As Rome navigates the geopolitical complexities that come with the rise of the Indo-Pacific order, a key challenge is deeper structural and functional engagement with Southeast Asia. For Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN, embrace of Indo-Pacific semantics has been sluggish and calculated, considering how the “Indo-Pacific” has been associated with negative and “exclusionary” connotations since its conception in the recent past. A “wait-and-see approach” has hence been adopted in the absence of a coherent and robust strategy towards the emerging Indo-Pacific order. This has largely deterred enhanced strategic cooperation between ASEAN and the EU through the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and by virtue, Europe and Southeast Asia. This paper argues that Italy has the potential to act as Europe’s bridge to the Global South. If Rome sees the Indo-Pacific as a “geographical region” instead of solely a “geostrategic construct”, then its terms of engagement with Southeast Asia can be anchored on a concept palatable to the region and – in recent years – this has been the Global South. As a “Global North Global South mobiliser” in the Indo-Pacific, Italy has a unique opportunity to frame its cooperation with ASEAN and ASEAN member states geographically part of the Indo-Pacific within the Global South agenda that these countries identify with. The reason for this is that firstly, Rome has not fallen into the “redundancy trap” like Germany and France with individual Indo-Pacific strategies, and secondly, Rome is already part of the Global South narrative since its G7 agenda was announced in December 2023 and its re-engagement with Africa. Rome must start advocating for Global South mobilisation in EU mechanisms and agencies to cement its role as Europe’s bridge to the Global South.

 

Effective EU-ASEAN Engagement in the Indo-Pacific? Or Global South? – What’s in a Name?

The end of the last decade has been marked by complex, dynamic geopolitics and a new, emerging regional order. The emerging Indo-Pacific order has become the default “theatre” for the unfolding United States-China competition as we witness several potent consequences borne out of this increasingly adversarial relationship – more so with the Trump 2.0 administration. One is the sense of urgency from Indo-Pacific countries to make sense of this new geopolitical environment – whether it is forming alliances or realigning priorities, this is manifested in the rise of minilateralism in the region and the emergence of targeted “Indo-Pacific strategies”.

In 2019, ASEAN released its ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) which “envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, while preserving their formats”.^[1] The EU published its EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific at the end of 2021 underlining how the regional bloc would be “stepping up its strategic engagement with the vital Indo-Pacific region…..aim[ing] to contribute to the region’s stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development, in line with the principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights and international law”.^[2]

It must be acknowledged here that the EU’s approach very clearly seeks out its many partners in the Indo-Pacific and articulates its reliance on the inherent synergies with existing partnerships. It is possible, however, that the EU’s “principled and long-term” engagement in itself requires tremendous effort, clarity and initiative from its partners – risking a lack of reception, despite its holistic nature. The AOIP, on the other hand, is a rather rigid response to the Indo-Pacific construct, rooted in familiarity to the point that it is banal. It is safe to say that all stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific recognise and endorse ASEAN Centrality despite the prevailing question on what this “centrality” even means in the current geopolitical context.

The emerging Indo-Pacific order has brought ASEAN to the forefront – not necessarily with its “permission”. Geographically, the Indo-Pacific construct automatically puts Southeast Asia at the heart of region, with ASEAN the natural core of engagement. Simply put, while an actor may not necessarily consider ASEAN its most important partner in the region, it most certainly cannot afford to ignore it, by virtue of its presence and unique value in the regional order. But it must be acknowledged – now more than ever – that this default significance shown to ASEAN quite clearly has created a sort of expectation vs reality paradox that 1) deepens the impression that ASEAN is not doing enough with the sense of urgency that is required in the current status quo; 2) reiterates that ASEAN is not keeping up with the times, losing relevance and a strong enough hold in the emerging Indo-Pacific and 3) questions ASEAN’s stance, intentions, principles and values in the status quo.

Having an “ASEAN stance” towards the Indo-Pacific has been visibly challenging for ASEAN because it lacks a collective outlook on how to respond to great power competition. This can be attributed to the different levels of attachment ASEAN countries have to great powers and their varying levels of commitment to ASEAN unity in foreign affairs.^[3] Embracing Indo-Pacific in ASEAN’s dialogue relations and ASEAN-led mechanisms has been spotty, given that its dialogue partners are deeply polarised on this issue – i.e., as cases in point, China^[4] and Russia. Hence, in what Hoang^[5] describes as ASEAN’s “promiscuous diplomacy”, ASEAN has to sing different tunes with different dialogue partners when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. This, of course, makes the regional grouping even more vague and spiritless when navigating the unfolding regional order. ASEAN member states also remain ambivalent about the concept of the Indo-Pacific due to its malleability^[6], dynamism and scope of interpretation — making them reluctant to invest in the necessary political, economic and military resources to follow up on the AOIP.

