As Germany and other member states of the European Union (EU) have gradually developed their own strategies for the emerging strategic space of the Indo-Pacific, they have become increasingly important partners for regional actors, particularly South Korea. Germany, in particular, stands out as a leading European advocate of a rules-based and multilateral order in the region. Yet, Seoul’s strategic ambivalence toward the Indo-Pacific introduces uncertainty into the future trajectory of its cooperation with Europe. While Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy, formulated in 2023 for the first time under the conservative administration, emphasized cooperation among like-minded partners grounded in shared rules and norms, the current liberal government has yet to officially endorse this strategy, revealing a deeper fissure in South Korea’s ambivalent strategic thinking regarding the Indo-Pacific as a strategic space. This chapter seeks to show that despite South Korea’s ambivalent strategic posture, it remains a key strategic partner for Germany and other EU states based on shared strategic interests for a stable regional order in the time of greater geopolitical uncertainties. The chapter also seeks to identify challenges for cooperation such as Germany’s lack of visibility and South Korea’s lack of strategic vision.

 

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific has now firmly established itself as a critical strategic space in the minds of policymakers and the public alike. While it is geographically bound by the Indian and Pacific Oceans by definition, its significance extends far beyond physical boundaries as a site for global geopolitical competition between the United States (US) and China. As a result, countries both within and beyond the region are recalibrating their strategies to redefine their roles in the Indo-Pacific. It is in such a context that many of the European countries began to develop their policies vis-à-vis the region starting from France who redefined itself as “an Indo-Pacific nation” in 2018.^[1] Following the French lead, Germany became the second European Union (EU) member state to publish its own strategic document on the Indo-Pacific under the title Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Given France’s unique identity as a ‘resident’ power in the region, Germany’s adoption of Indo-Pacific as the central strategic space where “the shape of tomorrow’s international order will be decided” heralded a new era of European engagement with Asia.^[2]

The aim of this chapter is to assess this emerging European engagement with the Indo-Pacific region as a new site for strategic importance through South Korea’s response to Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategy. There are specific reasons why examining European Indo-Pacific strategies through Korean eyes constitute a fruitful exercise. First, the Indo-Pacific is an “imagined region” that is still in the process of taking a concrete shape.^[3] As such, its boundaries, organising principles, and institutional contours remain undefined and subject to ongoing contestations. While the future of regional order depends primarily on the rivalry between the two hegemonic powers, secondary states are still capable of influencing the great power competition, particularly in the period of transition.^[4] In this respect, South Korea occupies a particularly important position as a middle power deeply embedded in the region’s security and economic networks. Second, South Korea is also uniquely positioned to reveal the contested nature of emerging regional order. As a long-standing ally of the US and simultaneously a major trading partner and close neighbour of China, its strategic posture reflects the inherent tensions faced by secondary states navigating intensifying great power rivalry. South Korea’s strategic understanding of the Indo-Pacific, therefore, provides a useful window into regional dynamics.

This chapter proceeds as follows. It will first discuss South Korea’s evolving understanding of the Indo-Pacific as it relates to changing strategic responses. The next section will specifically focus on South Korea’s response to German engagement of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic space. I will conclude with challenges and prospects for cooperation between South Korea and Germany (and Europe).

Indo-Pacific in South Korean Eyes

Despite being one of the most influential secondary states in the region, South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy came to see the light of the day only in 2023. This delay in formally articulating its Indo-Pacific strategy reflects a strategic dilemma South Korea faces amid intensifying Sino-American competition. In fact, South Korea deliberately avoided using the term Indo-Pacific until the official adoption of its strategy. Under the liberal Moon Jae-in administration (2017-2022), in particular, South Korea’s strategic vision was primarily focused on improving relations with North Korea, which culminated with the hyped summit diplomacy between the North and the US. With the US pivot toward the Indo-Pacific as a new strategic space, however, South Korea responded with a lukewarm and cautious approach, unlike other US allies in the region, such as Japan and Australia. President Moon reportedly said when asked about his response to the newly published Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy of the Donald J. Trump administration, “it was a suggestion that I never heard of before” and “it is difficult to understand the purpose” of the strategy.^[5] Rather than aligning with the US-led Indo-Pacific framework, South Korea opted to advance its regional engagement by launching the “New Southern Policy” (NSP) as a major foreign policy initiative.

