In 2021, the EU adopted its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is designed to promote an open, rules-based regional order in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy outlined the EU’s efforts to increase its presence in an area that was perceived as both distant and increasingly important. The definition and implementation of the strategy, however, essentially depend on the EU’s Member States. Several of these countries have already adopted their own strategies or guidelines for the region, including Germany, France, the Netherlands, Lithuania and the Czech Republic. The chapter addresses the question of how these strategies strengthen or weaken the EU’s approach and its ability to present itself as a unified actor in the Indo-Pacific. We address this question by examining how two EU Member States (France and Germany) perceive their role, and EU’s role in the region, in the context of mounting challenges to the rules-based international order.

Introduction

In 2021, the European Union (EU) adopted its strategy for the Indo-Pacific.^[1] The document outlines a future of a “principled and long-term” engagement with partners in the Indo-Pacific, with the aim of strengthening a rules-based order while addressing global challenges. The strategy lists seven priority areas in particular: sustainable and inclusive prosperity; the green transition; ocean governance; digital governance and partnerships; connectivity; security and defence; and human security. Three EU Member States had already published their national Indo-Pacific Strategy: France (2018), Germany (2020), and the Netherlands (2020). Other Member States would follow suit: The Czech Republic (2022), Lithuania (2023), and Slovakia (2025). As highlighted in the literature, the duplication of EU’s and national strategies for the Indo-Pacific is another example of the inherent tension between EU’s and Member States’ foreign policies. This chapter investigates the relationship between the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the those of France and Germany to observe the degree of complementarity and competition between them. If the latter is relatively high compared to the former, there is a risk that the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy will merely become a minimum common denominator among Member States, lacking effectiveness and real impact. In this case, partners in the region looking beyond the normative power of the EU in defense of a rules-based order, multilateralism and democracy, would instead turn to state-to-state relations. However, a lack of co-ordination among Member States, coupled with their relatively scarce resources compared to other regional actors such the People’s Republic of China, could diminish Europe’s impact on security and economic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.

We conduct our analysis by looking at the respective roles that Berlin, Paris and Brussels want to play in the region. In fact, sorting out what to do in the Indo-Pacific and how to do it is one of the three steps any country must take to design a credible, effective and coherent Indo-Pacific strategy – the other two steps being defining the geographical boundaries of action and choosing preferred partners.^[2] Drawing on Holsti’s framework of National Role Conceptions (NRCs),^[3] as updated by Anna Caffarena and Giuseppe Gabusi in their study of Italy’s foreign policy,^[4] we observe how the EU, France and Germany see their roles in the Indo-Pacific, and outline the similarities, overlaps, complementarities, and contradictions between their strategies. As evidence, we draw on official documents from the EU, French and German governments, secondary literature, and the views expressed by the contributors to this book.

The chapter is structured as follows: Section one reflects on the relationship between the EU’s foreign policy and those of its Member States. Section two reviews role theory in the analysis of foreign policy. Section three applies role theory to the EU’s foreign policy, while section four analyses the three Indo-Pacific strategies within the NRC framework. Section five draws some conclusions.

The Neverending Story: EU’s Foreign Policy and Member States’ Foreign Policy

A frequently asked question about the European Union (EU) is whether its foreign policy is more than the sum of its parts. In other words, is the EU a foreign policy actor in its own right, or merely an aggregation of the lowest common denominator of its Member States’ foreign policies? What meaning is attributed to the EU as an agent of foreign-policy action?^[5]

Since emerging on the international stage, the European Union has been characterised by a certain degree of constitutive ambiguity compared to traditional actors in international politics (and in IR analyses) such as states and, to some extent, international organisations. Although the EU has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its Member States have retained their own national foreign policies and continue to act as autonomous foreign policy actors. This ambiguity is embedded in the EU treaties themselves. On the one hand, Member States are required to support and actively contribute to the Union’s CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity (Treaty on the European Union, TEU). On the other hand, the treaties explicitly state that CFSP provisions do not affect the powers of Member States regarding the formulation and conduct of their national foreign policies, nor do they prejudice their responsibilities in this area (Lisbon Treaty, Declarations 13 and 14). As a result, the relationship between EU’s foreign policy and the foreign policies of its Member States is characterised by a persistent tension between collective action and national autonomy.^[6] The inherent tension between the Member States’ desire to retain the ability to act independently and the search for a unified European position in international politics is indeed often cited to explain inconsistencies in EU’s foreign policy behaviour.^[7]

This ambiguity has fuelled a long-standing debate within the fields of International Relations and European Studies concerning the nature of the European Union and, consequently, the most suitable analytical tools and theoretical frameworks for examining its external action and assessing its significance in international politics. “At one end of the spectrum are those who see the EU as a potential state, or at least the performer of essential state functions in the international political arena”; at the other end of the same spectrum are those who see the EU “at best a patchy and fragmented international participant, and as little more than a system of regular diplomatic co-ordination between the Member States”.^[8]

Between these two extremes, many observers tend to emphasize the “uniqueness” of the EU as an actor in international politics.^[9] This perspective is perhaps best illustrated by the extensive literature portraying the European Union as either a “presence”, a “civilian power” or a “normative power”, emphasising its distinctive mode of influence in international politics.^[10] In summary, this body of literature regards the European Union as a unique international actor due to the nature of its goals and values, the specific combination of instruments at its disposal and its distinctive institutional architecture.^[11] These studies focus on the relationship between institutionalisation processes and the construction of collective identities and shared understandings, as well as the distinctive features of the EU’s external action and its impact across different policy areas. In doing so, they opened the way for incorporating into this debate the parallel developments of Role Theory and its application to the analysis of foreign policy.^[12]

Role Theory in the Analysis of Foreign Policy

Role Theory in foreign policy analysis focuses on the ideas that inform foreign policy. Ideas, in fact, “shape and influence the early stage of foreign-policy formulation”.^[13] How does a state look at the world and its evolving dynamics? How does a state see itself within the international system? What are its political, economic and social resources that could be the foundations of an effective foreign policy? What role could a state perform best? By responding to these questions, countries design their foreign policy. Recalling Goldstein and Keohane’s tripartition^[14], Gabusi and Caffarena outline that “at the broadest level are worldviews… [that] establish the framework in which normative ideas [as foreign policy goals] are formulated”, while “operational ideas encompass policy recommendations regarding the means to achieve the established objectives”.^[15] What underpins such objectives is a National Role Conception, formulated on the basis of a country’s own reading of the world and which actions a country should consequently focus on.

