China’s expanding influence in the Asia/Indo-Pacific region, particularly in Southeast Asia, has become a focal point for geopolitical rivalry involving major powers like the U.S., Japan, Australia, India, and European countries. This paper explores how China has engaged with ASEAN countries over the past few decades and examines the implications of this engagement for EU-ASEAN relations.

China’s influence in Southeast Asia has grown significantly over the past 20 years, as evidenced by surveys from the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute^[1] and the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index^[2]. These surveys indicate that China has surpassed the U.S. in economic cooperation, defense networks, diplomatic ties, and cultural influence in the region. This raises questions about the strategies and policies China has employed to achieve such clout and how regional states have responded to these initiatives.

Despite China’s growing influence, many Southeast Asian countries harbor strategic mistrust towards China, primarily due to the South China Sea disputes and Beijing’s assertive actions. This mistrust is well-documented in regional surveys, highlighting concerns about China’s power and influence. Most ASEAN countries and the collective institution have maintained a strategically neutral position, favoring strategic hedging in response to major-power rivalry in the region.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of China-ASEAN engagement across various sectors, including politics, diplomacy, economics, society, education, and security. It also examines the responses of regional states and their domestic forces to Chinese initiatives and compares the EU’s engagement with ASEAN to that of China. The aim is to identify actions the EU could take to improve its engagement with ASEAN and explore the potential for Europe-China collaboration in Southeast Asia.

 

China-ASEAN Economic Ties: Growth and Challenges

Over the past three decades, China has significantly expanded its economic influence in Southeast Asia through targeted economic statecraft. Scholars widely agree that China’s deepening trade, investment, and policy initiatives with ASEAN countries have not only boosted its regional presence but also helped serve broader geopolitical objectives. The economic relationship now spans across trade in goods and services, foreign direct investment (FDI), and strategic partnerships at both national and subnational levels.

Trade in Goods: Rapid Growth and Rising Imbalance

ASEAN-China trade in goods has grown exponentially, rising from US$8.36 billion in 1991 to a peak of US$975.2 billion in 2022. China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and ASEAN became China’s largest partner in 2020.^[3] By 2022, trade with ASEAN accounted for 15.5% of China’s total trade, while ASEAN’s dependence on Chinese trade reached 21.4%—up from only 3.9% in 2000.^[4] This asymmetry highlights ASEAN’s growing reliance on China.

However, trade imbalances have worsened. ASEAN’s trade deficit with China widened dramatically from US$6.36 billion in 2004 to US$159.2 billion in 2022. Vietnam’s deficit alone surged to US$59 billion in 2022, up from a surplus in 2000. Despite multiple FTAs with other countries, including the EU and UK, Vietnam and other ASEAN states remain heavily dependent on Chinese imports.^[5]

Structurally, China-ASEAN trade shifted from primary commodities to manufactured products between 1993 and 1999. Machinery and electronics (especially HS85) dominate both imports and exports, reflecting increasing intra-industry trade. But these same categories have also driven ASEAN’s rising deficits with China.

Trade in Services and Tourism Dependence

China’s role in ASEAN’s service sector is less documented, but one area of clear influence is tourism. Before the pandemic, China was the largest source of visitors to ASEAN. In 2019, 32.28 million Chinese tourists visited ASEAN, accounting for 22.5% of the region’s total. Countries like Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand relied heavily on Chinese visitors, with tourism contributing up to 19.6% of Cambodia’s GDP in 2019.^[6] This dependency on Chinese tourism has broader implications for economic resilience and political leverage.

FDI Flows and Sectoral Expansion

China’s FDI into ASEAN rose from a mere 1.28% of total inflows in 2005 to 14.2% in 2017, before stabilizing at 8.9% in 2021. Between 2020 and 2021, FDI nearly doubled to US$13.6 billion, driven by investments in electric vehicles, infrastructure, digital economy, and real estate. However, the U.S. remains ASEAN’s top investor, contributing 26.3% of FDI in 2021.^[7] Conversely, ASEAN is not a major investor in China, with Singapore being the only exception.

Policy Frameworks and Strategic Initiatives

Institutional frameworks have underpinned China-ASEAN economic ties. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), signed in 2002 and implemented in 2010, reduced tariffs significantly. ACFTA 2.0 was completed in 2019, and negotiations for ACFTA 3.0 are ongoing. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), now ratified by all ASEAN members, further anchors regional integration.

