The Philippines finds itself at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region, in close proximity to several geopolitical flashpoints. Aware of its delicate position within a shifting regional security environment—characterized by the resurgence of great power competition and the challenges to existing institutions designed to maintain the regional security architecture—Manila has recalibrated its security strategy. This shift focuses on external defense, achieved through military modernization and the establishment of new partnerships with regional and extra-regional powers. As both a U.S. treaty ally and a member of ASEAN, analyzing the rationale behind the Philippines’ recent activism offers valuable insights into its evolving security policies and foreign policy orientation. We argue that the Philippines’ efforts to forge security partnerships with like-minded countries demonstrate its active commitment to upholding key international norms, such as freedom of navigation and respect for international law, which are seen as vital for maintaining order in the Indo-Pacific. However, these efforts must be complemented by partnerships that bolster the country’s economic resilience to ensure the sustainability of Manila’s foreign policy trajectory in the long term.

 

The Philippines sits at the core of the Indo-Pacific macro region. Such a geographical position is necessary for this archipelagic country to start thinking and strategizing about its relative position in such geographical expanse, in order to face the challenges and opportunities embedded in it. Historically, Manila’s historical reliance to its alliance with the U.S., as well as the presence of two U.S. military bases in northern Luzon during the Cold War made the country’s élites confident on external safety, focusing military efforts on counter-insurgency operations and disaster relief.^[1] Simultaneously, ever since its independence, the Philippines has actively sustained the Rules-Based International Order heralded by the U.S.^[2]

In recent years, with the intensification of the U.S.-China competition, countries of the Indo-Pacific now necessitate to reorient their assumptions over their role in the international system, as well as in the security environment surrounding them, and profile foreign policy strategies. Indeed, it has been observed^[3] albeit not explicit in policy documents, a Philippine “Grand Strategy” may be emerging through consistent patterns of behavior of its security and foreign policy apparatuses. Indeed, facing the necessity to confront an increasingly assertive China in the South China Sea, the Philippines has recently attempted to establish a minimum of strategic priorities towards orienting its national efforts. In doing this, the 2016 Arbitral award by an ad-hoc Tribunal established at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in La Hague, declaring illegitimate the Chinese claims over the 9-Dash Line and condemning Chinese assertive behavior as violations of the Philippines’ maritime entitlements according to UNCLOS^[4] served as the base for the Philippines’ position as a regional and extra-regional actor.

Even during the years of the Duterte presidency (2016-2022), in spite of the president’s attempts to downplay the arbitration in favor of a rapprochement to China^[5], in 2017 the Philippines adopted its first security policy document called the “National Security Policy” (NSP)^[6], setting the country’s security priorities until 2022. Even though the 2017-22 NSP placed domestic security as the first priority, territorial integrity and the country’s right to protect its EEZ figures as 4^th item in the agenda. After the unsuccessful pivot by Duterte and the continuations of maritime tensions, the new NSP 2023-2028 adopted by the Marcos Jr.’s administration places “National Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity” in first place.^[7] Changes in the two NSPs highlight how Manila is undergoing a strategic shift from inward-looking to outward-oriented security. Moreover, observant to Manila’s longstanding preference for international cooperation, the NSP seeks to pursue such primary objective through the diversification of security partners, defined as “vital” for the country’s successful attempts in navigating an increasingly deteriorating regional environment.^[8] The NSP thus prioritizes strengthening military cooperation through joint exercises, technology transfers, information sharing, and joint patrols to enhance defense capabilities and regional security.^[9] Alongside this, it seeks strategic investments and partnerships in key industries to foster economic growth and support military modernization.^[10] Regionally, the NSP emphasizes promoting bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation, with a strong commitment to ASEAN centrality.^[11] Such endeavor is seen critical for addressing security challenges in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions, reinforcing stability and collective security.^[12]

