Since the implementation of a national Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, France has relied primarily on two pillars to support its ambitions in the region. First, as a resident power, the exercise of sovereignty over its overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans remains the cornerstone of the French strategy. Second, Paris has developed key bilateral partnerships with “like-minded” countries – historically India, the United States (US), and Japan – and more recently complemented by growing engagement with Southeast Asian nations. While the concept of “like-mindedness” in international relations is currently subject to critiques, often exacerbated by unilateral actions of the US, it has historically been used as a framework for building flexible international partnerships rooted in shared values, objectives, or institutional mechanisms. French diplomacy has repeatedly relied on this paradigm to advance its diplomatic engagement in the Southeast Asian region, promoting dense, specific, and complementary bilateral partnerships. For Paris, effectively harnessing “like minded” bilateral partnerships is central to advancing regional ambitions, particularly in asserting European leadership on Indo-Pacific dynamics. In this context, Italy’s growing interest and engagement in the region could provide a significant asset, supporting broader European Union engagement in Southeast Asia.

Introduction

On 2 May 2018 in Australia, the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, formally articulated a new geopolitical framework: France’s Indo-Pacific strategy.^[1] Since then, the President and the relevant French authorities have consistently referred to this concept when addressing geopolitical developments in Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean. What does this concept entail and why has it gained such prominence in contemporary international relations?

Geographically, the Indo-Pacific refers to a vast maritime and continental space spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans and their littoral states, accounting for nearly 235 million square kilometres, or 64 percent of the world’s oceans. But beyond this spatial definition, the Indo-Pacific is above all a strategic construct that reflects and reshapes the balance of power among regional and extra-regional actors.^[2] While the term itself is not new – having been theorised as early as the early twentieth century by Karl Haushofer and later used in various institutional contexts^[3] – it experienced a revival in 2007 under the impetus of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.^[4] Subsequently, it has been widely adopted and adapted by key actors including India, the United States (US), and Australia, each projecting its own strategic priorities onto the concept.^[5]

Under the leadership of President Macron, France rapidly embraced the concept and developed a distinctive vision, grounded in its “resident power” status. Indeed, Paris possesses unique sovereign assets across the Indo-Pacific, with overseas territories located at both ends of the region: in the Pacific, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton Island; and in the Indian Ocean, Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (see Figure 1). The exercise of sovereignty over these territories grants France the world’s second-largest maritime domain after the US, with an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of nearly 11 million square kilometres. Approximately 93 percent of this EEZ lies within the Indo-Pacific and holds considerable energy, mineral, and biological potential. This territorial presence is complemented by a permanent military footprint of approximately 8,000 personnel, supported by a network of forward-deployed bases enabling sustained power projection. In the post-Brexit context, France remains the only European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, strengthening its claim to act as both a national and European stakeholder in regional security dynamics.

Figure 1 – The French overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific (source: the author).

Leveraging these assets, Paris has pursued an increasingly proactive diplomatic strategy across the Indo-Pacific. At the multilateral level, France is a member of key regional organisations – such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Indian Ocean Commission, and the Pacific Community – and has increased its visibility through partnerships and high-level visits, as illustrated by President Macron’s keynote address at the 2025 Shangri-la Dialogue.^[6] At the bilateral level, France has traditionally prioritised strategic partnerships with major Indo-Pacific powers, including India, the US and Japan. However, ongoing geopolitical reconfigurations have prompted Paris to elevate Southeast Asia’s strategic importance and deepen its engagement on concrete issues – a new subregional policy some observers describe as the French Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) pivot.^[7]

Underpinning this new strategic posture is the notion of “like-mindedness” which has emerged as a framework for building flexible international partnerships.^[8] Originally discussed in the 1980s by Scandinavian countries,^[9] the notion refers in international relations to ad hoc collaborations based on shared values, objectives, or institutional affinities.^[10] Its purpose is to establish collective mechanisms to address contemporary challenges while managing complex relationships with a wide range of actors. In this sense, “like-minded” partnerships are best understood as instruments of a milieu grand strategy^[11] – aimed not at countering a specific rival, but at shaping a cooperative international environment through shared norms and institutionalised ties. In practice, these partnerships tend to be more transactional than ideological, fostering diversified engagements across different blocs and sectors.^[12]

French diplomacy has repeatedly relied on the “like-minded” framework to advance its engagement in Southeast Asia.^[13] However, this bilateral activism confronts a deeper structural challenge: as geopolitical competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific, how can France leverage its partnerships in Southeast Asia to assert its role as a European leader and contribute to a coherent EU strategy in the region?