China has also promoted wide-ranging cooperation via bilateral FTAs and sectoral initiatives. These span agriculture, transport, smart cities, ICT, science and technology, and innovation. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, is central to China’s long-term strategy in the region. The BRI has increased both FDI and construction projects: FDI from Chinese firms in Southeast Asia rose by 85% between 2014 and 2018 compared to the 2010–2013 average.^[8]

The BRI now encompasses green and health components. Between 2020 and 2021, health-related BRI investments in Southeast Asia tripled.^[9] Infrastructure projects like hospitals in Cambodia exemplify China’s expanding soft power. The Green Silk Road has also gained traction: Chinese coal investments declined while renewable energy investments rose by 50% between 2021 and 2022. Notable projects include a 0.5 GW solar farm in Vietnam and US$13.76 billion in Chinese pledges to the Philippines’ renewable sector.^[10]

Local Government Initiatives and Subnational Diplomacy

Chinese local governments have played a key role in sustaining economic ties with ASEAN. The Guangxi government successfully lobbied to permanently host the China-ASEAN Expo (CAEXPO) in Nanning. CAEXPO has become a critical platform for regional trade and cooperation, with signed deals increasing from US$27.86 billion in 2019 to US$59.14 billion in 2022, despite the COVID-19 pandemic.^[11]

Guangxi and Yunnan have been especially proactive in cross-border collaboration, often preceding national BRI strategies. Guangxi promoted the Pan-Beibu Gulf Economic Zone and the Nanning–Singapore corridor. Yunnan positioned itself as a “bridgehead” for ASEAN engagement, initiating projects with Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam as early as 2009. Other provinces, like Sichuan and Chongqing, have sought to position themselves as logistical and industrial bridges between Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

Beijing’s Economic Narratives and Regional Reception

Beijing has actively crafted political narratives to frame China-ASEAN economic relations as “win-win cooperation” rooted in shared “Asian values.”^[12] President Xi Jinping frequently asserts that China seeks no hegemony, portraying the economic relationship as mutually beneficial. Beijing emphasizes community, harmony, and solidarity—framing crises like the pandemic and global supply chain disruptions as opportunities for closer China-ASEAN cooperation.

However, these narratives have met with mixed reception. According to the 2023 ISEAS survey, 64.5% of ASEAN respondents were concerned about China’s growing economic influence—nearly double those worried about the U.S. (34.3%). Nearly half suggested China should rebalance bilateral trade to make relations more mutually beneficial.^[13]

While China’s economic statecraft has significantly deepened its influence in Southeast Asia, the relationship is increasingly complex. Trade growth, surging FDI, expansive FTAs, and infrastructure cooperation have elevated China-ASEAN ties to unprecedented levels. However, rising trade imbalances, unequal dependency, and wariness over China’s intentions highlight persistent challenges. Beijing’s political narratives and local government activism offer additional tools, but regional skepticism and competition from other major powers will continue to shape the evolving economic landscape.

 

China-ASEAN Socio-cultural and Educational Engagement: Deepening Influence through Soft Power

Beyond economic cooperation, China has increasingly leveraged socio-cultural and educational engagement to strengthen its influence across Southeast Asia. Since the 2003 Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership, cooperation between China and ASEAN has expanded into people-to-people exchanges, public health, education, sustainable development, and digital governance.

Expanding Socio-cultural and Educational Ties

Over the past two decades, China and ASEAN have intensified socio-cultural ties through high-level meetings, training programs, and bilateral forums. China has tailored development lessons, such as poverty reduction strategies, to countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Initiatives such as the China-ASEAN Poverty Reduction Experts Database promote knowledge sharing, while projects in smart cities and urban development reflect growing cooperation in technology and planning.^[14] Singapore-Shenzhen pilot programs exemplify collaboration in smart governance.

Aligned with global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), China and ASEAN signed a joint statement in 2021 to cooperate on ecological protection, food security, and disaster resilience. The collaboration integrates cultural and urban policy with sustainability frameworks.

Cultural Diplomacy in Practice

Cultural exchange began formally with the 2003 ASEAN+3 Culture Ministers Meeting and gained momentum through the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding on Cultural Cooperation. Events like the China-ASEAN Cultural Forum and Expo feature performances, workshops, and policy discussions. These platforms have showcased Chinese and ASEAN culture, expanding soft power and mutual understanding.