Indeed, shortly after the Marcos Jr administration took office in 2022, the Philippines has embarked in efforts to diversify its partners in multiple forms. Such activity stems from the dual necessity of strengthening its deterrence and normative-upper-hand posture against Chinese assertiveness on the one hand, and on the other to hedge against its historical overreliance to its alliance with the U.S. Such efforts have resulted in the forging of new partnerships, giving substance of what may be an embryonal Indo-Pacific strategy for Manila. While short of forming alliances in the traditional sense, the Philippines is currently forging strategic partnerships, or tightening security and defense relations with several countries, as well as joining forms of minilateral security groupings. This report is aimed at briefly accounting for the most relevant relations and depicts the emerging web of security relations currently enjoyed by Manila. The current report will also contextualize such findings amidst the Philippine-US alliance under the current Trump administration, and conclude by highlighting the potential role for Italy as a partner.

 

Deepening Cooperation with Japan

Japan is Manila’s strongest and most relevant partner after the United States, and in recent years, the two countries have enjoyed burgeoning relationships. For decades Japan has ranked among Manila’s top ODA donors, but over the past decade, such a relationship has deepened into closer forms of security cooperation. After launching annual politico-security dialogues focused on counter-terrorism and maritime security in the early 2000s, in 2009 Manila and Tokyo elevated their ties by establishing a Strategic Partnership with an economic focus^[13], then revised in 2011 to include maritime security cooperation.^[14]

Such initiatives were taken in light of the growing shared interest in maritime security and a growing concern on the Chinese assertiveness in the South and East China Sea, as signaled by Japan’s second Abe administration National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which called for stronger ties with Southeast Asian countries.^[15] In those years, Japan transferred 10 patrol vessels to the Philippines Coast Guard, in a spirit of collaboration that led to the 2015 Strengthened Strategic Partnership.^[16] Security cooperation centered on three areas: equipment transfer, capacity building, and joint training. Crucially, Manila has been on the forefront of Japan’s efforts to revise their Equipment Transfer Law, enabling the transfer of several vessels, boats, aircrafts and helicopter parts to the Philippines.

Good relationships between the two countries have been maintained also during the turbulent years of Duterte, but it is with his successor Marcos Jr. that such partnership reached a golden age. In 2023, Japan’s new Overseas Security Assistance (OSA) program provided the Philippines with 4 mln USD worth of coastal surveillance radars.^[17] Japan also supported technical training, maritime safety, and joint exercises to Manila.^[18] Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to Manila in late 2023 strengthened and further accelerated such trend: both countries’ shared interest in maritime security and maintaining open sea lines of communication^[19], led to the signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement between Tokyo and Manila in July 2024, shortly after a violent clash between Chinese and Filipino vessels around Second Thomas Shoal.^[20]

The RAA testifies the current elevated status that the bilateral relations between the two countries currently enjoy. But concurrently, the Philippines and Japan have worked together to further enmesh the United States in maritime and security cooperation by commencing a sequence of high-level trilateral talks. Such interactions have resulted in a Joint Vision Statement between the three parties in April 2024.^[21] Such a statement is crucial, as on top of the usual reaffirmation of shared visions and commitment to uphold the Rules-Based International Order in the region and beyond, it places a specific emphasis on strengthening Manila’s economic security and resilience. In fact, it envisions the creation of the Luzon Economic Corridor^[22]: a plan of connectivity infrastructures aimed at linking the ports of Subic Bay with Metro Manila and its southern provinces of Cavite and Batangas, arguably the backbone of the Philippine growing economy. Lastly, the statement contains pledges of cooperation and investments in several economic sectors: open radio networks, semiconductors, supply chains in critical minerals, and clean energy. In other words, a conspicuous part of the trilateral seems to be aimed at strengthening the “junior partner’s” economic growth.^[23]

The multi-domain framework of cooperation that Japan and the Philippines currently entertain is indicative of Manila’s preferences when engaging foreign partners. Japan’s cooperation with the Philippines can be intended as holistically aimed at strengthening Manila’s security and economic robustness. Albeit short of an alliance in the proper sense, the signals of interest and support sent by Japan, the cordial and consistent relations conducted over time and across multiple administrations, served as the backbone for elevation of such ties beyond conventional relations. It also shows that, as part of the “San Francisco System”, both countries do have a shared understanding of regional security that may be autonomous from the perspective of the U.S. and ASEAN.