To address this question, the article first examines and assesses Paris’s growing bilateral relations in Southeast Asia, establishing a typology of France’s partnerships structured around three categories (I). It then considers the challenges of translating these bilateral relations into a more coherent and visible European strategy. From this perspective, the combined engagements of France and Italy in Southeast Asia could serve as a catalyst for broader EU-ASEAN cooperation (II).

A French Pivot to Southeast Asia?

France’s influence in Southeast Asia first developed in the early nineteenth century, driven by a triple ambition:^[14] religious, through the agency of Catholic missionaries; commercial, in pursuit of new markets and diversified supply chains; and strategic, in a context of colonial rivalry in which the United Kingdom was consolidating its own regional foothold. Seeking commercial access to Southern China, France’s exploration policy along the Mekong and then the Red River led to the progressive colonisation of the entire Indochinese peninsula: Cochinchina became a colony in 1862, the Kingdom of Cambodia a protectorate in 1863, followed by Annam and Tonkin in 1884, the Chinese enclave of Guangzhouwan in 1898, and finally Laos in 1899. Marginalised in the aftermath of the First Indochina War (1946-1954) and the debacle of Dien Bien Phu, France would wait nearly half a century before reformulating regional ambitions.

In the wake of the American “pivot to Asia” elaborated by the Barack H. Obama administration in 2011, French diplomacy outlined its own “French pivot to Asia” as early as 2013. From 2018 onwards, President Macron formalised a French Indo-Pacific strategy in which Southeast Asia was identified as a priority region. Situated at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, it constitutes the geographic and economic core of the Indo-Pacific, where France’s most significant strategic and commercial interests converge. ASEAN also represents a key economic and diplomatic partner and a lever through which Paris seeks to promote a multipolar international order. However, given ASEAN’s limited effectiveness in high politics, France has primarily sought to exercise its influence at the bilateral level.

A Typology of France’s Bilateral Relation in Southeast Asia

France’s bilateral relations within Southeast Asian countries are characterised by varying degrees of density, diversification, and specificity. For the purposes of this analysis, three categories can be identified, ranging from the “first circle” (most developed) to the “third circle” (most modest) (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 – France in Southeast Asia: “Three circles” of bilateral relations (source: the author, created with Datawrapper)

Countries	Total Trade ( in millions of euros)	Balance
Singapore	10230	4912
Vietnam	8507	-5467
Thailand	4986	-1978
Malaysia	4263	-1422
Indonesia	3282	-1628
Philippines	1896	92
Cambodia	1483	-1233
Myanmar	387	-313
Brunei	166	1160
Laos	56	-33
Timor Leste	3	NC
Total	35335	-5910

Table 1 – France’s Economic Relations with ASEAN Countries (2024)^[15] (source: the author^[16])

The first circle comprises France’s most important partners in the region – Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia – as illustrated by President Macron’s diplomatic tour of ASEAN in May 2025.

Singapore stands as France’s principal economic partner in Southeast Asia. The relationship is characterised by strong global connectivity – particularly in maritime affairs, technology, and the digital economy – as well as shared emphasis on technological excellence. Nearly 1,000 French company subsidiaries operate in the city-state, spanning virtually all sectors, with particularly strong positions in aerospace, shipping, electronics, finance, insurance, and business services. Singapore accounts for more than two-thirds of all French investments in Southeast Asia and is France’s largest investment destination in the region after the US. In 2024, as France and Singapore celebrated 60 years of diplomatic relations, both countries upgraded their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, the first of its kind between Singapore and a European power. The CSP covers key areas such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, green finance, and digital transition.

Vietnam occupies a distinctive place in this first circle, combining a shared historical legacy with a deepening process of reconciliation and robust economic cooperation. In 2024, for the first time, a French Defence Minister – Sébastien Lecornu – was invited to Dien Bien Phu to commemorate the 70^th anniversary of the battle, marking a symbolic milestone in bilateral reconciliation.^[17] Economically, the relationship remains substantial, with Vietnam being France’s second-largest economic partner in the region. France aims to expand its involvement in Vietnam’s modernisation trajectory, at a time when Hanoi faces the combined challenges of American trade pressures and China’s predominant economic influence.

