This chapter will look at the evolution of Germany’s position on and policy vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific. The focus will be on the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan and how Germany’s perception and policy has changed in the five plus years since the Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific were first published in September 2020. In contrast to some other countries, most notably the United States, the German government has declared to pursue an inclusive approach to the region. Moreover, the Guidelines were explicitly meant to be a building block for and contribution to an Indo-Pacific strategy of the European Union (similar to the Dutch approach).

While China has in no way become less important from the German perspective (economically, strategically and in terms of global order), the assessment of Beijing’s behavior and aspirations has become more critical over this period of time. At the same time, Taiwan has cautiously been “upgraded” as a partner.

The chapter will address the main factors that led to this evolution, namely changes in German domestic politics and in the geo-strategic and geo-economic environment. It will describe how this evolution (and its limits) manifested themselves in official documents and speeches.

 

Introduction

For the last three decades Germany’s policy in Asia was almost exclusively focused on the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). This was mostly due to China’s growing international role and economic weight as well as the strong engagement of German companies in this country. In comparison, other countries in the region received much less attention, be it politically, economically or in terms of diplomatic resources.

During these three decades China underwent significant changes, especially after Xi Jinping took over the highest positions in the Communist Party and the state (2012/13): Under his leadership the PRC formulated technological, geo-economic and geo-political aspirations much clearer and more openly than previous leadership generations. This also manifested itself in grand visions like the Belt and Road Initiative^[1] or the more recent “global initiatives”^[2] and in an overall more assertive and often coercive or even aggressive behavior in foreign and economic policy.

The goals of the Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific^[3](in short: Guidelines) published in early September 2020 were to diversify economic, political and other relations with the region, to strengthen partnerships with regional countries other than China and subsequently also to reduce (over-)dependencies on China. The German government had originally hesitated to embrace the concept of the Indo-Pacific promoted first by Japan, the United States, Australia, India, and also France, because this concept had been associated with the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China and the perceived efforts of the USA and some regional countries to contain the PRC and slow down or hinder its economic and political rise and technological progress.

Germany and the Netherlands published the documents on their respective approaches to the Indo-Pacific roughly at the same time, while France, namely the French Ministry of Defense, had published its own first strategy paper as early as 2018.^[4] Both, the German and the Dutch paper, were intended as building blocks for an Indo-Pacific strategy of the European Union (EU), which followed in the year 2021.

 

Three German Governments

Counting the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party Christian-Social Union (CSU) as one, Germany has usually been ruled by a coalition of either two or even three different political parties. Until spring 2025, when the present coalition government took office, this always meant that the positions of chancellor and foreign minister are filled by representatives of the two biggest parties in the coalition. Not surprisingly, this constellation does not always lead to an optimal synchronization and coordination in German foreign policy. Traditionally, Germany’s China policy has ultimately been decided by the chancellor.

 

Angela Merkel’s China Policy (2005 to 2021) – Steady, as She Goes

When the Guidelines were formulated and then published in early September 2020, Germany was governed by a grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Angela Merkel was already in the 15^th year of her chancellorship. During her four terms in office, she had pursued a steady China policy, visiting the country on an annual basis, usually with a big delegation of business representatives. She had initiated cabinet-to-cabinet consultations (Regierungskonsultationen) between Germany and the PRC which took place from 2011 onwards.^[5]

While gradual changes took place in the German perception of China after the Made in China 2025 document came out in 2015,^[6] these did not immediately lead to any drastic shifts in Germany’s overall China policy. Within German political and economic circles, however, more China-critical positions began to take hold even within Merkel’s own then ruling party CDU, for example on the question of allowing Chinese telecommunication companies like Huawei to be part of building the 5G network in the country (2019ff.).^[7] Moreover, in early 2019 the Federation of German Industries (BDI) published a position paper on China which called the PRC a “systemic competitor” for the first time.^[8] And at the EU-level, the March 2019 Strategic Outlook on China^[9] formulated a new triad for the EU’s relations with China, namely as a cooperation partner, a competitor and a systemic rival. However, this characterization was not incorporated in the German Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific.