Introduced by the president himself during his visit to Indonesia in November 2017, the NSP was a designed as a strategic rejoinder to the intensifying great power competition in the region, the emergence of a US-led coalition against China under the framework of Indo-Pacific, and growing economic coercion from China. The ultimate goal, therefore, was to find alternative strategic partners in Southeast and South Asia to alleviate the dilemma of having to choose between the US and China. Based on the three pillars of “people, prosperity, and peace”, the NSP sought to deepen socio-cultural, economic, and diplomatic ties with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India, thereby expanding South Korea’s economic and strategic networks beyond its immediate neighbourhood. ASEAN in particular had already become one of South Korea’s major trading partners following the implementation of the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement in 2010. In addition, Seoul had also established its diplomatic engagement through participation in ASEAN led regional institutions such as the ASEAN plus Three and ASEAN Regional Forum. South Korea’s southward turn in search of a strategic alternative was thus grounded in pre-existing economic and diplomatic linkages.^[6] By diversifying its strategic partnership, the NSP ultimately aimed to expand Seoul’s room for manoeuvre and enhance its foreign policy autonomy.

South Korea’s tepid response to the Indo-Pacific framework drew criticism from both domestic opposition and regional partners. Critics argued that Seoul’s reluctance to explicitly embrace the new Indo-Pacific concept signalled strategic ambiguity at a time when closer alignment was expected amid intensifying great power rivalry between the US and China. Within South Korea, some analysts and conservative politicians contended that the liberal Moon administration prioritised its progressive ideology over national interests.^[7] They argued that a long -held progressive agenda – perceived as more conciliatory toward North Korea and China, and relatively more confrontational toward the US – constrained Seoul’s ability to objectively assess the evolving security environments. In their view, this orientation risked pushing South Korea to the margins of an emerging regional security order aimed at countering China’s growing influence. Such perception heightened anxieties about alliance cohesion at a time when Washington was seeking stronger coordination among like-minded partners in the region.^[8] The controversy over South Korea’s potential participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) underscored this tension. While Seoul was viewed by many in Washington and its allies as a natural candidate for closer cooperation, the Moon administration remained cautious, wary of provoking China.^[9]

While some criticised the Moon government’s reluctance to embrace the Indo-Pacific framework, South Korea’s hedging against great power rivalry is far from unprecedented.^[10] In fact, South Korean leaders after the end of the Cold War – whether conservative or progressive – have consistently sought to walk a tightrope between a long-standing ally as a security guarantor and an increasingly crucial trading partner. The latter, in particular, has historically been the most important neighbour for Korea, shaping its ideas and interests over millennia. The progressives have certainly put a greater emphasis on South Korea’s strategic autonomy and have adopted a more ambivalent stance amid US-China competition. Yet, South Korean hedging has not been limited to progressives, as conservative president Park Geun-hye’s attendance at China’s commemoration of the 70^th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War underscores. Seoul’s strategic dilemma is thus deeply embedded in its geographical position at the crossroads of great powers and in its modern history marked by colonialisation and division.^[11]

It is in such context that the successor of Moon, Yoon Suk Yeol, sought to reorient South Korea’s foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific through his initiative titled “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”. This new strategy indeed marked a significant departure from South Korea’s traditional reliance on strategic ambiguity.^[12] Under Yoon, Seoul was keen on articulating more explicit alignment with like-minded democracies and a stronger commitment to values-based diplomacy. By emphasising principles such as the rule of law, freedom of navigation, democracy, and human rights, the Yoon government signalled a clear willingness to move closer to the strategic vision promoted by the US and its regional partners, particularly Japan. A central component of this shift was its effort to mend and strengthen ties with Japan, which had deteriorated under the previous administration. In doing so, Seoul elevated trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan to a cornerstone of its regional strategy, reflecting an effort to institutionalise security and economic coordination in the Indo-Pacific.

