The German government under Friedrich Merz has announced a tougher stance on China and more European alignment on foreign policy. This article examines whether these rhetorical shifts have translated into a more strategic and coherent German approach toward the Indo-Pacific during the coalition’s first nine months in office. It takes stock of Germany’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific across three policy areas: security and defence cooperation, research and technology cooperation, and economic relations. Rather than assuming a policy shift, it assesses continuity and change relative to the previous traffic light coalition government and evaluates whether current initiatives amount to any strategic reorientation or remain incremental adjustments. In the area of security and defence, the article argues that Germany’s engagement has remained stable. With the Social Democratic defence Minister remaining in office, Germany’s Indo-Pacific security engagement largely follows existing trajectories. The newly concluded defence cooperation agreement with the Philippines is examined in scope and substance and situated within Germany’s broader pattern of defence cooperation in the region, including capacity-building, military-to-military exchanges, and arms exports. It asks whether these initiatives meaningfully enhance Germany’s strategic presence or primarily serve industrial and signalling purposes.

The section on research and technology cooperation focuses on the visibly intensified German-Japanese engagement. High-level political initiatives have highlighted research security, scientific freedom, and integrity – concepts increasingly central to Germany’s China policy. At the same time, both governments have pushed for expanded cooperation in strategic technologies such as aerospace and related high-technology sectors. The article assesses how these initiatives align with the Merz government’s newly articulated “Space Security Strategy” and broader ambitions for more autonomous European space capabilities.

Finally, the article examines economic relations, concentrating on Germany’s engagement with India during the final phase of EU-India Free Trade Agreement negotiations. Besides drawing on trade and investment data for 2025 more broadly, this section evaluates whether Germany has primarily acted as a champion of EU-level interests of cohesion and de-risking or has pursued a more nationally driven economic diplomacy serving its export interests. Taken together, these discussions provide a more fine-grained assessment of the Merz government’s Indo-Pacific policy and clarify the extent to which it departs from its predecessors. The article concludes by identifying areas where closer coordination with other EU member states could strengthen Europe’s long-term strategic autonomy.

 

Introduction

The German government under Friedrich Merz has announced a stronger focus on the Indo-Pacific alongside its tougher stance on China and a stronger commitment to European alignment in foreign policy. This article examines how these rhetorical shifts have translated into Germany’s regional approach during the coalition’s first year in office, across three policy areas. German foreign policy under Merz has become more coherent and security-oriented though it has largely retained the direction of the preceding “traffic-light” coalition. Its policy on security and defence have followed existing trajectories of capacity-building, military-to-military exchanges, and arms exports. A notable development is Germany’s growing tendency to source military capabilities from regional partners, reflecting both budgetary constraints and a widening circle of like-minded defence relationships. On research and technology cooperation, the Merz government has more deliberately aligned its scientific initiatives with its strategic objectives. The intensification of German-Japanese engagement in space technologies, for example, reflects the security concerns of the new German “Space Security Strategy”. Taking India as an example for its regional economic engagement, Germany has been broadly supportive of the conclusion of an EU free trade agreement while simultaneously pursuing its nationally driven defence export interests. Novel multilateral European formats involving India offer tentative signs of broader European diplomatic coordination. A recurring limitation, nevertheless, is Germany’s continued bilateral pursuit of its objectives and missing leadership for fostering a more coherent European presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Germany in the Indo-Pacific: More Engaged under Merz?

In his first address to Parliament, Friedrich Merz, Germany’s Chancellor since May 2025, declared the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority, vowing to deepen regional ties and to reduce China’s significance to just one relationship among many.^[1] Fittingly, in the first two months of 2026, Merz and his foreign and defence ministers visited the region in quick succession. Just in March 2026, Boris Pistorius, the German Defence Minister, travelled to Japan, Singapore and Australia during ongoing military escalations in the Middle East.^[2] As it seems, the German government is reinforcing its growing track record in the region. It has sought closer coalitions among the states of the Indo-Pacific accompanying the more critical approach it has taken towards China.