According to Kal Holsti’s definition,

“a national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment”.^[16]

In his seminal contribution, Holsti identified 17 NRCs, while Caffarena and Gabusi added four new NRCs to the list that could be applied to any country, even though they were designed in relation to some aspects of Italy’s foreign policy (see Table 1). The effective multilateralist/responsible state NRC “is played by countries that conceive multilateralism as a powerful tool for responsible states to make governance work”, since in fact a functioning multilateralism “requires engagement and responsible commitment – in terms of capacity and resources – from each single country involved”.^[17] A globalization surfer/economic networker NRC is related to the liberal vision of an open global order and has two dimensions: “first, a globalization surfer wants to take advantage of all opportunities that economic interdependence offers (…) Second, the economic networker wants to pursue economic diplomacy (…) to attract direct foreign investments and support outgoing investments and exports”.^[18] A cultural power “is usually aware and proud of its cultural uniqueness and it perceives culture as a significant tool to be deployed to raise the country’s standing in the world, since it represents a respected source of contribution to the legacy of the humankind”. Moreover, “the promotion of culture is also a vehicle for advertising products and services offered by the country”.^[19] Finally, “a principled actor (…) is a country that consciously consults its founding principles before acting on the international stage. (…) Countries playing this NCR believe that whatever decision, action, or behaviour becomes an option, an evaluation of their compatibility with one’s defining values is due”.^[20]

Table 1: National Role Conceptions (NRCs)

National Role Conception (NRC)	Description
Regional Leader	Seeks a leadership position within a particular region and attempts to influence the behaviour of neighbouring states.
Regional Protector	Assumes responsibility for maintaining order and security within a regional subsystem.
Active Independent	Pursues an autonomous yet active foreign policy in international affairs.
Liberation Supporter	Supports national liberation movements and anti-colonial struggles.
Anti-Imperialist Agent	Opposes imperialism and external domination.
Mediator–Integrator	Acts as a mediator in international disputes and promotes cooperation and integration among states.
Faithful Ally	Consistently supports and cooperates with allied states and international partners.
Independent	Emphasizes sovereignty and freedom of action in foreign policy decisions.
Example	Seeks to serve as a political, economic, or social model for other countries.
Internal Development	Prioritizes domestic development and nation-building over international involvement.
Bastion of Revolution	Promotes revolutionary ideals and supports transformative political change beyond its borders.
Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Supports cooperation and collective action within regional organizations or subsystems.
Developer	Contributes to the economic and social development of other countries through aid and cooperation.
Bridge	Serves as a link between different regions, cultures, political blocs, or groups of states.
Defender of the Faith	Protects and promotes a particular religious, ideological, or normative community.
Independent Foreign Policy Actor	Maintains a distinct and autonomous foreign policy despite external pressures or alliance commitments.
Protective Security Role	Assumes responsibility for defending a region, alliance, or group of states against external threats.
Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State	Views multilateralism as an essential instrument of global governance and actively contributes resources and political commitment to ensure its effectiveness.
Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker	Embraces economic interdependence and pursues economic diplomacy aimed at attracting foreign investment, supporting exports, and promoting international economic integration.
Cultural Power	Uses cultural heritage, identity, and soft power resources to enhance international influence and national prestige, while also promoting economic interests.
Principled Actor	Bases foreign policy decisions on fundamental national values and principles, evaluating international actions according to their consistency with these norms.

Note: National Role Conceptions introduced by Caffarena and Gabusi are indicated in italics

 

Applying Role Theory to EU Foreign Policy

A key contribution to the application of Role Theory to the study of EU foreign policy is the volume The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis (2006), edited by Ole Elgström and Michael Smith. As the authors note, previous scholarship has typically considered role formation and role enactment to be separate analytical domains. While organisation theory has focused primarily on how institutional and organisational contexts shape role performance, social constructivist approaches have concentrated on the processes through which role conceptions are formed and internalised. The scholars involved in this collective effort seek to bridge these perspectives, arguing that a comprehensive understanding of the European Union’s external action requires an examination of both the construction of role identities and how these identities are translated into practice:

“Role conceptions encompass both actors’ self-images and the effects of others’ role expectations, and they prompt investigation of the interplay between these two elements. In terms of the EU, they give rise to discussion of the extent to which the EU can be seen as a distinctive actor in international politics, generating innovative roles and capable of transferring or reproducing those roles in a variety of contexts. Discussion of the ways in which (for example) the EU plays a leadership role in certain areas of international life, or the extent to which EU international policies enshrine principles such as multilateralism, is a logical consequence of a focus on role conceptions.”^[21]

Role conceptions play an important function in providing a Member State with the conceptual lenses trough which foreign policy issues on the international and EU agendas are framed. A country’s role conception indicates whether it identifies with specific values and objectives and whether it sees itself playing a particular role. They also provide a general orientation through which to define a national position, even if the Member State is not interested in the specific matter and has no interests to defend.^[22]

Since worldviews and NRCs are embedded in national history and national identity, they tend to be very difficult to compromise. Indeed, in the process of negotiating and bargaining over the definition of EU foreign policy goals and strategies, role conceptions could result even more crucial and persistent than differences in “interests”, which most literature on EU/Member States (MS) foreign policy focus on. However, it is important to note that, while national roles are persistent, they are not fixed and can change over time, also due to vertical (EU-MS) and horizontal (MS-MS) interactions within the complex EU foreign policy-making governance system. National Roles contribute to determine the EU’s role and, vice versa, in an evolving agent-structure dynamic.