After the publication of the Guidelines the German government made every effort to signal to the PRC that embracing the Indo-Pacific concept was not directed against any country and was inclusive of China. For example, for the first naval deployment – after an absence of 20 years – to the Indo-Pacific from August 2021 to early 2022, the German government had originally planned to include a port call in Shanghai – somewhat contradicting the stated purpose of this mission to support international law and in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the freedom of navigation. After some stalling, the Chinese side ultimately denied the request.^[10]

During the 16 years Angela Merkel held office Germany’s overall China policy remained dominated by strong economic (trade and investment) relations. China was mainly seen as a cooperation partner, and from 2014 onwards the relationship was officially called a “comprehensive strategic partnership”^[11]. The more critical German debate on China which unfolded after 2015 was certainly also fueled by the first Trump administration (2017-2021) in the United States: While the US-China strategic rivalry heated up, US pressure on “allies and friends” to fall in line with US restrictions on China increased during this period. This factor is also reflected in the Guidelines, which in several parts expressed “concern” about the growing tensions, but avoided taking sides.

 

The “Traffic Light Coalition”: SPD, Green Party and Liberal Party (2021-2024) – Strange Brew

After Germany held its regular general elections in October 2021, the new government consisted of three parties SPD, Greens and Liberals. The coalition treaty of these three parties announced that Germany would, for the first time ever, publish a China strategy paper. For describing Germany’s relations with China, the coalition document adopted the EU’s triad cooperation partner, competitor and systemic rival and stated that cooperation would be sought wherever possible on the basis of human rights and international law. It is also mentioned that Germany will seek transatlantic coordination on China and cooperate with other “like-minded” partners.^[12] The explicit mentioning of better transatlantic coordination was an expression of hopes that with the Biden administration a less coercive US policy vis-à-vis European countries and the EU including on China would return.

For the first time ever in such a coalition treaty, Taiwan is explicitly mentioned: The parties declare that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait was only to be altered in a peaceful way and if both sides agree. It also states that “within the framework of the EU’s one-China policy” Germany supports Taiwan’s issue-related participation in international organizations.^[13] The novelty here is that Taiwan was mentioned at all, while the statements as such did not constitute anything new.

The coalition treaty also devotes a relatively long paragraph to the Indo-Pacific region, building on the Guidelines and the Indo-Pacific strategy of the EU. It underlines strengthening cooperation with ASEAN and “value partners” like Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, as well as deepening the strategic partnership with India.^[14]

The coalition treaty was a manifestation of several factors that had led to a new risk awareness: the impact of the global COVID pandemic, the vulnerability of supply chains, the problem of economic over-dependencies and the “weaponization” of economic relations, not only by China, but also by the United States during the first Trump administration (2017-21).

During their term in government the three parties in the coalition displayed different positions on China. Broadly speaking, the SPD was divided with Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s pragmatic course in continuity with his predecessor Angela Merkel, on the one hand, and parts of his own party (especially in the German parliament) leaning towards a more critical stance, on the other. The Green Party, although in general China-critical, underlined the necessity of cooperating with China on global issues like climate change or biodiversity. And the Liberal Party which had arguably been the most China-skeptic, nevertheless opposed every action that could potentially limit the freedom of operation for German companies, including in the PRC. These differences resulted in a strange and inconsistent mix which ultimately was reflected in the China strategy paper, published in July 2023.^[15]

 

The Coalition-Government under Friedrich Merz (2025) – New Uncertainties, Harder Balancing Act

After the break-up of the traffic-light coalition at the end of 2024 and the ensuing general elections, a new coalition government was formed consisting of CDU/CSU and SPD. In this new coalition, which took office in May 2025, the chancellor and the foreign minister are from the same political party.

On the Indo-Pacific, the new coalition treaty echoes the goals of the previous government, mentioning again the “value partners” Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, but putting more emphasis on deepening the strategic partnership with India “on all levels” and including the support for a free trade agreement between EU and India.^[16]

For their China policy, the parties declare the willingness to cooperate with China “where it is in the German and European interest” and they plan to act self-confident and hold a clear and strong position where necessary. They acknowledge that due to China’s behavior “elements of systemic rivalry” had become more prominent. Therefore, Germany would strive to reduce one-sided dependencies and further pursue a policy of “de-risking”.^[17]

Again, Taiwan is at least mentioned in the coalition treaty, announcing that Germany would “continue to develop relations with Taiwan” on the basis of the one-China policy,^[18] but not mentioning Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.