China’s cultural engagement has evolved from traditional arts and heritage preservation into a broader public diplomacy strategy. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has further mainstreamed cultural diplomacy. Joint projects, such as the nomination of the Wangchuan Ceremony to UNESCO’s heritage list, illustrate how China fosters symbolic cultural partnerships. In 2022, nearly 250 high-level officials participated in the China-ASEAN Cultural Forum, highlighting its diplomatic relevance.

China is now investing in ASEAN’s cultural industries, promoting partnerships in digital content, animation, and tourism. Four strategies drive this agenda: integrating Chinese capital and platforms into ASEAN’s digital cultural industries; exporting Chinese business models; co-developing digital infrastructure; and aligning with ASEAN social media trends.

Educational Initiatives and Confucius Institutes

Educational cooperation has been central to China’s ASEAN engagement. The 2010 Guiyang Declaration set a goal to enroll 100,000 ASEAN and Chinese students in each other’s universities by 2020—a goal reached in 2019 with over 106,000 ASEAN students in China.^[15] The China-ASEAN Technical and Vocational Education and Training Consortium has also institutionalized skills development.

Confucius Institutes (CIs), first established in Singapore and Thailand in 2005, have grown to 40 across ASEAN, especially in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.^[16] They offer language training, cultural events, scholarships, and even instruction for officials in trade and foreign affairs. Unlike in the West, CIs are largely welcomed in ASEAN, although some resistance exists. In Indonesia and Thailand, concerns about cultural intrusion and academic freedom were addressed through flexible rebranding and local partnerships, such as renaming CIs “Mandarin Language Centers” to ease public apprehension.

Human Resource and Leadership Training

China also conducts extensive training programs for ASEAN elites across diplomatic, public health, digital, and business domains. The ASEAN Plus Three Training Program on Understanding China and the ASEAN Young Leaders Training Program promote China’s political model and economic governance, often through lectures, field visits, and exchanges.^[17]

Under the Health Silk Road, Chinese institutions train ASEAN healthcare professionals in pandemic preparedness and public health management. By 2022, China pledged to train more than 1,000 healthcare professionals.^[18] Digital economy cooperation is also rising, exemplified by the China-ASEAN Digital Talents Training Project launched in 2022 to train 1,000 professionals.^[19]

Training extends to intellectual property rights. In 2022, China organized capacity-building sessions for ASEAN IP officials, sharing best practices through field visits and lectures in Sichuan.^[20] These initiatives reflect China’s bid to shape regional governance norms and build long-term influence among Southeast Asian policy elites.

Media and Public Diplomacy: Narrative Building

Media engagement has become a pillar of China’s soft power in ASEAN. Guided by President Xi’s emphasis on discourse power, Chinese media aims to “tell China’s story well.” Since 2004, China has signed agreements with ASEAN on mass media cooperation, content production, and journalist exchanges.

The China Media Group (CMG) and Xinhua News Agency produce documentaries, news features, and cultural content in local languages. These include projects like Classics Quoted by Xi Jinping and Home in the Green Mountains and Rivers broadcast in ASEAN countries. Content-sharing deals with ASEAN outlets—such as MetroTV in Indonesia and TNN24 in Thailand—extend China’s narrative reach. From 2019 to 2022, over 150 op-eds by Chinese diplomats were published in leading ASEAN newspapers.^[21]

Cultural diplomacy is also extended via mobile cinemas and film festivals. The Lancang-Mekong Mobile Cinema project screened Chinese films in villages, schools, and temples across Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia, embedding Chinese narratives into everyday cultural life.^[22]

Digital Influence and Social Media

China increasingly engages ASEAN through social media platforms, particularly TikTok and YouTube. Popular Chinese influencers like Ms. Yeah, with over 10 million followers, promote Chinese culture to Southeast Asian audiences. The first China-ASEAN Online Influencers Conference in 2022 formalized this trend, with Chinese state media promoting ASEAN influencers as “cultural ambassadors.”^[23]

Local Government Diplomacy and Subnational Engagement

Southern Chinese provinces like Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangdong, and Fujian play an outsized role in China-ASEAN people-to-people diplomacy. These provinces leverage geographic proximity, ancestral ties, and economic interdependence to build grassroots connections.

Guangxi, the permanent host of the China-ASEAN Expo, integrates trade with cultural engagement via the “Charming City” program, education exhibitions, and vocational training. Guangxi’s brand “Studying in Guangxi” has attracted thousands of ASEAN students through scholarships and institutional alliances.

