In recent years, the international liberal order has undergone significant changes. In this context of extreme fluidity and unpredictability, two opposing camps have emerged. The first is led by the current US administration and opts for a “positional grand strategy” focused on deterring China. This policy stems from the belief that material gains in key fields are the best insurance against insecurity. The other camp, which includes the EU and other like-minded countries, has a different “philosophy of security” — one that leads to the adoption of a “milieu grand strategy” aimed at enhancing the collective willingness and joint capacity to address present and future challenges. The core of a milieu grand strategy is strengthening the order by increasing the level of international social capital through cultivating and institutionalising cooperative relations. As institutions built on cooperation between Member States, both the EU and ASEAN have much to lose if a positional grand strategy takes hold in Asia and forces countries to take sides. Moreover, ASEAN risks losing its centrality in the evolving regional order. Therefore, the EU and ASEAN should update their respective Indo-Pacific strategies with renewed ambition, aiming to reaffirm a rules-based international system capable of addressing the challenges of the 21st century and thereby contributing to the creation of a milieu grand strategy for the Asian regional order.

In 2021, the EU issued its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, a region it deemed “increasingly strategically significant” for Europe.^[1] Four years later, in a dramatically changed world — not for the better — the rationale behind this move appears even more compelling.

At the time, cross-regional economic interdependence was seen as a valuable achievement, and a key goal for the EU was to preserve and strengthen the networks of relations linking European countries and the EU itself to their regional partners, in order to benefit fully from their vitality and large populations. At the same time, the EU acknowledged that sustaining and developing such dense and complex relationships requires a set of generally recognised rules — and that strengthening this rules-based framework had to be part of any shared, forward-looking agenda.^[2]

Although this was widely regarded as a prerequisite for intensifying economic interactions, the institutional fabric of the established order was already under pressure at the time. Recently, it has become increasingly exposed to two disruptive developments. First, the increasingly harsh dynamics of international competition across political, economic and technological realms, with Asia being the most prominent arena. Second, the bruising policies of those who deliberately reject the idea that “international economic systems rest upon international political order” — thereby also rejecting the core rationale behind the kind of multifaceted “deep engagement” that Joseph Nye staunchly advocated.^[3]

Since 2021, two opposing camps have emerged — a development of the utmost relevance for Europe and Asia, with important implications for their future partnership. The first camp is led by the current US administration, which favours a “positional grand strategy” ^[4] focused on deterring China.^[5] This policy stems from the belief that material gains in key fields are the best insurance against insecurity in an ultimately competitive international system. The current transactional US foreign policy towards the whole world is rooted in this conviction. Material strength is what counts, and the environment in which foreign policy plays out is irrelevant — a belief that renders cultivating partnerships insignificant.

The other camp, which includes the EU and other like-minded countries, has a different “philosophy of security” — one that leads to the adoption of a “milieu grand strategy” aimed at enhancing the collective willingness and joint capacity to address a wide range of current and future challenges. Such capacity, and even the willingness of the actors involved, can only stem from a renovated multilateral international order that reflects inclusivity and fairness in practice. Thus, strengthening this order is central to a milieu grand strategy intended to increase international social capital by cultivating and institutionalising cooperative relations.^[6] The best way to enhance individual and collective security in the present world is considered to be a greater collective capacity to navigate a fragmented international system, marked by a very high level of uncertainty regarding future challenges and their possible detrimental combination.

The Centrality of the EU and ASEAN

As previously suggested, in light of these developments, the rationale behind the Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released four years ago appears even clearer and more compelling today. For the EU, the objective is not merely to establish a “special relationship”^[7]  with individual countries and various regional groupings in Asia. In 2025, the EU’s relationship with Asia is about partnering with a region that is becoming increasingly central to the international system. The EU^[8] is set to engage with Asia with the aim of jointly leveraging their respective resources towards the shared goal of preserving the rules-based international order. This is the true purpose of a grand strategy based on the broadest and most updated understanding of security, encompassing issues ranging from climate change to supply chain resilience. Only such an ambitious goal justifies the creation of a dedicated strategy — and, in particular, the assignment of a central role to ASEAN within it, with the EU fully endorsing the principle of “ASEAN centrality”.