 

Conclusion

Despite China undergoing dramatic changes in the years after 2012/13, these did not lead immediately to a visibly different China policy of the German government (or German business). However, a serious debate about how to deal with a more competitive and assertive PRC started after 2015. The Guidelines of 2020 still describe China mainly as a partner, albeit one that poses a challenge to some established international rules. With the incoming “traffic light coalition”, the tone vis-à-vis China becomes overall sharper and more straightforward, but due to differing positions within and between the parties and the persistent strong engagement of German companies in the PRC, China policy can only be described as an effort to have the cake and eat it too. Finally, the new German government under Friedrich Merz, while also quite critical of China’s internal developments and external behavior to start with, soon faced new uncertainties with a second Trump administration which proved to be even more destructive to the beleaguered international order and disruptive to global trade than his first presidency.

In the following two parts, we will analyze the evolution in Germany’s policy vis-à-vis China and Taiwan after the publication of the Indo-Pacific Guidelines. This is largely based on the annual progress reports issued by the German Foreign Office between 2021 and 2024. No such report was published in 2025 by the new coalition government with Chancellor Merz and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul. We will also consider diplomatic activities and military deployments by the consecutive German governments.

 

The PRC within the Framework of Germany’s Indo-Pacific Policy: Same, Same, only different

As outlined above, while the PRC was still mainly described as a cooperation partner in the 2020 Guidelines, the perception of China’s domestic development and foreign policy behavior in German political and economic circles had already taken a more critical turn in the five previous years.

The first Progress report on the implementation of the German Government guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region^[19] (in short: Progress Report) was published in September 2021, when the grand coalition under Chancellor Merkel was still in power. In this report, China is mentioned in several parts indirectly. The only direct mentioning refers to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI) between the EU and the PRC in December 2020.^[20] While the agreement is described in positive terms, it is pointed out that the ratification process in the European Parliament had been suspended because of China’s sanctions against European entities in March 2021. The indirect references all concern the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) and Germany’s efforts to support international law: A Note Verbale stating the legal position on the SCS was presented by France, the UK and Germany to the UN; the German frigate “Bayern” was deployed in the Indo-Pacific passaging through the SCS; and Germany flanked the establishment of a Group of Friends of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in New York.^[21]. The Progress Report 2022^[22] only mentions strengthening agricultural cooperation with China (and Vietnam) and promoting agriculture-related exports.^[23]Security cooperation with other countries in the region was continued. For example, two reconnaissance drones were handed over to the Philippine coast guard in June 2022.^[24]

Germany’s first ever National Security Strategy^[25] devoted one paragraph to China, which provides a concise summary of the official position at the time:

China is a partner, competitor and systemic rival. We have observed that rivalry and competition have increased in the past years. China is trying in various ways to remould the existing rules-based international order, is asserting a regionally dominant position with ever more vigour, acting time and again counter to our interests and values. Regional stability and international security are being put under increasing pressure and human rights are being disregarded. China makes deliberate use of its economic clout to achieve political goals. At the same time, China remains a partner without whom many global challenges and crises cannot be resolved. That is why we must grasp the options and opportunities for cooperation in these fields in particular.^[26]

A month later, the first ever China strategy^[27] of the German government followed (as had been stipulated in the coalition treaty). The 64-pages document covers all aspects of German-China relations. While adopting the triad of cooperation, competition and systemic rivalry as formulated by the EU in 2019 and acknowledging that the latter dimension has become more prominent, the paper strives to maintain an overall constructive tone. The Indo-Pacific is mentioned in this China strategy several times – partly describing the significance of the region for China, but also for the future global order, and partly stating goals and interests of Germany’s policy there, for example to protect public goods in the Indo-Pacific. It states that Germany will expand its security and military cooperation with close partners in the region and will continue temporary military deployments for safeguarding the rules-based international order.^[28] It also expresses support for the strategic discussion on EU Free Trade Agreements with countries in the region and with ASEAN. Germany also announced to flank engagement of German companies in the region by increasing high-level diplomatic visits.^[29] In terms of security policy, the German government expressed support for the ASEAN-led initiatives such as confidence building measures (CBMs) and military transparency, and also for the ASEAN-centered dialogue architecture. It offered cooperation on disarmament, arms controls and CBMs, including to China.^[30]