Seoul’s new Indo-Pacific strategy was embedded within a broader strategic vision of South Korea as a “Global Pivotal State” (GPS).^[13] This vision represented a shift away from the previous Moon administration’s heavy focus on inter-Korean relations to a more expansive and proactive foreign policy agenda. Under this framework, South Korea, as a key middle power in the region, was expected to assume greater roles and responsibilities in addressing regional and global challenges across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Central to this approach was the recognition that South Korea should move beyond punching below its weight and rediscover its strategic relevance amid a shifting global security environment. For the Yoon government, this entailed playing a more active role beyond the confines of the Korean peninsula while embracing values and principles such as freedom and democracy in support of a rules-based international order. All this was meant to firmly anchor the Korean strategic position within its alliance with the US. As both a reflection and extensions of the vision embodied in GPS, Yoon administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy clearly revealed this US-centred orientation. In fact, it was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ North American Affairs Bureau – not the Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau – that took the lead in drafting the Indo-Pacific strategy after careful examination of the US Indo-Pacific strategy.^[14] As one Korean watcher noted, the Korean Indo-Pacific strategy was “all about the United States and not about Asia” – or, Indo-Pacific for that matter.^[15]

When it comes to China, Yoon articulated a clearer stance against unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the region – language widely interpreted as directed at Beijing. However, such tilt toward the US did not amount to a full abandonment of Seoul’s long-stranding hedging strategy.^[16] China remained central to South Korea’s economic prosperity, and Seoul continued to exercise caution in order to avoid overtly antagonising China. Indeed, South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy document refers to its relations with China only once in a carefully worded language. It describes China as a “key partner for achieving prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific” and characterises the strategy as an “inclusive initiative that neither targets nor excludes any particular country”.^[17] It also emphasises “inclusiveness” as one of the three principles of cooperation. Given South Korea’s geopolitical constraints – particularly its geographical proximity to and economic interdependence with China – the Yoon administration’s call for greater strategic clarity fell short of endorsing any form of strategic decoupling. Instead, it ultimately disclosed the persistence of Seoul’s inherent strategic dilemma: the need to reconcile deepening security alignment with the US in the Indo-Pacific with enduring economic dependence on China.

South Korea’s Response to Germany’s Indo-Pacific Turn

In light of South Korea’s evolving understanding of the Indo-Pacific, how has it responded to Germany’s embrace of the concept following the publication of its official strategic statement in 2020, Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, Germany-Europe-Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together”?^[18] This comprehensive document marked Germany’s first formal adoption of the term “Indo-Pacific” and underscored the importance of the region for a global mercantile power with significant economic interests in the region. Most notably, its emphasis on inclusivity and the avoidance of unilateralism and bipolarity can be interpreted as an indication that Germany’s vision does not seek to contain China, but rather to promote the regional order not defined by great power rivalry. At the same time, the statement stresses the importance of embedding German strategy and foreign policy within a broader European framework and its close coordination with EU partners.

Despite the German strategy’s designation of South Korea as a core cooperation partner across multiple areas – such as security, trade, and digital transformation – Seoul’s official response remained rather restrained compared to that of other regional states. As a Korea expert based in Berlin pointed out, there were neither official statements nor notable media coverage regarding Germany’s strategic shift to the Indo-Pacific.^[19] Such a muted reaction can be understood in light of South Korea’s broader foreign policy priorities and strategic positioning. As discussed earlier, under the Moon Jae-in administration, Seoul remained hesitant to fully embrace the Indo-Pacific concept as part of its regional strategy. Even when the US announced its first Indo-Pacific strategy in 2017, Seoul’s response was visibly cautious, avoiding explicit engagement and for the most part refrained from using the terminology in official discourse. It was not until 2019 that Moon publicly mentioned the “Indo-Pacific” in a joint press conference with then US President Trump.^[20] Even in that instance, the reference was carefully framed, emphasising areas of overlap between Seoul’s NSP and Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, far from signalling strategic alignment of any sort.

Nonetheless, there were already significant areas of convergence between Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategy and South Korea’s NSP. In fact, they both reflect similar strategic dilemmas and geopolitical constraints as trading economies with stakes in regional stability. As such, both German and Korean strategies are formulated as broad and “catch-all” frameworks aimed primarily at expanding networks of cooperation.^[21] In particular, Germany’s emphasis on ASEAN as a central pillar of regional multilateralism (“ASEAN centrality”)^[22] aligns closely with South Korea’s NSP, which prioritizes strengthening relations with Southeast Asian countries.

