While China has in no way become less important from the German perspective (economically, strategically and in terms of global order), the assessment of Beijing’s behavior and aspirations has become more critical over this period of time. At the same time, Taiwan has cautiously been “upgraded” as a partner.
The German government under Friedrich Merz has announced a tougher stance on China and more European alignment on foreign policy. This article examines whether these rhetorical shifts have translated into a more strategic and coherent German approach toward the Indo-Pacific during the coalition’s first nine months in office.
This chapter paper assesses Germany’s security engagement with the Indo-Pacific in the five years since the publication of the 2020 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, asking how this engagement has evolved and to what extent Germany’s stated strategic objectives are matched by its observable behaviour and material commitment.
After long years of focusing on the African continent, the dynamics of China’s global expansion of foreign assistance have placed Asia at the forefront of Beijing’s priorities with the Belt and Road Initiative. Nevertheless, in Southeast Asia, traditional donors (Europe, the United States and Japan) have remained more generous, albeit increasingly less politically significant, until the demise of USAID in 2025.
Oceania was not a priority in the initial years of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as the region was largely treated as secondary to major strategic hotspots and key partnerships, while overseas territories were primarily handled as domestic issues and recipients of a top-down strategy. However, political, strategic, and geopolitical shifts in the region have progressively shaped and reoriented France’s approach.