 

Security Linkages with Australia

The Philippines – Australia relationship shows a longstanding and stable evolution, encompassing a wide range of fields. After the ratification of the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement in 2012^[24], since 2014 Australia has been the first country after the U.S. who attended the Balikatan joint exercises with the AFP and the U.S. military.^[25] Moreover, two countries’ ties elevated to a Comprehensive Partnership in 2015, aiming at closely cooperating in several fields, sharing the finding that “security and prosperity of both countries are linked to the stability in the Indo-Pacific region”^[26], establishing a biennial Ministers’ meeting as a platform for developing such cooperation. Second, Australia has shown full support to the Philippines’ “lawfare” strategy against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, substantiated in the PCA Ruling of 2016. In fact, not only Australia fully supported the Philippines’ position in upkeeping the rule of law in maritime affairs, but it also bound itself to the ruling, and adopted its provision for the settlement of maritime disputes over its overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone with Timor Leste.^[27]

Building on these pillars, in late 2023, President Marcos’ visit to Canberra resulted in the creation of a Strategic Partnership, welcomed by both parties as a necessary step to further pursue their common objectives of ensuring regional stability and prosperity^[28], where the parties affirmed their will to strengthen ties in enhancing cooperation on maritime, cyber and critical technology. Concurrently, Australia and the Philippines started to conduct joint bilateral patrols of the South China Sea in late 2023, and Australia has participated to joint patrols with the Philippines, Japan and the U.S. in 2024^[29], showing a strong commitment in order-upkeeping and maritime security. Moreover, the Strategic Partnership underscores the partners’ shared support of order-building institutions like ASEAN. Finally, this is further testified by the recent shared commitment by both the Philippines and Australia to further update the Partnership.

While the maritime-security dimension is clearly the main driver of such partnership, the parties established the Philippines-Australia Development Partnership Plan (DPP). On top of both countries’ membership in regional FTAs like the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA and RCEP, the DPP is aimed to be a periodically updating platform to set joint development goals catered to the necessity to “supporting stability; fostering inclusive and sustainable economic growth; and strengthening resilience”^[30] of the Philippine economy, orienting the already conspicuous development funds allocated by Australia for Manila’s development. Notably, Australia sustains the Philippines’ shipbuilding industry with a long-standing presence of Australian investors like Austal in Manila’s shipyard and shipbuilding industry, which is a pillar of the country’s economic drivers.

In sum, Australia and the Philippines have leveraged their longstanding and friendly relationships into a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, catering to both their domestic and strategic necessities. Such tightening of ties builds upon security, economic, and normative dimensions. While there is a clear common interest in maintaining regional and maritime stability by increasing the Philippines’ defense and maritime capabilities, Canberra understands that such necessity goes hand in hand with the strengthening of Manila’s economic resilience and robustness, positioning itself as a strong and irreplaceable partner. Finally, Australia is arguably the strongest normative supporter of Manila’s legal battles.

 

Exploring More Cooperation with South Korea

South Korea and the Philippines have scaled up their security and defense ties to unprecedented levels. Seoul has already enjoyed the status of top arms exporter to Manila, second only to the United States. Crucially, since 2013 the Republic of Korea (ROK) has contributed in great measure to sustaining the Philippines’ maritime capabilities, with the sale of two corvettes and six offshore patrol boats by Hyundai Heavy Industries, and prospective sales for other vessels and fighter jets by 2028.