The relationship with ASEAN has indeed deepened around a shared interest in the notion of ASEAN centrality. As early as 2019, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) emphasised that, in the region, “the rise of material powers […] requires avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation and patterns of behavior based on a zero-sum game”.^[9]  In response to this challenge, ASEAN doubled down on its efforts to maintain a central role in the evolving regional architecture. The aim was to ensure that the institutional infrastructure remained inclusive and capable of providing a strong platform for integration and interconnection across the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. This concept of “ASEAN centrality”, with its emphasis on cooperation, closely aligns with the EU’s grand strategic vision, providing the strongest rationale for mutual engagement in an uncertain and fragmented international system.

From a European perspective, the Asian region offers several key strengths towards the renewal of the international order, particularly in terms of its outreach potential. It is home to several influential participants in major global governance platforms, such as the G20. Notably, the two largest Asian powers, China and India, are key interlocutors for the diverse group of countries increasingly referred to as the “Global South”. India, in particular, played a decisive role in successfully advocating for the inclusion of the African Union in the G20. Its self-defined identity as a “Southwestern power”^[10]  underlines its ambition to act as a bridge between the Global South and the West — a role that could be highly valued by the EU and its member states.^[11] Indonesia is the most recent country to join the expanded BRICS+ grouping, which now comprises ten countries, all of which are aligned with pro-change agendas in different ways. The greater openness to collaboration with the EU shown by various Asian countries, as highlighted by contributors to this collection, presents a valuable opportunity to help heal existing fractures in the international system. This also aligns with the EU’s inclusive approach and its broader ambition to prevent the further entrenchment of fault lines in world politics, which are increasingly being driven by a recently reinvigorated zero-sum logic.

Asia — and ASEAN in particular — brings a growing capacity for constructive global engagement to its partnership with the EU, representing a valuable strategic asset. This is a critically important contribution to the global conversation on the kind of international system we want to live in and how to ensure the level of governance required for a functioning global economy. The EU can offer a steady and long-term commitment to filling the current leadership vacuum by sharing responsibility with Asian countries for providing essential global public goods, consistent conduct to anchor middle powers’ foreign policies aimed at stabilising and renewing the international order, and a willingness to reappraise its normative stance to allow meaningful contributions from Asian countries, especially on issues such as the respect of sovereignty.^[12]  After all, it was in Japan — a country associated with the “Global West” — that a scholar first proposed “localizing” the rules of the liberal order to make them more inclusive.^[13]  This approach builds on the idea of a more flexible — and potentially more streamlined — rules-based framework that could gradually raise expectations for accountability and effective governance among participating states. In a highly dynamic international system, change itself could work in favour of order, provided it unfolds within a collaborative and trusting context.

Implementing a milieu grand strategy based on mutual engagement implies that both the EU and Asian countries adopt a forward-looking strategy and implement the required changes to make the joint endeavour work. For ASEAN partners in the West, as Nicholas Farrelly argues in his contribution to this collection, this requires “embracing ambiguity”, since Southeast Asia often offers its own localised interpretation of political terminology, some of which borrowed from Europe.