The following analysis is an assessment of what making the Indo-Pacific a foreign policy priority has meant in the first year of Merz’s coalition government and what changes and continuities exist with the previous governments. It also asks how much of a European approach to the region can be observed and what Germany is contributing to member state coordination. These observations signal what Germany’s foreign policy could look like in the upcoming years. Initiatives are examined across three policy areas: in security and defence cooperation, research and technology cooperation, and economic relations. Taken together, they show that the degree of change from the former German government is moderate. The overall direction has stayed the same, but what can be observed is a more intense security framing and closer linkage between research and security. Germany has continued to expand its engagements in line with its military commitments and arms cooperation. The areas of its deepening research cooperation with Japan now target the gaps of European strategic capabilities the German government has deemed necessary to fill according to its Space Security Strategy. And in its engagement with India during the final phase of EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, Germany is pursuing the interests of its defence industry but participating in engaging India diplomatically.

A more coherent Indo-Pacific policy has come to be expected since the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) are not only leading the current government coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD), but also most ministers key to foreign policy come from their ranks.^[3] The inter-party rift which beset the preceding traffic-light coalition between Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals, no longer applies. We have seen the current CDU/CSU coalition giving up on the more pragmatic approach that has come to be associated with German China policy and instead taking a stronger stance against China. During his trip to Japan August 2025, Johann Wadephul, Germany’s Foreign Minister from the CDU, openly criticised China for its aggressive behaviour around Taiwan and in the region at large.^[4] German Chancellor Merz also reiterated at the Munich Security Conference in February 2026 how China was “systematically exploiting the dependencies of others, reinterpreting the international order on its own terms”.^[5] This departure has come with some consequences. The German Foreign Minister has had to postpone an imminent diplomatic visit to China in December 2025 and the German Chancellor’s first visit to China recently took on a more subdued tone.^[6] Nevertheless, these steeper costs have not significantly recalibrated Germany’s Indo-Pacific guidelines but instead been complemented with a stronger engagement with the region.

Striving for More Defence Cooperation

On security and defence, Germany’s engagement has remained stable and even slightly expanded on arms cooperation. Pistorius, who is a Social Democrat and has retained his post as German Defence Minister from the previous coalition, largely follows existing trajectories despite Germany’s more limited maritime capabilities. The newly proposed or concluded defence cooperation agreements with Japan and the Philippines have broadened the scope of cooperation with so-called “like-minded partners”. They are situated within Germany’s broader pattern of defence commitments in the region which include capacity-building, military-to-military exchanges, and arms exports. Germany has also been keen to enhance its strategic presence with a submarine maintenance hub in Singapore in planning. This may be motivated by defence industrial policy but could further signal Germany’s willingness to participate in regional security. More notably, the arms collaborations that have been coming along indicate that Germany is turning towards contenders from the region for its own military acquisitions, a divergence from its military equipment traditionally being sourced from the United States (US) or other European states.

Germany is neither a resident power in the Indo-Pacific region, nor does it possess the more wide-ranging maritime capabilities of European powers such as France or the United Kingdom (UK). Yet, it has progressively intensified its security and defence commitments to the region since 2020, participating regularly in regional multilateral military exercises. Under Merz, the German Bundeswehr (the Armed Forces) has kept the pace of its previous military engagements. It was part of the multilateral “Talisman Sabre” joint exercise in Australia in June 2025 and sent a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to India for the navy’s Indo-Pacific Deployment 2026.^[7] According to planning for the upcoming months, the German air force will join the “Pitch Black” exercise in Darwin, Australia in July 2026.^[8] Around a hundred German medical personnel will take part in the Japanese military exercise Keen Sword, while Germany’s navy intends to join the “Tarang Shakti” air combat exercise in India in September 2026.^[9]

In fact, German military presence in the Indo-Pacific has been embedded in multilateral settings. Its military exercises regularly involve partner countries from the region such as Australia, Japan, India, South Korea and Singapore as well as European counterparts including France, the UK, the Netherlands and Spain. This pattern can be observed in relation to its participation in other security-related initiatives in the region, which the current German government has continued backing with its resources. Its voluntary contribution to the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), for example, which provides sanctions monitoring for the UN sanctions against North Korea, is a case in point, as was its joining of the United Nations Command which monitors the ceasefire agreement on the Korean peninsula in 2024.^[10] Showing its commitment towards regional initiatives, Germany has likewise stationed a growing number of permanent liaison officers at the MSMT and other regional bodies such as the Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region in India.^[11]