The reasons for this perhaps stem from Southeast Asia’s reluctant or lukewarm ‘recognition’ and ‘embrace’ of the Indo-Pacific concept/construct itself. Ha^[7] opines that the ambivalence among Southeast Asian countries towards the Indo-Pacific is largely due to the flexibility and ambiguity of the concept. In addition to this, for many, the Indo-Pacific is still seen as a US-led, anti-China coalition, further reinforced by the Trump administration’s confrontational stance towards Beijing after the pandemic. Initially dismissing the Indo-Pacific as “sea foam that will soon dissipate”, China’s attitude shifted to alarm and anger, labelling it as part of the US’s “hegemonic strategy” and “Cold War, zero-sum thinking”. This heightened sensitivity from Beijing has made Southeast Asian countries hesitant to fully endorse the Indo-Pacific concept. Ha^[8] also highlights that within ASEAN, Indonesia and Vietnam are arguably the most proactive in embracing the Indo-Pacific concept, though they approach it from different perspectives.

It must be acknowledged, however, that this hesitancy has gradually diminished over the years as it becomes clear that the “Indo-Pacific order” is here to stay. Take the case of Malaysia, as a “least-likely to” example. Malaysia for the longest time, did not use the requisite Indo-Pacific semantics, inadvertently staying out of strategic discourse centred around a concept that was growing in significance.^[9] This has gradually changed, with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim growing more inclined with using the term in his speeches and statements in the last year.^[10] In the last two years, ASEAN’s internalisation of the Indo-Pacific, while slow, has also been more pronounced. More concrete efforts have emerged, such as the establishment of the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum under Indonesia’s 2023 chairmanship. Further steps toward implementing the AOIP have been taken through initiatives like the ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Mainstreaming Four Priority Areas of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific within ASEAN-Led Mechanisms^[11] and ASEAN’s participation in platforms such as the EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum.^[12] These examples, however, clearly demonstrate that in relation to Southeast Asia, the challenge of cooperating within the Indo-Pacific or even coalescing around the construct remains a potent challenge for partners in the region – more so the EU. To put plainly, Indo-Pacific cooperation is tricky because the usage of Indo-Pacific semantics is tricky. There is a clear gap between how the EU and EU member states view the Indo-Pacific and how ASEAN and ASEAN member states have adjusted to the Indo-Pacific reality.

Against this complex backdrop, since 2023, new strategic semantics related to Global South mobilisation have surfaced. Hogan and Patrick^[13] wrote that the resurgence of the Global South reflects a renewed push for a fairer global order, unlike the failed attempt in the 1980s. From 1990 to 2020, the global Gini coefficient fell, reducing inequality between nations. Countries like India, Indonesia, and Brazil have gained economic and political power, challenging the idea of a unified, powerless Global South. They have, rather remarkably, bypassed Western institutions with groups like BRICS+ and increased collaboration with the Global North through the G20.

For many Global South governments, growing economic and political strength has fuelled, rather than lessened, their push for realignment, as rising power has not brought greater privilege. Additionally, while some nations have gained wealth and influence, many others remain low-income and excluded from major multilateral platforms. While Global South countries often echo similar rhetoric about the global order, their positions differ. India and China, though both in BRICS+, are fierce geopolitical rivals competing for leadership in the Global South.^[14] Amid this diversity, Hogan and Patrick underline that references to the Global South should emphasize its core idea: uniting varied experiences under a common grievance—an exploitative global political economy that reinforces colonial hierarchies—and advocating for a global realignment that promotes self-determination.