This perspective is particularly useful for analysing the relationship between EU and Member-State role conceptions. Rather than replacing national role conceptions, EU-level roles provide an additional layer of collective identity and action, rooted in broadly shared norms and values. The EU can therefore be treated as a distinct actor whose role conceptions coexist with, and are partly shaped by, those of its Member States. This enables the analysis of  EU role conceptions at an aggregate level while acknowledging the continued relevance of national role sets and the persistence of independent foreign policy traditions among Member States.^[23]

 

Analyses of the Indo-Pacific Strategies

This study applies Role Theory and, more specifically the concept of NRCs, to analyse the European Union’s and selected EU Member States’ engagement in the Indo-Pacific. First, the EU’s role conceptions are identified through an analysis of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy and are subsequently compared with perceptions emerging from the literature, including this book. Secondly, the same approach is applied to France and Germany by examining both their official Indo-Pacific strategies and the assessments provided by contributors to this volume.

The NRC framework makes it possible to capture both the ego dimension of role construction, i.e.  how the EU and its Member States perceive and define their own international roles, and the alter dimension, namely how these roles are perceived, confirmed, contested, or reinterpreted by external actors and observers.^[24] Finally, whenever possible, the role conceptions identified through this analysis are compared with those highlighted in the existing literature on EU and Member States foreign policy in order to assess continuities, changes, and emerging patterns in their engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. 

To facilitate comparative analysis, the NRCs have been grouped into broader functional categories based on their primary foreign policy orientation. This aggregation helps to identify common patterns across roles and provides a more manageable framework for coding NRCs in foreign policy documents and comparing role conceptions across countries. Furthermore, this process highlights how the four NRCs introduced by Caffarena and Gabusi reflect themes that became increasingly salient in the post-Cold War era, such as multilateralism, globalisation, cultural soft power, and values-based foreign policy, which were less prominent in Holsti’s original taxonomy.

 

Table 2 – Aggregated NRCs

Macro-category	National Role Conceptions
Leadership	Regional Leader
Security	Regional Protector; Protective Security Role
Autonomy	Active Independent; Independent; Independent Foreign Policy Actor
Alliance	Faithful Ally
Mediation and Cooperation	Mediator–Integrator; Bridge; Regional-Subsystem Collaborator
Development and Economic Relations	Developer; Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker
Normative and Ideological Roles	Example; Liberation Supporter; Anti-Imperialist Agent; Bastion of Revolution; Defender of the Faith; Principled Actor
Multilateral and Cultural Roles	Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State; Cultural Power

Note: National Role Conceptions introduced by Caffarena and Gabusi (2017) are indicated in italics.

 

The European Union

Since the late 2010s, the Indo-Pacific has become an increasingly important theatre for the European Union’s external action.^[25] Initially driven by concerns over the region’s growing economic centrality, the security of maritime trade routes, and the necessity to diversify partnerships beyond China, the EU has gradually developed a more holistic approach that culminated in the adoption of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in September 2021. According to some observers, this strategy reflected a broader shift in the EU’s international stance, from a predominantly economic and normative presence to a more geopolitical entity capable of integrating trade, connectivity, sustainability, security, and strategic competition within a unified framework.^[26] At the same time, this strategy certainly represented an attempt to respond to the increasing strategic relevance of a region that is expected to shape the future international order and where almost half of global maritime trade transits through critical sea lanes.^[27]

The EU’s growing engagement has been supported by both institutional initiatives and Member-States activism. France, Germany, and the Netherlands were among the first European countries to publish dedicated Indo-Pacific strategies, paving the way for a common European approach. Since 2021, the EU has expanded its political dialogue with regional partners, strengthened cooperation with ASEAN, promoted the Global Gateway initiative as an alternative model of sustainable connectivity, and intensified its engagement in areas such as digital governance, climate cooperation, supply-chain resilience, and maritime security.^[28] Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forums held in Paris (2022) and Brussels (2024, 2025) together with the development of partnerships with countries such as Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, and ASEAN members, further demonstrate the EU’s ambition to establish itself as a relevant actor in the region.^[29]

The EU’s enduring interest in the Indo-Pacific is also reflected in a series of recent diplomatic and economic achievements. The successful conclusion of the EU–Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2025, the upgrading of EU–Viet Nam relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in January 2026, and the finalisation of the EU–India Trade Agreement in the same period demonstrate the Union’s commitment to deepening its network of strategic and economic partnerships across the region.^[30]

 

Table 3 – Main EU Role Conceptions in the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021)

NRC	Evidence from the Strategy	Salience
Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State	Repeated commitment to a “rules-based international order”, “effective multilateralism”, and cooperation with the UN, ASEAN, AU, WTO, G20, and other international organizations.	High
Principled Actor	Strong emphasis on democracy, human rights, rule of law, gender equality, labour rights, humanitarian law, and values-based partnerships.	High
Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Extensive engagement with ASEAN, Pacific regional organizations, African regional organizations, and Indian Ocean institutions.	High
Developer	Commitment to development cooperation, sustainable development, climate finance, capacity building, education, health, disaster preparedness, and infrastructure development.	High
Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker	Strong focus on trade agreements, resilient value chains, investment promotion, connectivity, digital partnerships, and economic interdependence.	High

Analysing the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy enables us to identify the EU’s main role conceptions in relation to the region (see Table 3). The strategy also contains evidence of several “secondary” role conceptions that are present but appear to be less salient. The EU portrays itself as a Mediator–Integrator and a Bridge, emphasizing dialogue, connectivity, and cooperation across regions and institutions. Elements of the Example role emerge through the promotion of EU regulatory standards and governance models, particularly in areas such as digital governance, sustainability, and environmental protection. The document also contains references to a Protective Security Role, notably through maritime security initiatives and capacity-building activities. Furthermore, aspects of a Faithful Ally role are reflected in the EU’s cooperation with “like-minded partners” like Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Together, these secondary roles complement the EU’s core identity as a multilateral, normative, developmental and economically connected actor.