Yunnan, despite losing out on CAEXPO, hosts the China-South Asia Expo and promotes tourism and vocational exchanges. Guizhou, as the host of the China-ASEAN Education Cooperation Week, has connected nearly 5,000 institutions through events like youth camps, university partnerships, and scholarship programs.^[24] Guangdong and Fujian engage ethnic Chinese communities and promote youth dialogue through cultural and entrepreneurial initiatives.

Reception in ASEAN

While some skepticism exists—particularly around CIs and China’s expanding media presence—most ASEAN elites view China’s cultural diplomacy positively. In contrast to U.S.-China tensions, ASEAN states often perceive cultural engagement with China as non-threatening and commercially beneficial. Even where political concerns arise, such as in Indonesia or the Philippines, local adaptations and pragmatic responses prevail. China’s COVID-19 assistance and vaccine diplomacy also enhanced goodwill during the pandemic, with 44.2% of ASEAN respondents identifying China as the region’s top helper.^[25]

Yet, concerns linger over the influence of Chinese-controlled social media on ethnic Chinese communities in ASEAN. Leaders such as Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong have warned of possible manipulation through platforms like WeChat.^[26] These tensions highlight the dual potential of China’s soft power: as a tool of engagement—and of influence.

 

Security Challenges in China-ASEAN Relations

Despite deepening economic and socio-cultural ties, security remains a major fault line in China-ASEAN relations. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea and regional power dynamics continue to undermine mutual trust. While Beijing has promoted defense diplomacy and non-traditional security cooperation, many ASEAN states still view China as a potential threat. The rise of U.S.-led minilateral alignments like the QUAD and AUKUS further complicates China’s regional ambitions.

The South China Sea: Core Security Flashpoint

At the heart of security tensions lies the South China Sea, where China’s expansive territorial and maritime claims—anchored in the “nine-dash line”—conflict with claims by several ASEAN countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. China’s strategies have included both engagement and coercion: from bilateral diplomacy and joint exploration agreements to military presence and administrative measures.

The 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef marked China’s first major military clash with an ASEAN member and revived U.S.-Philippine military ties. Although a 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) temporarily calmed tensions, China adopted a more assertive stance in the 2010s. It escalated patrols, deployed naval assets, and constructed artificial islands. The establishment of Sansha Municipality in 2012 and its militarization signaled Beijing’s efforts to consolidate control. The seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 and China’s rejection of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling further strained ties.^[27]

China’s coercive actions have prompted ASEAN claimants to bolster external defense ties. Vietnam and the Philippines, in particular, have deepened security partnerships with the U.S. and other powers. Still, China has continued to promote a Code of Conduct (COC) with ASEAN, though progress has been slow and contentious.

Economic Statecraft and Strategic Leverage

China has used economic incentives under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to strengthen bilateral ties and soften opposition to its maritime claims. Strategic investments in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia have served both economic and geopolitical objectives. Critics argue that such engagement enables China to divide ASEAN’s consensus, as illustrated by Cambodia’s blocking of a joint ASEAN statement in 2012.

Port developments, infrastructure projects, and financial assistance not only increase China’s regional footprint but may allow it to project military capabilities. This dual-use infrastructure has raised alarm among ASEAN states and external stakeholders alike.

China-ASEAN Security Dialogue and Defense Diplomacy

In response to growing skepticism, China has attempted to institutionalize security cooperation with ASEAN. Since the 1990s, China has taken steps to shed the “China threat” narrative, including joining ASEAN-led forums and signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003. Defense diplomacy expanded with military exchanges, high-level visits, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs).

By the 2000s, China had established regular defense dialogues with ASEAN and initiated joint training and information-sharing efforts on non-traditional security issues such as disaster relief and cybercrime. Under President Xi Jinping, China further emphasized “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security,” introducing proposals for joint disaster response and cybersecurity cooperation.

Institutional efforts include co-chairing the ASEAN Regional Forum workshop on cross-border crime management in 2016, launching ASEAN-China cyber dialogues (2020, 2022), and planning an ASEAN-China Centre for Emergency Management Cooperation. Yet the effectiveness and trust behind these mechanisms remain debated.

China’s Strategic Motivation and the Indo-Pacific Challenge

Amid U.S. strategic rebalancing and the emergence of Indo-Pacific frameworks, China has become increasingly concerned about U.S.-centered security structures. Through its rhetoric and actions, Beijing has sought to keep ASEAN aligned with “ASEAN centrality” rather than joining alliances like QUAD or AUKUS.

