As Germany and other member states of the European Union (EU) have gradually developed their own strategies for the emerging strategic space of the Indo-Pacific, they have become increasingly important partners for regional actors, particularly South Korea. Germany, in particular, stands out as a leading European advocate of a rules-based and multilateral order in the region.
The Indo-Pacific as a foreign-policy construct has reshaped how Asian regional space is both defined and governed. From a Southeast Asian perspective, its rise not only reflects less predictable leadership of the US, heightened concern about China, particularly at sea, but simultaneously growing unease about how the US-China rivalry could destabilise the region and decentralise its existing regional institutions.
Japan has come to treat European participation as a structural component of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision rather than as a symbolic supplement. Confronted with an increasingly transactional US and with intensifying Chinese economic coercion, Tokyo is pursuing a deliberately multilayered strategy in which the EU provides normative and economic ballast.
The Dutch experience demonstrates that European involvement in the Indo-Pacific is centred on economic security, maritime security, and institutional partnerships rather than sustained military presence. At the same time, it reveals structural limitations, including a capability-ambition gap and the risk of symbolic security engagement.
Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement since 2020 illustrates both continuity and adaptation. While the original guidelines provided a flexible and inclusive framework, the evolving geopolitical environment has required gradual strategic recalibration. Germany’s experience offers no blueprint for other European actors, but it does provide several strategically relevant lessons.
