This chapter will delve into the rationale behind the many bilateral and multilateral, often overlapping frameworks among the member states of the Indo-Pacific region, as well as those suggested by supranational bodies. Given the very nature of the Indo-Pacific and its ever-changing definition, the focus is on how the narrative is understood, exploited, and at times manipulated by non-Asian actors in order to gain leverage on the individual states. At the same time, the chapter focusses on how Asian states skilfully employ hedging to get the most out of the ensuing confusion. Notably, the role of Japan, geographically an Asian state, will be taken into consideration in this discussion, for the balancing power of its partly non-Asian geopolitics.

The Indo-Pacific region has become a focal point of global geopolitical and economic power struggles, driven by the rising influence of China, the strategic pivots of the United States, and the increasing involvement of non-Asian powers like the European Union and Australia. For many years, the region’s fluid geography and evolving political dynamics have posed challenges to policymakers and analysts, leaving the term “Indo-Pacific” itself subject to contestation. The concept, which in its broader definition spans from the eastern shores of Africa to the western Pacific, encompasses a vast array of states with competing priorities, different security concerns, and diverse economic interests. In such a rapidly changing environment, non-Asian states have sought to shape the diplomatic landscape of the Indo-Pacific to align with their strategic objectives. These states, particularly the United States, the European Union, and Australia, have cultivated relationships with regional powers through bilateral and multilateral frameworks at the same time. While these interactions aim to foster economic ties, counterbalance China’s influence, and promote regional stability, they also reflect deeper strategies rooted in the geopolitical concept of hedging.

Hedging—the strategy wherein a state attempts to simultaneously balance cooperation with an established or a rising power, while preparing for the potential risks posed by that power—has emerged as a key response to the uncertainty and complexity of Indo-Pacific diplomacy. In this framework, states do not fully commit to any specific bloc or alliance, instead opting for a flexible strategy that allows for adaptation as the geopolitical situation evolves. The notion of hedging is not only pertinent to regional actors but also to non-Asian states that are deeply invested in the region’s future. By participating in a range of often overlapping diplomatic, economic, and security frameworks, these states leverage their influence to ensure that they can navigate the changing power dynamics in ways that advance their national interests while staying connected with as many partners as possible.

While much has been debated about the role of Asian states in shaping the region’s diplomatic discourse, there is a growing recognition of the significant influence exerted by non-Asian actors as well. In particular, Japan—geographically part of Asia but heavily influenced by both Western powers and regional considerations—has walked a delicate line between aligning with its traditional allies, particularly the United States, and maintaining economic and security ties within Asia. This has made Japan an intriguing case study for understanding the strategies employed by non-Asian actors in the Indo-Pacific.

Understanding the region

The Indo-Pacific region has undergone significant changes in the last few decades, particularly as global power centres have shifted, and new regional challenges have emerged. Historically, the term “Indo-Pacific” was used primarily in naval terms, referring to the maritime space between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. However, over the past two decades, it has come to signify a broader geopolitical concept that encompasses a dynamic array of states. While initially dominated by Asian powers, non-Asian states—particularly the United States, the European Union, and Australia—have played an increasingly prominent role in shaping the diplomatic contours of the region. One of the central features of Indo-Pacific diplomacy is the complex web of overlapping multilateral frameworks and bilateral agreements that exist among states in the region.

One of the oldest and most significant multilateral organisations in the Indo-Pacific is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has served as a platform for dialogue and cooperation on a range of issues, including trade, security, and regional integration. ASEAN’s centrality in regional diplomacy is further demonstrated by its role in forums like the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which include not only Southeast Asian states but also major non-Asian powers, such as the United States, Australia, and Russia.

The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), established in 2007 and reinvigorated in recent years, represents another significant non-Asian involvement in the region’s security architecture. Comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, the Quad has become a cornerstone of regional diplomacy, particularly in the context of countering China’s rising influence. For non-Asian states, the Quad serves as a diplomatic platform through which they can collaborate on issues of regional security, freedom of navigation, and infrastructure development, all while hedging against the potential security challenges posed by an increasingly assertive China.