A staunch believer of the “Asian century”, Mahbubani^[15] writes that the world appears to be nearing what many see as the end of Western dominance. He asserts that 88 per cent of the global population resides outside the West, in what is now known as the Global South and many countries across Latin America, Africa, and Asia are no longer passive players on the global stage, increasingly asserting their independence from the West. PM Anwar in his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs during his maiden state visit to India, said that “the resurgence of Global South narratives and the desire for greater participation in the international system has pushed regional powers to the forefront, with opportunities to exert agency and shape the discourse around what a Global South agenda should look like”. He stressed that, at this geopolitical crossroads marked by strategic uncertainties, the Global South should aim for a collective good with fair opportunities for all. An empowered Global South is inevitable, with real opportunities to address global challenges collaboratively, including climate change, supply chain resilience, food security, and Artificial Intelligence governance.^[16]

Ha and Cha^[17] explain that Southeast Asian countries are indeed associated with the Global South across various material indicators and normative dimensions, including their developmental level, membership in organisations representing the Global South, and alignment with the Global South discourse advocating for a more representative and equitable international order. Despite this, they also concede that Southeast Asian countries make their foreign policy decisions based on their respective national interests rather than on ideological solidarity with the Global South. This is evident in their varied responses to the Russia-Ukraine war^[18], the Israel-Hamas conflict,^[19] and South China Sea disputes.^[20]

Major powers are increasingly adopting the Global South narrative in their approaches to Southeast Asia. China frames its ties with the region within both its neighbourhood policy and the Global South context. India has called on ASEAN to elevate the Global South for mutual benefit, while Japan aims to bridge the Global North and South, viewing ASEAN as a key gateway for strengthening its Global South relations.^[21]

It must be stressed here that Southeast Asia’s framing of the Global South discourse reveals a central inference. First, it is relatively easier and more effective for regional partners to engage Southeast Asia within the Global South narrative – it is less contentious than coalescing solely around the Indo-Pacific concept since all Southeast Asian countries identify with Global South semantics in one way or other.

This does not imply that partners like the EU abandon its Indo-Pacific push in Southeast Asia altogether; the idea is to recalibrate the frame of reference, primarily that Europe wishes to engage Southeast Asia and ASEAN as part of a collective and shared Global South agenda that brings development and prosperity and enhances cooperation across regions, leading to a stable and peaceful Indo-Pacific.

Essentially, for the EU, there is a need to cultivate long-term relationships by engaging with Global South countries on a broad set of issues, whether it is trade and economic cooperation, climate change, development support or even institutional reform in multilateral mechanisms, well before seeking their support. Identifying both formal and informal avenues for such engagement is essential. In an increasingly conflict-prone and complex world, there is ample scope for multiple groupings—as many as time permits. Recognising and treating Global South nations as distinct entities is both urgent and necessary. Expanding diplomatic outreach now will yield long-term benefits.^[22]

The Rome “Re-Connection”: What does Italy Want?

Italy’s approach to the Indo-Pacific^[23] requires greater clarity, especially in light of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which has received only lukewarm reception in the region. The question is whether Rome intends to take a more proactive role^[24] in shaping the EU’s Indo-Pacific engagement, or whether it seeks to carve out a distinct national strategy, as France^[25] and Germany^[26] have attempted. Both paths risk being conflated with the EU’s broader—and often muddled—Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), perpetuating confusion about the EU’s supranational coherence.

If Italy’s objective is deeper engagement with ASEAN and its member states, then a strategy centred on the Indo-Pacific may not be the most effective vehicle. Conversely, if Italy’s aim is to become a prominent actor in Indo-Pacific geopolitics, focusing too heavily on ASEAN may dilute that ambition; the two paths appear mutually exclusive. As a proponent of stronger Italy–Southeast Asia relations, this paper lies in identifying what enables this bilateral and multilateral engagement, even if it means de-emphasising Italy’s role as a broader Indo-Pacific actor. The crux of this debate lies in perception: does Italy view the Indo-Pacific as a mere geographic expanse^[27] or as a geostrategic construct?^[28] If it is the former, then Italy’s engagement with Southeast Asia can be framed in terms more acceptable to the region—namely, the Global South. While not all Indo-Pacific countries are part of the Global South, all Southeast Asian nations within the Indo-Pacific fall under that umbrella^[29], aligning neatly with Italy’s evolving foreign policy posture in recent years.