Table 4 – Aggregate role profile for the EU in the Indo-Pacific

Macro-category	Salience
Multilateral and Cultural Roles	Very High
Development and Economic Relations	Very High
Normative and Ideological Roles	Very High
Mediation and Cooperation	High
Security	Medium
Alliance	Medium
Leadership	Low-Medium
Autonomy	Low

The 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy portrays the European Union primarily as an Effective Multilateralist/Responsible State, committed to defending and strengthening a rules-based international order through cooperation with international and regional organisations. At the same time, the EU clearly projects itself as a Principled Actor, grounding its engagement in democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and sustainable development. A third prominent role is that of Developer, reflected in the emphasis on development cooperation, capacity building, climate action, health, education, and disaster resilience. Finally, the strategy strongly embodies the role of Globalization Surfer/Economic Networker, highlighting trade, connectivity, investment, resilient supply chains, and digital partnerships as key instruments of engagement.

Notably, the most salient role conceptions identified in the document correspond to the NRCs introduced by Caffarena and Gabusi, rather than to the more traditional roles originally identified by Holsti. This finding suggests that the EU’s contemporary external identity is shaped less by classical power politics, alliance formation, or regional leadership concerns, and more by commitments to multilateral governance, values-based diplomacy, sustainable development, and economic interdependence. The Indo-Pacific Strategy therefore reflects a distinctly “European” conception of international engagement, consistent with the EU’s broader self-understanding as a normative and cooperative global actor, as also emerges from other main strategic documents.^[31]

 

The EU’s Roles in the Indo-Pacific 

A comparison between the role conceptions identified in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the perspectives emerging from the various contributions in this volume reveals a nuanced picture. As expected, none of the EU’s core role conceptions are explicitly rejected by the authors. Rather, some are strongly confirmed, while the effectiveness, credibility, or practical relevance of others is called into question. The chapters therefore provide an opportunity to assess not only how the EU conceives its role in the Indo-Pacific, but also how that role is perceived by external observers and regional partners.

 

Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State

This is arguably the role conception that is confirmed most strongly across the text. Several authors identify the EU’s principal added value as being its support for multilateral institutions and regional cooperation mechanisms. For example, Elsa Lafaye de Micheaux argues that following the withdrawal of USAID from the region, the EU could help fill part of the resulting vacuum by engaging with ASEAN to deliver concrete benefits to the population.^[32] Similarly, Marie Kwon emphasises that any successful European engagement in the region must be rooted in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and respect ASEAN centrality.^[33] The EU is therefore consistently portrayed as a supporter of multilateral governance, regional institutions, and a rules-based international order.

 

Principled Actor

The EU is also consistently associated with democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and values-based diplomacy. However, several contributions question the practical relevance and influence of this role. For instance, discussions reported during the kick-off workshop for this research project noted that democracy appears to occupy a relatively limited place in the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, several authors suggest that regional actors generally prioritise tangible cooperation, connectivity, and development outcomes over normative promotion. Kwon further argues that many Southeast Asian countries remain cautious toward approaches that could be interpreted as ideological or as part of a broader strategy of balancing China.^[34] Consequently, while the EU’s identity as a Principled Actor is acknowledged, its capacity to translate normative commitments into political influence is increasingly being called into question, as Gianluca Bonanno highlights in the case of Japan.^[35]

 

Regional-Subsystem Collaborator

This role conception is strongly supported throughout the chapters. The EU is repeatedly portrayed as a partner of ASEAN and other regional organisations, operating primarily through institutional cooperation and network-building. Several authors emphasise that the effectiveness of European engagement hinges on its ability to work through regional frameworks, including ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Kwon explicitly argues that European strategies should be aligned with ASEAN priorities and regional governance mechanisms. The EU’s image as a collaborative regional actor is therefore broadly confirmed.^[36]

 

Developer

The EU’s role as a development actor also receives substantial support. Development assistance, capacity-building, climate finance, and support for sustainable development are frequently cited as areas in which the EU enjoys considerable credibility. Lafaye de Micheaux, for example, argues that the EU should expand its development assistance in Southeast Asia following the decline of American aid^[37]. Nevertheless, several contributions suggest that development cooperation alone is no longer sufficient to secure political influence. Although Europe and Japan remain major donors, their political significance is often perceived to be weaker than China’s. Consequently, the Developer role is confirmed, but it is also portrayed as requiring a stronger strategic dimension if it is to remain politically relevant.

 

Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker

This role conception is likewise confirmed across the reports, albeit in a modified form. The Indo-Pacific is still primarily understood as a space of economic interdependence, trade, connectivity, and global value chains. However, concerns about economic security, resilience, and strategic dependencies are increasingly being expressed alongside the language of globalisation. Discussions of de-risking, supply-chain diversification, critical technologies, and economic coercion are particularly prominent in the contributions dealing with Germany and the Netherlands.^[38] The EU is therefore still viewed as an Economic Networker, but one operating in a more securitised and geopolitically contested environment than was envisaged in 2021.

Table 5 – The EU’s NRCs in the authors’ views

NRC	Assessment
Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State	Strongly confirmed
Principled Actor	Partially contested / problematized
Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Strongly confirmed
Developer	Confirmed but considered insufficient
Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker	Confirmed but increasingly securitized

 Overall, the regional contributions broadly support the role profile projected by the EU in its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy. The role conceptions most strongly supported by observers are those associated with multilateralism, regional cooperation, development assistance, and economic connectivity. At the same time, however, the chapters reveal growing doubts about the effectiveness of the EU’s normative agenda, as well as its ability to convert its economic and developmental presence into meaningful geopolitical influence.

Most significantly, perhaps, the findings reinforce the relevance of the four role conceptions introduced by Caffarena and Gabusi (see Table 1). The EU is consistently perceived as an Effective Multilateralist/Responsible State, a Developer, and a Globalization Surfer/Economic Networker, while its role as a Principled Actor remains visible but increasingly contested. More traditional role conceptions associated with power projection, alliance politics, or regional leadership play a comparatively limited role in how the EU is perceived externally. Overall, the authors suggest that the EU’s contemporary identity in the Indo-Pacific is primarily that of a cooperative, multilateral, and economically connected actor, albeit one whose geopolitical influence remains constrained by questions of strategic credibility and effectiveness.

