This paper examines the two-way relationship between France’s Indo-Pacific strategy and developments in Oceania. Oceania was not a priority in the initial years of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as the region was largely treated as secondary to major strategic hotspots and key partnerships, while overseas territories were primarily handled as domestic issues and recipients of a top-down strategy. However, political, strategic, and geopolitical shifts in the region—ranging from the AUKUS deal and the growing Chinese presence in the area to renewed independence movements in French overseas territories—have progressively shaped and reoriented France’s approach. As a result, Paris had to devote greater resources to Oceania, adopting a more balanced and comprehensive approach toward Pacific Island countries, while making stronger efforts to empower its overseas territories as co-constructors of, and beneficiaries from, the Indo-Pacific strategy. This evolution is reflected in the 2025 update of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. By doing so, the paper highlights how Oceania has evolved from a peripheral consideration into an increasingly influential factor in Paris’s Indo-Pacific thinking, and illustrates some of the tensions within France’s Indo-Pacific strategy: the interconnection between grand strategy and domestic politics and the gap between ambitions and limited means.

Introduction

France’s distinctive feature in the Indo-Pacific is that it is the only European state with a substantial territorial presence across the region. It possesses several overseas territories and around 90 percent of its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is located in the Indo-Pacific, alongside approximately 1.6 million French citizens and more than 7,000 prepositioned military personnel stationed in La Réunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia. This sustained presence makes France a genuine “resident power” of the Indo-Pacific and constitutes a central source of legitimacy for its position as the first European country to adopt a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy in 2019.^[1]

A significant proportion of France’s overseas territories in the region is located in the South Pacific, which alone accounts for roughly 60 percent of its total EEZ. Despite this structural reality, Oceania (meaning the Pacific Islands nations, including Australia and New Zealand) initially remained relatively marginal in French strategic thinking, which tended to prioritize broader power projection narratives rather than the specific political and geopolitical dynamics of the South Pacific.

However, this imbalance has shifted. The 2025 French updated Indo-Pacific strategy places a much stronger emphasis on overseas territories as central pillars of France’s regional identity and influence. At the same time, strategy-oriented policy publications on Oceania have increased significantly, reflecting a growing recognition of the region’s strategic importance^[2]. This evolution indicates a gradual rebalancing of French strategic thinking, moving from a primarily declaratory Indo-Pacific vision toward a more territorially grounded approach that integrates the South Pacific more fully into France’s overall regional posture.

This article thus examines the two-way relationship between France’s Indo-Pacific strategy and developments in Oceania and highlights how Oceania has evolved from peripheral consideration into an increasingly influential factor in Paris’s Indo-Pacific policy thinking.

Oceania was not a priority in the initial years of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as the region was largely treated as secondary to major strategic hotspots and key partnerships, while overseas territories were primarily handled as domestic issues and recipients of a top-down strategy.

However, political, strategic, and geopolitical shifts in the region, ranging from the AUKUS deal and the growing Chinese presence in the area to renewed independence movements in French overseas territories, have progressively shaped and reoriented France’s approach.

As a result, Paris had to devote greater resources to Oceania, adopting a more balanced and comprehensive approach toward Pacific Island countries, while making stronger efforts to empower its overseas territories as co-constructors of, and beneficiaries from, the Indo-Pacific strategy. This evolution is reflected in the 2025 update of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Oceania as an Initial Afterthought in the French Indo-Pacific Strategy – 2019 – 2021

Oceania did not constitute a central priority within France’s Indo-Pacific strategy as articulated in 2018–2019.^[3] Rather, French strategic attention was predominantly directed toward major geopolitical hotspots and key regional partners, reflecting a hierarchy of interests shaped by hard security considerations, great-power competition and regional stability. In this context, Oceania appeared comparatively peripheral, despite the presence of French overseas territories.

