As the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) rolls out a digital yuan, officially designated as the Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP), monetary relations in China could be revolutionized. Digital currencies differ from both physical cash and traditional electronic payments in that they are digital tokens that use distributed ledger technology (DLT), commonly known as “blockchain”. However, unlike private cryptocurrencies, these tokens are official state-backed tender, issued in a centralized and regulated manner by central banks. The PBoC’s objectives for the launch of the DCEP are manifold, ranging from a substantial improvement of financial efficiency to the enhancement of state authority and supervision of monetary operations. This article explores the implications of the DCEP for the creation of new monetary relations in China and yuan internationalization.
This essay details how the United States has applied coercive financial statecraft tools on China and Hong Kong in 2020-21 and assesses the impact of these punitive measures. The tools include financial sanctions on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese officials, investment bans on Chinese companies with purported links to China’s military and pushing for Chinese corporate stock delisting from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The analysis shows, however, that large inflows of money from China, Asia and Europe into Hong Kong and Mainland financial markets have acted as offsetting portfolio investment, which have buoyed Hong Kong’s capital markets, and allow the targeted Chinese companies more capital and clout. Even though US divestment in the targeted Chinese assets has occurred, the net effect is that the US coercive statecraft measures are not working, and they are not having the disciplining effect on Hong Kong and Chinese officials, or on the Chinese companies, as intended. The policy recommendation is these coercive financial statecraft measures are actually damaging the relative global position of the United States and undermining the international economic order that has provided peace, growth, and stability across the Asia-Pacific region for the last five decades. The current US presidential administration and US legislators should rethink their policies and adjust.
interactions, including at times the investment activities of non-state actors designed to attain commercial objectives. This extended usage of the concept can in part be explained by assumptions and/or misunderstandings of the nature of Chinese international actors, and their relationship with the state. It also raises questions about whether economic statecraft entails something more than the normal day-to-day business of macroeconomic policy-making. But more than anything, it reveals a deep-seated distrust of Chinese ambitions, with interim commercial objectives – even when pursued by non-state actors – perceived as being part of a broader strategy of making China ever richer and stronger, and thus better able to pursue other goals intended to alter the nature of the global order. As one response to these perceived challenges is to offer national companies various forms of support and protection to fend off unwanted Chinese attention, it could be that one of the consequences of China’s integration into the liberal global economy is to make parts of that economy less (neo)liberal than before.
[IT] “La gente alla radio parla costantemente di diritti delle donne, ma la verità è che le donne possono far valere i propri diritti solamente se hanno anche una voce a livello socioeconomico. Se non hanno fonti di reddito, come possono distinguersi, come possono sentirsi forti? Loro sono tipicamente più povere degli uomini. È molto importante quindi che noi difensori dei diritti umani lavoriamo duramente per dare potere a queste donne socialmente ed economicamente, dotandole di competenze che possano aiutarle a difendersi da sole. In una situazione in cui riescono a malapena a sopravvivere, dare loro competenze e formazione può renderle meno vulnerabili. Le donne che non hanno potere economico, non hanno via di fuga”.
[IT] Durante i 53 anni di conflitto civile in Colombia, almeno 32.092 persone sono state vittime di violenza contro la propria integrità fisica e sessuale, di cui 29.035 donne e bambine. Nonostante la richiesta da parte delle organizzazioni di rappresentanza delle donne di aprire un macro caso sulla violenza di genere durante il conflitto armato presso la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) – il Tribunale speciale per la pace – come avvenuto per la violenza contro minori, questo non è stato fatto per mancanza di sufficienti elementi giudiziali. E sebbene nel 2016 il governo della Colombia abbia firmato un accordo con il gruppo guerrigliero FARC-EP, non si può ancora parlare di un paese in pace.