France – the Resident Power

As a European and Indo-Pacific nation, France perceives itself as uniquely positioned in the region. France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, whose initial orientations date back to 2018 under President Macron, was formalised in an interministerial public communication document first published in 2021 and updated in 2022. It was updated again in 2025, in parallel with the French national strategic review, to reflect recent geopolitical upheavals, acknowledge the progress made in its implementation and adjust its priorities.^[39]

According to Krot’s seminal analysis^[40], France’s enduring NRC is that of a Residual World Power. Deeply rooted in long-standing historical narratives of national grandeur, rank, and international prestige, this role conception portrays France as an autonomous and globally relevant actor with both the right and the responsibility to shape international affairs. Its core components are independence, understood as the capacity to make sovereign decisions without excessive reliance on allies; activism, reflected in a willingness to influence international developments and employ military power when necessary; and global presence, sustained by worldwide diplomatic, military, and territorial engagements.^[41] As we will see below, many elements remains present in the latest strategy towards the Indo-Pacific.

Table 6 – French Role Conceptions in the Indo-Pacific Strategy (2025)

NRC	Evidence from the Strategy	Salience
Regional Protector	France presents itself as a security provider committed to protecting maritime routes, regional stability, freedom of navigation, and security in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.	High
Regional Leader	France explicitly seeks to shape regional governance, support regional organizations, lead European engagement, and act as a driving force behind EU Indo-Pacific initiatives.	High
Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State	Strong support for ASEAN centrality, regional organisations, international law, UNCLOS, and multilateral governance mechanisms.	High
Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Active participation in ASEAN, Pacific Islands Forum, Indian Ocean Commission, IORA, and numerous regional cooperation frameworks.	High
Principled Actor	Repeated emphasis on sovereignty, international law, freedom of navigation, multilateralism, climate commitments, and rules-based order.	High
Bridge	France portrays itself as a connector between Europe and the Indo-Pacific and promotes “sovereignty partnerships” linking both regions.	Medium-High
Developer	Extensive references to AFD financing, climate adaptation, health, infrastructure, education, scientific cooperation, and sustainable development projects.	Medium-High
Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker	Strong focus on connectivity, infrastructure corridors, supply-chain diversification, energy security, trade agreements, and strategic economic partnerships.	Medium-High
Faithful Ally	Cooperation with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, India, Japan and other like-minded partners.	Medium
Cultural Power	Promotion of academic exchanges, scientific cooperation, mobility programmes, French research institutes, and people-to-people contacts.	Medium

France’s Roles in the Indo-Pacific

The analysis of the authors’ views suggests that France’s role profile in the Indo-Pacific is characterised above all by its self-perception and external recognition as a “Regional Protector” and “Regional Leader”. Unlike most European actors, France is consistently portrayed as a resident power with sovereign territories, a permanent military presence, and direct security interests in the region. Paco Milhiet, for example, identifies exercising sovereignty over France’s overseas territories and developing strategic partnerships as the two pillars of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy.^[42] Similarly, Céline Pajon emphasises that France’s territorial presence and extensive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) provide the principal source of legitimacy for its role in the region.^[43]

France also emerges as a “Regional-Subsystem Collaborator”. Several authors highlight Paris’s active engagement with regional institutions and cooperation frameworks, including ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Commission, the Pacific Community, and the Pacific Islands Forum. Milhiet describes the growing importance of Southeast Asia in French diplomacy, referring to a broader “French ASEAN pivot,” while Céline Pajon underlines the increasing integration of France’s overseas territories into regional governance mechanisms.^[44]

A further prominent role is that of “Bridge”. France is frequently depicted as a connector between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, leveraging its dual identity as both a European power and a resident Indo-Pacific actor. Milhiet argues that France is increasingly seeking to translate its bilateral partnerships into a broader European presence in the region, acting as a catalyst for stronger EU engagement in Southeast Asia.^[45]

Elements of the Effective Multilateralist/Responsible State role conception are also clearly visible. Both Milhiet and Köllner and Schramm emphasise France’s commitment to multilateral cooperation, its backing of regional institutions, and its defence of a rules-based international order. However, these multilateral commitments are generally presented as complementary to, rather than an alternative to, France’s broader strategic ambitions.^[46]

Other role conceptions appear with lower salience. France’s network of partnerships with India, Japan, Australia, the United States and a growing number of Southeast Asian countries reflects aspects of the “Faithful Ally” role, although Milhiet notes that these relationships are often pragmatic and transactional rather than purely ideological.^[47] Likewise, elements of the Globalization Surfer/Economic Networker role emerge through references to trade, connectivity, economic diversification, and defence-industrial cooperation.^[48] Finally, traces of the Principled Actor role can be found in recurring references to sovereignty, international law, and the rules-based order. However, several authors suggest that French diplomacy adopts a flexible and pragmatic interpretation of these principles when pursuing its regional objectives.

Overall, the chapters portray France as a considerably more geopolitical and security-oriented actor than the European Union as a whole. As Köllner and Schramm observe, security and defence issues occupy a much more central place in French Indo-Pacific thinking than in German or broader European approaches.^[49] France therefore combines EU-style role conceptions associated with multilateralism and partnership-building with more traditional roles centred on sovereignty, leadership, and security provision. The resulting profile is that of a resident power that seeks not only to participate in regional governance, but also to shape it.