In recent years, the Philippines’ and ROK’s interests converged further, favored by Yoon’s administration change in attitude toward China and a renewed interest in regional security. Such convergence prompted intensified dialogues at several levels, resulting in the signing of a Strategic Partnership in last October 2024, after Yoon’s historic visit to Manila.^[31] The partnership announcement expressively mentions shared interests in regional security and pledges to strengthen the parties defense cooperation and maritime cooperation, acknowledging the crucial role that Seoul plays as a contributor to Manila’s military modernization.^[32] Moreover, the nature of the strategic partnership (as it is usually the case with such typology of informal cooperation) involves a plethora of areas for joint efforts such as development assistance, cultural ties and environmental cooperation.

In addition to defense and military procurement, the partnership builds upon a deepened Korean economic presence in the Philippines and expanding trade ties, culminated in the signing of the PH-ROK Free Trade Agreement in 2023 and entered into force on December 31, 2024.^[33] On top of mutual commitments to lower tariffs on selected products, such FTA seeks expanding economic ties and investments. Specifically, the parties signed an Implementing arrangement for Economic and Technical Cooperation, aiming at selecting priority sectors for trade and investment promotion and industrial development through a bilateral consultation mechanism with relevant stakeholders. Such sectors are health and scientific manufacturing, critical minerals processing, innovation and research and development, creative and cultural industries, intellectual property, and e-commerce.

In sum, Seoul’s stake in Philippines security is rapidly evolving from arms provider to regional partner for security and economic development. Crucially, both states acknowledge the necessity of evolving ties comprehensively, dedicating substantial commitments to strengthening the Philippines’ economic resilience by the establishment of bilateral mechanisms for development consultation. While surely subject to shifts in Seoul’s policy preferences towards the PRC and limited constraints in defense commitments due to the North Korean threat, Manila has worked to secure Korean support at unprecedented levels, a trend destined to continue in future.

 

Pushing for Cooperation with India

As a member of the QUAD and a country that has progressively shown interest in upkeeping the existing rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, India has started to deepen defense and security cooperation with the Philippines, albeit not at the level of other regional states. The two countries enjoy burgeoning relations, fostered especially after the launch in 2014 of the “Act East” policy by Narendra Modi. Moreover, as a member of QUAD, India shares similar values regarding the kind of preferred order in the Indo-Pacific and circa the necessity of upkeeping the freedom of navigation in an increasingly complex region. India has subsequently deployed some of its naval assets to conduct exercises in the Philippines^[34] signaling an increased interest in maritime security. In this sense, on top of several frameworks for bilateral cooperation and high-level dialogue signed over the years, India has provided the Philippines with a battery of supersonic BrahMos missiles, with a possible second batch soon to be purchased by the Philippine Armed Forces.^[35] It is possible to argue, given the problems in terms of interoperability of such a system (designed using Russian technology) that Manila is willing to bear such cost with the expected gain of further enmeshing New Delhi in its security. The two countries’ shared visions and understanding of regional stability led Manila and New Delhi to elevate their ties with the formalization of a Strategic Partnership in 2025.^[36] However, India is also more cautious in showing explicit support for the Philippines in maritime security, as it does not participate in joint patrols and prefers to showcase a “quiet”, albeit relevant, support for Manila.

 

Enmeshing Relations with Europe and Canada

Tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the continuous reports on the clashes in the South China Sea have surely made waves far beyond the Indo-Pacific. It appears that other middle powers, such as European countries like the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, and Canada, have recently turned an eye to Manila, establishing forms of cooperation aimed at strengthening the Philippines’ stance in maritime and security affairs. The common values that sustain such partnerships are surely a shared vision of a maritime and International Order based on the Rule of law, and a common interest in upholding freedom of navigation at sea. Among these states, the ones who seemingly are the most involved are the UK and France. Both nuclear powers, while France considers itself a “resident” state of the Indo-Pacific, given the presence of its overseas territories, the UK is also active through several security initiatives in the region, from the Five Eyes grouping, to AUKUS, to the “Five Powers Defense Arrangement” with other regional countries. Indeed, the Philippines has deepened security cooperation with both: it has signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation with the United Kingdom with the maritime dimension being the primary focus of the agreement, and lately information-sharing.^[37] Similarly, France has commenced a series of high-level dialogues with Manila, requested to participate in the Balikatan military drills in 2025^[38], and kickstarted negotiations for the signing of a Reciprocal Access Agreement to allow joint military exercises between the respective armed forces. On a similar vein, after signing a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense cooperation with the Philippines in early 2024, Canada has accelerated its efforts to strengthen bilateral ties, with the imminent signature of a Visiting Forces Agreement with Manila.^[39] As a Pacific nation, Canada shares a similar stake in the regional order as the other two powers, and resolved to reach out to partners like Manila as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Also New Zealand was moved by similar motives in singing a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines in 2025.

