The Indo-Pacific region has long been characterized by a delicate balance of power, underpinned by U.S. leadership and a commitment to liberal multilateralism. Following the end of World War II, the United States provided security guarantees, promoted free trade, and helped establish regional institutions that collectively sustained peace and prosperity.^[1] Yet, over the past decade, this leadership has become increasingly erratic. Under administrations such as Donald Trump’s, and even partially continuing under Joe Biden’s, U.S. foreign policy has tilted toward unilateralism, transactionalism, and domestic preoccupations.^[2] This trend has created a growing leadership vacuum in the Indo-Pacific.

Simultaneously, China’s ascendancy as a major regional power has not filled this void adequately. Despite its remarkable economic rise and growing political influence, China continues to suffer from a legitimacy deficit in political and security domains. Its assertive actions, particularly in the South China Sea, along with fears of a revisionist agenda, have stoked unease among its neighbors. As a result, many Indo-Pacific states remain wary of China’s intentions and are reluctant to embrace its leadership.

This emerging leadership gap raises a critical question: without a strong commitment of American leadership in the region and the world, how can the Indo-Pacific maintain its regional order, stability, and prosperity? This chapter contends that secondary powers—those with substantial regional influence but lacking hegemonic capabilities—such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, including regional institutions like ASEAN – are essential to filling this power vacuum. Importantly, other like-minded stakeholders, like the European Union (EU), also share common strategic interests.

The central argument of this article is that the EU, though geographically distant, can play an indispensable role in reinforcing the agency of Indo-Pacific secondary powers. By strengthening multilateral institutions, enhancing regional resilience, and promoting inclusive cooperation frameworks, the EU can help maintain the liberal order. This approach is grounded in neoliberal institutionalism, which asserts that cooperative international structures can persist even amid hegemonic decline.^[3] As this chapter will demonstrate, by deepening partnerships and promoting regional norms, the EU has the potential to become a critical stabilizer in the Indo-Pacific.

Theoretical Framework: Hegemony and Neoliberal Institutionalism

Traditional international relations theories often argue that global order requires a hegemonic power to provide public goods such as security, economic stability, and rule-making capacity.^[4] According to hegemonic stability theory (HST), the absence of a clear leader would result in chaos and disorder. However, Robert Keohane’s groundbreaking work, After Hegemony (1984), challenged this deterministic view by proposing that multilateral institutions could maintain order even without a strong commitment by the hegemon. Keohane (1984) argued that rational states recognize the mutual benefits of cooperation and can sustain collaborative arrangements through international institutions, which reduce transaction costs, provide information, and establish norms of reciprocity. In a decentralized system, secondary powers can collectively uphold order by reinforcing institutional mechanisms, provided there is sufficient commitment to shared principles and mutual accountability.

In the context of the Indo-Pacific and the current geopolitical context, this theoretical framework is particularly relevant and promoted by many countries. With U.S. leadership becoming less reliable and China being viewed with suspicion, the burden of sustaining the regional order increasingly falls on the shoulders of secondary powers. Importantly, these powers—Japan, Australia, South Korea, India, and ASEAN member states—have demonstrated a vested interest in preserving a stable, rules-based environment. The EU, as an external actor committed to multilateralism, human rights, and international law, naturally fits into this emerging framework. The EU’s efforts to engage the Indo-Pacific through partnerships, capacity-building initiatives, and support for regional institutions can be seen as an extension of neoliberal institutionalist logic: maintaining order through collective action in the absence of hegemonic dominance.

The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Strategic Alignment with Key Regional Powers

The European Union’s (EU) strategy toward the Indo-Pacific has undergone a significant recalibration, particularly with the formal adoption of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2021. This strategy underscores the region’s growing economic and strategic importance^[5] and outlines key objectives, such as promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, strengthening regional resilience, fostering sustainable and inclusive prosperity, supporting the green transition, enhancing ocean governance, advancing digital governance, and intensifying security cooperation.^[6] The EU’s approach emphasizes inclusivity and multilateral dialogue over bloc-based confrontations. Unlike the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, which often focuses on strategic competition with China, the EU tends to seek for engaging with all regional partners. Whilst remaining cautious of China’s actions that undermine the rules-based order, particularly in maritime security and economic coercion, the EU remains open to cooperating with China where possible.^[7]

When analyzing the strategic outlooks of key regional players, there are clear overlaps with the EU’s priorities, though each actor emphasizes different domains based on their national interests.