A Weakened ASEAN Centrality

As the number of partners willing to engage with ASEAN grows, ASEAN centrality has become “a foundational principle of its existence and a guaranty of its sustainability and relevance in the web of complex power-play in the region”.^[14] Not only is ASEAN centrality a principle of diplomacy, but also – as Elizabeth Buensuceso argues in her book – “an aspiration to raise […] awareness about ASEAN”. In fact, ASEAN centrality encompasses three ambitions for the regionalism advocated by the organization^[15]: “forging a ‘Southeast Asia’ community”, “building a ‘wider Asia’, or at least ‘East Asia’, community”, and “attempting to influence the wider regional order”. The first ambition essentially involves defending the core interests of ASEAN; the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, which established the organization, explicitly aimed to avoid conflict and promote progress and prosperity among its member states.^[16] With regard to the second ambition, Astana Abdul Aziz and Anthony Milner contend that the AOIP has succeeded in mitigating the adversarial nature of the original Western-inspired formulation of the Indo-Pacific.^[17] The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which is open to signatories outside the region, exemplifies the third ambition. Multilateral frameworks such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is an attempt to establish a free trade regime based on regional rules involving ASEAN partners in both Northeast Asia (Japan, China and South Korea) and the Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), are also an example of this ambition. In short, ASEAN centrality relies on ASEAN leadership. However, as leadership is based on credibility, the gap between rhetoric and reality risks undermining the claim that ASEAN is central to the region.

ASEAN’s official documents, which are released periodically, are full of commitments to strengthening its role in Asia. For example, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999–2004), which operationalized the ASEAN Vision 2020, stated a commitment to “enhanc[ing] ASEAN’s role as an effective force for peace, justice, and moderation in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world”.^[18] The ASEAN Community Vision 2025 claims to “envision a peaceful, stable and resilient Community with enhanced capacity to respond effectively to challenges, and ASEAN as an outward-looking region within a global community of nations, while maintaining ASEAN centrality”.^[19] Finally, the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 advocates “a Community that sustains and reinforces its centrality through ASEAN-led mechanisms and other relevant platforms, leveraging its strengths in the peaceful conduct of relations among states, as well as in forging new and potential partnerships while ensuring substantive and mutually beneficial relations […] An ASEAN that remains a primary driving force in shaping the regional architecture and contributes towards a rules-based international order amidst geopolitical tensions and rivalries”.^[20] However, the same documents commit the organization to “upholding the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”^[21], exposing ASEAN to criticism for the discrepancy between its words and deeds.

The case of post-coup Myanmar in particular shows the tensions and contradictions between the principles ASEAN claims to uphold and the reality on the ground.^[22] ASEAN’s response to the 2021 military takeover in Myanmar, which involved the partial implementation of the 5-point consensus, is a critical example of the regional body’s limited capacity for large-scale collective action. Despite Buensuceso’s assertion that “ASEAN views issues like the situation in Myanmar as its own affair”^[23], it seems that ASEAN member states have signed a “mutual survival pact”^[24] based on non-interference. Consequently, ASEAN’s credibility and leadership diminish whenever the organization’s limited impact strengthens unpopular governments against the will of the people (contrary to ASEAN’s assertion that it pursues a people-centred approach). Moreover, ASEAN now faces crises that cannot be resolved through a strict non-interference approach. The spillover of the crisis into Thailand has made this clear^[25]: the idea that national political conditions can be isolated from international affairs, or put more simply, that peace can be preserved through domestic non-interference, is becoming increasingly untenable in the current regional and global order.

As order(s) become more dispersed horizontally, the proliferation of mini-lateral defence arrangements undermines ASEAN’s centrality in shaping its security architecture, while economic fragmentation undermines free trade — the driver of ASEAN’s growth. Consequently, “AOIP’s vision of ASEAN centrality and an inclusive region will remain an imagined illusion”.^[26] Indeed, ASEAN centrality rests on two pillars: significance and relevance. While the full range of ASEAN-led frameworks and forums, not to mention the organization’s efforts to promote free trade, establish ASEAN as a significant regional player, its relevance is weakening. In fact, two factors – one internal and one external – have changed over the past thirty years. Firstly, following the end of the Cold War, ASEAN membership was extended to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam: four autocratic, relatively poorer countries. The increasing diversity within the group has made it more difficult to reach a common position, i.e. the much-cherished ASEAN consensus. In other words, ASEAN has experienced enlargement fatigue. Secondly, the structure of the order has shifted from Cold War bipolarity to the unipolar moment in the 1990s and to the current multipolarity. ASEAN was established in 1967 amidst right-wing regimes and military dictatorships, serving as a counterweight to communist regimes and movements in Asia and aligning the organization with the West. There was simply no risk of it being caught in the middle of the rivalry between great powers. Things are different now. On the one hand, Southeast Asia is well aware that its prosperity has depended on economic engagement with China. On the other hand, most ASEAN member states do not trust their northern neighbour when it comes to security. Consequently, they have tended to look to Washington for reassurance — and, in the case of the Philippines, for an alliance. ASEAN’s fragile institutional structure cannot cope with growing tensions between China and the United States, and the very concept of ASEAN centrality has come under strain and cannot be taken for granted. While ASEAN may still be able to prevent war among its member states — a far from certain prospect, as recent border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia have shown — it is doubtful that it can help to preserve peace in the region unless it grows in ambition.

