This paper assesses Germany’s Indo-Pacific Guidelines five years after their adoption, asking whether they can be considered a strategic success—and why they now require fundamental revision. The paper starts by putting Germany’s Indo-Pacific (IP) engagement in context, comparing it to France’s engagement in that strategic space. While Germany and France IP strategies are aligned in many ways, their engagement is not alike. France’s own engagement in that space draws on its territorial presence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Germany has no such territories and also no comparable colonial baggage. A strong economic thrust characterizes Germany’s IP engagement while military aspects have only taken on more importance in recent years. France’s approach to the IP has been more shaped by military strategic considerations. Arms sales to the IP also matter much more to France than to Germany (though this is slowly changing, indicating a possible future convergence). We conclude this section by arguing that Italy’s IP engagement so far bears more similarities with Germany’s approach to the IP.   The second section of the paper zooms in on Germany’s 2020 Guidelines and the implementation thereof. It argues that the 2020 Guidelines functioned less as a classical strategy document than as a strategic framing device: They helped decentre Germany’s Asia policy from an overly China-centric focus, mobilised a whole-of-government approach, and anchored German engagement in the regional order shaped by ASEAN, international law and open markets. In doing so, they enhanced Germany’s visibility and legitimacy as a cooperative security actor and promoted economic diversification as an early form of “de-risking without decoupling.” In sync with the Guidelines, Germany’s high-level diplomacy to the region (official visits of chancellors, foreign and defence ministers) have both intensified and diversified, becoming far less China-focussed. In terms of the actions area mentioned in the Guidelines, Germany has been particularly active between 2020 and 2025 in terms of first, economic diplomacy, second, security engagement/defence diplomacy, and third, multilateral diplomacy. The third section of the paper contends that the geopolitical environment of 2026 differs structurally from that of 2020. Intensified US–China rivalry, the weaponisation of supply chains, and the growing centrality of security alignment and technological competition have exposed the limits of a framework designed for a comparatively stable order. Against this backdrop, Germany is moving toward a more explicitly strategic Indo-Pacific posture under Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, marked by a stronger focus on India, upgraded engagement with ASEAN, and the integration of trade, raw materials and security policy. Recent high-level diplomatic travel and expanded security presence underscore this recalibration.

The paper concludes by situating Germany’s evolving approach within a broader European context, highlighting the need for Franco-German-Italian coordination and for an updated EU Indo-Pacific strategy that prioritises resilience, security and strategic alignment alongside economic connectivity. It argues that Italy would be well served by developing an IP strategy with distinct Italian characteristics.

 

Introduction

In this chapter we bring together the perspectives of a scholar and a practitioner who have been concerned with Asian and broader international affairs in the past few decades. We join forces to assess Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement to find out what lessons it may offer for Italy’s engagement in that strategic space. We do so by first reflecting on the concept cum strategic vision/narrative of the Indo-Pacific to understand where the thinking in Indo-Pacific terms comes from. In a second step we juxtapose the Indo-Pacific engagement of France and Germany as these two countries were not only the first middle powers in the European Union to develop a foreign affairs focus on the Indo-Pacific but were also both instrumental in driving the EU’s own development of a strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. But then, as we will note, France and Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagements differ in important ways. In a third step, we examine the contours of Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement to better understand the general thrust of this engagement in the first five years since 2020. In a fourth step, we discuss how the geopolitical and broader international environment in 2026 differs from that of 2020 when Germany’s Indo-Pacific guidelines were first issued. We also discuss how the changed environment gets reflected in Germany’s current approach to the Indo-Pacific. In the final section, we situate Germany’s evolving approach within a broader European context, highlighting the value of Franco-German-Italian coordination and the need for an updated EU Indo-Pacific strategy that prioritises resilience, security and strategic alignment alongside economic connectivity. We argue that Italy would be well served by developing an Indo-Pacific strategy with distinct Italian characteristics.