While the UK, France and Canada arguably represent the extra regional countries with the highest stakes in Philippine security, there are other actors that have gradually stepped up their support with the archipelago, albeit in mixed forms. First of all is Germany, which commenced a high-level military dialogue with the Philippines, and aims to soon finalize a defense pact. Similarly, countries such as the Netherlands, Czech Republic and Sweden have offered some framework for bilateral security cooperation. The case of Sweden is worthy of a specific attention, as Stockholm was able to negotiate a defense memorandum in order to potentially facilitate the sale of its home -produced Gripen multirole fighter jets. In fact, while these states do indeed share with the Philippines an interest in maritime security and common visions on the international order, it is also to stress how much of these rapprochements go hand in hand with a strong interest in participating in arms procurement bids. The Philippines is now undergoing a process of military modernization called “Horizon”, that has reached its third and final stage. Under “Horizon 3”, the Philippines aims at purchasing equipment for external defense, and such necessity constitutes an important market opportunity for European defense manufacturers that may go hand-in-hand with a more deliberate and overarching support.^[40]

Lastly, after years of strained relations during Duterte’s presidency, the EU and the Philippines have rebooted their relations. After an official visit in 2023 of the European Commissioner, the EU has established a “subcommittee on maritime cooperation”^[41] with the Philippines. Such initiative underscores once again the convergence of interests and concerns with the Philippines circa the current order-upkeeping necessities. Moreover, in selecting the Philippines (and Vietnam) as a specific partner for maritime cooperation, Bruxelles denotes a certain understanding over the divergent preference among Southeast Asian states over such issues.

 

A “De-ASEANizing” Philippines?

Manila’s proactivity in partners’ diversification may project an image of the Philippines as a divergent actor in ASEAN, or even a direct challenger to the Association’s principles. While it is true that Manila has been the most vocal in ASEAN in showing dissatisfaction over the Association’s ability to bring stability in the South China Sea disputes, it is also true that the Philippines operates under a logic of inclusion and not exclusion, for several reasons. First, the Philippines’ understanding of its place in the “Indo-Pacific” region is shared among ASEAN members, who jointly adopted a specific “Outlook for the Indo-Pacific”. In the pursuit of its national interest in maritime security, it can be argued that Manila does not differentiate or discriminate among partners, and works on possible points of convergence. Second, while not all Southeast Asian states share the same threat perceptions, there are surely some whose concerns are similar to Manila’s. This is testified by two important developments of 2024: deepening maritime cooperation with Vietnam and the signing of a Defense Pact with Singapore. Regarding the first, while other forms of maritime cooperation with other members already exist, such as the INDOMALPHI grouping, Vietnam and the Philippines have signed a Coast Guard cooperation agreement in 2024 and undertaken to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, citing the existence of “common threats” and the “spirit of ASEAN solidarity” as motives for such move.^[42] Similarly, in mid 2024 Singapore and the Philippines have signed a Memorandum on Defense Cooperation in areas such as military education, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) signed in the spirit to promote “regional stability”.^[43] While surely more vague and less explicit compared to other partners, such moves between the Philippines and selected ASEAN partners underscore how a common understanding and sensitivity on certain issues remains very relevant in ASEAN, possibly paving the way for more robust forms of order-upkeeping initiatives in the future.