Three main drivers of the Indo-Pacific strategy keep Oceania as a secondary theatre

This relative marginalization can be explained by the three main motivations underpinning France’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

First, France sought to maintain and reinforce its relevance in an emerging and increasingly contested global order. The Indo-Pacific concept itself had already been embraced by major powers such as the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, each promoting their own strategic visions for the region. For Paris, adopting an Indo-Pacific framework was therefore not only a matter of regional engagement but also a way to assert its status as a global power and a credible strategic actor. This ambition was closely tied to President Emmanuel Macron’s broader objective of restoring France’s international influence and shaping the norms of a future multipolar order, leading French policymakers to focus on interactions with other major and middle powers, rather than on smaller island states in Oceania.^[4]

Second, the need to respond to the growing challenges posed by China played a decisive role in shaping French priorities. As highlighted in successive National Strategic Reviews (2017 and 2022), China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, the expansion of its military capabilities, and the establishment of a large military base in Djibouti in 2017 were perceived as a destabilizing factor and a challenge to the rules-based international order.^[5] France’s Indo-Pacific strategy thus emerged partly as a hedging and balancing response to China’s rise, even though the French officials insisted on its inclusive and non-discriminatory nature. Consequently, French attention gravitated toward zones where Chinese power projection was most visible and potentially destabilizing, reinforcing the focus on maritime Asia rather than the Pacific Islands.

Third, the Indo-Pacific strategy also provided an opportunity for France to advance its economic and industrial interests, particularly in the defense sector. Strengthening partnerships with key regional actors such as India and Australia opened avenues for major defense contracts (in 2016, two major deals were signed to sell 12 submarines to Australia and 36 Rafale fighter jets to India)^[6] and deeper security cooperation. This dimension further contributed to prioritizing relationships with larger states possessing significant procurement capacities, to the relative detriment of smaller countries.

A Top-down Approach, Imposed on French Overseas Territories

Another important limitation of France’s early Indo-Pacific approach lies in the relatively marginal role attributed to its overseas territories. The formulation of the strategy largely followed a top-down logic, initiated and driven by the executive, particularly under the push of President Emmanuel Macron, with limited consultation of local actors in the Pacific.^[7] As a result, the perspectives, needs, and political sensitivities of these territories were insufficiently integrated into the broader strategic reflection.

This centralized approach reflects an enduring institutional divide within the French state apparatus. Overseas territories have traditionally been treated primarily as matters of domestic governance, falling under the authority of the Ministry for Overseas Territories, rather than as fully-fledged components of foreign and strategic policy. In the context of the Indo-Pacific strategy, this translated into a disconnect between France’s external ambitions and the internal management of its own territories.

The initial sidelining of overseas territories in the strategic design process has generated a number of tensions. It has contributed to frustrations among local stakeholders, who perceived Paris’s Indo-Pacific strategy as externally imposed and insufficiently attentive to local realities^[8].

This perception is further compounded by France’s complex historical legacy in the region. The creation of the Pacific Islands Forum was itself partly a response to French nuclear testing in the Pacific, and issues of decolonization and self-determination, particularly in New Caledonia, continue to shape regional attitudes toward France.^[9] As a result, any strategy that insufficiently integrates local perspectives or fails to acknowledge this historical context risks generating mistrust and limiting France’s ability to position itself as a legitimate and constructive stakeholder in Oceania.

A Defense and Security-based Approach, far from Oceania’s Main Priorities

Finally, the initial French Indo-Pacific strategy was predominantly driven by military and diplomatic considerations, and suffered from a limited interministerial, or genuinely whole-of-government, approach.

Key instruments of influence beyond defense and high diplomacy remained underutilized, most notably development policy. The mandate of the French Development Agency (AFD) in the Pacific was, at the time, relatively constrained, which limited France’s capacity to engage with Oceania outside of the perimeter of climate adaptation and mitigation.^[10]

As a result, Oceania was largely approached through two main lenses. On the one hand, it was integrated into France’s strategic partnership with Australia, which occupied a central place in Paris’s Indo-Pacific vision prior to the AUKUS rupture. On the other hand, Oceania appeared as a theater of operation for French sovereignty forces stationed in New Caledonia (1,650 personnel) and French Polynesia (1,180 personnel). French armed forces play a visible and often positively perceived role, particularly in providing regional public goods such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), also in coordination with partners such as Australia and New Zealand in the FRANZ mechanism^[11], and maritime surveillance, and the fight against illegal activities including Illegal Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing, also with Australia, New Zealand, as well as US forces through the “Pacific Quad” scheme and narcotrafficking.^[12] These missions contribute to France’s image as a security provider and a reliable partner. However, this security-centric approach also encounters structural limitations when applied to Oceania, as only three Pacific Island Countries (Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Fiji) possess military capabilities.

2021-2023 – Oceania comes to Fore: Turning Points and Tensions Question France’s Legitimacy and Credibility

The period 2021–2022 marked a clear turning point in France’s position in the Indo-Pacific, as both external strategic shocks and internal territorial dynamics increasingly challenged its influence and legitimacy.