Notably, we understand the Indo-Pacific not as a natural region in any sense – it is far too vast and diverse for that – but as a socially constructed space connecting the strategic theatres of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean. Social constructions do not take place in a vacuum but reflect the interests of those who come up with relevant ideas. The Indo-Pacific has aroused the interest of strategic thinkers for different reasons for at least a century^[2] but the most recent Indo-Pacific turn has been propelled by the rise of China. Strategic thinkers and practitioners in Australia, India, Japan, and the United States became increasingly concerned after the turn of the millennium about the military dimensions of China’s inexorable rise and how an increasingly affluent and powerful China might come to dominate Asia, starting with what the country regards as some of it ‘core interests’ in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan straits. As a result, China would increasingly challenge the primacy of the United States which had built up in the wake of World War II a network of bilateral alliances, the ‘hub-and-spokes-system’, in the region, with the main spokes extending to Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia. Steeped in neorealist thought, the answer of strategists to the perceived challenge was to extend the strategic space in question, bringing in India with its resources (military and otherwise) to help balance China. The basic idea was the following: If China might at some point be able to dominate East and Southeast Asia, it would be much more difficult to dominate the entire Indo-Pacific region in which the United States joined forces not only with its traditional allies and partners but also India – which has its own sets of concerns about China’s rise and its growing engagement in the Indian Ocean region.^[3]

US and, by extension, European Indo-Pacific policies and their respective China policies are thus inextricably linked. The Indo-Pacific should thus be understood as a strategic space in which strategic competition unfolds between, on the one hand, the United States and its allies and partners, and China, on the other hand. While it makes sense to conceive of the Indo-Pacific in such geostrategic terms,^[4] governments which have used the notion of the Indo-Pacific, have often done so in a pragmatic manner, not necessarily embracing the strategic-military rationale of the concept. They have, for example, connected their existing Asia(-Pacific)-related policies and activities with a broader Indo-Pacific frame. Anxious not to antagonize China, several governments have emphasized the economic rationale of closer cooperation with the Indo-Pacific. (Although they could have easily stuck to existing Asia/Asia-Pacific monikers for that purpose.) Some Indo-Pacific strategies put out by governments have also put far less emphasis on balancing China than on cooperating with all partners in the region (including China and Taiwan), emphasizing the inclusiveness of the respective strategies. And notably, several states in the Indo-Pacific have not really embraced the idea of the Indo-Pacific idea at all, either because they understand it as directed against them – as in case of China (and Russia) – or because they prefer their own strategic visions of peaceful and prosperous development, as in the case of the Pacific Island countries.^[5]

France and Germany’s Indo-Pacific Engagement: Aligned, not Alike

One might be forgiven for thinking that France and Germany sing in unison from the same hymn sheet when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. After all, governments in Paris and Berlin were the first in the European Union member states to develop Indo-Pacific strategies. Both countries have also often acted in tandem to propel EU projects. And both were instrumental in driving, together with the Netherlands, the European Union’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific published in September 2021. In that sense France and Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategies are very much aligned. There is also a fair amount of similarity when it comes to the areas of cooperation that are envisioned in the respective Indo-Pacific strategies. Governments in Paris and Berlin have frequently emphasised the need to work together with Indo-Pacific partners to increase economic exchanges and cooperation in science and innovation; to uphold the rules-based international order and multilateralism; and to work together in tackling climate-change issues. Contributions to maritime security also feature in both French and German policy documents on the Indo-Pacific.

It is telling, however, that security and defence-related issues usually come first in French strategic documents on the country’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific^[6] whereas they feature more inconspicuously in Germany’s Indo-Pacific Policy Guidelines of August 2020. There, ‘peace, security and stability’ got listed third among the seven policy areas for cooperation, coming after combating climate change and protecting the environment in second place and multilateralism in first place. The prominence of the latter reflected not only Germany’s post-World War II European identity and its interests as a civilian and trading power but also the particular interests of Heiko Maass who first served as minister of justice (2013-2018) and then as foreign minister (2018-2021) in the last two grand-coalition cabinets led by Chancellor Angela Merkel.^[7]

Several reasons account for the much more pronounced military-strategic dimension in French policy documents on the Indo-Pacific than in Germany’s strategic directions for the Indo-Pacific – an emphasis that is also reflected in the fact that there is a separate policy document from the French Ministry of Defence concerning the country’s Indo-Pacific engagement.^[8] For one, security and defence-related issues have been of lower importance overall for Germany’s conduct of foreign affairs in the past eighty-odd years given the country’s resounding defeat in World War II and the ensuing identity of the Federal Republic of Germany as a ‘civilian power’.^[9] For France on the other hand, with its more ‘unbroken history’ and its claim to being a global power, endowed with a permanent seat in the United Nations’ security and equipped with nuclear weapons (the ‘force de frappe’), security and defence-related issues have continued to play a larger role since World War II. Concerns about China’s military build-up and corresponding threat perceptions also grew earlier in French military and strategic circles than in Germany where the main international security concern regarding China in the latter half of the 2010s seemed to be what the country’s rejection of the 2016 South China Sea ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) meant for the rules-based international order.^[10]