Table 7 – Aggregate Role Profile of France in the Indo-Pacific

Macro-category	NRCs	Salience
Security	Regional Protector; Faithful Ally	Very High
Leadership	Regional Leader	Very High
Mediation and Cooperation	Regional-Subsystem Collaborator; Bridge	High
Multilateral and Cultural Roles	Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State	High
Normative and Ideological Roles	Principled Actor	Medium-High
Development and Economic Relations	Developer; Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker	Medium-High
Autonomy	Active Independent (implicit)	Medium-High

Germany – the Pragmatic Liberal 

First and foremost, Germany presents itself as a commercial and multilateral power committed to preserving an open international order and avoiding bloc politics or containment strategies. Although security considerations are clearly present in the strategy, they remain subordinate to broader objectives, such as safeguarding the rules-based international order, protecting maritime trade routes and supply chains, and promoting regional stability. Rather than seeking to project power or exert geopolitical influence for its own sake, Germany primarily frames its engagement in the Indo-Pacific in terms of cooperation, economic interdependence, multilateral governance and maintaining an open and stable regional environment.^[50] These ideas align with the long-term NRC identified in the literature.^[51] Rooted in the historical legacies of World War II and the Shoah, these role conceptions – particularly that of “Civilian Power” – emphasise multilateralism, international law, predictability and responsibility, while maintaining a highly restrictive attitude toward the unilateral use of military force. Consequently, German foreign policy has long been characterised by a preference for institutional cooperation, alliance frameworks, and strengthening a rules-based international order.^[52]

 

Table 8 – Germany Role Conceptions in the Indo-Pacific Guidelines (2020)

NRC	Evidence from the Strategy	Salience
Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State	Multilateralism constitutes the organizing principle of the entire strategy. Germany emphasizes ASEAN centrality, the UN system, the WTO, WHO, G20, the Alliance for Multilateralism, and regional institutions.	Very High
Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker	Strong focus on open markets, free trade, connectivity, global value chains, diversification of economic relations, digital transformation, and trade agreements.	High
Principled Actor	Repeated references to human rights, democracy, rule of law, international law, UNCLOS, sustainability, and the rules-based international order.	High
Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Extensive engagement with ASEAN, ASEAN-centred institutions, IORA, BIMSTEC, PIF, ASEM and other regional frameworks.	High
Developer	Strong emphasis on development cooperation, climate finance, capacity-building, sustainable development, environmental protection and governance assistance.	High
Bridge	Germany explicitly presents itself as a connector between Europe and Asia and repeatedly frames its engagement through the EU and EU-ASEAN relations.	Medium-High
Active Independent	Germany rejects both hegemonic and bipolar structures and emphasizes diversification, strategic autonomy, and freedom of choice for regional partners.	Medium-High
Protective Security Role	Security engagement exists through maritime security, anti-piracy operations, sanctions monitoring, defence cooperation, and capacity-building. However, security remains subordinate to broader multilateral objectives.	Medium
Faithful Ally	Cooperation with like-minded democracies such as Japan, Australia, South Korea and India is repeatedly emphasized.	Medium
Example	Germany promotes its own governance standards in areas such as sustainable development, human rights, climate policy, vocational training, and rule of law assistance.	Medium

Germany’s Roles in the Indo-Pacific

Germany’s role profile in the Indo-Pacific, as it emerges from the chapters, is primarily that of an Effective Multilateralist/Responsible State. Wacker stresses that Germany’s Indo-Pacific Guidelines were conceived as an inclusive framework and as a contribution to a broader EU strategy rather than as a strategy to contain China.^[53] This confirms Germany’s preference for multilateralism, institutional cooperation, and EU coordination.

A second central NRC is that of Globalization Surfer/Economic Networker. Several authors underline that Germany’s engagement remains strongly shaped by trade, supply chains, economic security, and the need to diversify relations beyond China. Wacker demonstrates how Germany’s China-centred approach has gradually evolved toward de-risking and diversification, whereas Linda Liang argues that the Merz administration has maintained this trajectory, while adding a stronger security framing.^[54]

The contributors also confirm Germany’s role as a Principled Actor, albeit in a cautious and pragmatic manner. Germany consistently refers to international law, human rights, the rules-based order, freedom of navigation, and the peaceful management of disputes. However, Wacker also reveals that Berlin has often tried to avoid openly confronting China, highlighting the tension between normative commitments and economic pragmatism.^[55]

Germany also emerges as a “Regional-Subsystem Collaborator”. Köllner and Schramm emphasise that Germany’s approach is closely aligned with the EU framework, relying on cooperation with regional institutions and partners rather than unilateral power projection.^[56] This distinguishes Germany from France, as France acts as a resident power while Germany operates mainly through partnerships, multilateral formats, and institutional engagement.

A more recent development concerns the emergence of a limited “Protective Security Role”. Liang and Hörning both show that, since 2020, Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement has become more security-oriented, especially through naval deployments, military exercises, defence cooperation, liaison officers, and partnerships with Japan, Australia, India, Singapore and South Korea.^[57] Yet this remains a constrained and carefully calibrated role, far from the French model of a regional security provider.

Finally, Germany exhibits elements of both “Active Independent” and “Faithful Ally”. On the one hand, Berlin seeks to reduce overdependence on China and preserve room for manoeuvre; on the other, it increasingly cooperates with “like-minded” partners such as Japan, Australia, South Korea and India. In Young Min’s analysis through Korean eyes confirms that Germany is perceived as part of a broader European engagement with Asia, but not as a hard security actor comparable to the United States.^[58]

Overall, the chapters portray Germany as a multilateral, economic, normative, and increasingly security-aware actor. Unlike France, Germany does not present itself as a resident power or regional leader. Instead, its Indo-Pacific role is built around multilateral governance, economic diversification, rules-based cooperation and selective security engagement.

Table 9 – Aggregate role profile of Germany in the Indo-Pacific

Macro-category	NRCs	Salience
Multilateral and Cultural Roles	Effective Multilateralist / Responsible State	Very High
Development and Economic Relations	Globalization Surfer / Economic Networker; Developer	Very High
Normative and Ideological Roles	Principled Actor; Example	High
Mediation and Cooperation	Regional-Subsystem Collaborator; Bridge	High
Autonomy	Active Independent	Medium-High
Security	Protective Security Role	Medium
Alliance	Faithful Ally	Medium
Leadership	—	Low

 

Conclusions

As shown in Table 10, a comparison of the Indo-Pacific Strategies of the European Union, France and Germany reveals a closer alignment between Berlin and Brussels. In both cases, normative and multilateral roles, together with the salience of economic relations, feature prominently. Conversely, while France acknowledges that a commitment to multilateralism is essential for any meaningful European approach to the region, it sees itself – as a resident power – to be playing a role of leader in shaping the security environment in the Indo-Pacific.