The Progress Report on the Indo-Pacific for 2023^[31] referred to the existing climate and energy partnership/dialogue with China.^[32] But the major event in 2023 was the resumed cabinet-to-cabinet consultation between Germany and the PRC (7^th meeting of its kind), which resulted in an agreement on a new climate and transformation dialogue to accelerate green transformation. In the Progress Report 2024^[33] China is mentioned several times in the preamble – specifically its expansive maritime claims in the SCS, the fact that the share of China in Germany’s trade with the region had been shrinking and that China exported dual use goods to Russia, thus supporting the war against Ukraine. Chancellor Scholz and Vice-Chancellor Habeck both visited China. A bilateral dialogue on sustainability took place for the first time. However, Germany also continued its assistance to the Philippines and Malaysia in maritime surveillance.

Overall, high-level visits to countries in the Indo-Pacific region were considerably increased during the years 2022 to 2025. Even after Russia invaded Ukraine, which directed most of the government’s attention (and resources) back to the European theatre, the engagement with the Indo-Pacific including military deployments was maintained. The war in Ukraine added to the already strained relations with China, since Beijing did not only not distance itself from Moscow, but directly and indirectly supported Russia’s warfare.

The strengthening of political relations and security cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners other than China was not matched by the same level of diversification in economic terms, however. German companies, especially the multinational ones, have not reduced their engagement with China. On the contrary, German direct investment in China reached a four-year high in 2025^[34] and the PRC was Germany’s biggest trading partner again, but with a growing trade deficit on Germany’s side.^[35] The trade and investment figures for 2025 can largely be attributed to the “Trump factor”. For the whole period following 2020, German business’s logic of diversification or “de-risking” has differed from the ideas of the government: Increasingly, big German companies produce “in China for China”.

The new government with Chancellor Merz, which had more or less adopted the critical position on China of the previous government, was confronted with a weak economy domestically and an even more unpredictable international environment with the second Trump administration. It is therefore not surprising that when Friedrich Merz travelled to China for the first time as German chancellor in February 2026, economic issues were at the top of his agenda. While Merz did raise critical issues like Chinese overcapacities, export controls and unfair competition, he also sought to strengthen bilateral cooperation. He called the relationship with China a “comprehensive strategic partnership” again^[36] – a description that had not been used since Merkel – and announced the next round of cabinet-to-cabinet meetings.^[37] In contrast, Foreign Minister Wadephul had made quite critical remarks on China’s ambitions in the SCS and on the situation in the Taiwan Strait in several public speeches during his visits to countries in the Indo-Pacific, and even during his (postponed) trip to China in December 2025.^[38] Both, Germany’s foreign minister and Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius visited several countries in the Indo-Pacific in early 2026, the latter travelling to Singapore, Japan and Australia with representatives of the German arms industry.^[39]

 

Taiwan in Germany’s Indo-Pacific Policy: Cautious Upgrade

German political circles (or media) did not devote a lot of attention to Taiwan (officially “Republic of China on Taiwan”) during the years 2008 and 2018. Between 2008 and 2015 cross-Strait relations were relatively stable after the Kuomintang (KMT) came back to power: Both sides established direct connections and negotiated more than 20 agreements. However, after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2016, the PRC, which perceives the DPP as the party promoting the island’s independence, not only stopped direct talks, discontinued tourism to and boycotted certain imports from Taiwan. Beijing also gradually intensified efforts to intimidate the island by demonstrating its military power around Taiwan and directing cyber-attacks as well as disinformation campaigns at the island, ultimately aiming at coercing Taiwan into submission.^[40]

On the German and European side there was no immediate response to these coercive measures. However, several developments brought Taiwan back on the German (and European) political radar after 2018. Reports on labor camps in Xinjiang, China’s response to the demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2019 and the outbreak of the global COVID pandemic in early 2020 all played a role. The events in Hong Kong and China’s forceful reaction demonstrated that the “one country, two systems” formula was not a reliable concept (which it never had been from the Taiwanese perspective anyway). During COVID Taiwan became a model for how to respond to such a pandemic. This crisis also showed (again) that Taiwan should be granted some kind of participation in the World Health Organization (WHO). Most importantly, the vulnerability of globalized supply chains became a big topic in economic and political circles as well as the broader public due to temporary lock-downs, e.g. of Chinese ports. The supply chain debate also included the realization of Taiwan’s significance as the world’s (almost) only supplier of the most advanced semiconductors. Thus, any direct military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan would have a massive impact on the global (including the German) economy. The other big factor drawing attention back to cross-Strait relations and Taiwan was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This event played out in two dimensions: On the one hand, it added urgency to the issue of supply chain security and how to reduce over-dependencies. On the other hand, parallels were drawn between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the situation between the PRC and Taiwan in light of Beijing’s repeated threats to unite Taiwan with the mainland by military force if necessary.