A related second reason for France’s stronger emphasis on security and defence related cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is that the country defines itself as a ‘sovereign nation of the Indo-Pacific’ or as a ‘resident power’ because of the territories it occupies there and their strategic implications.^[11] In contrast, Germany has no such overseas territories, having gotten stripped of all existing colonies in the wake of World War I. Germany does thus not share the kind of overseas obligations and also not the same kind of colonial baggage that France does. Notably, two of France’s overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, French Polynesia and New Caledonia – with the latter having been rocked in recent years by pro-independence protests and unrest – are listed by the United Nations as non-self-governing territories to be fully decolonised.^[12]

France’s strategic-military interests also manifest themselves in terms of a vibrant arms industry with global interests. In recent years, France has emerged as the world’s second-largest arms exporter (10 percent of global arms exports in the 2021-2025 period), trailing the United States (42 percent) by far but having overtaken Russia (9 percent) in the wake of the latter’s war on Ukraine. The largest recipient of French arms, including the multirole fighter aircraft Rafale (produced by Dassault) and the Scorpène-class submarine (produced by Naval Group), these days is India, a central actor in the Indo-Pacific.^[13] France had also won a tender to supply new submarines to Australia, another major actor in that strategic space.^[14] Indonesia has become a further major French arms-exports destination in the Indo-Pacific, with contracts for the delivery of 42 Rafale jets and two Scorpène-class submarines getting signed in 2022 and 2024, respectively. Additional orders may ensue.^[15]

Whereas Germany has also emerged as a major arms exporter in recent years with a market share of over six percent, having recently overtaken China as fourth-largest global arms exporter,^[16] the importance of arms exports pales in comparisons with other industrial products such automobiles, chemicals or machinery. Tellingly, business and political circles in Germany woke up to the threat posed by China’s rise in industrial and technological terms only when the big German robotics producer KUKA was taken over by a Chinese competitor in 2016.^[17] While a convergence of French and German efforts to act as major suppliers of arms to the Indo-Pacific cannot be ruled out in the longer term, military engagement in, including arms export to, the Indo-Pacific played a far larger role for France than for Germany until 2025. Germany deployed for the first time in decades naval forces (two frigates and a supply ship) to the Indo-Pacific and stepped-up Indo-Pacific deployments of the Luftwaffe (airforce) as well as some army units in the 2021-2025 period. As will be argued below, however, and despite the visibility of such undertakings, the main thrust of Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement has been of an economic nature.^[18] The Indo-Pacific engagements of France and Germany up until the mid-2020s have thus been aligned but not alike. The Italian government might draw its own lessons on what kind of orientation and priorities best fit Italian interests and preferences in the Indo-Pacific.

Germany’s Asia Policy Before and After the Publication of the Indo-Pacific Guidelines

Asia assumed ever more importance for Germany’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. In the heydays of globalisation, in the 1990s and early 2000s, trade and investment ties between Germany and Asia boomed, and especially economic ties with China, where five thousand German companies have set up shop, multiplied. In 2016, the People’s Republic became Germany’s top trading partner – a position it has held since (except for 2024, when the US briefly overtook China). Klaus Kinkel, Germany’s foreign minister between 1992 and 1998, was instrumental in driving the development of the first Asia concept of the federal government published in 1994. Subsequent foreign ministers followed up on this, culminating in the establishment of a separate Asia-Pacific directorate-general (DG), composed of several desks – incl. one desk for Chinese affairs only – in the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) in 2017. The new Abteilung has since been headed by a director-general, supported – until an organisational restructuring in mid-2026 – by two deputy director-generals at the ambassadorial level.^[19]

Under the long-lived Merkel governments (2005-2021), the number of high-level diplomatic visits between the two countries also grew by leaps and bounds. Merkel herself visited China in her capacity as chancellor twelve times between 2006 and 2019. (Compared to five such visits to Japan, four to India, and three to South Korea.) Merkel thus become the head of government in the West with most visits to the People’s Republic. Regular government consultations between the two countries were introduced in 2011 and bilateral ties were upgraded to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ level in 2014. Growing concerns about China’s increasingly aggressive activities in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan, as well the growing challenge posed by Chinese business competitors (supported by government funding and the like) led to a more nuanced view of China in Germany in the latter half of the 2010s. Notably, German business and political circles played a major role in the European Union’s 2019 designation of China as a ‘partner, competitor and systemic rival’.  Still, the German government pushed the proposed Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China, which eventually got put on hold by the European Parliament in May 2021 after China had reacted strongly to European sanctions placed on China in view of the country’s systematic repression of Uighurs.^[20]

The publication of Germany’s policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific in August 2020 reflected not only Germany’s more nuanced views of China but also the government’s interest in actively diversifying business and other ties in the region beyond the existing strong focus on China. Yet, the guidelines were marked by an inclusive orientation. Despite the apparent interest in the diversification of all kinds of links with the Indo-Pacific, the guidelines made sure not to exclude necessary or potentially useful cooperation with China.