At the same time, the European Union has sought to expand its diplomatic and economic footprint in the Indo-Pacific through a range of initiatives. The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy underscores its intention to engage with the region in ways that align with its global values, particularly in promoting multilateralism, free trade, and climate action. Through its various partnerships, such as the EU-ASEAN cooperation and the EU’s engagement with regional multilateral institutions, the EU has sought to leverage its economic power and normative influence to shape the regional order. However, the EU’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific are often more focused on economic opportunities and regional stability rather than military engagement, which contrasts with the security-driven motivations of other non-Asian powers. In terms of military engagement, bilateral agreements are still more common.

Australia, which geographically straddles the Indo-Pacific, has long been a key player in the region’s diplomatic landscape. As a member of both the Quad and ASEAN-related forums, Australia has actively promoted multilateral cooperation and played a role in shaping the region’s security architecture. The country’s participation in the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) pact, which aims to strengthen defence ties, further highlights its increasing role in Indo-Pacific diplomacy.

Together, these frameworks and initiatives reflect the ongoing effort by non-Asian powers to shape the Indo-Pacific region to serve their own strategic interests. Through their engagement in multilateral institutions and bilateral agreements, these states influence the regional order by fostering alliances, promoting stability, and securing access to vital resources and markets.

However, the growing involvement of non-Asian actors in Indo-Pacific diplomacy has also led to the emergence of complex power dynamics. As these states continue to assert their influence, regional powers, especially China, have increasingly viewed their presence with suspicion. For smaller Asian states, the overlapping influence of non-Asian powers presents both opportunities and challenges. As a result, many of these states have adopted hedging strategies, balancing cooperation with multiple powers to navigate the uncertainty created by external actors and rising regional tensions.

 

Hedging in International Relations: Theory and Practice

The concept of hedging in international relations has garnered considerable attention in recent years, particularly in the context of the Indo-Pacific region. Hedging is typically described as a strategy employed by states to manage the uncertainties posed by a rising power, such as China, while simultaneously seeking to secure their interests by cultivating relationships with multiple actors. It is characterised by a dual approach: states may engage in cooperation with the rising power, while simultaneously preparing for potential adversities by strengthening their ties with alternative powers.[1] This strategic ambiguity allows states to balance the benefits of cooperation with the rising power, while hedging against the risks it may pose. Hedging differs in its intrinsic nature from other strategies, such as balancing or bandwagoning. While balancing involves aligning with a coalition of states to counteract a rising power’s influence, and bandwagoning entails aligning with the rising power itself to avoid conflict, hedging represents a middle ground. It is characterised by flexibility, allowing states to hedge their bets by engaging in multiple diplomatic, economic, and security frameworks. Hedging is often employed when states face uncertainty regarding the future behaviour of rising or established powers, or when they lack the capacity to fully confront or align with these powers. For example, Asian states, such as India and Vietnam, have adopted hedging strategies to navigate the growing rivalry between China and the United States, while non-Asian states like Japan, Australia, and the European Union also engage in hedging to safeguard their interests and maintain a strong influence in the region.^[2]

The motivations behind hedging in International Relations can be understood through a combination of theoretical frameworks, including realism and liberalism, as well as strategic calculations. Realist scholars argue that states engage in hedging because of the anarchic structure of international relations and the uncertainty that arises from power shifts.^[3] In this view, states hedge to protect themselves from potential threats, especially when the intentions of other powers are unclear or unpredictable. The rise of China, for instance, has led many Indo-Pacific states to hedge, as they are uncertain about the long-term intentions of Beijing and are wary of the risks associated with its growing power. Liberal scholars, on the other hand, contend that states hedge due to the growing interdependence in global governance, where states must engage in cooperation with both established and rising powers in order to maximise benefits.^[4] Hedging, in this view, is a strategy of risk management, as states balance the advantages of cooperation with the need for flexibility in case relationships deteriorate. In this context, hedging is not purely about avoiding conflict, but also about maintaining avenues for economic and diplomatic engagement, even while strategic options remain open. In practice, this manifests in various forms, including military diversification, economic balancing, and diplomatic engagement across multiple platforms.