Indonesia represents a partnership of growing strategic depth, driven by defence cooperation and major recent arms contracts (notably Rafale fighter jets and Scorpène-class submarines), but increasingly extending into a broader political dialogue. A strategic partnership was formalised in 2011 between the two countries, and the momentum has continued in recent years. In 2025 alone, the port call of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in Lombok, the official visit of Emmanuel Macron to Jakarta, and the invitation of Prabowo Subianto as guest of honour at the Bastille Day celebrations stand as testament to the ever-growing ties between France and Indonesia. Beyond symbolism, this reflects a dynamic convergence across military, economic, and diplomatic domains. For Indonesia, France – as a European partner and a permanent member of the UN Security Council – offers a credible lever for strategic diversification, consistent with Jakarta’s traditional non-aligned posture. In this respect, President Macron’s emphasis on strategic autonomy resonates strongly with Indonesia’s bebas aktif doctrine.^[18]

The second circle brings together partners whose relationships with France are significant but less developed, and whose trajectories vary considerably.

Malaysia was once a key partner for France in the region – particularly in the field of defence, marked by the completion of major contracts for Scorpène-class submarines and A400M aircraft – but the bilateral partnership has gradually declined. This downturn has been driven by frictions over palm oil taxation, controversial statements by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad after a terrorist attack in Nice, and a defence relationship that failed to live up to its initial ambitions. This erosion was reflected in Malaysia’s notable omission from President Macron’s 2025 ASEAN tour.^[19]

By contrast, the Philippines has emerged as a rising partner in both defence and strategic terms. This evolution is reflected institutionally through the appointment of a French defence attaché in Manila in 2025 and an armament attaché (relocated from Kuala Lumpur to Manila), and increased defence cooperation, particularly in the maritime security domain. France’s growing role as a supplier of defence equipment – most notably the sale of 40 patrol vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard – illustrates this upward trajectory.

Thailand remains an important partner for France, albeit of a different nature. The country is France’s oldest partner in the region, as the first diplomatic missions between the kingdoms of Siam and France were initiated 340 years ago.^[20] More recently, President Macron was the first European leader to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Thailand in 2022. The bilateral relationship is underpinned less by defence cooperation than by strong people-to-people and economic ties, particularly in tourism, with nearly 800,000 French tourists visiting Thailand each year.

Thailand’s regional environment inevitably brings Cambodia into focus. Indeed, the territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, which has escalated into a war in 2025, traces its origins in the colonial policy of French Indochina, as well as in the Franco-Siamese treaties of 1904 and 1907. While Cambodia does not offer the same economic opportunities as its Thai or Vietnamese neighbours, it remains a francophone state where a significant portion of the political and administrative elite – including the monarch – retains strong ties to the French language and culture. This is reflected in Cambodia hosting the Francophonie Summit in November 2026, an event President Macron will attend.

A third circle can be identified, comprising more limited bilateral relationships which nonetheless should not be overlooked.

Laos, a former French colony and member of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), remains a country where France maintains privileged ties. French influence persists primarily in the fields of culture, heritage preservation, and tourism, notably through Francophonie-related initiatives. However, France’s role in Laos is now largely cultural and diplomatic rather than economic, as regional Asian actors have gained increasing influence.

Myanmar also falls within this third circle. France and Myanmar have maintained diplomatic relations since 1948, with economic ties intensifying during the 2010s alongside the country’s gradual political opening, particularly through the presence of French multinational TotalEnergies. Following the February 2021 coup d’état, France strongly condemned the ruling military junta. In January 2022, TotalEnergies withdrew from Myanmar, citing worsening human rights abuses. While political relations appear severed for the time being, France has, like other states and international organisations, appointed a Special Envoy for Myanmar, reflecting efforts to maintain a channel of communication amid persistent political and humanitarian crises.

Brunei represents another limited case of engagement for France in the region. French influence in the country was long linked to the presence of TotalEnergies since 1987, but the French multinational sold its Brunei subsidiary in 2024 as the offshore field had become no longer profitable enough to keep in its portfolio. Since then, bilateral interaction has been modest, although naval port calls by French vessels continue to provide a minimal yet symbolic form of engagement.^[21]

Finally, we have to consider Timor-Leste, the latest country to have joined ASEAN in October 2025. While current French engagement remains limited, as a small insular nation located at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it holds strategic relevance as a potential bridge between France’s overseas territories. France previously held significant economic interests in the country, notably through Bolloré Group’s involvement in the construction of the main deep-water port, later subcontracted to a Chinese operator and subsequently sold to Italo-Swiss MSC.

