The Philippines and Italy present an interesting parallel analysis on how each deal with China and the US amid their strategic rivalry. For the Philippines, China’s historical claims and grey-zone activities in the South China Sea threaten its maritime security. This has prompted the country to strengthen its security alliance with the US to offset Chinese maritime power projections. What is fundamentally a maritime conflict between the Philippines and China has since evolved into a powerplay between China and the US in the region. Meanwhile for Italy, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) did not meet its economic expectations. Its eventual withdrawal reflects a meticulous cost-benefit analysis with its economic ties with China, while strengthening Italy’s shared foreign policy principles and agenda with the US and the European Union.
This paper features an analysis on the Philippines’ security dilemma with China and its military alliance with the US, and how it must cautiously navigate relations with them. Using the Philippines as reference, this paper relates it with Italy’s economic engagement with China through the BRI and how its departure reinforced its ties with the US. This paper’s analysis seeks to provide insights and shares similar observations on the factors that shape the Philippines and Italy’s engagement with competing great powers.
Being the subordinate countries, the Philippines and Italy seek good relations with China and the US and avoid explicitly prioritizing one over the other. However, there have been instances when the Philippines and Italy have oscillated either closer to China or to the US, as they pursue their national interests driven by their state leaders. According to Boon and Teo in their work entitled “Caught in the middle? Middle powers amid U.S.‑China competition”, domestic drivers, including the leadership factor, play a major part in the foreign policies of middle powers.[1] This is especially true for the Philippines under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Italy under Prime Minister Georgia Meloni who constantly prioritize their nation’s interests vis-à-vis their relations with China and the US. Thus, Marcos and Meloni seek to implement a cautious approach in their own calculated foreign policies despite pressures and challenges with great power competition.
US-China Rivalry
The US-China geopolitical rivalry in Asia Pacific is driven by various factors. US involvement in China’s unresolved sovereignty issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea are the thorniest in their bilateral relationship. On the Taiwan issue, China firmly “opposes the US having any form of official contact with Taiwan”, and urges it to “stop sending wrong signals to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces”.[2] But the US condemns “Chinese escalatory and destabilizing actions towards Taiwan and seeks no unilateral change to the status quo”.[3] On the South China Sea issue, China criticizes the US for inciting the Philippines to make trouble: “History has proven time and again that US intervention only makes the situation worse”.[4] Yet the US slams China’s “increasingly dangerous and unlawful actions that ‘injured people’ and ‘harmed vessels’ of rival nations in the disputed waters”.[5]
Such conflict between great powers puts the Philippines in a critical position. It has a long-standing maritime issue with China, while the country has a long-established military alliance with the US. The ongoing territorial issue in the South China Sea between the Philippines and China has elevated into great power competition between China and the US. For the US, bolstering alliance with the Philippines aims to neutralize Chinese maritime aggressions. American military support also seeks to uphold international law and promote freedom of navigation. For China, intensifying its gray-zone activities demonstrate its objections against the Philippines’ maritime claims. China’s belligerence at sea is also a show of force against US alliance network coordination against it.
China’s Maritime Issue with the Philippines
Chinese gray-zone activities in the South China Sea “has consistently provoked maritime conflicts without crossing the threshold of conventional war”[6] with the Philippines. Using the advanced capabilities of its maritime forces, China’s gray-zone activities are widely recognized as instrumental in its belligerence at sea. It has seized islands, reefs, and maritime features within the Philippines’ EEZ (Scarborough Shoal in 2012); sank Philippine fishing vessels (Gem Ver-1 in Reed Bank in 2019); swarmed Chinese ships in Philippine-controlled islands (more than 135 Chinese maritime militia vessels are detected around Whitsun Reef in 2023); used water cannons and military grade laser against Philippine vessels (several ships of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources were harassed since 2023); harassed Philippine resupply missions (China seized Philippine rubber boats going towards the BRP Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal since 2024); rammed Philippine vessels (Chinese Coast Guard’s (CCG) dangerous maneuvers collided with the Philippines in Sabina Shoal in 2024); and declared Chinese jurisdiction over Philippine waters (China established the “Procedural Regulations on Administrative Law Enforcement of Coast Guard Agencies” in 2024 allowing the CCG to detain foreigners “trespassing its claimed maritime borders” for up to 60 days without trial).