The Merz government has further deepened its defence cooperation relations in the Indo-Pacific. In his most recent visit to Asia in 2026, Defence Minister Pistorius put forward a new defence agreement and arms cooperation with Japan. A reciprocal access agreement was proposed with the aim to facilitate the deployment of visiting forces between the two countries.^[12] Less than a year earlier, another defence cooperation agreement was concluded in May 2025 by Germany and the Philippines,^[13] which seeks to advance cooperation between the militaries and on defence armaments. The German government’s willingness to expand its defence partnerships has been taken up by partners in the Indo-Pacific who are keen to diversify their own partnerships, not least because of the growing wariness towards the US in the region. Around the time of upgrading the pact with Germany, the Philippines also deepened their defence ties with several other countries, including New Zealand, Canada and France.^[14] Japan has been strengthening its ties through various agreements to increase joint exercises and defence industry cooperation with Canada and the Philippines as well.^[15]

While continuing to increase its defence industry cooperation, a shift has been taking place which shows Germany turning towards sourcing capabilities outside of the US and the European Union (EU) and taking advantage of more competitive contractors from the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, for the German defence industry, which was heavily represented in Pistorius’ March delegation, the Asia trip concluded with new arms cooperation as well. In the past five years, Germany has become the world’s fourth largest arms supplier (2021-2025).^[16] According to government reports, it has sold around 25 percent of its arms exports to the Indo-Pacific in the first half of 2025.^[17] Now, German defence contractor TDW has reportedly signed a letter of intent to expand Australia’s domestic manufacturing capability for guided weapons.^[18] Latest discussions also include plans for Germany’s warship builder TKMS and Singapore-based ST Engineering to build permanent infrastructure with military utility with a joint submarine maintenance centre in Singapore. This maintenance hub would service TKMS warships and submarines Singapore has already acquired and could also tend to other allied nations, which has been observed to be a potential boost for regional acquisitions of TKMS submarines.^[19]

These defence industry policies are geared more towards expanding the customer base of German arms manufacturers. However, we can also see the German government taking seriously the idea that like-minded countries in Europe and Asia would benefit from pooling resources, especially given budgetary constraints for expanding military capabilities. Besides discussing cooperations with Australian producers of rare earths, the German and the Australian government have expressed the joint objective of developing strategic space technology in the form of a joint early warning system which would serve as independent global monitoring capabilities in space.^[20] Even more notably, Germany has agreed to procure Australian-developed combat drones, which are unmanned aircrafts designed to fly alongside fighter jets to carry sensors, jammers or weapons.^[21] This sourcing of military equipment from regional partners might also include high-precision laser weapons used for drone defence on warships in the future. After German parliamentarians stopped a contract with German defence firms because of ballooning development costs, Electro Optic Systems (EOS) – an Australian defence company which has also considered permanently relocating its production to Europe – has currently become a likely contender.^[22] Japan’s Kawasaki Heavy Industries have continued talks to co-develop new engines for German Taurus long-range cruise missiles as well.^[23]

Germany’s military engagements and arms cooperation have remained on a steady upward trajectory. Its presence at military exercises has been unaffected by the change in its coalition government and the announcements of deepened defence ties have been a signal of intent. The intensifying arms cooperation and seeking out of secure supply chains are aligned with its strategic objectives of increasing its military capabilities. This does not look markedly different to the defence policy in the Indo-Pacific of the traffic-light coalition before, perhaps because Pistorius, who has held on to the Defence Ministry for the Social Democrats, has resumed bolstering Germany’s strategic capacities by seeking more arms sales and collaboration.

Regardless of Germany’s individual efforts in the Indo-Pacific, there are few signs of Germany under Merz leading efforts to coordinate European approaches in e.g. maritime or supply chain security in the region. Instead, member states have each been conducting their own defence and security policies. The EU and its member states have remained on the sidelines of more substantive regional defence dialogues such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus.^[24] The little reported 4th Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum in November 2025 can only attest to some very tentative attempts at collective European engagement, where European and Indo-Pacific foreign ministers as well as EU institutions came together in Brussels to discuss maritime security.^[25] Disappointingly, joint defence cooperation initiatives such as the “Eurodrone” programme, which has been in discussions for a Japanese participation, have been afflicted by withdrawals e.g. from France.^[26] With the US becoming a less trusted ally, it remains to be seen if Europeans can deepen ties outside of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As in other areas of foreign and security policy, German behaviour is contributing to the fact that EU policy in the Indo-Pacific remains the composite of what initiatives each member state takes on.

Strategic Space Research Cooperation with Japan

In the area of research and technology cooperation, German-Japanese engagement has visibly intensified. Several high-level political initiatives emphasising research security, scientific freedom, and integrity have emerged as a counterpoint to Germany’s reservations regarding its research cooperation with China. The areas of cooperation under consideration with Japan are broad, encompassing strategic technologies in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and nuclear fusion. Most notably, joint research initiatives have been announced in aerospace and related high-technology sectors – areas that coincide with the strategic objectives articulated in the Merz government’s Space Security Strategy, which harbours broader ambitions for more autonomous European space capabilities.