For non-Asian powers, hedging strategies are equally prevalent, as they navigate the complexities of regional security and economic interdependence. More so in recent years and amidst tectonic shifts in power balance, hedging itself is no longer a survival strategy for small and middle powers, as it used to be acknowledged until not long ago. It has indeed become a necessary skill in the balancing act of regional and global positioning. A risk-management skill all countries nowadays must embrace in its entirety if they are to keep their place at the negotiating table. This goes for weaker countries at the crossroads as it does for economic and geopolitical superpowers.  The United States, for example, has maintained its military presence in the Indo-Pacific through alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, while at times deepening and at times straining its economic ties with China, such as during the latest string of tariff confrontations between the two countries. The United States’ involvement in the Quad also exemplifies this. The Quad serves not only as a security alliance aimed at countering Chinese influence, but also as a forum for broader strategic collaboration across the Indo-Pacific. By participating in the Quad, the United States hedges its bets: it strengthens its alliances with key regional players while maintaining its ability to engage in economic negotiations with other countries on different avenues.^[5]

Similarly, while the EU engages heavily with China on trade and climate action, it also works closely with ASEAN and other regional actors to promote a rules-based international order. The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy seeks to balance the need for economic engagement with the desire to shape regional governance and security frameworks. This is most evident in its diplomatic efforts to support multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and to foster cooperation on issues like maritime security and climate change.^[6]

Australia these days is giving another great example of how to employ hedging strategies to navigate the complexities of Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Through its engagement with the Quad and its defence agreements with the United States, Australia well balances its security concerns about China’s rise, while greatly benefitting from the recent trade war between the US and China.^[7]

In sum, the concept of hedging offers a useful lens through which to understand the behaviours of states in the Indo-Pacific. It provides flexibility in a region characterised by rapid change and uncertain futures.

 

Japan’s unique stance

Japan, while geographically situated in the Indo-Pacific, occupies a unique position in the region’s diplomatic landscape. As an advanced economy and a key democratic player in regional security, Japan has long been a central actor in shaping the region’s economic and political order. However, Japan’s role in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly defined by its efforts to balance between its traditional security alliance with the United States and its complex relationship with China, as well as its growing engagement in regional multilateral frameworks. On the one hand, Japan is a key ally of the United States, often behaving like a non-Asian actor in the context of the Indo-Pacific region, hosting pivotal US military bases, with its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) closely integrated with US military forces, and participating in various security arrangements, including the decades-strong US-Japan Security Alliance. On the other hand, Japan is geographically close to China, its largest trading partner, and has a deeply intertwined economic relationship with its neighbour. The proximity of these two competing powers—one an ally and the other an economic partner—compels Japan to adopt a nuanced approach to diplomacy. Japan actively seeks to strengthen its military capabilities through increased defence spending and participation in multilateral security initiatives such as the Quad and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus).^[8] These efforts are aimed at countering China’s growing assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, where territorial disputes are a topic of utmost concern for the Japanese public.

However, Japan’s overall engagement with China remains more complicated. Despite its security concerns, Japan maintains strong economic ties with China, recognising that its economic future is closely tied to the Chinese market. Regionally, Japan participates in the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA), is involved in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and it’s enthusiastic about its own Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), but bilaterally it is also a key participant in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and this multi-faceted interdependence was recently made even the more apparent during the first economic dialogue Japan, together with China and South Korea, held in more than five years last March 2025 as a direct reaction to US President Trump’s indiscriminate tariffs on friends and foes alike.^[9]

In addition, Japan plays a leading role in inviting other Asian states to pursue regional trade agreements that are independent of either the US or China, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Such agreements allow other Asian states to diversify their trade relationships and hedge against the potential risks posed by a slowdown in US or Chinese growth.^[10]