Independence Moves in Overseas Territories Shake France’s Legitimacy

Political developments in France’s overseas territories intensified debates about the legitimacy of French sovereignty in the Pacific. In New Caledonia, a pro-independence government led by Louis Mapou was elected in July 2021, operating within a complex landscape marked by widening fragmentation between pro-independence and loyalist camps and compounded by internal divisions.^[13] In this polarised context, the third referendum on independence held in December 2021 was highly contested. Although France considered the referendum process in line with the Nouméa Accord on decolonisation, pro-independence leaders argued that the conditions for free and fair self-determination were not met.^[14] The vote was largely boycotted as it was held during customary mourning period among the Kanak population due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This divergence in interpretation has contributed to a prolonged institutional and political deadlock over the territory’s future.

This situation escalated further in 2024 when New Caledonia experienced a major outbreak of violence following proposed electoral reforms from Paris. The unrest that followed resulted in deaths, widespread arrests, the declaration of a state of emergency, and significant economic disruption.^[15] This crisis revealed the depth of political polarisation in the territory and further weakened trust between local actors and the French state.

A similar, although less confrontational, dynamic has emerged in French Polynesia. In May 2023, elections resulted in the victory of Moetai Brotherson and the pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira party. While his government does not advocate immediate independence, it explicitly supports a gradual transition toward sovereignty over the medium to long term. ^[16]

These developments have created increasing complexity in France’s regional diplomacy, as external relations is a shared competency between Paris and the Pacific territories. Both New Caledonia and French Polynesia are full members of the Pacific Islands Forum since 2016, while France itself holds only observer status. This asymmetry creates a situation in which French territories can directly participate in regional discussions on issues such as climate change, development, and maritime governance, sometimes expressing positions that differ from those of Paris. When territorial governments pursue political agendas that are not aligned with Paris, the coordination on external relations and regional strategy can become extremely difficult and conflictual.^[17] These difficulties in turn are hurting France’s reputation in the region.

AUKUS and France’s Credibility as an Indo-Pacific Security Player

France’s credibility as an Indo-Pacific power was significantly shaken by the announcement of the AUKUS agreement between Canberra, Washington and London in September 2021. This development constituted a major strategic shock for Paris, first because it led to Australia’s abrupt cancellation of its diesel-powered submarine contract with France’s Naval Group, in favour of nuclear-powered submarines co-developed with its partners. Second, this development was perceived in France as both a diplomatic betrayal and a serious failure of trust in defence-industrial cooperation.^[18] It exposed the fragility of France’s strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with Australia, and raised broader doubts about the reliability of France’s alignment with its traditional allies, including the United States and the United Kingdom in this specific context. This episode contributed to a broader perception that France’s role in the region was more limited than its official Indo-Pacific strategy suggested.

Beyond the immediate diplomatic fallout, AUKUS had structural consequences for France’s defence and industrial strategy. In response, Paris has sought to diversify its Indo-Pacific footprint, particularly by strengthening ties with Southeast Asian partners, which are seen as emerging markets for naval and security cooperation. Indonesia signed a deal in 2022 to purchase 42 French-made Rafale jets.

More broadly, AUKUS raised fundamental questions about France’s capacity to realistically exert meaningful influence in a region increasingly shaped by US–China competition.

The 2022 China-Solomon Security Deal and the Strategic Wake-Up Call for Oceania

In 2022, the security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands marked a major strategic turning point for Oceania and was widely interpreted as a wake-up call.^[19] The leak of this secret deal in March, followed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s unprecedented diplomatic tour across several Pacific Island states in May highlighted the rapid intensification of China’s presence in the region, through infrastructure investments and development financing under the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as its efforts to expand political influence.

This growing Chinese footprint has also been reflected in Beijing’s sustained pressure on Pacific states to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China.^[20] Several Pacific countries have already done so in recent years, including the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019, and more recently Nauru in 2024.

Concerns about Chinese influence have also extended to French territories in the Pacific, where debates over external influence and sovereignty have become more salient in political discourse. In this context, President Macron has repeatedly referred to what he describes as China’s “predatory” strategies in the Pacific, including in French Polynesia.^[21]

The new realization of the Chinese push in the region prompted a series of reaction from maritime democracies in the Indo-Pacific that intensified their Pacific engagement, starting with the US with a new strategy and a first-ever US-Pacific Island Countries Summit in September 2022^[22].