Since 2022, Germany has been steadily expanding its research and technology cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Having previously concentrated predominantly on green technologies, including green hydrocarbon supply chains, sustainable mobility projects, and environmental research, renewed attention is now being directed towards areas encompassing more strategically sensitive technologies. Since assuming the chancellorship, Merz has sought to explore bilateral partnerships with India not only in green transformation technologies, but also in artificial intelligence and biotechnology, building upon existing cooperative frameworks. In February 2026, the German and Singaporean government also approved a “Year on Innovation” initiative to advance cooperation on artificial intelligence, quantum computing, microelectronics and biotechnology.^[27]

Japan has recently received the most sustained high-level attention from Germany in the area of research and technology cooperation. Defence industry cooperation between the two countries has progressed slowly, notwithstanding Japan’s NATO-equivalent status on export controls since 2011, which is sometimes attributed in part to Japan’s comparatively less internationalised defence industry.^[28] Existing research relationships, nevertheless, are considerably more robust. As of Spring 2026, some 886 cooperative arrangements existed between Japanese and German higher education institutions, many concentrated in STEM disciplines (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), providing a solid foundation for the deepening of bilateral research collaboration.^[29] Ongoing cooperations in emerging technologies include joint projects in artificial intelligence, such as those linking Osaka Metropolitan University and the National Institute for Informatics in Tokyo with the Munich Centre for Machine Learning and the Berlin Institute for the Foundations of Learning and Data.^[30]

Since 2025, high-level exchanges between the two governments have markedly increased in frequency. In June 2025, German Research and Space Minister Dorothee Bär visited Japan alongside Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a visit reciprocated within the same month by Japan’s Research and Space Minister Minoru Kiuchi, whose trip to Germany included a visit to the German Aerospace Centre (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt, DLR).^[31] In October, Minister Bär made a further visit to Japan to present the German pavilion at Expo 2025 in Osaka.^[32] During these exchanges, two letters of intent were concluded and signed in Berlin in late June 2025, with the aim of expanding bilateral research cooperation.^[33] The areas designated for priority collaboration include space robotics, satellite technologies, and earth observation, alongside future cooperation in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and nuclear fusion research.

Of particular significance is the language employed in these agreements concerning research security and integrity, identified as fundamental prerequisites for sustainable scientific cooperation between the two countries. The agreements additionally affirm the principle of scientific freedom. Though not stated explicitly, these provisions mirror the concerns articulated by the preceding German traffic-light coalition government regarding China. In its 2023 China Strategy, Germany implicitly criticised China for unilateral knowledge and technology transfers in the context of research cooperation, and announced measures to curtail its collaborative projects, citing the risks that China’s military-civil fusion poses to shared civilian research.^[34] The strategy further references instances of illegitimate interference in the freedom of research and teaching within Germany. The inclusion of research security and integrity provisions in new bilateral agreements with a like-minded partner signals a heightened awareness among German policymakers of the necessity for guardrails in scientific cooperation, particularly in domains involving strategically sensitive technologies.

Space has emerged as the most prominent area of German-Japanese research cooperation under the current initiatives. The second letter of intent is dedicated exclusively to space cooperation, encompassing space exploration, launch technologies, and their commercialisation. The German side has specifically proposed collaboration in space robotics, satellite technologies, and earth observation. A well-established track record of cooperation already exists between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the DLR, including the Callisto project – a joint initiative with the French space agency Centre National d’Études Spatiales (CNES) developing reusable rocket launch systems – and the “JAXA Martian Moons eXploration” mission, to which DLR and CNES are contributing the Idefix moon rover for in situ investigations.^[35] Beyond inter-agency cooperation, current policy is also oriented towards deepening academic partnerships, including plans for joint doctoral programmes and interdisciplinary research networks between RWTH Aachen University and the Institute of Science Tokyo.^[36]

The current prioritisation of space within the Merz government’s research cooperation policy with Japan is consistent with the strategic objectives it has established for Germany’s defence capabilities. The German Space Security Strategy, published by the Defence Ministry in November 2025, directly addresses gaps in German and European space capabilities and the imperative for the EU to reduce its dependence on non-European providers for core strategic and military functions, including space reconnaissance.^[37] The strategy concludes that to secure an independent European space architecture, Germany and the EU must develop their own industrial competences and launch capabilities. Joint research initiatives and information-sharing arrangements with Japan are well-aligned with these objectives, as are the specific areas of reusable launch technologies and space surveillance capabilities prioritised for collaboration.