 

The U.S.-Philippines Alliance under Trump 2.0

It seems like the Philippines have prepared for the Trump 2.0 administration by making steady progress with its security relations with middle powers covered by this paper. This seemed to be a manifestation of the learning of the defense establishment given the prior Trump administration as well as the foreign policy shifts often emanating from a change in the country’s presidency. However, it remains to be seen whether the current U.S. government will implement policies that will downgrade its alliance with the Philippines as indications were seen in the alliance of the U.S. with Japan and South Korea. Under Trump’s first presidency, the alliance with the U.S. in fact did not deteriorate. For example, the U.S. gave a clear ironclad commitment on the country’s defense in any possible incidents in the South China Sea.

Thus far, the U.S. under Trump 2.0 has remained committed to its alliance with the Philippines. It granted an exemption to the freeze of military aid and with several of his cabinet members expressing a more hawkish stance with China, Trump may appreciate the policies of the Marcos Jr administration such as the transparency initiative. Moreover, the U.S. currently has a trade surplus with the Philippines and the Luzon Economic Corridor as well as current U.S. investments in the Philippines could lock in the U.S. in defense of the Philippines given any possible contingency. The U.S. Trump 2.0 could also continue to help the modernization of the Philippine military to build credible deterrence against more provocative and aggressive actions of China.^[44] This seems to be the approach taken by Secretary of Defense Hegseth during his last visit in Manila in March 2025, where he reaffirmed the US’ commitments in Philippine defense and the expansion of the annual Balikatan exercises with more sophisticated equipment.^[45] Furthermore, the two allies have signed a “Joint Vision Statement on Defense Industrial cooperation” signaling where the US pledged to assist the Philippines in the creation of its defense industry sectors, crucially in sectors like unmanned vehicles and critical minerals.^[46]

However, the Philippines did not benefit from any “ally discount” given that it received a similar tariff treatment (19 percent) as other ASEAN countries after negotiation with the Trump administration. However, the uncertainties from Trump’s foreign policy does not provide a sense of policy stability and predictability that are necessary to prop the US-Philippines alliance. Moreover, Trump’s goal of securing a deal with China can potentially undermine Philippine strategic interests, especially if economic deals means that the US will disengage in security cooperation with its allies like the Philippines. There is also the prospect that Trump will ask the Philippines to fund its external defense and that includes US military presence in the country.

 

Conclusion: where does Italy stand?

Italy and the Philippines have enjoyed long standing cordial relationships for 78 years. Italy is an important trade partner with the Philippines, and democratic values and shared visions on the international order are surely a strength in the two countries’ relationship. However, Italy has so far refrained from formulating its own Indo-Pacific strategy, but in spite of such lack, has also deployed some of its naval assets in the region. Specifically, in 2023, the visit of the “Morosini” interceptor in Manila has sparked some interest in Italy’s stake in the region. The Italian ambassador has declared the imminent finalization of a Memorandum on Defense Cooperation for joint training and technology transfers.^[47] Such commitments were reinstated last October 2024, with the first half of 2025 as target for the finalization of the agreement.^[48] Finally, the Italian Navy has initiated talks with the Philippine navy for cooperation in shipbuilding, where Rome can play a role as a contributor.^[49]