At the minilateral level, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) gathering the US, India, Japan and Australia, also began to develop more structured approaches to Pacific engagement, including initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) program launched in 2022, with a special focus on the region.^[23] These efforts reflect a broader shift toward more coordinated strategies among like-minded partners in response to China’s expanding role in the Pacific and provide impetus for France to also step up its engagement in the region.

2023-2025 – Adaptation of France’s strategy: an Enhanced and Comprehensive Approach to the Region

France has responded to the intensification of geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific by undertaking a multilayered reinvestment in Oceania, combining diplomatic, development, and security instruments in a more integrated approach. This strategy reflects a recognition that France’s influence in the Pacific can no longer rely solely on its sovereign territorial presence, but must instead be actively maintained through sustained engagement with regional states and institutions.

France’s Multilayered Reinvestment in Oceania

At the diplomatic level, France has significantly strengthened its institutional footprint in the Pacific. A key development has been the decision in 2023 to base the French Permanent Secretary for the Pacific, Véronique Roger-Lacan, in Nouméa (rather than in Paris before that), which reflects a shift toward embedding high-level diplomatic coordination directly within the region. France has also expanded its regional diplomatic presence, including the establishment of new embassies such as in Samoa in 2025 and the deployment of engaging diplomatic figures such as Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer in Vanuatu, to embody France’s everyday commitment.^[24]

These efforts were reinforced by President Emmanuel Macron’s regional visit in July 2023, which included stops in New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea, signaling a renewed political attention to Oceania.^[25] At this occasion, he announced the set-up of the Pacific Academy, an interministerial project designed to provide diversified training programmes in security, policing, and defence, extending cooperation beyond strictly military frameworks. Finally, in December that year, New Caledonia hosted the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM), further demonstrating its role as a platform for regional security.^[26]

Finally, France has also pursued the modernisation of its military equipment in the Pacific with ancient maritime patrol vessels being replaced by Oceanic Multimission Patrol Vessels (POMs), which will enhance the effectiveness of surveillance in the EEZ and Falcon-50 maritime patrol aircrafts by 2030.^[27] France also expanded flexible cooperation tools such as ship-riding agreements. These mechanisms allow personnel from partner countries to embark on French naval vessels, thereby enhancing interoperability, maritime surveillance, and operational cooperation across the region.

In parallel, France has also increased its development and economic engagement in the region, particularly through a strengthened role for the French Development Agency. The AFD has expanded its activities across the Pacific, including the establishment of two new offices in Papua New Guinea and Fiji in 2024.^[28] It promotes climate-related activities, and environmental security agenda, in close collaboration with regional actors, including multilateral Pacific Community and Pacific Island Forum.

Paris frames environmental challenges not only as ecological issues but as strategic and security concerns. This “securitization” of climate issues strongly resonates with vulnerable states, especially in the Pacific, where climate change is seen as an existential threat. This includes disaster risk reduction, sustainable resource management, and support for adaptation to climate change. By linking environmental security, development, and multilateral cooperation, France strengthens its legitimacy and appeal in the region.

France has also progressively shifted its strategy toward greater engagement with smaller and non-aligned regional partners. Rather than focusing only on major powers, France seeks to build a dense network of relationships with ASEAN countries, Pacific Island states, and Indian Ocean partners. In this context, France adopts a tailored approach, aligning its discourse with the priorities of regional actors, such as development, sovereignty, and stability, while avoiding confrontational rhetoric, particularly toward China. This flexibility allows France to engage partners that value strategic autonomy and are reluctant to choose sides.^[29]

Efforts to Empower Overseas Territories

During this period, a growing effort to empower overseas Pacific territories has been noticed. These are no longer seen merely as strategic footholds, but as actors in their own right, increasingly appropriating and shaping the Indo-Pacific concept. This is illustrated by the joint report issued in March 2023 by the Assembly of French Polynesia, in cooperation with New Caledonia, which assesses the impact of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy on Oceanian territories and provide recommendations.^[30]

Accordingly, efforts have been made to consult with the territories in preparation of the updated Indo-Pacific strategy published in July 2025.^[31] These consultations signal a shift toward a more realistic approach that integrates local stakeholders into strategic planning. Overseas territories are thus placed front and center in the new Strategy, not only as beneficiaries but as contributors to policy design.