While NSP did not explicitly envision closer cooperation with countries beyond the geographical boundaries of the Indo-Pacific, South Korea’s subsequent Indo-Pacific strategy places greater emphasis on engaging European actors in the region. In particular, it highlights the importance of strengthening the strategic link between the Indo-Pacific and Europe under the broader vision of the GPS. The global repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further contributed to broadening Seoul’s strategic outlook. In this context, Germany – alongside France and the United Kingdom – is identified as a like-minded partner who share “the same core values of freedom, democracy, and human rights”.^[23]

Despite this rhetoric of elevated strategic partnership, however, concrete policy implementation has remained limited on both sides. In the case of Germany, the most visible step has been the deployment of naval frigates to the Indo-Pacific – first in 2020 and again in 2024 – marking its return to Asian waters in two decades. Yet, its strategic shift toward the Indo-Pacific has largely remained a “technocratic exercise attracting relatively little public interest”.^[24] The more fundamental question has consistently revolved around China, Germany’s most important trading partner in the region. In fact, Germany’s economic exchange with other Indo-Pacific countries pales in comparison to those with China, underscoring the structural constraints on any meaningful strategic reorientation.^[25] For South Korea, on the other hand, domestic politics hindered the realisation of its Indo-Pacific vision. The Yoon administration faced unprecedented unpopularity due to political scandals early in its term, significantly limiting its capacity to translate strategic ambition into concrete policy measures.

Seoul has instead made its mark primarily through diplomatic engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Under Yoon, he became the first South Korean head of state to attend the NATO summit. He attended the summits annually from 2022 to 2024 as part of the “Indo-Pacific Four” (IP4) initiative, signalling its strong willingness to align closely with the US-led Western alliance. As a tangible demonstration of commitment, Seoul established its first diplomatic mission to NATO in November 2022. While cooperation with NATO had already begun under the previous administration, the Yoon government elevated it to a new strategic level by broadening the scope of engagement. In a milestone step, Seoul participated for the first time in the NATO defence ministers’ meeting in October 2024, reflecting its clear strategic orientation toward linking Indo-Pacific and European security frameworks.^[26]

Prospects and Challenges

The new government in Seoul has been betting on what it calls “pragmatic diplomacy” to navigate an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape. In his inaugural address on June 4, 2025, the new President Lee Jae-myung outlined a clear vision to steer the country away from his predecessor’s values-based approach to foreign policy, emphasising instead the need to adopt a pragmatic policy to “strengthen the US-Korea alliance, bolster Korea-US-Japan cooperation based on it, and manage relations with neighbouring countries from a practical, national-interest perspective”.^[27] This marked a notable shift for Lee, who had long championed a more traditional progressive foreign policy stance. He was once considered by his critics as a left-leaning nationalist for his critical remarks on military cooperation with Japan and taking a relatively accommodating position toward China. What pragmatism in Seoul’s foreign policy ultimately entails, however, remains open to interpretation. In a public statement that would have been difficult to imagine from past liberal leaders in South Korea, Lee made clear that the era in which Seoul could rely on “the U.S. for security and China for the economy” is no longer sustainable.^[28] This nonetheless does not suggest full alignment with Washington. Rather, while emphasising the alliance with the US as the foundation of South Korea’s security, Lee has also pursued a strategy of “maximum flexibility” in managing relations with China to avoid unnecessary confrontation, as reflected in his engagement with President Xi Jinping during summit diplomacy at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) last year and a state visit to Beijing in January.^[29]

What is clearer, however, is the new administration’s intent to recalibrate South Korea’s foreign policy discourse away from the Indo-Pacific. During the election campaign, Lee made it explicit that his government would no longer pursue the Indo-Pacific strategy advanced by his impeached predecessor. Notably, the term “Indo-Pacific” was completely absent from his foreign policy pledges.^[30] This continued after he took office as the administration refrained from using the term all together in statements and foreign ministry’s briefings.^[31] Instead, Lee envisioned a revival of the Moon administration’s NSP as the guiding framework for Seoul’s engagement with the region. Taken together, this raises important questions about how Seoul will implement its pragmatic diplomacy while navigating the increasingly turbulent strategic competition between the US and China.