To counter U.S. influence, China has engaged in high-level military diplomacy, conducted joint exercises, and expanded defense engagements. A landmark moment came in 2018 when China held its first joint naval exercise with all ten ASEAN members, signaling its intent to institutionalize military cooperation. However, the substance of these exercises is often considered less significant than those led by the U.S.

Vietnam and the Philippines: Strategic Balancers

Vietnam and the Philippines have emerged as key ASEAN countries actively balancing China’s influence. In September 2023, the U.S. and Vietnam elevated their ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, leading to closer security coordination, joint patrols in the South China Sea, and provision of U.S. surveillance aircraft to Vietnam. Simultaneously, economic and environmental cooperation also deepened.

The Philippines has strengthened defense relations with the U.S., Japan, and Australia. Recent milestones include a new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the U.S., involving expanded U.S. military access and massive joint exercises. Manila also signed agreements with Tokyo and Canberra, facilitating joint training and exchanges.

These expanded partnerships enhance regional deterrence and serve as counterweights to China’s assertiveness. However, they have drawn Beijing’s ire, raising the risk of great power competition intensifying in Southeast Asia.

Security Narratives and Strategic Messaging

To counter U.S. influence and address regional skepticism, China has crafted alternative narratives emphasizing peaceful development, sovereignty, and inclusivity. These narratives are part of China’s broader effort to increase its soft power and redefine global governance norms.

Beijing promotes its “peaceful rise” as a contrast to U.S. interventionism, highlighting its non-interference principle, respect for sovereignty, and opposition to external meddling. These resonate with ASEAN’s long-standing norms of non-alignment and non-intervention. China criticizes U.S.-led security blocs as destabilizing and rooted in Cold War thinking, positioning itself as a stabilizer rather than a disruptor.

Chinese officials frequently rebut claims that China undermines a “rules-based order,” asserting instead that such rhetoric masks American hegemonic aims. Through these narratives, China seeks to reassure ASEAN leaders while challenging U.S. dominance in the regional discourse.

Security remains the most fragile pillar of China-ASEAN relations. While economic interdependence and socio-cultural exchanges have flourished, maritime disputes and strategic rivalry cast long shadows. China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea and growing military reach alarm several ASEAN states, pushing them toward external partnerships.

At the same time, China has made efforts to build trust through dialogue, defense diplomacy, and cooperative initiatives. However, differing strategic perceptions, the persistence of the South China Sea disputes, and the rising influence of the U.S. and its allies ensure that China-ASEAN security ties will remain complex and contested.

Most ASEAN states will continue to hedge—engaging China economically while maintaining security ties with other powers. The challenge for Beijing lies in convincing its neighbors that its rise will not come at the expense of regional autonomy, sovereignty, or unity.

The EU in Southeast Asia: Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications for China-ASEAN Relations

The European Union (EU) has maintained dialogue with ASEAN since 1977, and their relations have grown significantly, especially in the post-Cold War era. The EU seeks to promote not only economic integration and institution-building in Southeast Asia but also to advance democratic norms, good governance, and human rights. As ASEAN-China ties deepen, the EU has emerged as both a complementary and strategic counterbalancing actor in the region.

Evolution of EU-ASEAN Relations

Milestones such as the 2007 Nuremberg Declaration and the 2020 elevation of ties to a Strategic Partnership have institutionalized EU-ASEAN relations. The current Plan of Action (2023–2027) builds on earlier frameworks to expand collaboration across political, economic, and socio-cultural domains. The EU’s engagement with ASEAN-led mechanisms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2012 reflect its commitment to Southeast Asian security and multilateralism.

Formal diplomatic channels were reinforced in 2015 when the EU appointed its first ambassador to ASEAN. The establishment of the EU Mission to ASEAN further strengthened policy coordination and strategic visibility in the region.

Economic Relations: A Growth Opportunity

The EU is one of ASEAN’s top trading partners and foreign investors. In 2021, it accounted for 10.6% of ASEAN trade.^[28] Efforts to deepen economic ties have led to free trade agreements (FTAs) with Singapore and Vietnam, and negotiations for broader ASEAN-EU FTA frameworks are ongoing. Economic cooperation now includes areas like supply chain resilience, green technologies, transportation, digital economies, and regional connectivity.

ASEAN views engagement with the EU as a way to diversify economic partnerships and reduce reliance on China. This aligns with EU goals of expanding market access and increasing resilience. The rapidly growing ASEAN middle class and digital economies offer lucrative opportunities for EU companies, particularly in infrastructure, renewables, manufacturing, and technology transfer.