French Pacific territories’ agency has also been reinforced through concrete measures, such as the presence of representatives from New Caledonia in French embassies across the region, and some high-level political engagement. For instance, when he visited the area in Summer 2023, President Emmanuel Macron invited, in an unprecedented move, Caledonian President Louis Mapou and Polynesian President Moetai Brotherson to join his visit to Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.^[32] This reflects a broader effort to strengthen their regional integration and neighborhood diplomacy, giving substance to a more decentralized and inclusive French presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Still, serious challenges remain

However, significant challenges remain that continue to undermine France’s position in Oceania. New Caledonia remains the most sensitive and unresolved issue, as the broader decolonisation process continues to generate deep political and historical tensions. Attempts to reach a new political compromise, including through the Bougival agreement^[33]of July 2025, have been rejected by the FLNKS, the key pro-independence party. Ongoing discussions and negotiations illustrate that the political situation remains highly fluid and that no durable consensus has yet been achieved regarding the future institutional status of the territory.^[34] In French Polynesia, the legacy of colonial rule, especially those of France’s nuclear testing, continues to fuel distrust and shape local political discourse.^[35]

More broadly, France continues to face structural political challenges in redefining the nature of its relationship with its Pacific territories. A central question remains how to develop genuine convergence between Paris and local governments in order to ensure effective coordination on shared competencies, particularly in areas such as foreign relations, security, and regional engagement. This difficulty is reflected in France’s participation in regional and international organisations, including the Pacific Islands Forum and the United Nations, where the coexistence of multiple political voices complicates the articulation of a coherent diplomatic position.^[36] As a result, France is increasingly confronted with the need to reinvent its partnership model and clarify the institutional status of its overseas collectivities within the broader Indo-Pacific strategy.

At the same time, new hybrid security threats have been reinforced in these territories, particularly around issues of foreign interference and disinformation. Recent reports by think tanks and strategic analysis institutions have highlighted growing attention to information manipulation and external influence operations in the Pacific, including narratives targeting France’s presence in its overseas territories.^[37] This adds an additional layer of complexity to France’s regional posture, as it must now address not only traditional geopolitical competition, but also informational and cognitive dimensions of influence in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific environment.

Conclusion

This chapter highlights how Oceania has evolved from a peripheral consideration into an increasingly influential factor in Paris’s Indo-Pacific thinking, and illustrates several key tensions within France’s Indo-Pacific approach. It reveals the interconnection between grand strategy and domestic political realities, particularly the fact that France’s Indo-Pacific presence is directly shaped by its overseas territories, whose political status remains somewhat contested. It also highlights the gap between France’s global strategic ambitions and the constraints of limited means, both in terms of military resources and diplomatic presence. Finally, it underscores the contrast between a comprehensive strategic vision of France as an Indo-Pacific power and the complex, often unstable local realities on the ground, where questions of sovereignty, legitimacy, and identity remain central.

To place this in a broader perspective, despite renewed diplomatic, economic, and security engagement in Oceania, France’s primary strategic focus remains more firmly anchored in the western Indian Ocean. This relative prioritisation reflects a combination of structural, geopolitical, and institutional factors that make the region both more accessible to French and European forces and more immediately consequential for French interests.

First, the western Indian Ocean offers a more established framework for cooperation with European partners, notably through EU maritime security initiatives and coordinated counter-piracy operations, facilitating burden-sharing and legitimising French engagement. Second, its proximity to the European continent, combined with the strategic importance of key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, highlighted by the conflict with Iran in early 2026, reinforces its centrality for France and broader European security. Third, India is a core partner for France in the Indo-Pacific, given their converging views on strategic autonomy and multipolarity, the breadth of bilateral cooperation, from critical minerals and technologies to maritime security, and the very significant defense industrial cooperation that structures the strategic trajectory of the partnership.^[38] This helps explain why strategic attention continues to prioritise this area over Oceania.

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Prévost, B. (2023)  “Moetai Brotherson : ‘Jeter les bases d’une autre relation’ ”, Tahiti Infos, July 31, available online at: https://www.tahiti-infos.com/Moetai-Brotherson-Jeter-les-bases-d-une-autre-relation_a218563.amp.html, accessed 5 May 2026.

Prime Minister of Australia (2023) Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement, Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, 20 May, available online at: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/quad-leaders-joint-statement, accessed 5 May 2026.