1. Japan: Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy aligns closely with the EU’s focus on maritime security and connectivity, particularly through shared goals around freedom of navigation and infrastructure development.^[8] Japan places a high priority on freedom of navigation, infrastructure development, and the protection of maritime commons, echoing the EU’s commitment to upholding international maritime law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Japan’s emphasis on the rule of law at sea and its role in fostering regional stability aligns well with the EU’s focus on promoting a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. Japan also seeks to ensure regional security through initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which promotes shared democratic values and open trade routes, dovetailing with the EU’s broader strategic goals of security cooperation and regional stability. Furthermore, Japan and the EU are natural partners in advancing sustainable economic development, particularly in green technology and the transition to renewable energy, where both share a commitment to addressing climate change.^[9]
2.  South Korea: South Korea’s New Southern Policy also intersects with the EU’s focus on digital governance, as both prioritize cybersecurity norms, data protection standards, and digital infrastructure development.^[10] South Korea places significant emphasis on economic connectivity, people-centered development, and emerging digital domains. Its focus on expanding digital infrastructure and promoting cybersecurity aligns with the EU’s emphasis on digital governance and its efforts to promote secure and resilient digital ecosystems. South Korea’s growing role in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian missions also complements the EU’s human security agenda. The convergence of priorities between South Korea and the EU in digital and human security areas presents a powerful platform for deepening their partnership.^[11]
3. Australia: Australia’s Indo-Pacific vision emphasizes maritime security and economic resilience, aligning with the EU’s commitment to security cooperation and sustainable economic partnerships. Australia’s ongoing concern over Chinese influence in the region, particularly regarding economic coercion and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, aligns with the EU’s stance on upholding international law and promoting a rules-based order. Additionally, Australia’s increasing commitment to green transition initiatives, including renewable energy projects and climate change adaptation, resonates strongly with the EU’s green transition agenda. The EU and Australia share common ground in their efforts to promote sustainability and tackle climate change, opening avenues for collaboration in green technologies and energy transitions. Furthermore, Australia’s role in the Quad group and its close cooperation with ASEAN are strategic assets in aligning Australia’s policies with the EU’s broader Indo-Pacific goals.^[12]
4. India: India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) shares common goals with the EU, particularly in ocean governance, human security, and a rules-based maritime order, providing ample opportunities for deepened cooperation.^[13] India’s Indo-Pacific strategy focuses on maritime security, sustainable development, and connectivity among littoral states. India’s objectives align closely with the EU’s emphasis on ocean governance and its broader human security goals. India’s vision of a “free, open, and inclusive” Indo-Pacific resonates with the EU’s advocacy for a rules-based international order and multilateralism. India’s reluctance to engage in rigid alliances further complements the EU’s flexible, multilateral approach, which is built on diplomacy and consensus-building. Both India and the EU prioritize sustainable development in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in areas like fisheries management, climate change, and disaster risk reduction, creating space for joint initiatives. India’s growing engagement with ASEAN and its leadership in regional organizations like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) are crucial for strengthening ties with the EU in pursuit of a secure, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.^[14]
5. ASEAN: ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) aligns with the EU’s emphasis on inclusivity and economic cooperation, making it a natural partner for the EU in areas such as capacity-building and sustainable development.^[15] ASEAN’s focus on regional unity and dialogue aligns perfectly with the EU’s approach, which advocates for non-confrontational engagement with all Indo-Pacific actors. ASEAN’s commitment to a rules-based order and its proactive stance in regional peacebuilding create significant opportunities for collaboration with the EU in addressing issues such as maritime security, human trafficking, and environmental protection. The EU’s emphasis on capacity-building initiatives, particularly in narrowing development gaps within ASEAN, offers a valuable framework for advancing shared regional goals.^[16]