Unsurprisingly, all three actors highly value a role of mediation and cooperation, as none of them would benefit from serious crises in the region, possibly involving clashes between the United States and China. Given the increased security risk posed by great power competition, it is no surprise that, following the adoption of its strategy, Germany has turned increasingly to military projection in the Indo-Pacific, mainly as a signalling exercise. However, in doing so, Berlin has diluted its normative role, which had already been tarnished by its very significant trade relationship with China, a country not known for its respect of human rights or its true commitment to a level-playing, rules-based international order. However, the Indo-Pacific is not a priority for Germany, and hence the resources devoted to military and security-providing missions and operations can only be scarce, with the consequences highlighted by Emanuele Ballestracci as Europe’s “deteriorating security environment, structural constraints on defence integration, and strained transatlantic relations raise questions about the long-term viability of its emerging role as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific”.^[59]

Furthermore, the resurgence of industrial policies in Europe – including at the EU level, with the European Commission’s proposal of the Industrial Accelerator Act – is also undermining the continent’s perceived commitment to defending an open, liberal trade and investment order. These dynamics generate confusion among regional partners: while they – being mostly middle powers – appreciate the EU’s commitment to a rules-based order, they wonder how effectively an inward-looking EU can fulfil this role in a rapidly deteriorating security environment. Looking at the two most significant Member States, they will find a liberal power whose economic relations with a neo-authoritarian and assertive China have limited its normative stance (Germany), and a possible security provider constrained by economic and political malaise (France). For historical reasons, France and Germany have significantly different approaches to the Indo-Pacific, preventing a common approach to the region. The question we posed at the beginning of the chapter about the need to clarify roles to play still remains unanswered. Rather than multiplying formal national strategies – now including even those of small states like Lithuania – European Member States should agree at the EU level on what roles the Europeans should focus on in the Indo-Pacific in order to be perceived as credible. In fact, a dispersion of roles, accompanied by a relative lack of resources inevitably leads to scarce credibility, which, in turn, would make foreign policy ineffective.^[60]

Table 10 – Comparative Aggregate Role Profile of the EU, France and Germany in the Indo-Pacific

Macro-category	European Union	France	Germany
Leadership	Low-Medium	Very High	Low
Security	Medium	Very High	Medium
Autonomy	Low	Medium-High	Medium-High
Alliance	Medium	Medium	Medium
Mediation and Cooperation	High	High	High
Development and Economic Relations	Very High	Medium-High	Very High
Normative and Ideological Roles	Very High	Medium-High	High
Multilateral and Cultural Roles	Very High	High	Very High

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^[1] European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2021) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The Indo-Pacific strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, JOIN (2021) 29 Final, 16 September, available online.

^[2] Gabusi, G. (2025) “Introduction”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) Indo-Pacific Outlooks: Implications for the EU-ASEAN Relationship and Italy’s Role in Southeast Asia, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 5-11, available online.

^[3] Holsti, K. (1970) “National Role Conceptions in the study of foreign policy”, International Studies Quarterly,14(3), 233-309.

^[4] Caffarena, A., Gabusi, G. (2017) “Making sense of a changing world: foreign policy ideas and Italy’s National Role Conceptions after 9/11”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica/Italian Political Science Review, 47(2), 125-147; Gabusi, G., Caffarena, A. (2025) “Changing and yet the same? Italy’s foreign policy ideas and National Role Conceptions in a populist age”, Contemporary Italian Politics, 17(3), 314–335.

^[5] Aggestam, L. (2006) “Role theory and European foreign policy a framework of analysis” in Elgström, O., Smith, M. (eds) The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, Abingdon: Routledge, 11-29.

^[6] Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T. (2014) The Foreign Policy of the European Union (2nd ed.), London: Bloomsbury Academic, 18-19.

^[7] Orenstein, M. A., Kelemen, R. D. (2017) “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(1), 87–102.

^[8] Elgström, O., Smith, M. (2006) “Introduction”, in Elgström, O., Smith, M. (eds) The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, Abingdon: Routledge, 1-10, 1.

^[9] Ibidem, 2.

^[10] Ibidem, 2-3; Allen, D., Smith, M. (1990) ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’, Review of International Affairs, 16, 19–37; Duchêne, F. (1972) “Europe’s Role in World Peace”, in Mayne, R. (ed.) Europe Tomorrow, London: Collins, 32–47; Manners, I. (2002) “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2), 235–258.

^[11] Ibidem.

^[12] Aggestam, L. (2006) “Role theory and European foreign policy a framework of analysis” in Elgström, O., Smith, M. (eds) The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, Abingdon: Routledge, 11-29.

^[13] Gabusi, G., Caffarena, A. (2025) “Changing and yet the same? Italy’s foreign policy ideas and National Role Conceptions in a populist age”, Contemporary Italian Politics, 17(3), 316.

^[14] Goldstein, J., Keohane, R.O. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, New York: Cornell University Press.

^[15] Gabusi, G., Caffarena, A. (2025) “Changing and yet the same? Italy’s foreign policy ideas and National Role Conceptions in a populist age”, Contemporary Italian Politics, 17(3), 316.

^[16] Holsti, K. (1970) “National Role conceptions in the study of foreign policy”, International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), 245-246.

^[17] Caffarena, A., Gabusi, G. (2017) “Making sense of a changing world: foreign policy ideas and Italy’s National Role Conceptions after 9/11”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica/Italian Political Science Review, 47(2), 136.

^[18] Ibidem.

^[19] Ibidem, 137.

^[20] Ibidem.

^[21] Elgström, O., Smith, M. (2006) “Introduction”, in Elgström, O., Smith, M. (eds) The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, Abingdon: Routledge, 6.

^[22] Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T. (2014) The Foreign Policy of the European Union (2nd ed.), London: Bloomsbury Academic, 127.

^[23] Michalski, A., Nilsson, N. (2019)“Resistant to change? The EU as a normative power and its troubled relations with Russia and China”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 15(3), 432-439.