Reuters (2017) “Australia, India deals boost French arms sales to record 20 billion euros in 2016”,  The Express Tribune, 20 January, available online at: https://tribune.com.pk/story/1301746/australia-india-deals-boost-french-arms-sales-record-20-billion-euros-2016, accessed 5 May 2026.

Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (2022)  Revue nationale stratégique 2022,  Gouvernement français, November, available online at: http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/communiques_presse/revue-nationale-strategique-2022/, accessed 5 May 2026.

Senat (2023) La Stratégie Française pour l’Indo-Pacifique : des Ambitions à la Réalité, Rapport d’information n° 285, 25 January, available online at: https://www.senat.fr/rap/r22-285/r22-285_mono.html, accessed 5 May 2026.

Senat (2025) Audition de Mme Véronique Roger-Lacan, ambassadrice pour le Pacifique, Délégation Sénatoriale aux Outre-Mer, 18 December, available online at: https://www.senat.fr/travaux-parlementaires/office-et-delegations/delegation-senatoriale-aux-outre-mer/detail-actualite/default-de1a1089f291b124933d11c9a0d9670a.html, accessed 7 July 2026.

U.S. Embassy in Canberra (2022) FACT SHEET: Roadmap for a 21st-Century U.S.-Pacific Island Partnership, 20 September, U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Australia, available online  at: https://au.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-roadmap-for-a-21st-century-u-s-pacific-island-partnership/, accessed 5 May 2026.

Werkhäuser, N. (2025) “Living with the legacy of France’s nuclear weapons testing”, Deutsche Welle, 26 September,  available online at: https://www.dw.com/en/living-with-the-legacy-of-frances-nuclear-weapons-testing/a-74131800, accessed 5 May 2026.

Wyeth, G. (2026) “New agreement expands on the France-New Caledonia bougival accord”, The Diplomat, 26 January, available online at: https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/new-agreement-expands-on-the-france-new-caledonia-bougival-accord/, accessed 5 May 2026.

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^[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France (2025) The Indo-Pacific: a Priority for France,  available online.

^[2] Pina, C. (2026) “Stratégies Chinoises et équilibres de Puissance en Océanie Insulaire”, IRSEM,  Etude 133, available online; Comité d’études de Défense Nationale (2024) Revue Défense Nationale, L’Océanie, un Théâtre Sécuritaire en Indo-Pacifique?, 872, available online ; Pajon, C. (2022) “Two Shades of Blue: Europe and the Pacific Islands, Strategic Partners in the Indo-Pacific”, Ifri, available online.

^[3] Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, France (2018) 2030 French Strategy in Asia-Oceania. Towards an inclusive Asian Indo-Pacific Region, France Diplomatie, August,  available online.

^[4] Macron, E. (2017) Discours du Président de la République à l’ouverture de la conférence des Ambassadeurs, 29 August, Paris, available online.

^[5] Ministry for the Armed Forces, France (2017) Strategic Review of Defence and National Security 2017, October,  available online; Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (2022)  Revue nationale stratégique 2022,  Gouvernement français, November, available online.

^[6] Reuters (2017) “Australia, India deals boost French arms sales to record 20 billion euros in 2016”,  The Express Tribune, 20 January,  available online.

^[7] Bachelier, J., Pajon, C. (2023)“France in the Indo-Pacific: The Need for a Pragmatic Strategic Posture”, Focus Stratégique, Ifri, available online.

^[8] Leyral, M. (2021) “En Polynésie, Emmanuel Macron se pose en rempart contre l’influence chinoise dans le Pacifique“, Le Monde, 29 July,  available online.

^[9] Mohamed-Gaillard, S. (2022) “La Calédonie Dépasse la Calédonie: Ancrage Régional et Perspectives Internationales d’un Outre-mer français“, Asie Visions, Ifri, 22 December,  available online.

^[10] Senat (2023) La Stratégie Française pour l’Indo-Pacifique : des Ambitions à la Réalité, Rapport d’information n° 285, 25 January,  available online.

^[11] Through the FRANZ mechanism (named after the acronyms of the participating countries), established in 1992, France, Australia and New Zealand agreed to coordinate their responses to natural disasters by pooling logistical resources, information and response capabilities, when requested by affected countries. FRANZ is a civilian-led arrangement supported by defence forces and is regularly activated.

^[12] Pajon, C. (2025) “France’s Contributions to Pacific Maritime Governance”, East-West Center, Asia Pacific Bulletin, 729, 20 February, available online.