Japan’s role in the Indo-Pacific is thus defined by a constant balancing act between the West and the East, with its heavy involvement with organisations such as the United Nations, the WTO, but also the G7 and the OECD. This underscores its position as a global actor and demonstrates its desire to maintain a diversified foreign policy that avoids over-reliance on the United States.^[11] Even its growing defence cooperation with individual European powers like the United Kingdom and Italy, with a visionary project to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet by 2026, reflects its strategic interest in diversifying its military dependence.^[12]

 

The European Union

The EU represents another key non-Asian actor that has increasingly sought to shape the diplomatic, economic, and security environment in the Indo-Pacific. As a global actor, the EU’s role in the region has evolved significantly in recent years, driven by its need to secure its economic interests, address regional security concerns, and uphold a rules-based international order. However, its interest in the region still appears to be driven primarily by its economic and strategic benefit. The region is critical to global trade, with several of the world’s busiest shipping lanes passing through the Indo-Pacific, and it represents a key market for European exports. In this context, the EU’s relationship with China is of eye-opening importance. As its second-largest trading partner, China is a key player in Europe’s economic strategy. However, the EU is also increasingly concerned about China’s human rights record, its policies in the South China Sea, and its approach to global governance.^[13]

To manage these competing concerns, the EU has adopted a strategy that seeks to engage China economically while also confronting its more contentious policies. The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, adopted since 2021, outlines its commitment to deepening economic relations with the region while promoting sustainable development, climate action, and a commitment to a multilateral order. The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), proposed more than ten years ago and arguably one if not the most ambitious economic agreement between China and a non-Asian actor, is a clear example of shared willingness to engage economically, despite political and strategic differences. However, due to alleged aggressive behaviour by Chinese diplomats and public figures toward members of the European Parliament, the European Council’s Political and Security Committee, and European think tanks in general, the agreement has not been signed yet. With this regard, it seems as if the EU’s hedging strategy will not go beyond a certain compromise.^[14]

In terms of security, the EU’s hedging strategy is most evident in its commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific through multilateral frameworks. The EU is not a traditional military power in the region, but it has become increasingly involved in security cooperation, particularly in maritime security. It supports a rules-based international order over the seas, and it has voiced strong opposition to China’s militarisation of the South China Sea and its aggressive territorial claims.^[15] This is also reflected in its active partnership with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), where it promotes cooperation on counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and maritime security. Through initiatives like the EU-ASEAN Cooperation on Maritime Security, the EU seeks to balance its economic engagement with China by supporting regional stability and the adherence to international law. Hence, the most significant aspect of the EU’s hedging strategy in the Indo-Pacific is its emphasis on multi-sector multilateralism, while being active on many multilateral frameworks, not only ASEAN, but also Quad countries, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), a number of Free Trade Agreements with several Indo-Pacific countries, including Japan and South Korea, who, as mentioned, are still more eager to hedge under a larger umbrella, such as that of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).^[16]

Conclusion: not exactly a choice for all

Asian states remain at the forefront of hedging, especially as they deal with multiple, competing, and greater powers that exert different kinds of influence on them. In the Indo-Pacific, the rise of China, the continued but capricious presence of the United States, the renewed interest of Russia pushed by international sanctions, and the increasing assertiveness of regional powers like India have made the region a key battleground for competing ideologies and security interests. Asian states are, therefore, constantly faced with this dilemma of how to manage relations with all of those powers while ensuring their sovereignty, security, and economic growth. Not an easy task.^[17]

The future of Indo-Pacific diplomacy will no doubt continue to be shaped by the strategic use of hedging, as states and non-state actors alike manoeuvre within a complex web of diversified interests. For Asian and non-Asian actors, the ability to hedge effectively will determine their position in the evolving power dynamics of the region and their influence on global governance. While non-Asian actors can carefully experiment with this new strategy while staying on the good foot of their core ideologies, Asian states do not share this privilege, as they don’t possess the leveraging power to do so. The risk of playing with hedging too much or compromising too little can result in strategic isolation and potential conflict, where alliances may suddenly become increasingly unpredictable.^[18]

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References

Bollard, A. (2022) “Economic diplomacy and diplomatic economists in the Asia–Pacific”, in Patman, R. G., Köllner, P., Kiglics, B., From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Diplomacy in a Contested Region, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 53–72.