While it remains unclear where Europe fits within this evolving strategic vision, the new government appears to have inherited Seoul’s commitment to expanding its partnership with Europe, especially through NATO. The list of key national policy tasks issued to guide the new administration’s priorities reaffirms this orientation, signalling continuity in efforts to deepen strategic dialogue and security cooperation with European partners, including Germany. In fact, the Lee administration envisions South Korea’s status as a “G7+ Diplomatic Power”, positioning itself on an equal footing with its key European partners.^[32] Reflecting this vision, Lee, upon his inauguration, appointed the largest number of presidential special envoys to Europe in the nation’s history, sending missions to France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom. Although he did not personally attend last year’s NATO summit, the decision aligned with those of Australian and Japanese counterparts amid ongoing transatlantic alliance crisis. The importance of this relationship was underscored when South Korea and NATO further strengthened their ties by launching a defence industrial cooperation dialogue in September.^[33] This approach aligns closely with Germany policy as outlined in its Indo-Pacific strategy, which emphasises NATO’s role in “expand[ing] relations with the Partners Across the Globe, which includes Indo-Pacific players such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea”.^[34]

There are compelling cases for Seoul and Berlin – as well as other European capitals – to strengthen their ties. They share fundamental strategic interests in the region, regardless of whether it is labelled the Indo-pacific or otherwise. As established liberal democracies and major trading economies, South Korea and Germany both envision the region as a stable and prosperous environment for business opportunities and multilateral diplomacy.

From Germany’s perspective, cultivating reliable partners in the region is essential to maintaining its presence, given its limited capacity to directly project influence. South Korea, already a close and capable partner, stands out as a natural choice.^[35] Germany’s participation in the US-led United Nations Command in South Korea – a body that helps monitor the 1953 armistice and oversee the border between the two Koreas – offers a concrete example of such engagement. In fact, Seoul can serve as a bridge by offering regional insight and operational cooperation that enable Berlin to sustain and amplify its Indo-Pacific engagement. For South Korea, closer cooperation with external powers such as Germany can help amplify its voice as it seeks to become a rule-maker in the region rather than merely a passive rule-taker. Germany is a particularly suitable partner in this regard, given their shared interest in de-risking their economic and strategic dependencies on both Washington and Beijing.

Yet, challenges remain for deeper cooperation. As security issues become more prominent in regional affairs, Germany is inherently constrained in what it can offer, regardless of its genuine willingness to engage the Indo-Pacific. Among the European powers, only France can credibly claim a consistent presence and visibility with its sovereign presence and military deployments. In the context of a protracted war in Europe, moreover, there are clear limits to how much strategic attention Germany can realistically devote to the Indo-Pacific. As a result, Germany is unlikely to be counted in as a serious security actor in the region.^[36]

For Seoul, on the other hand, the challenge lies in articulating a clear and reliable strategic position toward the Indo-Pacific region. The lack of domestic consensus further complicates this task, particularly amid growing political polarisation. The current administration’s pragmatic foreign policy may offer a viable middle path, but it must find a way to overcome criticism from both its traditional supporters and opponents. Conservatives view Lee’s approach as echoing Moon’s strategic ambiguity, which they argue tilts toward Beijing at the expense of Washington. Progressives, by contrast, call for a more decisive departure from Yoon’s values-based strategy and a full-fledged embrace of American conception of the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

We are currently witnessing a period of profound geopolitical transformation in which long-standing assumptions about security and economic order are increasingly being called into question. Under Trump’s transactional approach to the world, the US has not been reluctant to threaten traditional allies and undermine institutions and norms that have underpinned the international order for decades. At the same time, Europe continues to grapple with the ongoing war in Ukraine, while the US is being drawn again into the conflict in the Middle East. In this evolving context, the Indo-Pacific becomes even more important in the global strategic landscape. In particular, uncertainty surrounding the reliability of US security commitments carries significant implications for regional security dynamics. While the American military posture in the region remains intact, perceptions of transactionalism in US foreign policy may prompt regional actors to reassess existing alignments and diversify their strategic partnerships.

In this regard, South Korea, as a middle power navigating the tensions between its alliance with the US and its deep economic ties with China, occupies a particularly pivotal position. Given its strategic interest in maintaining a stable and inclusive regional order, South Korea stands to benefit from strengthening strategic partnerships with European actors – including Germany – that are increasingly engaged with the Indo-Pacific. While periods of systemic transition can provide secondary states with greater agency and flexibility, such opportunities are most effectively realised when these states coordinate and cooperate to advance common strategic visions and shared interests.