^[13] Comminsoli, Q. (2024) “Fractures in New Caledonia’s independence movement widen, uncertainty reigns”, The Diplomat, available online.

^[14] Fisher, D. (2022) “After Three Referendums, France Still Faces Major Challenges in New Caledonia”, The Strategist, ASPI,available online.

^[15] Les Décodeurs (2024) “New Caledonia: six questions to understand the current crisis”, Le Monde, 17 May,  available online.

^[16] Leyral, M. (2023) “French Polynesia: Independentists’ victory is first step toward a self-determination referendum”, Le Monde, 1st May,  available online.

^[17] Senat (2025) Audition de Mme Véronique Roger-Lacan, ambassadrice pour le Pacifique, Délégation Sénatoriale aux Outre-Mer, 18 December,  available online.

^[18] Pajon, C. (2021) “AUKUS, the Indo-Pacific, and France’s Role: Fluctuat nec Mergitur”, RIAC, available online.

^[19] Lyons, K., Wickham, D. (2022) “The deal that shocked the world: inside the China-Solomons security pact”, The Guardian, 20 April,  available online.

^[20] Julienne, M. (2026) “China’s Strategy Toward Pacific Island Countries: Countering Taiwan and Western Influence”, Ifri, 7 January, available online.

^[21] Milhiet, P. (2022) ”French Polynesia has its own China dream“, The Diplomat, 23 June, available online.

^[22] U.S. Embassy in Canberra (2022) FACT SHEET: Roadmap for a 21st-Century U.S.-Pacific Island Partnership, 20 September, U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Australia,  available online.

^[23] Prime Minister of Australia (2023) Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement, Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, 20 May,  available online.

^[24] He is very active on social media. Check his Twitter/X account,  available online.

^[25] Pajon, C. (2023a) “President Macron’s historic pacific visit: a signal of France’s regional step-up”, The Diplomat, 21 July, available online.

^[26] Pajon, C. (2023) “Reflecting on a decade of the South Pacific defence ministers meeting (SPDMM)”, Ifri, 23 November, available online.

^[27] Ministry for the Armed Forces, France (2023) Objectifs LPM 2024-2030 : Renforcer Notre Souveraineté dans les Outre-mer, 24 May, available online.

^[28] Agence française de développement (2023) Océan Pacifique : la France et le groupe AFD aux avant-postes pour le climat et la biodiversité, 8 September, available online.

^[29] Pajon, C. (2024) ”Macron is not giving up France’s role as a Pacific player”, Nikkei Asian Review, 4 August, available online.

^[30] Assemblée de la Polynésie Française (2023) Rapport de la Mission d’Information Portant sur l’Impact des Stratégies de la France dans l’Espace Indopacifique, sur les Collectivités Françaises du Pacifique, March.

^[31] Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, France (2025) France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – The Indo-Pacific: a Priority for France, France Diplomatie,  available online.

^[32] Prévost, B. (2023)  “Moetai Brotherson : ‘Jeter les bases d’une autre relation’”, Tahiti Infos, July 31, available online.

^[33] The accord negotiated in the town of Bougival by the French overseas territories minister and representatives from the territory’s six pro and anti-independence delegations involves the creation within the French Republic of a ”State of New Caledonia,“ enshrined in the Constitution, as well as a ”Caledonian nationality,“ which would be inseparable from French nationality. This would be a transitional step, preceding the full sovereignty sought by the pro-independence movement.

^[34] Wyeth, G. (2026) “New agreement expands on the France-New Caledonia bougival accord”, The Diplomat, 26 January, available online.

^[35] Werkhäuser, N. (2025) “Living with the legacy of France’s nuclear weapons testing”, Deutsche Welle, 26 September,  available online.

^[36] Senat (2025) Audition de Mme Véronique Roger-Lacan, ambassadrice pour le Pacifique, Délégation Sénatoriale aux Outre-Mer, 18 December.

^[37] Brady, A.M. (2024) “When China Knocks at the Door of New Caledonia”, ASPI Special report, 23 August, available online; Pantz, P.C. (2024) “Azerbaïdjan : une puissance (du) «Pacifique»? Anachronisme géopolitique et répercussion d’une escalade diplomatique avec la France”, RDN, 872.

^[38] Ahlawat, D., Lim, Y.H. (2026) “India–France convergence: redrawing the strategic map of the Indo-Pacific”, AIIA, 26 February,  available online.

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• The Indo-Pacific and the European Approaches to the Region