The likelihood of these scenarios occurring or repeating themselves is high, given the dominant presence of China in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Unfortunately for the Philippines, these gray-zone tactics will continue, and “Beijing won’t stop until it controls that whole of the South China Sea”.[7]
US security alliance with the Philippines
Long outgunned and outspent by China, the Philippines cannot match Chinese maritime capabilities despite its commitment to upgrade its forces. Thus, it strategically depends on its alliance with the US, which serves as crucial force multipliers due to its limited military capability.
To further strengthen the alliance, Marcos granted the US rotational access to four more military facilities in April 2023, in addition to the five existing sites in the country under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2014. The extension of access sites in strategic locations near the South China Sea enables the Philippines to offset China’s maritime power projections.
In addition, the Philippines maintains collaborative activities with the US through its Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) military exercises under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). It also benefits from American deployment of naval assets such as assault ship, destroyers, and cruisers within Philippine territory. Moreover, both countries also conduct joint naval patrols to combat Chinese threats in the South China Sea. Whether through the enhancement of capabilities or the demonstration of resolve, cooperation with like-minded states is a crucial element of the Philippines’ deterrence against China.
Understanding the Philippines’ Policy Perspectives
Amidst two competing great powers, the Philippines like other third countries, are caught in a bind. While the tendency is to dismiss the Philippines as comparatively inferior to both powers, it is important to consider the realities that shape its foreign policy and influence relations between China and the US to avoid miscalculations and misperceptions:
Given the constant tensions at sea, the Philippine government is judiciously defending its maritime rights and territories in all forms and manners whenever it can. It independently acts on its own to serve its interests, strategically weighing options and its implications. Foremost of which is maximizing its security alliance with the US, given the Philippines’ apparent power asymmetry with China. However, banking on this alliance led to perceptions of the Philippines being a “puppet of the US and just following the Americans’ playbook”.[8] Such allegation assumes the Philippines has no ability to think and stand up for its rights.
Because it shares security interests with the US and threat perceptions on China, the Philippines’ actions are aligned with US regional strategy and conduct. As allies, there are political quid pro quo and security concessions made on most bilateral agreements. But there are also instances when the Philippines dissociates itself and declines assistance from the US. Under former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines cancelled several military exercises with the US, threatened to repeal the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) but eventually restored it. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. meanwhile has turned down offers from the US naval escorts during the country’s resupply missions to the Second Tomas Shoal, opting to “rely on ourself first”.[9] Moreover, Philippine National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano said the Philippines wanted them to be a “pure Philippine operation since this is our legitimate national interest, so we don’t see any reason for them (the US) to come in”.[10] Essentially, the Philippine wants to independently demonstrate its resolve amid rising tension with China.
Thus, it is important to look at the Philippines on its own and not through the shadow of another great power. This is especially important especially since China insists on engaging with the Philippines bilaterally on maritime concerns in the South China Sea. Understanding the Philippines in its own unique characteristics can also prevent misperceptions and miscalculations in dealing with such long-standing territorial issue in the South China Sea.
Because of its state leader’s personal predispositions, the Philippines experiences shifting focus of its national interests. Prioritizing is deemed difficult as these interests are not mutually exclusive. But the president is expected to effectively prioritize which interests are to be defended, and which (if necessary) are to be sacrificed in dealing China. Essentially, the Philippine president must be able to make compromises and manage trade-offs in advancing the nation’s interests. The different prioritization of national interests is very much evident during the Duterte and Marcos administrations.
The Philippines under Duterte prioritized economic relations with China, while downplaying security alliance with the US. He declared that the Philippines would pursue “separation from the US and… alignment with China”.[11] Duterte set aside maritime issues despite the Philippines’ 2016 arbitrations victory at the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in favor of gaining economic concessions from China. He argued “focusing more on the trade and economic aspects in Philippines-China relations would ultimately benefit the Filipino people more than insisting on national maritime claims that it cannot impose”.[12]
But in reviving relations with China, Duterte consequently relegated the importance of the Philippines’ alliance with the US. This was apparent during the conduct of the Balikatan military exercises between the Philippines and US in 2017. They were scaled down unlike the previous exercises that featured massive combat drills directed at a hypothetical threat emanating from the South China Sea.[13] Balikatan under Duterte “has been one of the early victims of his government’s rebalanced Philippine foreign policy, which has meant less dependence on its traditional ally, the United States, relative to other partners like China and Russia and has led to the cancelation of some drills and the refocusing of others”.[14] In 2020, Duterte has also announced the cancellation of the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement, which set the rules, guidelines and legal status of US soldiers during military exercises in the Philippines; but which he eventually restored in 2021.