Italy as a “Global North” Global South Mobiliser in the Indo-Pacific

Rome has the potential to be a distinct “Global North” Global South mobiliser in the Indo-Pacific, not through a singular strategy but through an evolving, multifaceted engagement that resonates with the priorities of the Global South. While countries like Japan are recalibrating their Indo-Pacific approaches to align with the growing assertiveness and agenda-setting by Global South actors—particularly in the wake of Western disillusionment—Italy offers a nuanced model. Italy’s strategic involvement in the Indo-Pacific is already taking shape across three broad domains: economy, security, and norms.^[30] Among these, the normative dimension stands out, positioning Italy as a potential bridge between the EU and the Global South. This is most evident in Prime Minister Meloni’s G7 agenda, which foregrounded a renewed focus on Global South dialogue.^[31]

This, in fact, is in line with Italy’s aim to function as an “enhanced bridge” in terms of National Role Conception (NRC). This role goes beyond merely acting as a ‘translator’ or conduit of information between diverse cultures, as described in Holsti’s concept of the bridge NRC.^[32] Rather, Italy seeks to shape a discourse that nurtures a sense of community and shared purpose, thereby creating a political environment conducive to advancing common agendas. The idea of Italy as a bridge in global affairs resonates strongly with Italian Foreign Ministers. Situated at the intersection of multiple cultural, economic, political, and security divides, Italy is naturally positioned to facilitate dialogue, foster mutual understanding, and connect the West with developing and emerging nations.^[33]

Italy’s status as an IORA dialogue partner and an ASEAN development partner further signals its conscious effort to reshape the terms of engagement around challenge-based cooperation, a core tenet of the Global South agenda. Moreover, unlike the EU’s often top-down “normative exports”, Italy promotes regionally palatable practices such as niche cooperation and targeted multilateralism^[34]—approaches that eschew paternalism and align more closely with regional priorities. In this context, Italy’s re-engagement with Africa^[35] offers a useful reference point for building sustainable partnerships in Southeast Asia.

 

Conclusion

In the current strategic context in Southeast Asia, Global South semantics are increasingly more resonant and palatable than the Indo-Pacific discourse where uptake is surely but slowly gaining traction. In this context, Italy holds a unique opportunity to shape its cooperation with ASEAN and its member states—geographically situated in the Indo-Pacific—through the lens of the Global South agenda, which these countries more readily identify with. Unlike Germany and France, which have risked strategic redundancy by developing separate Indo-Pacific strategies, Italy – so far – has avoided this pitfall. Instead, Rome’s approach is already embedded in the Global South narrative, as seen in its G7 presidency priorities and structured re-engagement with Africa. This positioning enables Italy to serve as a credible and non-prescriptive partner in Southeast Asia. To consolidate this role, Italy must now take the lead in advocating for “Global North enterprise”^[36] in Global South mobilisation within EU mechanisms and agencies, ensuring that European engagement aligns more closely with the region’s priorities and sensitivities.

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^[1]  ASEAN (2019)  ASEAN Outlook on the Indo‑Pacific, Jakarta, 22 June, available online.

^[2] European Commission (2021) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Brussels, 16 September, available online.

^[3] Muhibat, S.F. (2022) “Looking beyond the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, East Asia Forum, 20 July, available online.

^[4] Despite its multifaceted nature, China has consistently rejected the use of the Indo-Pacific concept in its official policy. Beijing’s attitude was reflected in Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remarks that dismissed the Indo-Pacific as a “come-back of Cold War mentality” and “retrogression of history”. Reference: Jaknanihan, A.A. (2022), Beyond Inclusion: Explaining China’s Rejection of the Indo-Pacific Regional Construct, Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional, available online.

^[5] Hoang, T.H. (2021) “ASEAN Navigates between Indo-Pacific Polemics and Potentials”, ISEAS Perspective, 49, available online.

^[6] Ibidem.

^[7] Hoang, T.H. (2021) “ASEAN Navigates between Indo-Pacific Polemics and Potentials”, ISEAS Perspective, 49, available online.

^[8] Ibidem.

^[9] Mishra, R., Wang, P.B.M. (2021) “Malaysia and the Indo-Pacific: Navigating the Ocean of Strategic Uncertainties”, The Diplomat, available online; Hooi, K.Y. (2022) “Malaysia and the ‘Indo-Pacific’: Why the Hesitancy?”, The Diplomat, available online; Kuik, C.C. (2020) “Mapping Malaysia in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Construct”, in Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, CSCAP Regional Security Outlook, Canberra: CanPrint Communications, 45-48, available online; Abdullah, M.F. (2023) “Malaysia’s Role in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order”, ISIS Malaysia, available online.

^[10] Indian Council of World Affairs (2024) “Towards a Rising Global South: Leveraging on Malaysia-India Ties”, speech by Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim-Prime Minister of Malaysia at the 50th Sapru House Lecture, New Delhi, 20 August, available online; Anwar, D.S. (2023) Keynote Address at the 36th Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR), Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), 10 August, available online.

^[11] ASEAN (2022) “ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Mainstreaming Four Priority Areas of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific within ASEAN-Led Mechanisms”, 11 November, available online.