Additionally, individual EU member states have crafted their national strategies that complement the EU-wide approach. The UK’s post-Brexit “Indo-Pacific Tilt” reinforces its commitment to the Indo-Pacific, focusing on security cooperation and engagement with ASEAN, while France, with its overseas territories in the region, emphasizes sovereignty and regional stability, particularly through maritime security.^[17] Germany’s policy focuses on multilateral norms and sustainable development, aiming to avoid open confrontation with China while supporting international law. Even Italy, though less visible, has increasingly engaged in the region through economic diplomacy.^[18]

Through this coordinated approach, the EU and its member states aim to position themselves as credible and constructive actors in shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future, ensuring that the region’s security and prosperity align with European interests. The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, with its focus on multilateral partnerships and economic strength, marks not just a regional engagement but a vital component of its vision for maintaining a liberal international order amidst growing great power competition.^[19]

Table 1: Comparative Focus Areas and Strategic Objectives in Indo-Pacific Strategies

Actor	Key Strategic Priorities	Alignment with EU Strategy
European Union (EU)	The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific includes goals such as promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, sustainability, green transition, digital governance, and security cooperation	– Advocates multilateralism and inclusivity – Seeks cooperation with all regional partners, including China, on shared goals – Aims to foster regional stability, economic resilience, and long-term prosperity through cooperative partnerships
Japan	Focus on maritime security and trade connectivity (FOIP)	– Aligns with EU’s focus on maritime security and infrastructure development – Emphasizes freedom of navigation and adherence to international maritime laws (UNCLOS) – Opportunities for collaboration on green energy and climate change adaptation
South Korea	New Southern Policy emphasizes economic connectivity, digital governance, and people-centered development	– Aligns with EU’s digital governance focus – Emphasizes cooperation on cybersecurity norms, data protection standards, and digital infrastructure development
Australia	Focus on maritime security, economic resilience, and sustainable development	– Aligns with EU’s commitment to security cooperation and sustainable economic partnerships – Opportunities for collaboration on renewable energy and climate change adaptation
India	Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) focuses on ocean governance, human security, and a rules-based maritime order	– Strong alignment with EU’s focus on ocean governance, human security, and promoting rules-based maritime order – Opportunities for deepened cooperation in sustainable development and regional stability
ASEAN	Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) emphasizes inclusivity, sovereignty, and economic cooperation rather than geopolitical rivalry	– Aligns with EU’s focus on inclusivity and economic cooperation – Natural partner for capacity-building initiatives and narrowing development gaps within ASEAN – Strong emphasis on sustainable development

 

Opportunities for EU Cooperation with Regional Secondary Powers

The Indo-Pacific region presents a complex yet fertile environment for the EU to forge meaningful partnerships with regional secondary powers. Amidst rising uncertainties caused by great power rivalry, middle powers such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and ASEAN have sought to strengthen their strategic autonomy while preserving the rules-based international order. The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy aligns closely with the strategic visions of these actors, creating multiple avenues for cooperation grounded in shared values and mutual interests.^[20]

Strengthen regional order and stability. One critical starting point lies in identifying the common key areas across various Indo-Pacific strategies where the EU can contribute effectively. Climate change mitigation emerges as a top shared priority. Countries such as Australia, Japan, and ASEAN members have emphasized climate resilience and sustainable development in their national strategies. The EU, with its European Green Deal and commitment to carbon neutrality, is well-positioned to provide technological support, climate finance, and capacity-building assistance to enhance regional efforts at environmental sustainability.^[21] Collaborative programs on green infrastructure, renewable energy development, and disaster risk reduction could form pillars of EU engagement.

Maritime security constitutes another key area of strategic alignment. With the South China Sea remaining a flashpoint of geopolitical tension, regional states prioritize freedom of navigation, adherence to international maritime law, and peaceful dispute settlement. Japan’s FOIP initiative, Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) all underscore maritime security.^[22] The EU’s longstanding commitment to UNCLOS and its operational contributions, such as the CRIMARIO project enhancing maritime domain awareness, enable it to play a supportive role. Conducting joint naval exercises, providing training programs on maritime law enforcement, and promoting codes of conduct for responsible naval behavior could significantly bolster regional stability.