It is still unclear if Italy will follow a similar path to the one of other major European countries, but this may also be a better chance to carve out a specific role for Rome. In fact, as highlighted by several initiatives undertaken by the Italian Agency on Development Cooperation (AICS), Italy’s long-standing participation in Philippine development has resulted in projects to strengthen Manila’s agricultural sector and poverty alleviation.^[50] Such a positive record can be a platform to expand Italy’s role in strengthening Philippine economic resilience and robustness, in a division of labor with European partners that may produce effective results. In turn, the Philippines sees Italy as a valuable partner for its diversification efforts: as testified by the strong interest shown in maritime industry cooperation, Italy’s maritime industry and capabilities may be seen as vital to sustain the Philippines’ military and defense modernization, as well as a key to enhance its Coast Guard capabilities. But more than that, Italy’s image and role as a promoter of peace, stability and cooperation through multilateralism may resonate further for Manila, creating a broader like-mindedness ground for cooperation in other domains than security and defense. This is testified, for example, by the kind of “multi-level” engagement that the Philippines enjoys with key partners like Japan, Korea and Australia, where the economic and developmental dimension is entangled with these countries’ stake in maritime security. In order to do so, Italy can carve a unique role for itself (perhaps by exploring synergies with other European initiatives like the EU Global Gateway), by paying a closer look to the Philippines’ necessities on infrastructure renovation and investments, which has consistently been a priority for several administrations.

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Kabagani, L.J. (2025) “PHL Navy engaged in exploratory talks on shipbuilding with Italian Navy”, Daily Tribune, 18 March, available online at: https://tribune.net.ph/2025/03/18/phl-navy-engaged-in-exploratory-talks-on-shipbuilding-with-italian-navy, accessed 11 July 2025.

Magcamit, M. I., Arugay, A. A. (2024) “Explaining populist securitization and Rodrigo Duterte’s anti-establishment Philippine foreign policy”, International Affairs, 100(5), 1877-1897.

Maitem, J. (2025) “Will Philippines’ second BrahMos missile system deter Beijing in the South China Sea?”, South China Morning Post, available online at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3307300/will-philippines-second-brahmos-missile-system-deter-beijing-south-china-sea, accessed 11 July 2025.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2009) “Japan Philippines joint statement: Fostering a strategic partnership for the future between close neighbors”, available online at: https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8896781/www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/joint0906.html, accessed 11 July 2025.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2011) “Japan Philippines joint statement on the comprehensive promotion of the ‘Strategic Partnership’ between neighboring countries connected by special bonds of friendship”, available online at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/noda/joint_statement110927.html, accessed 11 July 2025.

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^[1] De Castro, R. C. (2016) “Strategic culture: continuity in the face of changing regional dynamics”, in Lantis, J.S., Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific, London: Routledge, 84-104.

^[2] Misalucha-Willoughby, C. (2023) “The Philippines and the liberal rules-based international order”, International Affairs, 99(4), 1537-1555.

^[3] Ibarra, E. J. A. (2024) “Articulating a Philippine grand strategy: Policy continuities on the South China Sea”, Asian Politics & Policy, 16(3), 317-336.

^[4] Permanent Court of Arbitration (2016) “The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China)”, available online.

^[5] Magcamit, M. I., Arugay, A. A. (2024) “Explaining populist securitization and Rodrigo Duterte’s anti-establishment Philippine foreign policy”, International Affairs, 100(5), 1877-1897.

^[6] National Security Council (NSC) Secretariat (2017) National Security Policy for the Well-Being of the Filipino People 2017-2022, Manila,  available online.

^[7] ASEAN Secretariat (2019) ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Jakarta, available online.

^[8] Ibidem.

^[9] Ibidem.

^[10] Ibidem.

^[11] Ibidem.

^[12] Ibidem.

^[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2009) “Japan-Philippines joint statement: Fostering a strategic partnership for the future between close neighbors”, available online.

^[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2011) “Japan-Philippines joint statement on the comprehensive promotion of the ‘Strategic Partnership’ between neighboring countries connected by special bonds of friendship”, available online.

^[15] Government of Japan (2013) “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond”, available online.

^[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2015) “Action Plan for Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership”, available online.

^[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2023) “Official Security Assistance (OSA)”, available online.

^[18] Ibidem.

^[19] Arugay, A. A., Galang, M. A. (2023) “The Philippines-Japan security relationship: A new golden age?”, Fulcrum, available online.

^[20] Arugay, A. A., Galang, M. A. (2024) The Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement: Complementing and cementing the hub-and-spokes system, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective, 70, available online.