Ultimately, it will be instructive to assess whether the forthcoming regional engagements of France confirm our broader typological hypothesis regarding the evolving hierarchy and differentiation of France’s partnerships within ASEAN.

Assessing French Strategy in Southeast Asia

Beyond bilateral diplomatic activism, the French government – aware of the inherently malleable nature of the Indo-Pacific concept – regularly complements its national strategy and bilateral engagement with normative attributes to reinforce its strategic narrative and enhance its credibility. President Macron thus pairs France’s Indo-Pacific ambitions with a distinct strategic grammar:^[22] upholding an international order governed by the rule of law, rejecting bloc-based rivalries, promoting strategic autonomy for both Europe and Asian nations, and respecting all national sovereignties without double standards. Through this framework, Macron consistently presents France and Europe as a “force for peace and equilibrium”, repeatedly advocating for a distinctive and inclusive French “third way” in the region through the formation of “coalitions of independents” founded on sovereignty, transparency and open exchange.

Behind these signature concepts lies a fundamentally clear message: remaining free from Chinese coercion, while avoiding systematic alignment with the US. This positioning, widely interpreted as a Gaullist legacy, is frequently criticised in the West, yet well understood across Southeast Asia, where most countries maintain economic ties with China being a too significant partner to risk openly siding with Washington. In this regard, Macron’s vision of a “third way” and “strategic autonomy” resonates with the non-alignment, or even multi-alignment, approaches adopted by some ASEAN states.^[23]

In short, France in Southeast Asia is welcomed and listened to, but not necessarily awaited. Sustaining this presence therefore requires permanent diplomatic activism. More fundamentally, France faces the challenge of translating its dense and differentiated network of bilateral relationships into a more coherent and visible regional strategy – an objective that lies at the heart of its renewed Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly in the context of deepening EU-ASEAN institutional engagement.

Building on Bilateral Relations to Foster EU-ASEAN Cooperation

Since launching its national Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, France has consistently sought to play a leading role within the EU on Indo-Pacific affairs, with its diplomats actively lobbying in Brussels for a collective European regional approach. This effort paid off when the EU published its own Indo-Pacific strategy in September 2021^[24] – an outcome widely interpreted in Paris as a significant diplomatic victory. Building on this momentum, French diplomacy leveraged its Presidency of the EU Council in 2022 to organise the first ministerial forum for Indo-Pacific cooperation,^[25] bringing together European institutions, foreign ministers – or their representatives – from all 27 EU member states, and delegates from around thirty Indo-Pacific nations.

This European vocation remains central in the French narrative, confirmed by the latest update of the French Indo-Pacific strategy, published in July 2025, in which supporting the EU’s strategy in the region figures among France’s four core objectives.

This alignment between French and European priorities finds its most tangible expression in a shared commitment to regional multilateralism – one that necessarily implies stronger ties with ASEAN and support for its centrality in the Indo-Pacific architecture. This ambition has already taken concrete institutional form: the EU and ASEAN elevated their relationship to a “strategic partnership in 2020”, and their complementary strengths offer significant opportunities to deepen economic ties and address shared challenges such as climate change and digital transformation. Enhanced cooperation between the two blocs would also reduce vulnerability to unilateral pressure from China and the US, providing a more balanced multilateral framework. In this sense, the “coalition of independents” envisioned by President Macron at the Shangri-la Dialogue could evolve into a durable “Euro-ASEAN way”.

Persistent Challenges to Wider European Cohesion

However, the EU’s Indo-Pacific ambitions confront several structural obstacles that limit their translation into collective European action.^[26] EU member states frequently pursue competing national agendas in Southeast Asia, generating confusion among regional partners about Europe’s strategic priorities and capacity to act as a unified actor.^[27] Without stronger internal alignment, Europe risks undermining the very principle of strategic autonomy it seeks to promote. Furthermore, recent geopolitical developments such as the war in Ukraine and instability across the Middle East have further diverted European political attention and defence resources away from the Indo-Pacific. Finally, Europe’s persistent reliance on the US as its primary security guarantor exposes it to external policy shifts that may not align with European interests, and its considerable economic and normative weight will prove insufficient so long as it lacks the strategic agency to act independently in the region.