---

References

Ballbach, E.J. (2023) “South Korea’s Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges for Cooperation with the EU”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, available online at: https://doi.org/10.18449/2023RP02, accessed 25 March 2026.

Ballbach, E.J., Morazzini, L. (2021) “A Restrained Embrace. South Korea’s Response to Germany’s Indo-Pacific Strategy”, SWP Comment, available online at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2021C13_SouthKorea_Indo_Pacific.pdf, accessed 25 March 2026.

Botto, K. (2021) “South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties with India and ASEAN”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 October, available online at: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/research/2021/10/south-korea-beyond-northeast-asia-how-seoul-is-deepening-ties-with-india-and-asean, accessed 23 March 2026.

Byun, D. (2020) “Seoul’s participation in ‘Quad’ may jeopardize regional security: S. Korean adviser.” Yonhap News Agency, 28 October, available online at: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201028000200325, accessed 24 March 2026.

Camroux, D. (2024) “France within the European rediscovery of the Indo-Pacific”, in Tran, C.T., Chirathivat, S., De, P. (eds) Indo-Pacific and ASEAN: New Balances and New Challenges for Asian Integration and Stability, Abingdon: Routledge.

Cho, S. (2026) “Korea Policy Series: Explaining the Lee Jae Myung Administration’s China Policy”, Korea Economic Institute of America, 7 January, available online at: https://keia.org/the-peninsula/korea-policy-series-explaining-the-lee-jae-myung-administrations-china-policy/, accessed 31 March 2026.

Choe, W. (2021) “‘New Southern Policy’, Korea’s Newfound Ambition in Search of Strategic Autonomy”, IFRI – Institut français des relations internationales, Asie.Visions, n. 118, available online at: https://www.ifri.org/en/papers/new-southern-policy-koreas-newfound-ambition-search-strategic-autonomy, accessed 23 March 2026.

Goh, E. (2021) “The Asia-Pacific’s ‘age of uncertainty’: great power competition, globalisation and the economic-security nexus”, in Patman, R.G., Köllner, P., Kiglics, B. (eds) From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Diplomacy in a Contested Region, Singapore: Springer Nature.

Huynh, T. (2023) “Bolstering middle power standing: South Korea’s response to U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy from Trump to Biden”, The Pacific Review, 36(1), 32-60.

Jaffrelot, C., Plagemann, J. (2025) “Europeans and the Indo-Pacific: is there a ‘third way’ between China and the United States?”, in Allès, D., Jaffrelot, C., Köllner, P. (eds) Order and Agency in the Indo-Pacific, Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature.

Kim, D. (2021) “Washington and Seoul must heal their alliance”, Foreign Affairs, 26 January, available online at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/washington-and-seoul-must-heal-their-alliance, accessed 24 March 2026.

Kim, E.J. (2025) “Indo-Pacific – a missing word in South Korean diplomacy”, Chosun Ilbo, 28 July, available online at: https://www.chosun.com/international/us/2025/07/29/Y5GRVONQ5RFUHHW24R4XBGTHLI/, accessed 31 March 2026.

Kim, J. (2024) “The agency of secondary states in order transition in the Indo-Pacific”, The Pacific Review, 37(1), 1-29.

Kim, M. (2023) “Hedging between the United States and China? South Korea’s ideology-driven behavior and its implications for national security”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 23(1), 129-158.

Köllner, P., Plagemann, J., Wirth, C. (2022) “Towards Closer European Union and German Cooperation with South Korea in the Indo-Pacific”, GIGA – German Institute for Global and Area Studies, GIGA Focus Asien, 5, available online at: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/giga-focus/towards-closer-european-union-and-german-cooperation-with-south-korea-in-the-indo-pacific, accessed 27 March 2026.

Krause, D. (2025) “German and Korean approaches to the Indo-Pacific: middle power strategies for a global key region”, Korea Europe Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics, Society and Economics, 7.

Lee, D. (2025) “South Korea moves away from former Indo-Pacific strategy”, East Asia Forum, 21 July, available online at: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/07/21/south-korea-moves-away-from-former-indo-pacific-strategy/, accessed 27 March 2026.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea (2025) “Lee Jae Myung Government’s Key Diplomatic Tasks View: Press Releases”, 16 September, available online at: https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322968, accessed 31 March 2026.

