The year 2025 marked a phase of deepened co-operation and consolidation in the long-standing engagement of the Philippines with Japan. Recognising Tokyo as a “steadfast” partner, since his election in 2022 President Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr. has been committed to strengthening relations with Japan in multiple areas of mutual interest, such as maritime security, infrastructure development and disaster risk reduction. For its part, Japan considers the Philippines a significant actor in its Indo-Pacific vision. During the Cold War, both Japan and the Philippines were part of what was then referred to as the “Great Crescent,” a strategic configuration the defence of which has historically been – and continues to be – anchored in a shared alliance with the United States (US). However, beyond its role as a meaningful ally, Japan is the second-largest trading partner of the Philippines. In 2024, the total value of bilateral trade between the Philippines and Japan reached US$20.4 billion. Philippine exports to Japan amounted to US$10.3 billion and imports from Japan totalled US$10.1 billion. In the same year, Japan accounted for 38% of Philippines’ total foreign direct investment inflows, with the manufacturing sector receiving the largest share. This policy brief seeks to scrutinise Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy and Philippine-Japan relations, through three analytical lenses. First, the Marcos administration has formally readjusted its alliance with the US in order to “preserve” peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and in the West Philippines Sea, which is the Philippines’s name for the portion of the South China Sea (SCS) in the internationally recognised Philippine exclusive economic zone. In this strategic framework, consolidation of relations with Japan constitutes a key component of efforts to prop up the trilateral alignment among the US, Japan and the Philippines, which is conceived to deter China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the South and East China Seas. Second, Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy on Japan is characterised by a certain degree of continuity. The previous Philippine administrations, from Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010) to the Duterte administration (2016-2022), consistently welcomed expansion of economic co-operation between Japan and the Philippines. The deepening of bilateral relations thus reflects Manila’s recognition of Japan as a vital trading partner and a key contributor to stability in Mindanao. Finally, although Marcos Jr.’s positions differ significantly from those of the previous administration, his foreign policy also provides a cautious approach to China. The Philippines, like other member states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), exercises strategic restraint to prevent direct confrontation with the region’s foremost economic and military power.
Raimondo Neironi (University of Rome Tor Vergata & T.wai) is author of the policy brief “Philippines-Japan Relations under the Marcos Jr. administration” published by the European University Institute