While adopting a fully unified European position remains a complex undertaking, bilateral cooperation within the EU offers promising avenues for broader intra-regional engagement and greater strategic clarity. In this regard, the Franco-Italian partnership in the Indo-Pacific presents considerable assets that should not be overlooked.

A Case for Wider Franco-Italian Cooperation in the Region

Franco-Italian partnership in the Indo-Pacific represents a natural and underexplored avenue for European strategic consolidation in the region. While Italy is not a resident power, it has actively engaged with the Indo-Pacific through trade, defence procurement, and naval deployments, positioning itself as a meaningful – if still emerging – contributor to European regional presence.^[28] Rome’s interest in the Indo-Pacific is further shaped by its broader Mediterranean enlargement strategy,^[29] reflecting a distinctly Italian geopolitical sensibility that seeks to connect its near abroad with more distant theatres. Significantly, although Italy has yet to publish a formal Indo-Pacific strategy – having thus far only released a document outlining its contribution to the EU’s regional approach^[30] – the Italian Chamber of Deputies has concluded a series of auditions intended to guide Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and the Government toward a more comprehensive strategic framework, signalling growing institutional momentum.^[31]

Regarding the Indo-Pacific, and particularly Southeast Asia, France and Italy are more complementary than competitive. At the security level, both countries possess the most capable naval forces within the EU, with a proven record of collaboration in regional security operations (Atalanta and Aspides), and a recently expanded reach in the Indo-Pacific – notably through successive deployments: the ITS Cavour in 2024, and the Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group in 2025. Politically, drawing on a previous analytical framework,^[32] any Italian Indo-Pacific strategy would logically rest on pillars that closely mirror French priorities: (1) upholding the primacy of international law and regional stability; (2) advancing a broad conception of the Indo-Pacific that links Italy’s enlarged Mediterranean vision with France’s sovereign presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans; (3) strengthening bilateral relationships with ASEAN and regional states committed to a rules-based international order. A structured Franco-Italian dialogue on Indo-Pacific affairs would therefore not only reinforce European cohesion in the region but demonstrate that the EU can act as a credible and autonomous player in the Indo-Pacific, beyond the traditional transatlantic framework.

Conclusion: An Indo-Pacific Dimension for the Quirinal Treaty?

France’s engagement in Southeast Asia, as this article has sought to demonstrate, is neither uniform nor improvised. Structured around a three-tiered typology, France’s bilateral network in the region reflects a deliberate and differentiated diplomatic architecture. Underpinning this engagement is a coherent normative grammar, rooted in a Gaullist tradition of strategic autonomy, that resonates distinctly across a region wary of both Chinese coercion and unconditional alignment with Washington. Yet as this analysis has also highlighted, France faces a structural tension: its bilateral relationships, however dense and well-calibrated, have yet to be effectively translated into a coherent and visible European regional strategy.

A structured Franco-Italian dialogue therefore appears as a meaningful step toward a more coherent and credible EU posture in the Indo-Pacific – one that ASEAN partners have long awaited. The suitable mechanism for such coordination may already exist. Though conceived in a European context, the Quirinal Treaty – signed in November 2021 – institutionalises bilateral consultation across diplomacy, defence and economic affairs. Its regular summits, ministerial meetings and joint working groups provide a natural forum for extending Franco-Italian coordination to the Indo-Pacific agenda. Rather than building new mechanisms from scratch, both countries could leverage this ready-made framework to turn their parallel ASEAN commitments into genuinely joint action – coordinating positions, aligning development priorities, and speaking with greater weight in a region where European fragmentation has too often diluted European ambition.

Symbolically, France and Italy were granted “ASEAN Development Partner” status on the same day – 9 September 2020 – a convergence that has yet to translate into coordinated action but may well point to a shared destiny. The time has come to move beyond parallel engagement and advance jointly toward the next stage of their relationship with Southeast Asia.

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^[1] Elysée, French Presidency (2018) Discours à Garden Island, Base Navale de Sydney, 3 May, available online.

^[2] Saint-Mézard, I. (2022) Géopolitique de l’Indo-Pacifique, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 216.

^[3] Medcalf, R. (2018) “La Chine et l’Indo-Pacifique: multipolarité, solidarité et patience stratégique”, Revue de Défense Nationale, 811, 17 February, available online.

^[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan (2007) Confluence of the Two Seas, Speech by H.E. Mr. Abe Shinzo, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, New Delhi, 22 August, available online.

