[IT] Il mondo intero è da più di un anno alle prese con la pandemia da COVID-19, ma non tutte le regioni e i Paesi sono stati colpiti allo stesso modo. Diversi paesi del Sud-Est asiatico hanno cercato di limitare la diffusione del nuovo coronavirus, ma ciò è avvenuto a caro prezzo, tenendo conto soprattutto della dipendenza della regione dal turismo.
Change is a notable feature of our time. Indeed, we expect that the world we live in will soon be significantly different, as will our lives and the lives of the communities we belong to. Because of technology, because of environmental degradation and, last but not least, because of the influence of rising powers on the world economy and the rules-based international order, the adaptation required at all levels is of unprecedented magnitude. The vastness of the task can be translated into effective decision-making by organizations of various sorts, from states to companies, only if all of them engage change, make sense of phenomena that spawn innovation, and anticipate the often-multidimensional impact of those phenomena. In-depth understanding of relevant global issues and knowledge-based foresight are key to steering change according to one’s worldview, mission and broader, long-term aims.
In 2020 the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) moved quickly during a global pandemic to halt the spread of Covid-19, with impressive mobilization at local, national and regional levels. Across such an economically and politically diverse group of countries, some fared better than others. The response to this ongoing crisis highlighted several important institutional strengths across this region of 650 million people. It also emphasized the range of financial, cultural, strategic and administrative vulnerabilities within the ASEAN region. This paper explores the response to the pandemic as a framework for understanding how ASEAN may handle future crises. It presents a brief analysis of the potential for improved regional responses to damaging health, conflict and natural disaster scenarios. In this context, ASEAN’s tentative answer to Myanmar’s February 2021 coup is a critical example of the regional body’s limited capacity for large-scale collective response. As potential partners for crisis response in Southeast Asia, the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, and Australia are all relevant to this discussion.
Covid-19 offers an opportunity for rethinking the topic of China and global health governance. This paper first draws attention to the notion of “global health” by offering a brief contour of China’s contributions to solve the world’s health burden throughout modern history. The author argues that it may be wise for both developed and developing countries to view global health less as an extension of development aid and more as a public good. Assurance of health as a public good necessitates equity-based contributions by all. The paper then touches upon the renewed interest in linking health provision and national security, which pitches China as a competitor against established health industry leaders like the United States. International harmonization of the rules of trade in health products for emergency responses and the negative spillover effects produced on health provision by economic sanctions deserve continuous research attention.
How are global trade and investments in energy likely to be impacted by China’s pledge to reach carbon dioxide neutrality before 2060? How will countries need to respond to stay ahead of the game, or simply not to miss trade and investment opportunities with a net zero carbon China? This paper argues that the impacts of China’s decarbonization in energy trade and investments will be felt differently across the globe depending on countries’ environmental performance, the profile of their energy exports to China, and the availability of decarbonization plans domestically. Countries that have already started to roll out their decarbonization and are supplying non-fossil fuels to China are more likely to level up their bilateral engagement. Countries that have not yet started to roll out their decarbonization plans and are supplying fossil fuels to China are more likely to restrain, if not phase out, their economic relations with the Asian giant. This paper concludes that China’s proposal to achieve net zero emissions by 2060 could be the turning point for fossil fuel markets and the global energy transition, creating a future of mutual adaptation for China and its sources of energy supply.