The Philippines under Marcos, however, overturned Duterte’s foreign policy by focusing on renewing security alliance with the US at the risk of losing economic opportunities with China. After Duterte’s term, China’s promises of loans and investments have not been fully realized, with major infrastructure projects either delayed or shelved. Moreover, it has continued with its gray-zone activities in the South China Sea. In response, Marcos expanded EDCA in 2023 and has since increased military exchanges between the Philippines and the US.
The Philippines and Italy between China and the US
Despite the Marcos administration’s assertive approach towards China and its cultivation of deeper security ties with the US, the Philippines continues to tread more carefully in balancing its bilateral relationships. It considers the growing economic interdependence with China despite its maritime conflicts. And because of its alliance with the US, the Philippines is wary of being dragged into a possible US-China war in the region, particular over Taiwan. Thus, it is cautiously contemplating on the extent and depth it is willing to engage militarily with the US.
As the old saying goes, one can choose one’s friend but one cannot choose one’s neighbor. This is particularly true in international relations. While the Philippines can choose how far its alliance with the US can go, it has no choice but to engage with China, a close neighbor. As with other countries in Southeast Asia, the long-standing challenge for the Philippines is to develop a foreign policy that can protect its national interests while striving to avoid being caught in the middle of a tug-of-war between the US and China.
Like the Philippines, Italy is also taking a cautious approach in its relations with China and the US. Since taking office as Italy’s Prime Minister in 2022, Giorgia Meloni has navigated a complex international landscape marked by increased tensions between both great powers. Her decision to withdraw Italy from China’s BRI signaled a major shift in the country’s foreign policy.
In 2019, Italy shocked the US and Europe by becoming the first country among the Group of Seven (G7) to join the BRI. It sought to attract Chinese investments and to expand market access for its exports to China. After joining the BRI, Italy signed numerous arrangements with China regarding sanitary requirements for food exports and imports, cultural property and heritage sites, and other commercial agreements.
However, the BRI failed to meet Italy’s expectations and fell short of changing the trajectory of its economic relations with China. Italy had sought to offset the trade imbalance with China through the BRI. However, it contributed modestly to increasing Italy’s exports to China, while imports of Chinese products nearly doubled in contrast to Italian exports. Specifically, Italian exports to China have increased “from 14.5 billion euros to 18.5 billion euros, but Chinese exports to Italy have grown far more dramatically, from 33.5 billion euros to 50.9 billion euros”.[15] Moreover, Chinese investment in non-BRI countries in Europe has far outstripped its investments in Italy. Its foreign direct investments (FDI) in Italy have dropped from 650 million dollars in 2019 to just 33 million dollars in 2021.[16] The case of Italy demonstrates that joining the BRI does not automatically result in a special status with China nor guarantee more Chinese trade and investments. Such unmet expectations led to Italy’s withdrawal from the BRI in 2023.
Aside from economic issues, Italy’s pull out from the BRI also stems from its desire to align more closely with the US on the political front. Meloni’s foreign policy reflects a reassurance to the US that “Italy remains a reliable partner, loyal to its traditional alliances. This is reflected in its Indo-Pacific strategy, which aligns closely – though not exclusively – with the interests of its Western allies”.[17] A key interest of Meloni’s government is the importance of upholding the rules-based order in the region[18], which aligns with American and European foreign policy principles and agenda. And with the US under Donald Trump’s presidency, Italy will likely limit its engagement with China given Meloni’s orientation to the West. At her meeting with Trump on April 18, she explained that making America great again is complemented and reinforced by “making the West great again”.[19]
As Italy craft and implement its foreign policy, its state leader plays a critical role in the prioritization of national interests according to his/her perceptions. Balancing Italy’s economic relations with China on the one hand, and its security partnerships with the US and the EU on the other, presents a challenge for Italian foreign policy under Meloni. Italy’s participation in the BRI was, according to Meloni, a “big mistake” and declared: “there is no political will on my part to favor Chinese expansion into Italy or Europe”.[20] Her view of China revealed her disapproval of former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s decision for Italy to join BRI in 2019, who has a more favorable perception on the Chinese. In the past, most Italian prime ministers have positive views on China such as Massimo D’Alema, Matteo Renzi, and Paolo Gentiloni. The “only major dissenting voice has been Silvio Berlusconi, who argued that Italy should side with the United States in its antagonism toward China”.[21] Similar to Berlusconi’s views, Meloni particularly warns China of the risks of a potential attack on Taiwan and calls out Chinese position on Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine”.[22]
Conclusion: Policy Commonalities between the Philippines and Italy
The Philippines and Italy share similar policy perspectives in their pursuit of national interests that are driven by their state leaders. Such perspective reinforces Boon and Teo’s argument that “a considerable degree of this middle-power agency is animated by elite calculations of the respective domestic interests at stake”.[23] For Marcos, maritime threats in the South China Sea from China prompts the Philippines to strengthen alliance with the US. For Meloni, economic discontent from BRI causes Italy to derisk relations with China and boost trade ties with other Western partners, though she is also wary of Trump’s tariff impositions in his trade and economic policies. Marcos and Meloni have overturned their predecessors’ accommodating approach with China and turned towards the US and other Western partners. They have promoted a more circumspect and cautious policy in dealing with both great powers to maximize benefits and secure their nations’ interests.