^[21] Government of the Republic of the Philippines, Government of Japan, Government of the United States (2024) Joint Vision Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States, Manila: Presidential Communications Office, available online.

^[22] Ibidem.

^[23] Ibidem.

^[24] Australian Embassy in the Philippines (2012) “Status of Visiting Forces Agreement with Australia ratified by the Philippines”, available online.

^[25] Department of Defence, Australian Government (2024) “Defence joins partners for exercise Balikatan”, available online.

^[26] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government (2023) “Joint Declaration on Australia-The Philippines Comprehensive Partnership”, available online.

^[27] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government (n.d.) “Australia’s maritime arrangements with Timor-Leste”,  available online.

^[28] Government of Australia, Government of the Philippines (2023) Joint declaration on a strategic partnership between the Republic of the Philippines and the Commonwealth of Australia, Manila, 9 September, available online.

^[29] Siow, M. (2024) “New ‘Squad’ bloc could allow Philippines to ‘borrow strength’ of Australia, Japan, US to counter China”, South China Morning Post, 9 May, available online.

^[30] Australian Embassy in the Philippines (2024) “Launch of the Australia-Philippines Development Partnership Plan 2024–2029”, available online.

^[31] The Associated Press (2024) “Philippines, South Korea strengthen strategic relationship”, Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, available online.

^[32] Reyes, M. T. (2024) “Philippines-South Korea partnership seen as model for regional security cooperation”,  Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, available online.

^[33] Department of Trade and Industry, Philippines (2024) “Landmark trade agreement between Philippines and South Korea enters into force”, available online.

^[34] Cabuenas, J. V. D. (2024) “Philippines, India to hold joint maritime exercises”, GMA News Online, available online.

^[35] Maitem, J. (2025) “Will Philippines’ second BrahMos missile system deter Beijing in the South China Sea?”, South China Morning Post, available online.

^[36] Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines (2025) “Declaration on Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the Republic of India”, available online.

^[37] Domingo, K. (2025) “PH, UK seal deals on joint maritime exercises, defense cooperation”, ABS-CBN News, 8 March, available online.

^[38] Embassy of France in the Philippines (2024) “France participates in Balikatan 24 (April 22 to May 10)”, available online.

^[39] Government of Canada (2025) “Statement: Canada, Philippines conclude negotiations on Status of Visiting Forces Agreement”, 8 March, available online.

^[40] Piasentini, M. (2024) “Philippines-Europe cooperation on defense modernization: Navigating a complex patchwork”, FactsAsia, 11 July, available online.

^[41] Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines (2024) “Philippines-EU Joint Committee meets, establishes new dialogue on maritime security”, available online.

^[42] Strangio, S. (2024) “Vietnam, Philippines agree to bolster maritime security cooperation”, The Diplomat, 2 September, available online.

^[43] Chan, S. (2024) “Philippines, Singapore deepen ties with defense cooperation agreement”, Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 5 September, available online.

^[44] Amador, J. (2025) “Trump 2.0 and the US-Philippines Alliance: Consistency and Change”, Fulcrum, available online.

^[45] Argosino, F. (2025) “Hegseth: US deploying more advanced assets to PH for Balikatan”, Inquirer, available online.

^[46] U.S. Department of Defense, Philippine Department of National Defense (2025) Joint Vision Statement on U.S.-Philippine Defense Industrial Cooperation, Washington, 28 March, available online.

^[47] Piasentini, M. (2023) “Patrol Ship Morosini docks in Manila: a turning point for military relations between Italy and the Philippines?”, Geopolotica.info, available online.

^[48] Rocamora, J. A. L. (2024) “PH, Italy agree to fast-track talks on new defense deal”, Philippine News Agency, 23 October, available online.

^[49] Kabagani, L.J. (2025) “PHL Navy engaged in exploratory talks on shipbuilding with Italian Navy”, Daily Tribune, 18 March, available online.

^[50] Aranci, C. (2024) AICS-Hanoi Rapporto Annuale 2023, Hanoi: Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (AICS), available online.

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