^[12] European Union (n.d.) “EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forums”, available online.

^[13] Hogan, E., Patrick, S. (2024) “A Closer Look at the Global South”, Carnegie India, available online.

^[14] Ibidem.

^[15] Mahbubani, K. (2024) “Measuring Power in the Global South”, Chatham House, February, available online.

^[16] Indian Council of World Affairs (2024) “Towards a Rising Global South: Leveraging on Malaysia-India Ties”, speech by Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim-Prime Minister of Malaysia at the 50th Sapru House Lecture, New Delhi, 20 August, available online.

^[17] Ha, H.T., Cha, H.W. (2024) Southeast Asia and the Global South: Rhetoric and Reality, Singapore: ISEAS Perspective, 14 June, available online.

^[18] Singapore has imposed sanctions on Russia and supported United Nations General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia; the Philippines transitioned from abstentions to supporting these resolutions under the Marcos Jr administration; Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand maintain a neutral stance, offering certain support for resolutions condemning Russia; and both Vietnam and Laos predominantly abstained.

^[19] Southeast Asian responses to the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023 were varied between Muslim majority nations and non-Muslim nations. Singapore and the Philippines condemned the attacks by Hamas which then led to Israel’s subsequent disproportionate attacks on Gaza. Muslim-majority Indonesia attributed “the root of the conflict” to “the occupation of the Palestinian territories by Israel”, Malaysia expressed solidarity with the Palestine people and maintains ties with Hamas, and Brunei condemned Israel’s occupation and illegal settlements. Thailand and Vietnam meanwhile have expressed concerns but adopted a more neutral stance.

^[20] The South China Sea issue sheds light on how nations in Southeast Asia and the Global South at large have prioritised their interests over standing up for international law and for fellow small states in the face of larger powers, i.e. China. This dynamic has played out at NAM meetings in recent years. At the 2024 NAM, ASEAN countries even failed to reach consensus on the group’s proposed wording on the SCS due to differences among themselves.

^[21] Ibidem.

^[22] Ashton, B. (2024) “Stop Taking the Global South for Granted”, Chatham House, February, available online.

^[23] Mazziotti Di Celso, M. (2024) “Is Italy Needed in the Indo-Pacific?”, War on the Rocks, available online.

^[24] Patalano, A. (2024) “Italy: The Globally Connected Mediterranean Power?”, RUSI Commentary, available online.

^[25] Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (2021) France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Paris, available online.

^[26] Federal Foreign Office (2023) “Germany and the Indo-Pacific – Three Years of Enhanced Engagement in a Key Region in International Politics”, available online.

^[27] Bonavita, M., Murday, L., Scholz, T. (2024) The Indo-Pacific: A Survey of the Key Issues and Debates, King’s College London, available online.

^[28] Smith, N.R., Bacon, P.M. (2024) “The Indo-Pacific is an Idea More Than a Region – and It’s Pushing Politics in a ‘Pessimistic and Paranoid’ Direction”, The Conversation, November, available online.

^[29] As post-colonial nations with largely developing economies and non-aligned foreign policies, Southeast Asian countries are typically classified within the Global South—though Singapore and Brunei stand out as exceptions due to their higher levels of development. Ideologically, however, these countries would not be averse to cooperating with partners within the “Global South agenda” since fellow ASEAN members resonate with these semantics.

^[30] Abbondanza, G. (2024) “Italy’s Quiet Pivot to the Indo-Pacific: Towards an Italian Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, available online.

^[31] Voice of Vietnam (2024) “G7 Summit Opens in Italy, Meloni Affirms Global South Dialogue”, 14 June, available online.

^[32] Holsti, K.J. (1970) “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, International Studies Quarterly 14(3), 233–309, available online.

^[33] Gabusi, G., Caffarena, A. (2024) “Changing and Yet the Same? Italy’s Foreign Policy Ideas and National Role Conceptions in a Populist Age”, Contemporary Italian Politics: 1–22, available online.

^[34] Casini, E. (2025) “Italy as a European Hub in the Rise of the Global South”, Med-Or Foundation, February, available online.

^[35] Guglielminotti, L. (2024), “The evolution of Italian presence in Africa: towards an innovative policy approach?”, FMES Institute, available online.

^[36] Louis, Y.M. (2025), “Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship 2025: Strengthening regionalism, inter-regionalism and Global South mobilisation”, Observer Research Foundation, 2025, available online.