^[24] Harnisch, S., Frank, C., Maull, H.W. (eds) (2011) Role Theory in International Relations, Abingdon: Routledge.

^[25] Neironi, R. (2026) “From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: geographical delimitation and the political construction of a mega world region” in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 13-32.

^[26] Grgić, G., Tercovich, G. (2025) “Shifting narratives? The EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific after the war in Ukraine”, Journal of European Integration, 47(1), 63-8; Michalski, A., Parker, C.F. (2024) “The EU’s evolving leadership role in an age of geopolitics: beyond normative and market power in the Indo-Pacific”, European Journal of International Security, 9(2), 263-280.

^[27] Reuter, F., Grare, M. (2021) “Moving closer: European views of the Indo-Pacific”, European Council on Foreign Relations, September 13, available online.

^[28] Fasulo, F. (2023) The Eu Indo-Pacific Bid. Sailing Through Economic and Security Competition, Milano:  Ledizioni.

^[29] European External Action Service (2025a) “EU and Viet Nam Upgrade Relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during President Costa’s Visit”, 29 January, available online; European External Action Service (2025b) “Fourth EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum”, 20-21 November, available online.

^[30] European Commission (2026a), EU and Indonesia Conclude Negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), Brussels, 23 September, available online; European Commission (2026b), EU–India Free Trade Agreement: Political Agreement Reached, Brussels, 27 January, available online; European Council/Council of the European Union and Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (2026), Joint Declaration on the Upgrade of EU–Viet Nam Relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Brussels/Hanoi, 29 January, available online.

^[31] Council of the European Union (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 8 December, available online; European External Action Service (2016) Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, available online.

^[32] Lafaye de Micheaux, E. (2026) “On the rise of Chinese aid in Southeast Asia: contextualized perspectives for European cooperation in the Indo-Pacific context After the fall of USAID”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 81-96.

^[33] Kwon, M. (2026) “Indonesian perspectives on European engagement in the Indo-Pacific: the case for multi-alignment”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 196-209.

^[34] Ibidem.

^[35] Bonanno, G. (2026) “Japan’s perspective on Italian and European engagement in the Indo-Pacific”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 182-195.

^[36] Kwon, M. (2026) “Indonesian perspectives on European engagement in the Indo-Pacific: the case for multi-alignment”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 196-209.

^[37] Lafaye de Micheaux, E. (2026) “On the rise of Chinese aid in Southeast Asia: contextualized perspectives for European cooperation in the Indo-Pacific context After the fall of USAID”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 81-96.

^[38] Van der Zwan, G. (2026) “The Indo-Pacific engagement: lessons from the Dutch case for Italy’s Indo-Pacific turn”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 167-180; Wacker, G. (2026) “China and Taiwan in Germany’s approach to the Indo-Pacific: evolution, but no revolution”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 138-151.

^[39] Gouvernement Français (2025) France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Paris: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 12 December, available online.

^[40] Krotz, U. (2002) National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared, Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper 02.1 Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies Harvard University, available online.

^[41] Krotz, U., Sperling, J. (2011) “The European security order between American hegemony and French independence”, European Security, 20(3), 305–335.

^[42] Milhiet, P. (2026) “From bilateral to European: France’s like-minded partnerships in Southeast Asia and the case for a coherent EU Indo-Pacific strategy”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 55-66.

^[43] Pajon, C. (2026) “The Oceania factor in France’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 67-80.

^[44] Ibidem; Milhiet, P. (2026) “From bilateral to European: France’s like-minded partnerships in Southeast Asia and the case for a coherent EU Indo-Pacific strategy”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 55-66.

^[45] Ibidem.

^[46] Ibidem; Köllner, P., Schramm, O. (2026) “Assessing Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement: what lessons for Italy?”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 152-166.

^[47] Milhiet, P. (2026) “From bilateral to European: France’s like-minded partnerships in Southeast Asia and the case for a coherent EU Indo-Pacific strategy”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 55-66.

^[48] Ibidem; Pajon, C. (2026) “The Oceania factor in France’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 67-80.

^[49] Köllner, P., Schramm, O. (2026) “Assessing Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement”.

^[50] The Federal Government, Germany (2020) Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific: Germany–Europe–Asia. Shaping the 21st Century Together, Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, available online.

^[51] Krotz, U. (2002) National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared, Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper 02.1 Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies Harvard University.

^[52] Ibidem.

^[53] Wacker, G. (2026) “China and Taiwan in Germany’s approach to the Indo-Pacific: evolution, but no revolution”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 138-151.

^[54] Ibidem; Liang, L. (2026) “Tougher talk, careful steps in the Indo-Pacific: Germany’s foreign policy under Friedrich Merz”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 122-137.

^[55] Wacker, G. (2026) “China and Taiwan in Germany’s approach to the Indo-Pacific: evolution, but no revolution”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 138-151.

^[56] Köllner, P., Schramm, O. (2026) “Assessing Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement: what lessons for Italy?”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 152-166.

^[57] Liang, L. (2026) “Tougher talk, careful steps in the Indo-Pacific: Germany’s foreign policy under Friedrich Merz”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 122-137; Hörning, C. (2026) “Germany’s security engagement with the Indo-Pacific: implementation of the 2020 Policy Guidelines in a changing strategic environment”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, forthcoming, 98-121.

^[58] Min, I.Y. (2026) “Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategy through Korean eyes: perceptions and prospects for cooperation”, in Gabusi, G. (ed.) European Approaches to the Indo-Pacific and Their Implications for Italy, Torino: T.wai – Torino World Affairs Institute, 210-220.

^[59] Ballestracci, E. (2026)  Is the European Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Already Coming to an End?, RSIS commentary no. 113, 25 May, available online.

^[60] Caffarena, A., Gabusi, G. (2017) “Making sense of a changing world: foreign policy ideas and Italy’s National Role Conceptions after 9/11”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica/Italian Political Science Review, 47(2), 125-147.

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• The Indo-Pacific and the European Approaches to the Region