Keeping Faith in the Rules-Based International System: A Common EU-ASEAN Endeavour

According to the 2025 State of Southeast Asia report, the EU has overtaken the US to become the second most trusted nation in Southeast Asia, after Japan.^[27] Hence, conditions are ripe for renewed EU–ASEAN engagement. The question is not just what more to do together, but why and for what ultimate purpose. Although the EU and ASEAN are based on different models of regional integration and collaboration, they are both committed to a rules-based international system. The high level of tariffs levied by the Trump administration on exports from Southeast Asian countries has raised further concerns in the region. Therefore, due to its rules-based approach, the EU appears to be a much more reliable partner. However, for Southeast Asia to successfully “tilt to Europe”, the bloc must undertake reforms to increase its competitiveness while keeping its commitment to the international trading order.^[28] Despite uncertainties regarding ASEAN’s capacity to maintain its strategic autonomy, ASEAN member states seem to be in a better position to adapt to the power shift, drawing on their historical pragmatism and empowered by the global appeal of their thriving economies. In fact, as Anthony Milner argues, “flexibility in political and economic engagement — and a record of building inclusive relations and institutions — may prepare them to negotiate, and even assist in shaping, a post-liberal Indo-Pacific order”.^[29] The EU therefore has an opportunity to seize, but Brussels must be ambitious, too, insisting on ASEAN centrality. For example, while the EU has been pursuing bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN member states, it should never give up on the ultimate goal of achieving an inter-regional EU-ASEAN FTA. The EU’s desire to engage with the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)^[30] by exploring joint initiatives, such as standard harmonization and supporting the rules-based trade regime^[31], should not tempt it to sideline ASEAN as a meaningful interlocutor on trade issues.

While the previous cycle of globalization was based solely on cost and efficiency considerations, geopolitics, security, and supply chain resilience now matter too as we move into “a world of strategic interdependence”.^[32] Successfully navigating the upcoming cycle of globalization requires in-depth knowledge and the ability to understand nuances, subtleties and ambiguities. This is a necessary skill to ensure that strategic interdependence creates mutual benefits rather than new vulnerabilities. A common understanding of engagement objectives is essential for designing and implementing meaningful policies for both partners. To this end, ASEAN and the EU must therefore channel their propensity to adopt joint projects and diversify partnerships in the Indo-Pacific into a more structured, long-term institutional framework. To begin with, the EU’s four-year-old Indo-Pacific Strategy and ASEAN’s six-year-old Outlook on the Indo-Pacific are becoming outdated. In light of the significant changes to the global order in recent years, updating them could help generate a new focus while making the joint effort more explicit.

Most of the EU’s and ASEAN’s member states stand to lose a great deal from the affirmation of positional grand strategies in the hands of great powers. The EU and ASEAN should maintain their positive relationship, bearing in mind that their shared interest in preserving a rules-based international system capable of overcoming the challenges of the 21^st century could lead to the development of a grand strategy for the Asian regional order — an order in which countries are not compelled to choose sides.  Ultimately, this would mean that ASEAN is effectively central in the Indo-Pacific.