The Indo-Pacific guidelines, a framing device for a whole-of-government effort to increase exchanges with that strategic space, brought the German nomenclature more in sync with those of its main transatlantic partner and ally, the US, as well as with that of Australia, Japan, and India, i.e. other proponents of the Indo-Pacific concept. Interestingly, it was however only after the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had published its own (inclusive) Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in 2019^[21] that Germany followed suit with its own guidelines – which played tribute to the much-heralded ‘centrality’ of ASEAN in regional affairs. That reference also reflected Germany’s support of multilateral structures in general and regional organisations in particular.

The reality though has been that Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement in the first five years after the publication guidelines saw concerted efforts to intensify mostly bilateral ties. This is perhaps no surprise as, fundamentally, nation-states have remained central actors in international affairs. Moreover, ASEAN’s effectiveness as an international actor has always been circumscribed by the Southeast Asian bloc’s tremendous respect for national autonomy. Whereas relations between Germany and ASEAN were elevated to strategic-partnership level early on, particular attention has been paid to both deepen and widen bilateral ties with regional heavyweights. For example, the first 2+2 exchanges (foreign and defence ministers) with Japan were set up with Japan in 2022.

As other chapters in this report do so, there is no need to detail here Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement over time or in specific domains. What can be noted though is the following.

First, whereas the Indo-Pacific guidelines list seven relevant policy fields ranging from multilateralism, and security via human rights and the rule of law, free trade, and digital affairs to culture, education and science, in all of which numerous activities have taken place (as documented in four progress reports put together by the FFO^[22]), the German government put a particular focus on economic (including digital) cooperation, and on defence diplomacy.

The economic thrust of implementing the policy guidelines becomes even clearer when one considers the strong efforts exerted by the German federal government – whether under Merkel, Scholz or Merz – to expedite free-trade agreements of the European Union with countries such as Australia (negotiations finalised in 2026), New Zealand (signed in 2024), Indonesia (negotiations finalised in 2025) and India (negotiations also finalised in 2026).

Second, there has been a substantial diversification of ties with Indo-Pacific nations as evidenced by intensification of high-level diplomacy (visits by the chancellor, the foreign and defence ministers, as well as the federal president). Whereas China clearly topped the list in the Merkel years, Japan topped the list in the first five years after the publication of the Indo-Pacific guidelines, followed by India and China. Moreover, since 2022 several German ministers have participated in the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the region’s premier security-related dialogue and networking platform.

Third, the Pacific Island Countries began to figure more visibly on the German foreign policy radar, also reflecting the confluence of the new Indo-Pacific thrust and the active climate foreign policy (Klimaaußenpolitik) championed by former Foreign Minister Annalena Bearbock (2021-2025).^[23] Germany joined the US-led Partners in the Pacific initiative in 2022, set up an embassy in Suva (Fiji) in 2023, Baerbock and her successor Johannes Wadephul visited Palau in 2022 and Tonga in 2026, respectively. In sum, Germany’s diplomatic ties with various parts of the Indo-Pacific have visibly deepened and become much more diversified since the publication of the Indo-Pacific policy guidelines in August 2020.

Germany’s Indo-Pacific Engagement in a Changing Geopolitical Environment

The geopolitical environment in which Germany’s Indo-Pacific guidelines were conceived in 2020 differs in important structural respects from that of 2026. What was originally framed as a broad, largely cooperative and economically driven policy approach now unfolds in a context marked by intensifying geopolitical rivalry, the securitization of interdependence, and increasing pressure for political alignment.

This transformation has become more explicitly acknowledged under the current German government led by Friedrich Merz. Senior members of the current German government increasingly frame the Indo-Pacific less as a space of opportunity than as a central arena of geopolitical competition, technological rivalry, and strategic positioning.^[24] This shift in language reflects a broader recalibration of German foreign-policy thinking.