Mobrand, E. (2023) “What’s korean about South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy?”, The National Interest, 10 January, available online at: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/whats-korean-about-south-koreas-indo-pacific-strategy-206091, accessed 27 March 2026.

Nemeth, B., Kim, S. (2024) “South Korea and NATO: from unlikely companions to key partners”, International Affairs, 100(2), 609-629.

Pacheco Pardo, R. (2026) “South Korea-Europe relations in 2025: partners in an uncertain world”, Korea Observer, 57(1), 129-144.

Ryo, S., Jeong, J. (2025) “South Korea and Japan’s Responses to the US Latticework for the Indo-Pacific System”, The Asan Forum, 15 January, available online at: https://theasanforum.org/south-korea-and-japans-responses-to-the-us-latticework-for-the-indo-pacific-system/, accessed 21 March 2026.

Snyder, S.A. (2018) South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers, New York: Columbia University Press.

The Federal Foreign Office, Government of Germany (2020) Germany-Europe-Asia: Shaping the 21^st Century Together: The German Government Adopts Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region, 1^st September, available online at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/asien/german-government-policy-guidelines-indo-pacific-2380510, accessed 27 February 2026.

The Government of the Republic of Korea (2022) Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, December, available online at: https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_26382/contents.do, accessed 27 February 2026.

The Korea Herald (2025) “Full text: Lee Jae-Myung’s inaugural address”, 4 June, available online at: https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10502281, accessed 2 March 2026.

Ulatowski, R. (2024) “Germany and the Indo-Pacific in an age of superpower competition”, International Political Science Review, 45(5), 647-657.

Wakabayashi, D. (2025) “Trapped between US and China, South Korea feels trade war’s pressure”, The New York Times, 27 October, available online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/27/business/south-korea-trump-tariffs.html, accessed 22 March 2026.

Wilkins, T., Kim, J. (2020) “Adoption, accommodation or opposition? – regional powers respond to American-led Indo-Pacific Strategy”, The Pacific Review, 35(3), 415-445.

Yeo, A. (2022) “South Korean Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific Era”, Brookings, November, available online at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/south-korean-foreign-policy-in-the-indo-pacific-era/, accessed 26 March 2026.

Yeo, A. (2023) “South Korea as a Global Pivotal State”, Brookings, 19 December, available online at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/south-korea-as-a-global-pivotal-state/, accessed 26 March 2026.

Yoon, S. (2022) “South Korea needs to step up”, Foreign Affairs, 8 February, available online at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-korea/south-korea-needs-step-yoon-suk-yeol, accessed 11 February 2026.

---

^[1] Camroux, D. (2024) “France within the European rediscovery of the Indo-Pacific”, in Tran, C.T., Chirathivat, S., De. P. (eds) Indo-Pacific and ASEAN: New Balances and New Challenges for Asian Integration and Stability, Abingdon: Routledge.

^[2] The Federal Foreign Office, Government of Germany (2020) Germany – Europe – Asia: Shaping the 21^st Century Together”: The German Government adopts policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region, 1^st September, available online.

^[3] Goh, E. (2021) “The Asia-Pacific’s ‘age of uncertainty’: great power competition, globalisation and the economic-security nexus”, in Patman, R.G., Köllner, P., Kiglics, B. (eds) From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Diplomacy in a Contested Region, Singapore: Springer Nature.

^[4] Kim, J. (2024) “The Agency of Secondary States in Order Transition in the Indo-Pacific”, The Pacific Review, 37(1), 1-29.

^[5] Wilkins, T., Kim, J. (2022) “Adoption, Accommodation or Opposition? – regional powers respond to American-led Indo-Pacific Strategy”, The Pacific Review, 35(3), 432.

^[6] Botto, K. (2021) “South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties with India and ASEAN”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 October, available online; Choe, W. (2021) “’New Southern Policy’, Korea’s Newfound Ambition in Search of Strategic Autonomy”, IFRI – Institut français des relations internationales, Asie.Visions, n. 118, available online.

^[7] Kim, M. (2023) “Hedging between the United States and China? South Korea’s ideology-driven behavior and its implications for national security”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 23(1), 129-158.