While the first Progress Report of 2021 does not mention Taiwan at all, exchanges and cooperation between Germany and the island were listed in the reports published in 2022, 2023 and 2024. For example, the Progress Report 2022 underlines that against the background of the COVID pandemic German Health Minister Lauterbach for the first time publicly advocated the inclusion of Taiwan in the WHO at the World Health Assembly in May 2022.^[41] Indirectly, the report criticizes the PRC for challenging the rules of the international order by raising the risk of an escalation in the Taiwan Strait. It repeats the statement that the status quo in the Strait can only be changed by peaceful means.^[42]

While Taiwan did not appear in Germany’s first National Security Strategy of June 2023, the China strategy paper published about a month later (July 2023) mentions Taiwan several times and devotes a paragraph to the island under the heading “one-China policy”. It repeats once again the positions as they had been formulated before: The one-China policy remains the basis for Germany. Diplomatic relations only exist with the PRC. With Taiwan, Germany maintains close and good relations in many areas and wants to expand these. Within the framework of the EU’s one-China policy Germany supports Taiwan’s issue-related participation in international organizations. A change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait can only happen peacefully and if both sides agree. And finally, a military escalation would also affect German and European interests.^[43] The document also mentions that it will pursue better working conditions for German political foundations and that their cooperation with Taiwan conforms with the one-China policy.^[44] In the context of “de-risking” the situation in the Taiwan Strait is raised as an example of the vulnerability of supply chains, especially semiconductors.^[45] Chinese disinformation campaigns are described as increasing globally, with Taiwan and Hong Kong cited as examples.^[46] German economic and technological interests in Taiwan are brought up in the context of trade and diversification. Taiwan is mentioned not only as an important trading partner, but also as a relevant site for German companies.^[47]

The Progress Report Indo-Pacific for 2023 mentions statements in support of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, this time specifically in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in September 2023.^[48] According to the report, statements in favor of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait were made by the German government on several occasions in consultations and in public, underlining that a military escalation would affect German and European interests.^[49] The report also notes that legal cooperation between Germany and “value partners” in the Indo-Pacific has increased after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.^[50] In this context, an “Arrangement on the Cooperation in the Area of Judicial Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters” is mentioned that was agreed on between Germany and Taiwan in March 2023. Intensification of cooperation also took place in science and research, with both sides agreeing to pursue exchanges on technological applications.^[51] This agreement was signed during a high-level visit which had not taken place since 1997: The German Minister for Education and Science Bettina Stark-Watzinger was the first German cabinet-level minister to travel to Taiwan in 26 years. While this is only mentioned briefly in the Progress Report without naming the minister,^[52] in the media this visit was called a “landmark”^[53] and “historic”^[54]. However, there was actually never any reason for cabinet members not to travel to Taiwan other than the anticipation of official protests (and maybe punitive measures) from the Chinese side. Therefore, this trip demonstrated to what degree exchanges with Taiwan have been intensified and have become more important in the last years.

The biggest project between Germany and Taiwan is an investment of the Taiwanese semiconductor giant TSMC in a chip factory in Dresden (Saxony), which was announced in August 2023.^[55] The plant is supposed to open in 2027. Intensive collaboration between Germany and Taiwan continues also in other technological sectors, including joint high-tech research projects.