Three interrelated developments are particularly relevant: First, the global systemic context has changed in ways that go beyond US–China rivalry alone.  While strategic competition between Washington and Beijing remains a defining structural feature of the Indo-Pacific, it is no longer the sole organising axis. The consequences of the war against Ukraine have significantly deepened European distrust of revisionist great-power behaviour more broadly, including vis-à-vis China. At the same time, the second Trump administration has contributed to a more transactional and less predictably alliance-driven US foreign policy, including renewed debates on burden-sharing, spheres of influence, and selective disengagement. Together these developments have accelerated Europe’s – and Germany’s – search for a greater strategic autonomy and diversification beyond traditional transatlantic frameworks. India, often perceived as strategically autonomous and comparatively China-sceptical while maintaining selective ties with Russia, has thereby gained additional salience as a partner of first resort.

Second, the weaponization of economic interdependence has further advanced. The concept of de-risking has replaced earlier, more technocratic notions of “risk minimisation” and now constitutes a central pillar of German and the EU foreign economic policy. Germany’s China Strategy of 2023 explicitly warns that dependencies can be politically instrumentalized.^[25] This shift has concrete implications: it has led not only to tighter investment screening and supply-chain diversification, but also to a more explicit linkage between China policy and Indo-Pacific engagement, especially in semiconductors, green technologies, and critical raw materials.

Third, technological and industrial competition has become structurally embedded in Indo-Pacific geopolitics. The strategic relevance of technological competition increasingly extends beyond industrial competitiveness to questions of technological sovereignty, industrial ecosystems, AI governance, cyber resilience, and dual-use innovation^[26]. For Germany and Europe alike, economic security and geopolitical relevance are becoming increasingly intertwined. As several analysts note, European actors remain constrained in their ability to project hard power in the Indo-Pacific.^[27] However, this underestimates that even limited deployments – such as German naval transits through the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait^[28] – have acquired notable signalling effects, including episodes of close surveillance by Chinese naval forces. These incidents underscore that even symbolic military presence is increasingly embedded in contested strategic environments.

Evolution of Germany’s Indo-Pacific Engagement

Against this backdrop, Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement has undergone a gradual but discernible shift. While multilateralism and inclusiveness remain guiding principles, policy practice has become more selective, interest-driven, and strategically framed. India has emerged as a central partner and is now explicitly described as a key actor in preserving a multipolar order.^[29]

This reflects both Germany’s economic diversification agenda and India’s growing relevance as a geopolitical counterweight to China.

Engagement with ASEAN continues to play an important role but is increasingly complemented by differentiated bilateral partnerships. The elevation of EU-ASEAN relations to a strategic partnership in 2020 has been paralleled by intensified bilateral engagement with individual ASEAN member states, particularly Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore. At the same time, German initiatives are increasingly embedded in existing European frameworks, including the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the Global Gateway initiative^[30], and sector-specific connectivity partnerships with regional actors. German Indo-Pacific policy is therefore no longer merely national in character, but increasingly nested within a broader European strategic architecture. However, the emphasis on ASEAN “centrality” often functions more as a normative anchor than as a structuring principle of German action.

Germany’s diplomatic outreach has also expanded significantly to the Pacific Island countries. This outreach reflects not only climate diplomacy but also growing awareness that geopolitical competition increasingly extends into the Pacific Islands, including in areas such as infrastructure, connectivity, maritime domain awareness, and strategic access^[31]. In this context, Indo-Pacific policy has also served as a signalling instrument – particularly vis-à-vis key partners such as Japan, where alignment on sanctions against Russia after 2022 was reinforced through intensified political and security dialogue. In this sense, the Indo-Pacific guidelines have not only structured engagement but also helped consolidate political trust among like-minded partners.

Security engagement has become more visible but remains limited in scale. Naval deployments are increasingly framed in strategic terms yet remain episodic. As SIPRI notes, European Indo-Pacific engagement is still characterized by symbolic presence rather than sustained military capability.^[32] In sum, Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement has evolved from a predominantly economic and normative framework into a more integrated approach linking economic, technological, and security considerations. However, this evolution remains incremental rather than transformative, constrained by fiscal limitations, institutional fragmentation, and a continued preference for multilateral framing.