^[8] Kim, D. (2021) “Washington and Seoul must heal their alliance”, Foreign Affairs, 26 January, available online.

^[9] Byun, D. (2020) “Seoul’s participation in ‘Quad’ may jeopardize regional security: S. Korean sdviser.” Yonhap News Agency, 28 October, available online.

^[10] Yeo, A. (2022) “South Korean Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific Era”, Brookings, November, available online.

^[11] Snyder, S.A. (2018) South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers, New York: Columbia University Press.

^[12] Ryo, S., Jeong, J. (2025) “South Korea and Japan’s Responses to the US Latticework for the Indo-Pacific System”, The Asan Forum, 15 January, available online.

^[13] Yoon, S. (2022) “South Korea needs to step up”, Foreign Affairs, 8 February, available online.

^[14] Yeo, A. (2023) “South Korea as a Global Pivotal State”, Brookings, December 19, available online.

^[15] Mobrand, E. (2023) “What’s korean about South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy?”, The National Interest, 10 January, available online.

^[16] Ballbach, E.J. (2023) “South Korea’s Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges for Cooperation with the EU”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, available online.

^[17] The Government of the Republic of Korea (2022) Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, December, available online.

^[18] The Federal Foreign Office, Government of Germany (2020) Germany-Europe-Asia: Shaping the 21^st Century Together: The German Government Adopts Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region, 1^st September, available online.

^[19] Ballbach, E.J., Morazzini, L. (2021) “A Restrained Embrace. South Korea’s Response to Germany’s Indo-Pacific Strategy”, SWP Comment, available online.

^[20] Huynh, T. (2023) “Bolstering middle power standing: South Korea’s response to U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy from Trump to Biden”, The Pacific Review, 36(1), 32-60.

^[21] Ballbach, Morazzini, “A Restrained Embrace…”

^[22] Krause, D. (2025) “German and Korean approaches to the Indo-Pacific: middle power strategies for a global key region”, Korea Europe Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics, Society and Economics, 7.

^[23] The Government of the Republic of Korea, Strategy for a Free…, 20.

^[24]Jaffrelot, C., Plagemann, J. (2025) “Europeans and the Indo-Pacific: is there a ‘third way’ between China and the United States?”, in Allès, D., Jaffrelot, C., Köllner, P. (eds) Order and Agency in the Indo-Pacific, Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 228.

^[25] Ulatowski, R. (2024) “Germany and the Indo-Pacific in an age of superpower competition”, International Political Science Review, 4(5), 647-657.

^[26] Nemeth, B., Kim, S. (2024) “South Korea and NATO: from unlikely companions to key partners”, International Affairs, 100(2), 609-629.

^[27] The Korea Herald (2025) “Full Text: Lee Jae-Myung’s inaugural address”, 4 June, available online.

^[28] Wakabayashi, D. (2025) “Trapped between US and China, South Korea feels trade war’s pressure”, The New York Times, 27 October, available online.

^[29] Cho, S. (2026) “Korea Policy Series: Explaining the Lee Jae Myung Administration’s China Policy”, Korea Economic Institute of America, 7 January, available online.

^[30] Lee, D. (2025) “South Korea moves away from former Indo-Pacific strategy”, East Asia Forum, 21 July, available online.

^[31] Kim, E.J. (2025) “Indo-Pacific – a missing word in South Korean diplomacy”, Chosun Ilbo, 28 July, available online.

^[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea (2025) “Lee Jae Myung Government’s Key Diplomatic Tasks View: Press Releases”, 16 September, available online.

^[33] Pacheco Pardo, R. (2026) “South Korea-Europe relations in 2025: partners in an uncertain world”, Korea Observer, 57(1), 129-144.

^[34] The Federal Foreign Office, Government of Germany (2020) Germany-Europe-Asia: Shaping the 21^st Century Together: The German Government Adopts Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region, 1^st September, 39, available online.

^[35] Köllner, P., Plagemann, J., Wirth. C. (2022) “Towards Closer European Union and German Cooperation with South Korea in the Indo-Pacific”, GIGA – German Institute for Global and Area Studies, GIGA Focus Asien, 5, available online.

^[36] Ulatowski, “Germany and the Indo-Pacific…”, 648.

Published in:

• The Indo-Pacific and European Approaches to the Region