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^[1] This communication to the European Parliament and the Council followed a series of earlier EU documents dating back to 1994. The political relevance of the 2021 EU strategy lays in the fact that it was released alongside various national strategies, each presenting a specific interpretation of the Indo-Pacific and related challenges. In particular, the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific—developed during the first Trump administration and declassified in 2021—was centered on maintaining American primacy in the region by “preventing China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence”, available online. By contrast, the EU’s document formally expressed an alternative, inclusive vision. Regarding China, the EU outlined a strategy of “multifaceted engagement”: European Commission (2021) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Brussels, 16 September, 4, available online.

^[2] In the very introduction of the strategy the EU states that it “intends to increase its engagement with the [Indo-Pacific] region to build partnerships that reinforce the rules-based international order” as a means to addressing global challenges and sustaining economic recovery from the pandemic: Ibi, 1.

^[3] Nye, J.S. (1995) “The Case for Deep Engagement”, Foreign Affairs, 74(4), 90-102, 90. Nye’s reflection, moving from the claim that “our [US] national interests demand our deep engagement in the region”, was focused on Asia and was written in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The strategy of engagement, at the time, included China.

^[4] For the two variants of positional and milieu grand strategy see Ikenberry, G.J. (2008) “Liberal order building”, in Leffler, M.P., Legro, J.W., To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 85-108.

^[5] As it was stressed by Defense Secretary Hegseth at Shangri-la Dialogue on May 30^th 2025: Olay, M. (2025) “Hegseth outlines U.S. vision for Indo-Pacific, addresses China threat”, Department of Defense, 30 May, available online. A similar assessment would also be warranted for the Biden administration, which announced the trilateral agreement — between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States — to supply nuclear-powered submarines to Canberra on the very same day the European Union released its own Indo-Pacific Strategy. As Rosa Balfour wrote at the time: “’Cooperation, not confrontation’ were the words repeatedly chosen by EU High Representative Josep Borrell at the press conference launching the strategy. Soon after being presented on September 16, the EU’s strategy looked like a lone dove singing in a choir of hawks”; Balfour, R., (2021) “What the US-British-Australian Security Pact Means for Europe”, Carnegie Europe, 21 September, available online.

^[6] It is worth recalling that the essay Ikenberry devotes to highlighting the value of a milieu grand strategy is entitled Liberal Order Building. Ikenberry goes on to define the milieu variant, a grand strategy of “multitasking” insofar as it is meant to create “shared capacities to respond to a wide variety of contingencies”, Ikenberry, cit., 87-88. For this very reason, a grand strategy today should be seen as an “investment problem” (91), a conception in line with the idea of a deep and long-term engagement towards cultivating partnerships.

^[7] The reference is to be found in Baruah, D.M., Nouwens, V. (2025) “Europe and the Indo-Pacific: new opportunities for a “special relationship”, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 29 July, available online.

^[8] Alongside the EU as a whole, several of its member states have also shown increasing willingness to engage with Asian partners — as demonstrated by the publication of national Indo-Pacific strategies and growing parliamentary interest. Notably, in the case of Italy, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chambers of Deputies has conducted a series of auditions, published in Camera dei Deputati (2025) Indagine Conoscitiva sulla Proiezione dell’Italia e dei Paesi Europei nell’Indo-Pacifico, Rome, 12 March, available online.

^[9] ASEAN (2019) ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Jakarta, available online.

^[10] Jaishankar, S. (2019) “India would be a South Western Power, says External Affairs Minister”, India Today, 3 October, available online.

^[11]  On the strategic relevance of the so-called Global South for achieving Europe’s objectives, see Brender, R. (2024) In Danger of Falling Short: The EU, the Global South, and the Reform of Multilateralism, Brussels: Egmont Paper 127, February, available online. Brender suggest that the EU should address effectively the southernisation of the international agenda and reflect more carefully on what is needed, in terms of engagement with the Global South, to foster an effective renovation of multilateralism.