Implications for German Policy

The evolving environment has triggered an internal debate within the German government – particularly within the Federal Foreign Office – on whether the existing Indo-Pacific guidelines remain sufficient or whether they should be replaced by a more explicit strategy. This discussion reflects a broader shift toward strategic prioritisation. As one internal paper states, “the time of framework documents without prioritization is over.”^[33]

Three implications follow: First, clearer prioritisation is required: The 2020 guidelines deliberately avoided hard choices. However, Germany’s strategic environment now demands clearer focus on key partners – especially India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and selected ASEAN states. This also implies a more explicit balancing between inclusiveness and selectivity.

Second, integrated policymaking must move from principle to practice: The distinction between economic, technological, and security policy is increasingly obsolete. The Federal Government’s concept of “integrated security” is a step in this direction, but operational coordination remains uneven.

Third, Germany’s strategic communication must become more explicit: A recurring tension persists between inclusiveness and alignment. While engagement with China remains necessary, Germany has become more explicit in defending its interests. At the same time, strategic communication increasingly requires clarity vis-à-vis partners and competitors alike, particularly where economic resilience, technological sovereignty, and security commitments intersect.

Fourth, strategic ambition increasingly collides with finite resources. Every frigate deployed to the Indo-Pacific, every diplomatic post opened, and every development programme expanded in the region necessarily competes with commitments in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

Germany’s Indo-Pacific policy therefore faces not merely a strategic challenge, but a fundamentally budgetary and prioritisation challenge. This raises a politically sensitive question: can Germany sustain a visible Indo-Pacific presence without dedicated budget lines? Thus far, much of Germany’s engagement has been financed through reallocation rather than through structurally increased resources.

Germany’s Experience Offers Several Lessons for Italy

The first lesson concerns strategic framing. Germany’s Indo-Pacific guidelines have provided a coherent but deliberately flexible framework. For Italy, a comparable strategy could enhance coherence and visibility, particularly given Italy’s already growing Indo-Pacific footprint.

The second lesson concerns diversification. Germany’s experience illustrates both the benefits and vulnerabilities of deep economic exposure to China. Italy has already encountered similar dynamics, including its recalibration of Belt and Road participation. A more diversified Indo-Pacific engagement – particularly with India and ASEAN – would reduce strategic exposure while expanding economic opportunities.

The third lesson concerns security integration. Italy’s strong maritime tradition and naval capabilities provide a natural basis for deeper engagement in maritime security cooperation, including EU-led and multilateral Indo-Pacific missions.

The fourth lesson concerns European coordination. The Indo-Pacific increasingly requires coordinated European approaches. Germany’s experience shows that bilateral and EU-level initiatives can reinforce each other, but only if strategically aligned. Italy may also draw on historical relationships that differ from those of Germany. Long-standing industrial and defence cooperation with India, strategic industrial partnerships with Japan – including participation in the Global Combat Air Programme^[34] – and a historically active commercial presence in parts of Southeast Asia provide Rome with assets that could support a distinctly Italian Indo-Pacific profile.

Does Italy Need an Indo-Pacific Strategy?

The need for greater European coordination in the Indo-Pacific has become increasingly evident. The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy provides a common framework, but its implementation remains uneven. France and Germany have played leading roles, though with different strategic logics: France is a resident Indo-Pacific power with military assets, Germany as a primarily economic and diplomatic actor. These differences are not contradictory but potentially complementary.

More fundamentally, Europe faces the question whether it can develop an Indo-Pacific strategy that remains compatible with transatlantic cooperation while achieving a greater degree of strategic and operational autonomy from US leadership^[35]. The return of more transactional tendencies in Washington has made this question considerably less theoretical than it appeared only a few years ago.

For Italy, closer coordination with both partners would offer significant added value, particularly in maritime security, infrastructure, and defence-industrial cooperation. Joint naval deployments coordinated diplomatic initiatives, and co-investment in critical technologies would significantly enhance Europe’s strategic visibility in the region. At the same time, the EU will need to update its Indo-Pacific strategy to reflect current realities: increased geopolitical fragmentation, technological competition, and the need for resilience-oriented policy frameworks.

Finally, Europe – and Germany in particular – must clarify what kind of power it seeks to project in the Indo-Pacific. European hard-power capabilities in the region remain limited, episodic, and geographically constrained. Yet Europe retains significant comparative advantages as a regulatory, technological, and economic actor. The more fundamental strategic question may therefore not be whether Europe can match military presence, but whether it can translate comparative advantage in standard-setting – whether in AI governance, green technologies, digital regulation, supply-chain security, or industrial norms^[36] – into geopolitical influence.