Brinza, A., Bērziņa-Čerenkova, U. A., Le Corre, P., Seaman, J., Turcsányi, R., Vladisavljev, S. (2024) EU-China relations: De-risking or de-coupling − the future of the EU strategy towards China, European Parliament, March, available online at: https://chinaobservers.eu/publications/eu-china-relations-de-risking-or-de-coupling-the-future-of-the-eu-strategy-towards-china/ , accessed 9 July 2025.

Ciorciari, J. D., Haacke, J. (2019) “Hedging in international relations: an introduction”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 19(3), 367–374.

Harris, P. (2022) “The Indo-Pacific Power: The United States, the Quad and the Making of a Megaregion”, in Roy Choudhury, S., The Indo-Pacific Theatre, London: Routledge, 35–49.

Hayakawa, T. (2024) Who gets in? A pragmatic view on the future course of the expanding TPP, doctoral dissertation, Fukuyama University.

Koga, K. (2020) “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?”, International Affairs, 96(1), 49–73.

Koga, K. (2022) “Japan’s strategic vision on Indo-Pacific institutions: Quad, Quad Plus and ASEAN Centrality”, in India-Japan-ASEAN Triangularity, London: Routledge, 213–231.

Kuik, C. C. (2022) “Hedging via institutions: ASEAN-led multilateralism in the age of the Indo-Pacific”, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 10(2), 355–386.

Kuik, C. C., Jamil, N. S. (2024) “The feasibility and future of middle-state hedging”, East Asian Policy, 16(4), 7–28.

Lim, D. J., Cooper, Z. (2015) “Reassessing hedging: The logic of alignment in East Asia”, Security Studies, 24(4), 696–727.

McElwee, L. (2024) “The rise and demise of the EU–China investment agreement: Takeaways for the future of the German debate on China”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), available online at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-and-demise-eu-china-investment-agreement-takeaways-future-german-debate-china, accessed 9 July 2025.

Nagy, S. (2015) “Balancing trade and security relationships in the Asia Pacific: The advent of a trilateral seikei bunri relationship between Japan, China, and the US”, Journal of Asian Politics & History, available online at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2561970 , accessed 9 July 2025.

Nedić, P. (2022) “Hedging strategy as a response to the United States-China rivalry: The case of Southeast Asia”, The Review of International Affairs, 73(1185), 91–112.

Nováky, N. (2022) “The Coordinated Maritime Presences concept and the EU’s naval ambitions in the Indo-Pacific”, European View, 21(1), 56–65.

Reuters (2025) “South Korea, China, Japan agree to promote regional trade as Trump tariffs loom”, Reuters, 30 March, available online at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-china-japan-agree-promote-regional-trade-trump-tariffs-loom-2025-03-30/, accessed 9 July 2025.

Rezza, S. (2025) “Australia’s strategic hedging in the Indo-Pacific: A neoclassical realist analysis of RCEP and AUKUS”, Global Strategis, 19(1).

Scott, D. (2019) “The geoeconomics and geopolitics of Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 6(2), 136–161.

Terada, T. (2023) “Politics on TPP and CPTPP: Turning Japan into one of the world’s major free trade powers”, in Funabashi, Y., Nakakita, K., Critical Review of the Abe Administration, London: Routledge, 114–137.

Van Willigen, N., Blarel, N. (2025) “Why, how and to whom is the European Union signalling in the Indo-Pacific? Understanding the European Union’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific in the epicentre of multipolar competition”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 27(1), 69–90.

Yamada, S. (2024) “Japan, U.K. and Italy aim for next-gen fighter prototype in 2026”, Nikkei Asia, available online at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-U.K.-and-Italy-aim-for-next-gen-fighter-prototype-in-2026, accessed 9 July 2025.