Space capabilities are inherently dual-use, and the strategic objectives stated in the Space Security Strategy therefore exist in some tension with Germany and Japan’s mutual commitment to the peaceful use of their space cooperation. Scientists have reiterated calls for the bilateral research cooperation to be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, as both states have formally committed to under their cooperation agreement and in relevant international frameworks, including the Outer Space Treaty.^[38] Technologies such as rocket launch systems and satellites, though developed for ostensibly civilian purposes, carry evident military applications and cannot be neatly disaggregated from their potential strategic utility. In Japan’s case, space capabilities have long constituted a cornerstone of its latent nuclear power – a status that has grown increasingly salient given the country’s evolving strategic environment.^[39] Germany, by contrast, no longer retains such latent nuclear capability, having exited its civilian nuclear energy industry in the 2010s.^[40] More enhanced space capabilities oriented towards defensive capabilities such as reconnaissance, surveillance, and launch resilience could contribute to collective European deterrence – specifically, by reducing European dependence on US satellite and reconnaissance infrastructure. It would also further strengthen the credibility of autonomous European security provision. The longer-term risk that defensive space capabilities could be repurposed for offensive applications nonetheless warrants continued scrutiny from policymakers and the scientific community alike.

In sum, the Merz government has moved to more closely align its research cooperation initiatives with its broader strategic objectives, a tendency most pronounced in its efforts to deepen engagement with Japan’s aerospace research community. Notwithstanding this initial convergence of security and research policy at the level of high-level political coordination, it remains premature to draw firm conclusions regarding their efficacy. The success of expanded space cooperation will ultimately depend on the long-term outcomes. Furthermore, as in the previous policy area, Germany has not actively sought to coordinate its research cooperation policy at the European level. That said, existing cooperation networks at the implementation level frequently feature European partners. During Expo 2025 in Osaka, for instance, DLR, the French Aerospace Lab (ONERA), and JAXA convened a trilateral meeting to advance aerospace research cooperation.^[41] Germany’s broader conviction that Europe requires more resilient and autonomous space capabilities is, moreover, consonant with a wider European consensus on the matter. Its efforts in this domain could yet serve as a catalyst for more substantive European pooling of resources in partnership with Indo-Pacific actors.

 

From Arms Exports to India to New Diplomatic Formats

This section examines Germany’s economic relations with the Indo-Pacific, concentrating on its engagement with India during the final phase of EU-India FTA negotiations. Drawing on trade and investment data for 2025 more broadly, it evaluates whether Germany has acted as a champion of EU-level interests in cohesion and economic de-risking, or whether its diplomacy has been primarily driven by national commercial objectives. The rapid succession of high-level visits to India by Chancellor Merz and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul during the concluding stages of the FTA suggests that Germany’s economic diplomacy has been considerably shaped by its national arms export interests. Nevertheless, the conditions India attaches to arms sales and their implications for long-term European security interests warrant careful consideration. A further development of note has been the emergence of novel multilateral formats, in which Germany has engaged with Indian counterparts e.g. within the framework of the “Weimar Triangle”^[42]. Such constellations, bringing together a European minilateral format and a strategic partner from the Indo-Pacific, may offer a template for future European coordination in the region.

The EU-India FTA, now anticipated to be signed in November 2026, forms part of a broader number of EU trade agreements with Indo-Pacific partners.^[43] The EU Commission finalised the trade agreement with Indonesia in September 2025^[44] and concluded negotiations with Australia in March 2026.^[45] In contrast to the previously covered policy areas, the competence to negotiate trade agreements here resides exclusively with the EU Commission. The now pending agreement with India has been characterised as less comprehensive than comparable EU trade deals, with contentious areas such as agricultural goods largely excluded from its scope.^[46] Its principal political objective appears to be to advance European economic security after its conclusion, with cooperation in critical sectors, including green technologies, pharmaceuticals, advanced manufacturing, and biotechnology, intended to diversify and strengthen the resilience of European supply chains, as well as to enable deeper security and defence ties.^[47]