^[5] Gyngell, A. (2018) “To each their own ‘Indo-Pacific’”, East Asia Forum, 23 May, available online.

^[6] Macron, E. (2025) Keynote Address – Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, 22^nd Asia Security Summit of the Shangri-la Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 30 May, available online.

^[7] Milhiet, P. (2025) Emmanuel Macron in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue: A French Pivot to Southeast Asia?, RSIS – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, IDSS Paper, 25063, 5 June, available online.

^[8] Ishmael, L., Klingebiel, S., Sumner, A. (2025) In Search of a Plan B: Like-Minded Internationalism and the Future of Global Development, Global Policy 20 August, available online.

^[9] Hveem, H. (1980) “Scandinavia, the Like-Minded Countries, and the NIEO”, Western Europe and the New International Economic Order, available online.

^[10] Conley Tyler, M., Vu, M. (2024) “The Translator: ‘Like-Minded Countries’”,The Interpreter, 11 April, available online.

^[11] Ikenberry, G.J. (2008) “Liberal order building”, In Leffler, M.P., Legro, J.W., To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 85-10.

^[12] Shehadeh, O. (2025) “The Myth of ‘Like-Minded Countries’: Reality vs. Public Perception?”, 14 March, available online.

^[13] Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Government of France (2025) France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, available online.

^[14] Joyaux, F. (2022) Nouvelle histoire de l’Indochine française, Paris: Edition Perrin, 411.

^[15] The trade data largely corroborates our proposed typology, with the notable exception of Indonesia, which remains in the first circle despite its more modest trade figures, owing to the growing Franco-Indonesian strategic and political engagement.

^[16] The data is sourced from the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs website, available online.

^[17] Milhiet, P. (2024) Dien Bien Phu, 70 Years after the Battle, RSIS – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, IDSS Paper, 24052, 24 May, available online.

^[18] Frécon, E., Milhiet, P. (2025) “Prabowo in Paris: beyond the parade, geopolitical synergies”, The Diplomat, 15 August, available online.

^[19] Milhiet, P., Singh Rayar, N. (2025) Malaysia-France Relations: A Renewed Momentum for Deeper Engagement?, RSIS – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, IDSS Paper, 25071, 22 July, available online.

^[20] Van der Cruysse, D. (1991) Louis XIV et le Siam, Paris: Fayard, 588.

^[21] Milhiet, P., Hashim, H. (2025) Brunei-France Relations: A Bilateral Reset Grounded in Defence Cooperation, RSIS – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, IDSS Paper,  25118, 10 December, available online.

^[22] For example, Elysée, French Presidency (2023) Conférence des Ambassadrices et des Ambassadeurs: le Discours du Président Emmanuel Macron, 28 August, available online.

^[23] Nicolas, F. (2025) “L’Asie du Sud-Est entre Chine et États-Unis : la stratégie du non-choix ?“, interview con Marc Hecker, Le Monde selon l’Ifri, Podcast, épisode 45, Ifri.

^[24] European Commission (2021) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Brussels, 16 September, available online.

^[25] Grare, F. (2022) “Will and intent: the Paris ministerial forum on the Indo-Pacific”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 28 February, available online.

^[26] Abbondanza, G., Grgić, G. (2025) Europe’s Indo-Pacific Pivot Navigating New Horizons, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, available online.

^[27] Tan, E., Lin, J. (2024) “Engaging Southeast Asia: The EU’s Role as a Resilient and Reliable Middle Power?”, ISEAS Perspective, n. 41, 5 June, available online.

^[28] Abbondanza, G. (2023) “Italy and the Indo-Pacific: towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy”, 9 Dashline, 9 November, available online.

^[29] Patalano, A. (2024) “Italy: The Globally Connected Mediterranean Power?”, Royal United Service Institute, 1 August, available online.

^[30] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Government of Italy (2022) Contributo Italiano alla Strategia Europea per l’Indo-Pacifico, Rome, 20 January, available online.

^[31] Chamber of Deputies, Italian Parliament (2025) Indagine Conoscitiva sulla Proiezione dell’Italia e dei Paesi Europei nell’Indo-Pacifico, Rome, 12 March, available online.

^[32] Gabusi, G. (ed.) (2025) Indo-Pacific Outlooks: Implications for the EU-ASEAN Relationship and Italy’s Role in Southeast Asia,  Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 3 October, available online.

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