The Progress Report in 2024^[56] mentions the first meeting of the German-Taiwanese Dialogue Platform which had been established in December 2023, and joint research projects on batteries. The support for Taiwan’s inclusion in WHO was repeated by the German Health Minister at the WHA. Again, one of the more significant events is not mentioned explicitly in the report: The German frigate “Baden-Württemberg” and a supply ship sailed through the Taiwan Strait during their deployment in the Indo-Pacific in 2024.^[57] As was to be expected, China called this action a provocation and filed official complaints.^[58]

As mentioned above, no progress report was published in 2025. However, under the new coalition government and Chancellor Merz, exchanges with Taiwan continued. While no German cabinet member visited Taiwan, Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim gave an interview to Germany’s state television ARD after delivering a speech in the European Parliament and transited through Germany in October 2025, and in the following month, former President Tsai Ing-wen spoke at the Berlin Freedom Conference.^[59]

 

Conclusions

The German approach to the Indo-Pacific as formulated in the Guidelines was explicitly meant as a building block for the EU to go forward with an Indo-Pacific strategy. The goal of diversifying and strengthening relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific other than China has been somewhat successful in terms of diplomatic exchanges, high-ranking visits and security cooperation. However, so far, the results on the goal of economic de-risking leave much to be desired.

China has remained one of the most important economic partners for the German economy in terms of trade and investment, and it is still seen as an indispensable partner for tackling global issues like climate change, biodiversity and disarmament. Despite German efforts to keep communication between both sides open and to promote cooperation, the visits of Chancellors Scholz and Merz made clear that China’s leadership, despite all their rhetoric on protecting free trade etc., is not really willing to compromise on substance.

Taiwan, which has always been a significant economic partner for Germany, has been upgraded in terms of cooperation and exchanges since 2021 and the island has attracted more attention in the German media and public than in the years before. German politicians have become more outspoken on the situation in the Taiwan Strait and in support of Taiwan’s functional participation in international organizations, especially the WHO. However, this development has not changed the underlying framework of the one-China policy, which still is the basis for the relations between Germany and Taiwan. Therefore, Germany still acts well within limits that should ultimately be acceptable to Beijing.

Meanwhile, the EU has recently finalized Free Trade Agreements in the Indo-Pacific with India, Australia – maybe both with a little help of the current unpredictable US trade policy – and Indonesia and it continues to negotiate with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.^[60] The EU has also started a dialogue about closer cooperation with CPTPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.^[61] To support economic de-risking, the German government (during the “traffic light coalition”) has expanded its investment guarantees to several countries in the Indo-Pacific (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam), while limiting these guarantees for China.^[62] Whether these instruments and measures will really lead to a substantive diversification and reduction of over-dependencies of German companies in the future remains to be seen.

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^[1] For a more recent article on the Belt and Road Initiative see McBride, J., Berman, N., Chatzky, A. (2023) “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”, Council of Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 2 February, available online.

^[2] There are now four global initiatives are: Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022), Global Civilization Initiative (2023) and Global Governance Initiative (2025). See e.g. Awan, Z.A. (2025) “China’s visionary global initiatives: building a shared future for humanity”, People’s Daily Online, 24 December, available online.

^[3] Federal Foreign Office,  Germany (2020) Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Germany – Europe – Asia. Shaping the 21^st Century Together, The Federal Government, Berlin, available online.

^[4] Ministère des Armées (2018) France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, 2018 edition – updated in May 2019, available online.

^[5] A joint declaration was published as a result of these first cabinet-to-cabinet consultations. (in German only): Generalkonsulat der Volksrepublik China in Frankfurt a. Main (2011) “Gemeinsame Erklärung Anlässlich der 1. Deutsch-Chinesischen Regierungskonsultationen in Berlin”, 29 June, available online.

^[6] This document formulated ambitious goals for ten industry sectors like robotics and AI in which China aimed at achieving global market leadership by the year 2025. See for example Wübbeke, J. et al. (2016) Made in China 2025. The Making of a High-Tech Superpower and Consequences for Industrial Countries, Merics Papers on China, (2), December, available online.

^[7] See for example Barkin, N. (2019) “The Huawei conundrum”, Berlin Policy Journal, March/April, available online.

^[8] BDI (2019) Partner and Systemic Competitor –How Do We Deal with China’s State-Controlled Economy? , January, available online.

^[9] European Commission and HR/VP contribution to the European Council (2019) EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, 12 March, available online.

^[10] Deutsche Welle (2021) “China denies port visit by German warship”, Deutsche Welle, 15 September, available online.

^[11] Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in New York (2014) “China, Germany Establish Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, 29 March, available online.

^[12] SPD (2021) Mehr Fortschritt wagen. Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit. Koalitionsvertrag 2021-2025 zwischen der SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/Die Grünen und FDP, 23 November, available online, 124.

^[13] Ibidem.

^[14] Ibidem, 125.

^[15] English version Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2023) Strategy on China of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 13 July, available online.