Germany has been a consistent advocate of the FTA with India, motivated by its industries’ interest in improved market access, particularly in the automotive, automotive supply, machinery, and speciality chemicals sectors.^[48] During the final stages of the negotiations, Foreign Minister Wadephul visited India in September 2025, followed by Chancellor Merz in January 2026 – the latter visit being Merz’s first to an Asian and non-NATO partner country. The precedent of visiting another Asian partner before China has become an established pattern in German foreign policy since the end of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship: Merz’s predecessor Olaf Scholz similarly visited Japan prior to travelling to Beijing. While India’s overall ranking as a trading partner for Germany has remained broadly stable across both the current and preceding governments, arms exports have increased markedly under Scholz, and the Merz government has pursued a notably more assertive agenda in support of German defence suppliers. The delegation accompanying Foreign Minister Wadephul to India in 2025 included several prominent German arms manufacturers, among them sensors and electronic warfare specialist Hensoldt and warship builder TKMS, a subsidiary of Thyssenkrupp.^[49] By 2026, the timeline for the anticipated sale of six German submarines to India had been accelerated, with the contract now projected to be concluded within the coming three months.^[50]

This particular submarine contract would be substantial and could further advance India’s strategic diversification away from its traditional supplier Russia towards Western alternatives, which have thus far predominantly comprised France, the US, and Israel.^[51] While these efforts by Germany may be interpreted as the pursuit of domestic commercial interests, the broader objective of cultivating influence through strategic defence partnerships has equally featured prominently on the EU’s agenda. Nevertheless, a potential Indian acquisition of German submarines remains contentious, not least due to the requisite technological transfer obligations, given that the prevailing “Make in India” policy mandates that such vessels be constructed by Indian domestic shipbuilders.^[52] It remains an unanswered question whether this form of defence cooperation will really reshape India’s broader geopolitical orientation.

What has been particularly noteworthy, however, is the emergence of new diplomatic formats between European actors and India on the sidelines of trade negotiations, in which Germany, while not assuming a leading role, has nonetheless been an active participant. First, German Chancellor Merz’s visit to India as a European head of state was succeeded by a series of further high-level engagements, including visits by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb in early 2026.^[53] More consequential, however, was the participation of Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar in the Weimar Triangle meeting of his German, French, and Polish counterparts in January 2026. On this occasion, the Polish Foreign Minister commended India for reducing its procurement of Russian oil, and India was affirmed as a strategic partner for the EU’s economic resilience, alongside broader discussions on European security.^[54] Beyond this minilateral format, Foreign Minister Jaishankar also attended the meeting of the Council of EU Foreign Ministers in March 2026, where deliberations were dominated by Iran and energy security.^[55] These emerging formats may tentatively indicate how Germany could coordinate European initiatives on economic security policy and structure them to include partners from the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion: Taking Steps, but not Yet Jointly European Ones

The first year of the Merz government’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific reveals a foreign policy that is marked by continuity in its orientation and tentative steps towards deepening its track record in the region. Across the three policy areas examined – security and defence, research and technology, and economic – the overall trajectory established under the preceding ‘traffic-light’ coalition has largely been maintained, with incremental rather than transformative shifts characterising the new government’s approach.

In the domain of defence and security, Germany has sustained its growing military engagement and arms cooperation in the region. The deepening of defence partnerships with Japan and the Philippines and the planned submarine maintenance hub in Singapore reflect a steady intensification of commitments which predates the Merz government. The shift towards new arms acquisitions from regional partners such as Australia, however, shows that German budget restraints are pushing lawmakers towards the pooling of resources among like-minded countries across the regions.

What is more distinct for the current government is an increasingly explicit security framing of its Indo-Pacific policy, which is reflected in its research and technology cooperation. Here, the Merz government has more deliberately aligned its scientific initiatives with its strategic objectives. The high-level attention directed towards space technologies, AI, and quantum research represents a notable reorientation away from the green technology focus that was previously predominant. The initiatives aimed at deepening German-Japanese space cooperation exemplify how German research cooperation policy has been increasingly aligned with the capability gaps articulated in the German Space Security Strategy of late 2025. The emphasis on research security and scientific integrity in new bilateral agreements further signals a heightened awareness of the risks associated with open research cooperation.