Conclusion

Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement since 2020 illustrates both continuity and adaptation. While the original guidelines provided a flexible and inclusive framework, the evolving geopolitical environment has required gradual strategic recalibration. Germany’s experience offers no blueprint for other European actors, but it does provide several strategically relevant lessons. For Italy, the development of a distinct Indo-Pacific strategy could strengthen policy coherence, enhance strategic visibility, and translate existing economic, industrial, and security engagement into greater geopolitical agency. Such a strategy should be interest-driven, selective, and embedded within EU coordination structures. More fundamentally, Germany’s own experience raises a broader European question: whether Europe is prepared to move from Indo-Pacific engagement to Indo-Pacific strategy – from presence to prioritisation, and from declaratory ambition to sustained political and budgetary commitment. This question becomes even more pressing in an environment in which American strategic leadership can no longer be assumed as a constant, while European hard-power projection in the region remains necessarily limited. Under these conditions, Europe’s long-term relevance in the Indo-Pacific may depend less on matching military presence than on its ability to combine selective security engagement with economic resilience, technological sovereignty, and the capacity to shape international standards. Ultimately, the Indo-Pacific has become a central arena of global politics. For European states – including Italy – the central challenge is therefore no longer whether to engage in the Indo-Pacific, but how to translate engagement into sustained strategic relevance under conditions of finite resources, competing theatres, and an increasingly contested international order.

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^[1] The authors thank Giuseppe Gabusi and Johannes Plagemann for their very useful comments and Vinzenz Fröhlich for his able research assistance. Patrick Köllner served as lead author for the first three sections while Oliver Schramm served as lead author for the following sections. Schramm is currently based as a diplomat in residence and fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. The views expressed in this chapter are his own and do not represent those of the Federal Republic of Germany.

^[2] Scott, D. (2023) “The return of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ ”,  Asia Maior 34, available online.

^[3] Köllner, P., Patman, R. G., Kiglics, B. (2022) “From Asia–Pacific to Indo-Pacific: diplomacy in an emerging strategic space” in: Patman, R.G., Köllner, P., Kiglics, B. (eds) From Asia–Pacific to Indo-Pacific Diplomacy in a Contested Region, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 1‒27. For a related understanding of the Indo-Pacific as a ‘macro-securitized constellation’ see Smith, N. R., Bacon, P. (2025) “The Indo-Pacific as a macrosecuritized constellation: revising regional security complex theory for the age of the Indo-Pacific”, The Pacific Review, 1–29, available online.

^[4] For discussions of how the age of the Indo-Pacific with all its geostrategic connotations and implications came to replace the age of the Asia-Pacific with its emphasis on economic cooperation and globalisation see Köllner et al. (op. cit.) and Higgott, R. (2026) “What is in a name? From the geo-economics of the Asia–Pacific to the geo-politics of the Indo-Pacific”, in A. Acharya et al. (eds) Essays on Global Regionalism I, United Nations University Series on Regionalism 30, available online.

^[5] Köllner, P. (2021) “Beyond ‘Indo-Pacific’: Understanding Small Pacific Powers on Their Own Terms”, GIGA Focus Asia, 5, available online.

^[6] Starting with Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2018) Stratégie française en Asie-Océanie à l’horizon 2030. See also the most recent edition of the strategy: Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2025) La stratégie indopacifique de la France, France Diplomatie,  available online.

^[7] Federal Government, Germany (2020) Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, Berlin, Federal Foreign Office, Germany, available online.

^[8] Ministère des Armées (2019) Stratégie française en Indopacifique, available online.

^[9] A term popularised by Maull, H.W. (1990) “Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers”, Foreign Affairs 69(5), 91-106. This is not to deny that arms deals played an important role in Germany’s bilateral relations with several countries in the Middle East and beyond since the 1970s.  For example, (West) Germany agreed to supply two submarines to Indonesia in the late 1970s. After German unification, no less than 39 of the ships of East Germany’s naval forces, including 16 corvettes, were sold to Indonesia. For a recent history of (West) Germany’s ‘deals with dictators’, see Bösch, F. (2024) Deals mit Diktaturen: Eine andere Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, Munich: C.H. Beck.

^[10] Economically, there were also concerns about China’s growing industrial-technological prowess, what this meant for German industry, and about the lack of a level playing field in terms of market access.  See Meijer, H. (2022) Awakening to China’s Rise. Europe’s Foreign and Security Policies toward the People’s Republic of China, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, chapters 1 and 2.