Economic resilience and supply chain diversification also feature prominently in regional strategies. The COVID-19 pandemic and U.S.-China trade tensions exposed vulnerabilities in concentrated global supply chains. Australia, Japan, and India’s Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) seeks to mitigate such risks by promoting trusted partnerships. The EU, with its emphasis on “de-risking” rather than “decoupling” from China, can cooperate with Indo-Pacific economies to create alternative trade corridors, enhance connectivity, and foster sustainable investment practices.^[23]

Cybersecurity and digital governance represent emerging domains of cooperation. As digital transformation accelerates, concerns over cyber threats, digital authoritarianism, and technological dependencies grow. Japan’s Cybersecurity Strategy, ASEAN’s Digital Masterplan 2025, and Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy all prioritize resilient digital ecosystems. The EU’s expertise in data protection (GDPR), digital rights, and cybersecurity standards offers valuable assets for capacity-building partnerships.

Amid these sectoral alignments, ASEAN emerges as the primary regional platform for EU engagement. ASEAN’s centrality is a fundamental organizing principle in the Indo-Pacific, yet concerns about ASEAN’s slow and ineffective responses to dynamic political and economic developments persist.^[24] The EU can play a vital role in enhancing ASEAN’s institutional capacity, thereby preserving its centrality and relevance. Technical assistance in regulatory harmonization, support for ASEAN-led forums, and investment in ASEAN’s economic integration projects such as the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 can strengthen regional coherence.^[25]

Specifically, capacity-building initiatives in crisis management, environmental governance, maritime security, and cyber resilience can empower ASEAN to act collectively and credibly. The EU’s experience with regional integration offers valuable lessons for ASEAN’s efforts to bridge intra-regional gaps, enhance multilateral diplomacy, and resist external coercion.

The European Union not only has the capacity to support ASEAN integration, but its consistent and constructive engagement in the region has also earned a high level of trust. According to the State of Southeast Asia 2025 survey, ASEAN remains overwhelmingly optimistic about the EU’s role in the region. Respondents highlighted the EU’s strong commitment to environmental protection, human rights, and climate change, as well as its advocacy for international law. They also believe that the EU possesses both economic resources and political will to provide effective global leadership.^[26]

Managing the China Factor. In navigating the major rivalry between Washington and Beijing, ASEAN is widely recognized for adopting hedging strategies to manage uncertainty. According to the State of Southeast Asia 2025 survey, the European Union is regarded as the most trusted strategic partner in supporting this approach. This reflects the EU’s successful cultivation of normative power and a positive image among ASEAN member states. Other middle powers—such as Japan, India, Australia, and the United Kingdom—are also seen as following a similar path. This trend underscores the region’s recognition of the strategic value in deepening cooperation between ASEAN and secondary powers (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2025).^[27]

However, the EU must be careful not to adopt an exclusionary approach towards China. Isolating China could prove destabilizing, given its deep entanglement in the region’s economic and security architecture.^[28] Instead, the EU should pursue a dual strategy: reinforcing regional resilience while engaging China within normative frameworks. China’s ASEAN strategy emphasizes economic engagement, infrastructure investment through the BRI, and participation in ASEAN-led platforms such as the ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit. Beijing projects itself as a champion of regional economic growth and multilateralism, albeit on its own terms.^[29] Nevertheless, tensions persist over China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, coercive diplomacy practices, trade deficits, as well as other socio-economic challenges from various Chinese actors.

Therefore, the EU and regional actors can ensure that China’s participation in regional governance is in line with respect for international law and established norms. This includes insisting on UNCLOS compliance, transparency in economic projects, and adherence to dispute resolution mechanisms.^[30] By working through inclusive multilateral frameworks, the EU can encourage constructive Chinese behavior while preserving an open, rules-based regional order.

In this sense, the EU’s role should not be to contain China but to socialize it within a normative architecture that privileges cooperation over coercion. Strengthening ASEAN’s capacity, aligning with the Indo-Pacific visions of regional secondary powers, and sustaining principled engagement with China collectively form the pillars of an effective EU Indo-Pacific strategy. This approach not only serves the immediate interests of the region but also reinforces the EU’s broader commitment to global stability and multilateralism.