Germany’s economic engagement with India, conducted against the backdrop of the final EU-India FTA negotiations as one EU FTA among many with countries of the Indo-Pacific, have been in support of a successful conclusion but also driven by national commercial interests, particularly in the defence sector. The prominent role of German arms manufacturers in high-level diplomatic delegations, and the acceleration of the anticipated submarine sale to India, suggest that bilateral defence export interests have taken precedence, with questions remaining on how these align with long-term European security interests in safeguarding strategic technologies. Nevertheless, the emergence of novel multilateral formats, most notably India’s participation in the Weimar Triangle meeting and the EU Foreign Affairs Council, offers tentative evidence that Germany’s bilateral engagement may be contributing, even if inadvertently, to broader European diplomatic coordination with India.

Yet, a recurring limitation across all three policy areas is the absence of genuine European coordination. Germany has largely pursued its security, research, and economic objectives bilaterally. European-level initiatives have remained fragmented and subordinate to its member state priorities. As the US becomes a less reliable security guarantor in the region, the imperative for a more coherent and coordinated European presence in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more pressing. Germany, under Merz, has not shown the strategic ambition to assume a leadership role in fostering this coordination function but has remained one contributor among many.

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^[1] Federal Government, Germany (2025) Address by Chancellor Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz, Bulletin 34-3, available online.

^[2] Friederichs, H. (2026) “Boris Pistorius in Asien: Unterwegs bei Freunden”, Die Zeit, 24 March, available online.

^[3] These include Germany’s Chancellery, Foreign Ministry, Economy Ministry and Research Ministry. The Defence Ministry and Development Ministry are both led by the Social Democrats.

^[4] Graham, D. (2025) “German foreign minister criticises ‘aggressive’ China ahead of trip to Japan”, Reuters, 17 August, available online.

^[5] Federal Government, Germany (2026) Speech by Federal Chancellor at the Munich Security Conference, available online.

^[6] Knapp, F., Burchard, H. von der, Verhelst, K. (2025) “Diplomatic bombshell as German foreign minister postpones China trip”, Politico, 24 October, available online, Roßbach, H. (2026) “Friedrich Merz in China: Der Kanzler kritisiert nur leise – heikle Themen bleiben vage”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 February, available online.

^[7] German Armed Forces (2026) Swifter and Farther: P-8A Poseidon Takes Off for the Indo-Pacific. available online; German Armed Forces (2025) Talisman Sabre 2025: Bundeswehr Trains in Australia, available online.

^[8] Ministry of Defence, Germany (2026) Japan, Singapore, Australia: Pistorius Holds Talks on Security Policy, available online.

^[9] Nedden, C. Zur (2026) “Singapore: How Berlin is reviving its Indo-Pacific strategy”, Table.Briefings, 24 March, available online; Ministry of Defence, Germany, Japan, Singapore, Australia..

^[10] Before the MSMT, Germany has participated in the similar network: Pacific Security Maritime Exchange (PSMX) in 2024 and with an additional liaison officer post for the Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) in Yokosuka, Japan, see Federal Government, Germany (2024) Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the Year 2024, 25 September, available online.

^[11] The German Bundestag (2024) Strategic Policy Document on Bilateral Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of India, Drucksache 20/13333, available online.

^[12] Lunday, C. (2026) “Germany pushes new military cooperation deal with Japan”, Politico, 22 March, available online.

^[13] Flores, M. (2025) “Germany, Philippines sign defence agreement”, Reuters, 15 May, available online.

^[14] Ibidem.

^[15] Yamaguchi, M. (2026) “Japan and Canada sign agreement to step up defence and energy cooperation”, Associated Press, 6 March, available online; Strangio, S. (2026), “Japan, Philippines sign new defence pact to facilitate flow of military supplies”, The Diplomat, 16 January, available online.

^[16] Friederichs, “Boris Pistorius in…”; George, M. et al. (2026) “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025”, SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available online.

^[17] Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Germany (2026) Report on Export Policy for Conventional Arms in the First Half of 2025, 10 December, available online.

^[18] Kuper, S. (2026) “Australia, Germany to partner on expanded guided weapons industry”, Defence Connect, 26 March, available online.

^[19] Sprenger, S. (2026) “TKMS and ST Engineering to create submarine service ‘hub’ in Singapore”, Defense News, 24 March, available online.

^[20] Nienaber, M. (2026) “Germany, Australia team up on space security, laser weapons”, Bloomberg, 26 March, available online.

^[21] Rheinmetall (2026) Rheinmetall and Boeing partner on German MQ-28 Ghost Bat, available online.

^[22] Rugamer, M., Lhomedet, H. (2026) “Exclusive: Australian laser maker EOS heads for Europe as defence demand soars”, Reuters, 30 January, available online.