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^[1] On the concept of hedging in international relations and its first appearance in East Asia, see:
Ciorciari, J. D., Haacke, J. (2019) “Hedging in international relations: An introduction”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,19(3), 367–374. Lim, D. J., and Cooper, Z. (2015) “Reassessing hedging: The logic of alignment in East Asia”, Security Studies, 24(4), 696–727.

^[2] On hedging in the shifting balance of power between China and the US in the region, see:
Nedić, P. (2022) “Hedging strategy as a response to the United States–China rivalry: The case of Southeast Asia”, The Review of International Affairs, 73(1185), 91–112.
Kuik, C. C. (2022) “Hedging via institutions: ASEAN-led multilateralism in the age of the Indo-Pacific”, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 10(2), 355–386.

^[3] To better understand the realists’ position on this, see the many works of, among others, John Mearsheimer, who best embodies offensive realism and the quest for regional hegemony.

^[4] For a liberal perspective on the same issues, see the many works of, among others, Robert Keohane.

^[5] Harris, P. (2022) “The Indo-Pacific Power: The United States, the Quad and the Making of a Megaregion”, in Roy Choudhury, S., The Indo-Pacific Theatre, London: Routledge, 35–49.

^[6] Van Willigen, N., and Blarel, N. (2025) “Why, how and to whom is the European Union signalling in the Indo-Pacific? Understanding the European Union’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific in the epicentre of multipolar competition”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 27(1), 69–90.

^[7] Rezza, S. (2025) “Australia’s Strategic Hedging in the Indo-Pacific: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of RCEP and AUKUS”, Global Strategis, 19(1).

^[8] Koga, K. (2022) “Japan’s Strategic Vision on Indo-Pacific Institutions: Quad, Quad Plus and ASEAN Centrality”, in India–Japan–ASEAN Triangularity, London: Routledge, 213–231.

^[9] Reuters (2025) “South Korea, China, Japan agree to promote regional trade as Trump tariffs loom”, available online.

^[10] Terada, T. (2023) “Politics on TPP and CPTPP: Turning Japan into one of the world’s major free trade powers”, in Funabashi, Y., Nakakita, K., Critical Review of the Abe Administration, London: Routledge, 114–137; Hayakawa, T. (2024) Who Gets in? A Pragmatic View on the Future Course of the Expanding TPP, Doctoral dissertation, Fukuyama University.

^[11] Scott, D. (2019) “The geoeconomics and geopolitics of Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 6(2), 136–161.

^[12] Koga, K. (2020) “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?”, International Affairs, 96(1), 49–73. Yamada, S. (2024) “Japan, U.K. and Italy aim for next-gen fighter prototype in 2026”, Nikkei Asia, available online.

^[13] Brinza, A., Bērziņa-Čerenkova, U. A., Le Corre, P., Seaman, J., Turcsányi, R., and Vladisavljev, S. (2024) EU-China relations: De-risking or de-coupling − the future of the EU strategy towards China, European Parliament, March, available online.

^[14] McElwee, L. (2024) “The rise and demise of the EU–China investment agreement: Takeaways for the future of the German debate on China”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), available online.

^[15] Nováky, N. (2022) “The Coordinated Maritime Presences concept and the EU’s naval ambitions in the Indo-Pacific”, European View, 21(1), 56–65.

^[16] Economic diplomacy is defining how political diplomacy works in the Indo-Pacific region, and not the other way around, as well explained in Bollard, A. (2022) Economic diplomacy and diplomatic economists in the Asia–Pacific, in Patman, R. G., Köllner, P., Kiglics, B., From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Diplomacy in a Contested Region, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 53–72.

Nagy, S. (2015) “Balancing Trade and Security Relationships in the Asia Pacific: The Advent of a Trilateral Seikei Bunri Relationship between Japan, China, and the US”, Journal of Asian Politics & History, available online.

^[17] Nedić, P. (2022) “Hedging strategy as a response to the United States-China rivalry: The case of Southeast Asia”, The Review of International Affairs, 73(1185), 91–112.

^[18] Kuik, C. C., and Jamil, N. S. (2024) “The Feasibility and Future of Middle-state Hedging”, East Asian Policy, 16(4), 7–28.