While it may be tempting for external actors to pursue a containment strategy against China, such an approach would likely be counterproductive in the Indo-Pacific context. China is deeply integrated into the regional economy—it is ASEAN’s largest trading partner, and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects have entrenched economic ties across Southeast Asia. According to The State of Southeast Asia 2025, while China remains the most influential economic power (56.4% of respondents), distrust towards China also remains alarmingly high (41.2%), reflecting a complex relationship of economic dependency mixed with strategic anxiety.^[31]

Given this dual reality, the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy should continue with engagement over isolation. Rather than excluding China from regional frameworks, the EU seeks to incorporate China into multilateral mechanisms that encourage adherence to international norms, transparency, and peaceful dispute resolution. Engagement does not equate to appeasement; rather, it involves holding China accountable through participation in structures that bind behavior to agreed rules.

For instance, the EU supports ASEAN-led platforms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which include China as a participant. These multilateral settings offer venues for dialogue, norm-setting, and crisis management, helping to prevent escalation. Moreover, the EU’s emphasis on upholding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) aligns with ASEAN claimant states like the Philippines and Vietnam, who seek international legal backing in their disputes with China.

Additionally, the EU’s engagement strategy dovetails with efforts to diversify economic dependencies. Initiatives such as the EU Strategy on Global Gateway and the Indo-Pacific Connectivity initiatives offer alternatives to BRI projects, promoting infrastructure investment based on transparency, sustainability, and respect for local governance standards.

Indeed, by pursuing a strategy of engagement embedded within normative frameworks, the EU not only mitigates the risks associated with great power rivalry but also enhances the resilience of regional actors against coercive economic and security pressures. This approach reflects a mature, sophisticated understanding of Indo-Pacific geopolitics, prioritizing inclusive stability over divisive confrontation.

Expected Benefits of a Strengthened EU Role in the Indo-Pacific

The potential benefits of a robust and strategic EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific are manifold. Firstly, by reinforcing multilateral institutions and supporting the agency of secondary powers, the EU helps preserve the liberal international order in a multipolar environment. This contribution is crucial at a time when doubts about the sustainability of that order are intensifying globally.^[32]

Secondly, the EU’s involvement enhances ASEAN centrality and regional unity, addressing concerns about ASEAN’s relevance and capacity. ASEAN’s role as the linchpin of Indo-Pacific regionalism can be revitalized through external support focused on capacity building, conflict prevention, and economic integration.

Thirdly, the EU’s efforts to diversify economic partnerships and promote alternative supply chains reduce regional vulnerabilities. Southeast Asia’s reliance on Sino-centric supply chains exposes it to economic coercion and political pressures. By offering alternative investment and trade frameworks, the EU strengthens regional economic resilience.

Fourthly, managing China’s rise through engagement allows for a stable, predictable regional environment where disputes are mediated through dialogue rather than force. This approach minimizes the risks of major power confrontation spilling over into the region.

Finally, from a European perspective, proactive engagement in the Indo-Pacific enhances the EU’s global standing. It enables Europe to assert its strategic autonomy, contribute meaningfully to global governance, and forge deeper partnerships with fast-growing Asian economies, thereby aligning normative values with tangible economic interests. By anchoring its Indo-Pacific strategy in cooperation, inclusivity, and rule-based engagement, the EU not only serves regional needs but also advances its own interests in an increasingly interconnected world.

 

Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific region finds itself at a decisive moment. U.S. leadership, which once provided a predictable strategic anchor, has become less certain. At the same time, China’s expanding influence is meeting growing resistance and questions about legitimacy. Because the two primary powers can no longer guarantee order on their own, the responsibility for sustaining a stable system increasingly falls to the middle and secondary powers.

In this context, the European Union has a distinctive window of opportunity to act as a constructive and stabilising force. When the EU supports regional multilateral institutions, it strengthens an architecture that distributes influence rather than concentrating it. By reinforcing the central role of ASEAN, the EU helps ensure that smaller and medium-sized states retain agency in regional decision-making processes.

Managing relations with China will remain central to any Indo-Pacific strategy, and here the EU’s strength lies in principled engagement. Rather than framing the relationship in purely adversarial terms, the Union can cooperate with Beijing when interests overlap, for example on climate mitigation, while pushing back against coercive economic practices or maritime assertiveness that violate international law. Consistent reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other established norms provides a rules-based framework that all regional actors can recognize.

