr, Germany (2024) “The German Navy and the United Nations´North Korea sanctions” available online.
[72] Bundeswehr, Germany (2024) Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 der Marine Beendet, available online; Bundeswehr, Germany (2024) Partnering auf Hoher See: Indische und Deutsche Marine üben Gemeinsam, available online.
[73] Bundeswehr, Germany (2024) Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 der Marine beendet, available online.
[74] Bundeswehr, Germany (2024) Pacific Skies 24 – One deployment, Five exercises, available online.
[75] Bundeswehr, Germany (2025) Talisman Sabre 2025: Bundeswehr Trainiert in Australien, available online; Bundeswehr, Germany (2025) Vom Fuji Nach Laage: Deutsch-Japanische Freundschaft Stärkt Sicherheit im Luftraum, available online.
[76] Bundeswehr, Germany (2026) Schneller Und Weiter: P-8A Poseidon Richtung Indo-Pazifik Gestartet, available online; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2024) Für einen Freien und Offenen Indo-Pazifik: Pistorius Besucht Partnerstaaten, Berlin, 28 July, available online.
[77] Australian Government, Department of Defence (2026) Joint Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 March, available online.
[78] Ministry of Defence, Germany (2024) Für einen freien und offenen Indo-Pazifik: Pistorius besucht Partnerstaaten, Berlin, 28 July, available online.
[79] Ministry of Defence, Germany (2026) Speech by Boris Pistorius at the National Press Club of Australia: “Germany and Australia: Partners in an Era of Strategic Competition”, Canberra, 25 March, available online.
[80] German Bundestag (2025) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Alexander Wolf, Stefan Keuter, Jan Wenzel Schmidt, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der AfD – Umsetzung der Indo-Pazifik-Leitlinien der Bundesregierung, BTDrucksache 21/2485, 30, Oktober, available online.
[81] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2024) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the Year 2024, Berlin, 25 September, available online.
[82] Ibidem.
[83] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2020) “Foreign Minister Baerbock welcomes Germany joining the United Nations Command on the Korean Peninsula”, Berlin, 8 July, available online.
[84] The Federal Government, Germany (2023) Progress report on the implementation of the Federal Government’s policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2023, Berlin, 5, available online; Federal Government, Germany (2024) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2024, Berlin, 9, available online.
[85] The Federal Government, Germany (2022) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2022, Berlin, 7, available online; Maitem, J. (2024) “Germany to provide additional drones to the Philippine Coast Guard,” Naval News available online.
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