Nonetheless, several challenges complicate economic cooperation. ASEAN’s internal diversity, with members at different stages of development, presents coordination difficulties. In addition, the EU faces stiff competition from China, the U.S., Japan, and others. Disputes such as the EU’s restrictions on palm oil—perceived as discriminatory by Indonesia and Malaysia—have also sparked friction. Furthermore, geopolitical uncertainty and regional tensions can hinder long-term planning and investment by European stakeholders.

Security Cooperation: Shared Interests and Constraints

Security cooperation presents mutual opportunities. The EU’s active role in ASEAN-led forums allows both parties to promote multilateralism and regional norms. As ASEAN grapples with external pressures, especially over the South China Sea and China-U.S. rivalry, EU engagement helps expand ASEAN’s strategic options and reinforce norms like the rule of law and good governance.

The EU has worked with ASEAN to combat non-traditional threats, including terrorism, cybercrime, and organized crime. While China is also expanding cooperation in these areas, trust deficits and geopolitical considerations limit the extent of China’s involvement. The EU, in contrast, is viewed as a less threatening actor, providing room to expand its role in capacity-building and security dialogues.

However, European engagement in the Indo-Pacific still lags behind other actors such as Japan and Australia. Many EU countries lack coherent Indo-Pacific strategies or the military capabilities to significantly influence the region’s security architecture. The absence of binding defense frameworks, such as Australia’s ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, further limits the EU’s hard security role.

Diverging perspectives between ASEAN and the EU can also constrain cooperation. One such issue is the treatment of the Rohingyas in Myanmar. While the EU advocates for stronger measures against human rights violations, ASEAN’s non-interference principle restricts its response to humanitarian assistance. These normative differences complicate coordinated policy action.^[29]

Strategic coherence within the EU is another obstacle. Not all member states have clear Indo-Pacific strategies, and competing domestic priorities—especially in light of the Russia-Ukraine conflict—have raised questions about Europe’s capacity and willingness to invest in long-term engagement in Southeast Asia.

Socio-cultural and Educational Engagement

There is significant untapped potential for EU-ASEAN cooperation in research, education, and public health. In education, programs like Erasmus+ and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions can deepen student exchanges, researcher mobility, and skills development aligned with green and digital transitions.^[30] English language training, vocational education, and joint degree programs can strengthen people-to-people ties.

Academic collaboration in science and innovation, particularly under Horizon Europe, can enhance R&D in life sciences, health technology, and climate-related fields. ASEAN countries have expressed growing interest in leveraging EU expertise in these domains, particularly given the EU’s reputation for regulatory excellence and cutting-edge research.

The COVID-19 pandemic spotlighted the importance of EU-ASEAN cooperation in health. The EU’s “Team Europe” initiative provided vital support to the region’s pandemic response. Future collaboration could focus on vaccine research, clinical trials, medical technologies, and digital health networks. Initiatives in pathogen sequencing, surveillance, and capacity-building for healthcare systems—especially in the least developed ASEAN countries—could serve as high-impact areas of joint action.

Implications for China-ASEAN Relations

EU engagement in Southeast Asia provides an alternative partner for ASEAN countries that seek to diversify both economically and strategically. Many ASEAN states, increasingly wary of overdependence on China, are interested in deeper economic and technological links with Europe. Moreover, the EU’s low-security profile and normative focus on multilateralism position it as a non-threatening counterweight to China.

That said, EU involvement does not displace China’s centrality in the region. Rather, it complicates Beijing’s strategic calculus. As ASEAN countries gain more partners and options, China may face difficulties using economic incentives to dominate regional diplomacy, as it has in the past. This could, in turn, influence how assertively China pursues its interests in contested areas like the South China Sea.

Nonetheless, the EU’s limited hard power and internal fragmentation restrict its ability to be a full-spectrum strategic player in Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, the EU remains a valued partner in economic development, governance, and socio-cultural cooperation—but is unlikely to supplant China or the U.S. in traditional security affairs.

The EU’s engagement with ASEAN has matured into a multi-dimensional partnership, spanning trade, development, security, education, and health. While opportunities abound, challenges remain—ranging from strategic incoherence and military limitations to normative gaps with ASEAN. However, the EU’s presence adds valuable balance to the regional order, offering ASEAN states broader options in navigating great power rivalry and fostering inclusive, rules-based cooperation.