Across each of these areas, the EU’s credibility rests on its own record of integration and on its demonstrated commitment to multilateral problem-solving. Because the Union routinely coordinates the policies of twenty-seven diverse member states, it can offer practical expertise on confidence-building measures, dispute-resolution mechanisms and norm-creation. These assets make the EU an indispensable partner for those Indo-Pacific governments that wish to keep the regional order open, inclusive and resilient.

Ultimately, the Union’s engagement is not a quest for external dominance; it is a collaborative effort to create a regional architecture that reflects shared values and mutual interests. At a time when many pillars of global governance are under strain, such partnerships are more necessary than ever. Through patient, sustained and principled cooperation, the European Union can help ensure that the future Indo-Pacific is defined less by the rivalry of great powers and more by collective action that secures stability and prosperity for all.

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^[1] Ikenberry, G. J. (2018) “The end of liberal international order?” International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23.

^[2] Ibidem.

^[3] Keohane, R. O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

^[4] Kindleberger, C. (1973) The World in Depression, 1929–1939, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

^[5] Gorana, G. (2023) “Ambition, meet reality: The European Union’s actorness in the Indo-Pacific”, Sage Journal, 45(5), available online.

^[6] European External Action Service (2021), The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, available online.

^[7] Sicilia, G., Benson, E. (2024) “Navigating Tides: The European Union’s Expanding Role in the Indo-Pacific”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, available online.

^[8] Medcalf, R. (2020) Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

^[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2024a) Diplomatic Bluebook 2024, available online.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2024b) Foreign Policy: Free and Open Indo-Pacific, available online.

^[10] Lee, K. H., Ro, Y. J. (2021) The New Southern Policy Plus Progress and Way Forward, Sejong-si: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, available online.

^[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK (2022) Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, available online.

^[12] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia (2017) 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, available online.

^[13] Medcalf, R. (2020) Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

^[14] Baruah, D. M. (2020) India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available online.

^[15] Pugliese, G. (2024) “The European Union and an ‘Indo-Pacific’ Alignment”, Asia-Pacific Review, 31(1), 17–44, available online.

^[16] The ASEAN Secretariat (2021) ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, available online.

^[17] Gorana, G. (2023) “Ambition, meet reality: The European Union’s actorness in the Indo-Pacific”, Sage Journal, 45(5), available online; Medcalf, R. (2020) Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

^[18] Pugliese, G. (2024) “The European Union and an ‘Indo-Pacific’ Alignment”, Asia-Pacific Review, 31(1), pp. 17–44, available online.

^[19] Ikenberry, G. J. (2018) “The end of liberal international order?”, International Affairs, 94(1), pp. 7–23.

^[20] Pugliese, G. (2024) “The European Union and an ‘Indo-Pacific’ Alignment”, Asia-Pacific Review, 31(1), 17–44, available online.

^[21] Ferenczy, Z. A. (2023). “The EU’s New Thinking in a New Geopolitical Reality: How Challenges to the Global Order are Driving EU-Taiwan Ties”, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 36(1), 149–184, available online.

^[22] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia  (2017) 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2024b) Foreign Policy: Free and Open Indo-Pacific, available online; The ASEAN Secretariat. (2021) ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, available online.

^[23] Ferenczy, Z. A. (2023) “The EU’s New Thinking in a New Geopolitical Reality: How Challenges to the Global Order are Driving EU-Taiwan Ties”, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 36(1), 149–184, available online.

^[24] Seah, S., Ha, H. T., Martinus, M. Thao, P. T. P. (2025) The State of Southeast Asia: 2025 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, available online.

^[25] Pugliese, G. (2024) “The European Union and an ‘Indo-Pacific’ Alignment”, Asia-Pacific Review, 31(1),17–44, available online.

^[26] Seah, S., Ha, H. T., Martinus, M. Thao, P. T. P. (2025) The State of Southeast Asia: 2025 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, available online

^[27] Ibidem.

^[28] Medcalf, R. (2020) Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

^[29] Qiao-Franco, G., Karmazin, A. Kolmaš, M. (2024), “The Indo-Pacific and the Next Phase of ASEAN Centrality”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, available online.

^[30] Johnston, A. I. (2019). “China in a world of orders: Rethinking compliance and challenge in the international order”, International Security, 44(2),  9–60, available online.

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