^[23] Geddie, J., Kubo, N. (2025) “Exclusive: Kawasaki in talks to develop Taurus missile engines, sources say”, Reuters, 17 October, available online.

^[24] ASEAN (2026) About the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, available online.

^[25] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2025) Two Meetings in Brussels: EU and Indo-Pacific Foreign Ministers to Discuss Security in Europe, Africa and the Indo-Pacific, available online.

^[26] Hauke, Unterwegs bei Freunden…

^[27] Subhani, O. (2026) “Singapore seeks deeper ties with Germany to boost trade between ASEAN and EU: Gan Kim Yong”, The Straits Times, 25 March, available online.

^[28] Lill, F. (2023) “‘Wir stehen sehr schlecht da’: Warum Japans Waffenproduzenten nicht mithalten können”, Der Tagesspiegel, 31 January, available online.

^[29] International Cooperation of Higher Education (2026) Hochschulkompass: Kooperationen nach Staaten, available online.

^[30] Kuhrt, N. (2025) “Germany and Japan embark on a new mission”, Deutschland.De, 24 October, available online.

^[31] Kuhrt, “Germany and Japan embark…”; Jung, B. (2025) Japan and DLR strengthen research ties, The German Aerospace Centre, 30 June, available online.

^[32] Kuhrt, “Germany and Japan embark…”.

^[33] Ministry of Research, Technology and Space, Germany (2025) Letter of Intent on strengthening Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation between the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan and the Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space of the Federal Republic of Germany, available online; Ministry of Research, Technology and Space, Germany (2025) Joint Declaration of Intent Between the Cabinet Office of Japan and the Federal Ministry of Research Technology and Space of the Federal Republic of Germany on Space Cooperation for Peaceful Purpose, available online.

^[34] Federal Government, Germany (2023) Strategy on China of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, available online.

^[35] German Aerospace Center (2026) CALLISTO. Mission & Projects, available online. The second project is also realised with the participation of the European Space Agency (ESA). Its expected launch date is in November 2026, see Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (2026) MMX – Martian Moons eXploration official homepage, available online.

^[36] RWTH Aachen University (2025) RWTH and Institute of Science Tokyo Forge Strategic Partnership, available online.

^[37] Federal Government, Germany (2025) Space Safety and Security Strategy, available online.

^[38] University of Münster (2025) Physics societies sign “Declaration for the Future” in Münster, 14 November, available online.

^[39] Albessard, T. (2022) “Japan’s Nuclear Latency. A Dual-Use Diplomatic Lever?”, IRSEM – Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire, 93, available online.

^[40] Kühn, U. (2024) “Germany and the Puzzling End of Nuclear Latency”, in Kühn, U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century: Atomic Zeitenwende?, Abingdon: Routledge, 260-280.

^[41] Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (2025) DLR-ONERA-JAXA Trilateral Meeting held in Osaka, Japan. available online.

^[42] In August 1991, the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, and Poland met in Weimar to launch a forum aimed at deepening cross-border ties and shaping a shared European future.

^[43] Mohan, G., Varma, T. (2026) “The Europe-India Briefing – Inaugural Edition”, German Marshall Fund, available online.

^[44] European Commission (2026) EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and Investment Protection Agreement, available online.

^[45] European Commission (2026) The EU-Australia Trade Agreement, available online.

^[46] The Economist (2026) “Europe’s long-awaited free-trade deal with India”, 25 January, available online.

^[47] Mohan, G. (2026) “A Long Time Coming: Europe and India Have Discovered a Strategic Partnership”, German Marshall Fund, available online.

^[48] Wagner, C. (2026) “Die deutsch-indischen Beziehungen: Wertegeleiteter oder interessensgeleiteter Partner?”, IFRI – Institut français des relations internationales, Notes du Studienkomitees für deutschfranzösische Beziehungen (Cerfa), 191, available online.

^[49] The German Bundestag (2025) Written questions and received replies from the German Government during the week of 29 September 2025, Drucksache 1948, 24, available online.

^[50] Linnemann, N. (2026) “Deutsch-indische u-boot-kooperation rückt näher”, CPM Defence Network, 22 April, available online.

^[51]  George, M. et al. (2026) “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025”, SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available online.

^[52] Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung (2025), Rüstungsexportbericht 2025 der GKKE,  74, 6-7, available online.

^[53] European Council president Antonio Costa and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez also visited, see Mohan, Varma, “The Europe-India Briefing…”.

^[54] Ibidem.

^[55] Ibidem.