 

Potential for China-Europe Collaboration in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is a key region for both China and the European Union (EU), attracting long-term investment and engagement from both sides. China’s presence is largely driven by infrastructure development through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while the EU emphasizes social development, good governance, education, and human rights. These differing strengths present opportunities for China and Europe to cooperate through third-party market initiatives in Southeast Asia.

First proposed by China in 2015, third-party market cooperation aims to foster collaborative projects between Chinese and foreign firms in host countries. It seeks to avoid unnecessary competition, improve perceptions of the BRI, and deliver mutual benefits. China has since signed agreements with 13 developed countries—most of them European, including France, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland—to explore such cooperation globally, including in Southeast Asia.^[31]

Although less extensive than China-Japan cooperation, China-Europe third-party projects in Southeast Asia are emerging. Notable examples include the China-UK Global Health Support Programme in Myanmar, financial cooperation on Vietnam’s Hai Phong Thermal Power Station involving several export credit agencies, a Sino-French renewable energy partnership in Thailand, and a deepwater port project in Timor-Leste constructed by China and operated by the French firm Bolloré.^[32]

Three features characterize China-Europe cooperation in the region: France’s leadership in third-party projects with China; the diversity of cooperation formats—spanning finance, engineering, and strategic partnerships; and the sectoral focus on infrastructure, health, and green energy, though geographically limited to a few Southeast Asian countries.

The economic potential in Southeast Asia—driven by consistent GDP growth and vast infrastructure needs—creates further opportunities for collaboration. For example, China’s proximity and construction efficiency can complement French expertise in high-speed rail and renewable energy. In the UK-China context, British strengths in design, law, and project management can be paired with China’s capabilities in construction, supply chains, and cost control. The two sides could also advance green finance in the region, a shared strategic priority.

Despite this potential, several challenges remain. Conflicting standards and goals, miscommunication, and duplicated infrastructure efforts may create inefficiencies. Divergent ambitions—such as when European countries pursue broader political aims versus China’s commercial focus—could complicate joint project implementation. In addition, political and regulatory instability in some Southeast Asian countries may hinder long-term cooperation.

Nevertheless, China-Europe indirect collaboration and complementary roles in the green transition of some African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Morocco, and South Africa,^[33] suggest that their positive interaction in Southeast Asia is possible. Joint participation in initiatives like the International Platform on Sustainable Finance—co-led by China and the EU and joined by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—signals growing multilateral potential.^[34] As Southeast Asia continues to seek infrastructure, sustainable growth, and diversified partnerships, third-party cooperation between China and Europe could contribute positively—provided differences are managed and mutual benefits clearly defined.

 

Conclusion

China-ASEAN relations have transformed dramatically since the early 1990s. Once a marginal player, China is now central to nearly every aspect of regional affairs. While the U.S. retains military dominance, China has emerged as a key economic power in Southeast Asia, using trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives like the BRI and RCEP to deepen its regional influence. This economic engagement strategy—“using economics to enhance political ties”—has led to asymmetric interdependence, pushing many ASEAN states to adopt hedging strategies.

Despite China’s growing influence, significant distrust persists among ASEAN nations, especially over China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. These tensions continue to undermine China’s security relations with the region, despite Beijing’s efforts at defense diplomacy.

This strategic environment creates space for the EU to expand its engagement. Long a positive contributor to ASEAN development, the EU can leverage its strengths in capacity-building, innovation, digital economy, and sustainability to offer alternative partnerships. However, China-Europe cooperation in Southeast Asia remains limited due to geopolitical rivalry and differing business standards. While Chinese policy statements indicate interest in collaboration, some European stakeholders express concern that joint initiatives with China might inadvertently reinforce Beijing’s strategic presence in the region, potentially reducing Europe’s ability to offer independent alternatives and limiting its role in regional balancing or hedging.

Thus, for Europe, a key policy consideration emerges: Should the EU deepen collaboration with China to leverage combined resources for ASEAN’s development, or pursue a more independent pathway to provide ASEAN states with clearer alternatives for strategic diversification? Addressing this nuanced choice will be critical for policymakers seeking to enhance Europe’s impact and relevance in Southeast Asia’s evolving strategic landscape.

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^[1] ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (n.d.) State of Southeast Asia Survey, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online;

Lowy Institute (n.d.) “Asia Power Index”, available online.

^[2] Lowy Institute (n.d.) “Asia Power Index”, available online.