^[12] Indeed, some of the most compelling reflections on the renewal of multilateralism focus on how to reconcile national sovereignty — a value strongly held by many Asian countries — with the need for effective governance. In this regard, the “dual compatibility principle” proposed by Inge Kaul offers a promising approach to addressing this challenge constructively. See Kaul, I. (2020) “Multilateralism 2.0: It Is Here – Are We Ready for It?”, Global Perspectives, 1(1).

^[13] Nakano, R. (2023) “Japan and the liberal international order: rules-based, multilateral, inclusive and localized”, International Affairs, 99(4), 1421-1438.

^[14] Buensuceso, E. (2021) ASEAN Centrality: An Autoethnographic Account by a Philippine Diplomat, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 27.

^[15] Astanah, A.A., Milner, A. (2024) “ASEAN’s inclusive regionalism: ambitions at three levels”, Centre for ASEAN Regionalism Universiti Malaya (CARUM), 10 June, available online.

^[16] Tene, M. (2023) Remarks/Lecture by H.E. Michael Tene, Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for ASEAN Political-Security Community at the University of Turin, 6 December, available online. That is the reason why, by the way, the escalation of the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia has been a serious stress test for ASEAN centrality (and credibility)

^[17] Astanah, A.A., Milner, A. (2024) “ASEAN’s inclusive regionalism: ambitions at three levels”, Centre for ASEAN Regionalism Universiti Malaya (CARUM), 10 June, available online.

^[18] ASEAN (1998) Hanoi Plan of Action, Jakarta, Chapter VIII, available online.

^[19] ASEAN (2015) ASEAN Community Vision 2025, Jakarta, 13, available online.

^[20] ASEAN (2025) ASEAN Community Vision 2045: Resilient, Innovative, Dynamic, and People-Centred ASEAN, Jakarta, 17, available online.

^[21] Ibidem, 15.

^[22] Tucker, S. (2023) “Myanmar reveals ASEAN’s weak spot again”, Stimson Centre, 25 July, available online.

^[23] ASEAN-Japan Centre (2025), “ASEAN Centrality, the future of ASEAN, and prospects for ASEAN-Japan Relations: A Conversation”, Tokyo, 2 April, available online.

^[24] Farrelly, N. (2021) ASEAN’s mutual survival pact”, Inside Story, 4 May, available online.

^[25] The Straits Times (2025) “Hundreds of Myanmar troops and civilians flee across Asia”, July 12, available online; on the humanitarian crisis regarding Myanmar’s refugees in Thailand see for instance Hou, T. (2024) “Humanitarian aid practices on the Thai-Myanmar border after the coup: beyond depoliticization and inequality”, International Journal of Humanitarian Action, 9(16).

^[26] Yaacob, A.R., Donnellon-May, G. (2024) “ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific vision in troubled waters”, East Asia Forum, 5 September, available online.

^[27] Seah, S., et al. (2025) The State of Southeast Asia: 2025 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online.

^[28] East Asia Forum (2025) “The success of Southeast Asia’s tilt to Europe depends on commitment to regional reform and global openness”, 30 June, available online. See also Heydon, K. (2025) “Southeast Asia needs to ramp up its trade links with Europe”, 29 June, East Asia Forum, available online.

^[29] Milner, A. (2025) “ASEAN adapts and advances as global politics shift”, Centre for ASEAN Regionalism Universiti Malaya (CARUM), 25 February,  available online.

^[30] Four of the 12 member countries of the CPTPP are from Southeast Asia, namely Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam, together with Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, and the United Kingdom.

^[31] Foster, P., et al. (2025) “EU eyes closer ties to Trans-Pacific bloc as Trump jolts trade order”, Financial Review, May 4, available online.

^[32] Waldron, J. (2025) “Strategic interdependence is rewiring the global economy”, Financial Times, 12 August, available online.