^[11] Jaffrelot, C., Plagemann, J. (2025) “Europeans and the Indo-Pacific: is there a ‘third way’ between China and the United States?”, 223, in: Allès, D., Jaffrelot, C., Köllner, P. (eds) Order and Agency in the Indo-Pacific, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

^[12] United Nations (n.d.) “Non-Self-Governing Territories”, available online.

^[13] George, M., Djokic, K., Hussain, Z., Wezeman, P.D., Wezeman, S.T. (2026) “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2025”, SIPRI,  Stockholm, 8 March, available online.

^[14] In 2021, the Australia government decided to abort the deal and to go, under the AUKUS agreement, for nuclear-powered submarines supplied by the US and the United Kingdom. The new agreement has been beset by numerous problems.

^[15] Strangio, S. (2026) “Indonesia takes delivery of first French-made Rafale fighter jets”, The Diplomat, 27 January, available online.

^[16] George, M., Djokic, K., Hussain, Z., Wezeman, P.D., Wezeman, S.T. (2026) “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2025”, SIPRI,  Stockholm, 8 March, available online.

^[17] Haupt, A. (2023) “Franka, Emika, Hamburger Hafen und Kuka: So viele Übernahmen von deutschen Unternehmen durch chinesische Investoren gab es wirklich”, Business Insider, 23 November, available online. See also Meijer, H. (2022) Awakening to China’s Rise. Europe’s Foreign and Security Policies toward the People’s Republic of China, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, chapter 5.

^[18] For an in-depth comparison of France and Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement see Jaffrelot, C., Plagemann, J. (2025) “Europeans and the Indo-Pacific: is there a ‘third way’ between China and the United States?”, 223, in Allès, D., Jaffrelot, C., Köllner, P. (eds) Order and Agency in the Indo-Pacific, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

^[19] Before, Asian affairs had been dealt with by another DG which also covered African, Latin American and Middle East affairs.

^[20] Meijer, H. (2022) Awakening to China’s Rise. Europe’s Foreign and Security Policies toward the People’s Republic of China, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, chapters 1 and 2. See also the chapter by Gudrun Wacker in this report.

^[21] ASEAN (2019) ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 23 June, available online.

^[22] Federal Foreign Office (2024) Progress report on the implementation of the Federal Government’s policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific for the year 2024, German, available online.

^[23] Hasenkamp, O., Köllner, P. (2023) “Die Neuentdeckung des Pazifiks: Möglichkeiten deutscher  Zusammenarbeit“, GIGA Focus Asia, 4, available online.

^[24] Federal Government, Germany (2025) Verantwortung für Deutschland. Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD, 128, 4070-4071, Berlin; Federal Foreign Office (2026) The Indo-Pacific Region, 30 January, Berlin;  Author interviews with senior officials of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, February-April 2026.

^[25] Federal Government, Germany (2023) China Strategy of the Federal Government, July, 9-12, Berlin.

^[26] European External Action Service (2021) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,16 September, Brussels; European Commission (2024) European Economic Security Strategy – Joint Communication on European Economic Security, Brussels.

^[27] International Institute for Strategic Studies (2025)  The Military Balance 2025, London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2025) SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

^[28] Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany (2024) Frigate Baden-Württemberg transits Taiwan Strait, Official Press Release, September; Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany (2024) Official reporting on the Indo-Pacific deployment of FGS Baden-Württemberg and Task Group, May.

^[29] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2024) Germany and India: Strong Partners in a Multipolar World, Berlin.

^[30] European External Action Service (2021) EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; European Commission (2021) Global Gateway Strategy; European Council (2022) EU-India Connectivity Partnership.

^[31] Federal Foreign Office, Germany (2026) The Indo-Pacific Region, official mission statement, Hasenkamp, O.,  Köllner, P. (2023) Die Neuentdeckung des Pazifiks, GIGA Focus Asia, 4; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2022) Joint Statement on Partners in the Blue Pacific Foreign Ministers Meeting, September 22, available online.

^[32] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2025) SIPRI Yearbook 2025, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm.

^[33]  Author interviews with officials of the German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, February-April 2026.

^[34] Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) Joint Leaders Statement, 9 December; GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO) (2025) Official update.

^[35] Fiott, D. (2025) “The three images of EU strategic autonomy: perspectives on wedging, binding and hedging,” Journal of European Integration, 47(3),  373-390.

^[36] European Commission (2025) “Global Gateway Implementation Review”, Brussels, available online; European Commission (2025) International Digital Strategy for the European Union, Brussels, available online.