^[3] Asian Development Bank & General Administration of Customs China (2018–2022) Data collected from Asia Regional Integration Center Database and GACC reports, Manila, available online and available online.

^[4] ASEAN Secretariat (various years) ASEAN Yearbooks, Jakarta, available online.

^[5] Tran, B. T. (2021) “Vietnam continues efforts to reduce trade dependence on China”, ISEAS Perspective, 27 August, available online.

^[6] ASEAN Secretariat (2013–2022) ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, Jakarta, available online.

^[7] ASEAN Secretariat (various years) ASEAN Statistical Yearbooks, Jakarta; ASEAN Secretariat and UNCTAD (2022) ASEAN Investment Report 2022: The Green Investment Facilitation Agenda, Jakarta, available online.

^[8] HKUST – Institute for Emerging Market Studies (IEMS) (2020) “Study Reveals Growing Need for Sharper Focus on Sustainability in Belt and Road Initiative Projects in ASEAN”, available online.

^[9] Xinhua News Agency (2022) China-aided hospitals key to strengthening Cambodia’s health system, 22 March, available online.

^[10] Norman, W. (2023) “Chinese companies commit US$13.7 billion for renewables in Philippines”, Pvtech, available online.

^[11] Zhang, L. (2020) “China-ASEAN Expo Concludes; Billions in Deals,” China Daily, November 30, available online.

^[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC (2022) “Wang Yi Talks about the Directions of China–ASEAN Cooperation in the Next Stage”, available online.

^[13] Seah, S., Ha, H. T., Martinus, M. Thao, P. T. P. (2023) The State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online.

^[14] Global Times (2022) “China, ASEAN to continue to strengthen cooperation in poverty reduction”, 28 June, available online.

^[15] Data compiled from the Chinese Ministry of Education.

^[16] DigMandarin (n.d.) “Your guide to the Chinese learning jungle”, available online.

^[17] ASEAN Young Leaders Training Program China (2019) “ASEAN Young Leaders Training Program China”, available online.

^[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC (2020) “Speech by Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, at the Opening Ceremony of the 17th China–ASEAN Expo and China–ASEAN Business and Investment Summit, 27 November, available online.

^[19] Wang, I. (2022) “China actively promotes digital paradigm, follows win-win and inclusiveness rule to help ASEAN progress”, Global Times, 16 November, available online.

^[20] China National Intellectual Property Administration (2022), “China, ASEAN organize training on IP capacity building”, 26 July, available online.

^[21] Wang, Z. (2022) “Tell China’s Story Well”: Chinese Embassies’ Media Outreach in Southeast Asian Media, Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

^[22] China Film News (2019) Outdoor Cinema – The Mekong Journey of Chinese Movies in 2019, 25 December.

^[23] Xu, L., Xing, X. (2022), “Online Influencers Conference Highlights Close Ties between China and ASEAN,” Global Times, January, available online.

^[24] Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization – Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (SEAMEO) (2019) China–ASEAN Education Cooperation Week, Bangkok, May, available online.

^[25] Seah, S., Ha, H. T., Martinus, M., Thao, P. T. P. (2021), The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online.

^[26] Lim, M. Z. (2022), “NDR 2022: Be wary of social media messages on Ukraine war with ulterior aims, says PM Lee,” The Straits Times, 21 August, available online.

^[27] Philips, T., Holmes, O., Bowcott, O. (2016), “Beijing rejects tribunal’s ruling in the South China Sea case,” The Guardian, 12 July.

^[28] McAllister, D., Caspary, D. (2022), “ASEAN and the EU: Beyond the summit, a call for action”, The Diplomat, 13 December, available online.

^[29] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore (2020) “ASEAN and EU: the untold story”, 16 October, available online.

^[30] ASEAN Secretariat and European External Action Service (2022) Plan of Action to Implement the ASE ANEU Strategic Partnership (2023–2027), Jakarta/Bruxelles, available online.

^[31] National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2019), “Third-Party Market Cooperation Guidelines and Cases”, available online.

^[32] CLBrief (2022), “Chinese-built Tibar Bay Deepwater Port in Timor-Leste officially opens”,  14 December, available online.

^[33] Di Ciommo, M., Veron, P., Ashraf, N. (2024), The EU and China in the Global South: Perspectives from African countries, Discussion Paper, 373, September, available online.

^[34] European Commission (n.d.), “International Platform on Sustainable Finance”, available online.