Given the significant influence of their leaders’ policy interpretation and implementation, the Philippines’ and Italy’s foreign policies are not static guidelines of principles, but an evolving strategy of their national aspirations. As Marcos and Meloni seek to balance their nations’ interests with China with the demands of their US and Western alliances, their strategies will continue to evolve in response to shifting international pressures and opportunities. Given these complexities, it behooves the Philippines and Italy to promote its own calculated foreign policy in dealing with China and the US. Such policies should benefit both countries’ interests amidst the escalating great power rivalry.
References
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[1] Hoo, T. B., Teo, S. (2022) “Caught in the Middle? Middle Powers amid U.S.-China Competition”, Asia Policy, 17(4), 59–76.
[2] Jingxi, M. (2024) “US meddling in China’s internal affairs opposed”, China Daily, 12 January, available online.
[3] Chen, Y., Chung, J. (2024) “US blasts China over threats to Taiwan”, Taipei Times, 26 June, available online.
[4] China Daily (2023) “China accuses US of stirring up trouble in South China Sea”, 30 November, available online.
[5] Al Jazeera (2024) “Blinken condemns China’s ‘dangerous and unlawful’ moves in South China Sea”, 11 October, available online.
[6] Taipei Times (2020) “Diplomacy: Maritime militia warning issued”, 16 June, available online.
[7] Watson, I. et al. (2023) “Exclusive: Philippine Defense Secretary Vows to Stand Up to ‘Bully’ China”, CNN, 29 September, available online.
[8] Nepomuceno, P. (2023) “Teodoro: China depiction of PH as US puppet ‘insulting’, ‘disgusting’ “, Philippine News Agency, 26 October, available online.
[9] Maitem, J. (2024) “Rejection of US help in South China Sea shows Philippines acting on its own: analysts”, South China Morning Post, 10 July, available online.
[10] Lema, K. (2024) “Exclusive: Philippines turned down US help amid South China Sea tensions – military chief”, Reuters, 5 July, available online.
[11] Blanchard, B. (2016) “Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost”, Reuters, 21 October, available online.
[12] Wong, A. C. (2017) “The Philippines’ Relations with China: A Pragmatic Perspective under President Duterte”, T.note n.51 – RISE series 12, T.wai, 26 December, available online.
[13] Dancel, R. (2017) “U.S. and Philippines Begin Scaled-down Military Drills”, The Straits Times, 19 May, available online.
[14] Parameswaran, P. (2016) “Why the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte Hates America”, The Diplomat, 1 November, available online.
[15] Sacks, D. (2023) “Why Is Italy Withdrawing From China’s Belt and Road Initiative?”, Council on Foreign Relations, 3 August, available online.
[16] American Enterprise Institute (n.d.) “China Global Investment Tracker (2005–2024)”, available online.
[17] Longhi, G. (2025) “From the BRI to the Action Plan: Italy’s China Strategy under Meloni”, Choice, 21 January, available online.
[18] Cassarini, N. (2023) Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 17 May, available online.
[19] Straus, I. (2025) “The Trump-Meloni challenge: How to make both the US and the West great again”, Atlantic Council, 2 May, available online.
[20] Amante, A., Balmer, C., Vagnoni, G. (2022) “Italy’s Meloni promises to defy Chinese and Russian expansionist ambitions”, Reuters, 25 August, available online.
[21] Bindi, F. (2019) “Why Did Italy Embrace the Belt and Road Initiative?”, Commentary, 20 May, available online.
[22] Zeneli, V. (2023) “Italy’s ‘arrivederci’ to China’s BRI could be a template for others”, Atlantic Council, 10 December, available online.
[23] Hoo, T. B., Teo, S. (2022) “Caught in the Middle? Middle Powers amid U.S.-China Competition”, Asia Policy, 17(4), 59–76.
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