^[16] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2025) Verantwortung für Deutschland. Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 6 May, available online, 128.

^[17] Ibidem.

^[18] Ibidem.

^[19] The Federal Government, Germany (2021) Progress Report on the Implementation of the German Government Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region, 6 September, available online.

^[20] Ibidem.

^[21] Ibidem.

^[22] The Federal Government, Germany (2022) Progress Report on the Implementation of the German Government Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region in 2022 (Progress Report Indo-Pacific 2022), September, available online.

^[23] Ibidem, 10.

^[24] Ibidem, 7.

^[25] The Federal Government, Germany(2023) Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany, National Security Strategy, June, available online.

^[26] Ibidem, 23.

^[27] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2023) Strategy on China of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 13 July, available online.

^[28] Ibidem, 50.

^[29] Ibidem, 51.

^[30] Ibidem, 57.

^[31] The Federal Government, Germany (2023) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2023, 22 September, available online.

^[32] Ibidem, 3.

^[33] The Federal Government, Germany (2024) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the Year 2024, 25 September, available online.

^[34] The Business Times (2025) “German firms’ investments in China boomed in 2025 on US trade war worries”, The Business Times, 27 January, available online.

^[35] Statistisches Bundesamt (2026) China im Jahr 2025 Wieder Wichtigster Handelspartner Deutschlands, 20 February, available online. According to this source, this was also the case between 2016 and 2023. In 2024, Germany’s biggest trading partner was the US.

^[36] The Federal Government, Germany (2026) We Want a Partnership with China, 26 February, available online.

^[37] Interesse, G. (2026) “Germany-China Relations Under Merz: What the First Official Visit to Beijing Means for Business”, China Briefing, 13 March, available online.

^[38] See e.g. Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2025) Speech by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul at the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia in Jakarta, 20 August, available online. On his visit to China see Buckenmaier, C., Kirchner, R. (2025) “ ‘Wadephul in China’ der deutsche balanceakt in der Volksrepublik”, Tagesschau, 10 December, available online.

^[39] Reuters (2026) “German defence minister to visit Indo-Pacific with arms firms”, 18 March, available online.

^[40] For an in-depth analysis of China’s gray zone activities see e.g. Grossman, D. (2025) The Chinese Communist Party’s Gray Zone Tactics Against Taiwan, Global Taiwan Institute, March, available online.

^[41] The Federal Government, Germany (2022) Progress Report on the Implementation of the German Government Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region in 2022 (Progress Report Indo-Pacific 2022), 9.

^[42] Ibidem, 1.

^[43] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2023) Strategy on China of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 13.

^[44] Ibidem, 23.

^[45] Ibidem, 25.

^[46] Ibidem, 43.

^[47] Ibidem, 51.

^[48] The Federal Government, Germany (2023) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2023, 3.

^[49] Ibidem, 5.

^[50] Ibidem, 7.

^[51] Ibidem, 10.

^[52] Ibidem, 1.

^[53] Deutsche Welle (2023) “German minister makes landmark visit to Taiwan”, Deutsche Welle, 21 March, available online.

^[54] Wu, P., Madjar, K. (2023) “German minister leads historic visit to Taiwan”, Taipei Times, 22 March, available online.

^[55] Silicon Saxony (2023) “Germany shows Europe the way – 20 billion Euro funding commitment moves the semiconductor industry”, 10 August, available online.

^[56] The Federal Government, Germany (2024) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the Year 2024, 25 September, available online.

^[57] See Legarda, H. (2024) “The German navy wades into the waters of the Taiwan Strait”, MERICS, 25 September, available online.

^[58] Liang, X. (2024) “PLA slams Germany for sailing ships through Taiwan Strait, citing ‘security risks’ ”, South China Morning Post, 14 September, available online.

^[59] Taiwan Today (2025) “Berlin Freedom Conference welcomes former president Tsai’s speech”, Taiwan Today, 18 November, available online.

^[60] European Commission (n.d.) Negotiations and Agreements, available online. In previous years, the EU concluded FTAs with South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, New Zealand, Samoa and Papua New Guinea. See ibidem.

^[61] European Commission (2025) Joint Ministerial Statement from the EU and the CPTPP at the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference, 27 March, available online.

^[62] AHK (2023) German Federal Government Investment Guarantees for Diversification Targets, 3 December, available online.