This paper explores the evolving dynamics of ASEAN–EU relations from an Indonesian perspective, contextualised within the lingering shadows of colonial legacies and the opportunities of twenty-first-century strategic cooperation. It analyses the “bipolar” nature of Indonesia’s stance, which is characterised by a mix of historical resentment and pragmatic cooperation. This is exemplified by President Prabowo Subianto’s shifting rhetoric, from criticising the EU for “double standards” and embracing non-Western powers like BRICS, to a more conciliatory tone following the political breakthrough on the Indonesia-EU Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IEU-CEPA) in July 2025. The essay also investigates bilateral ties with key EU member states, ASEAN–EU strategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific, and mutual commitments to multilateralism, connectivity, and sustainable development. While Southeast Asian public opinion surveys reveal fluctuating trust in the EU, the IEU-CEPA and a convergence in Indo-Pacific strategies signal a new phase of engagement. The paper concludes that a successful partnership depends on both sides’ ability to confront the past honestly, build on shared values, and foster equitable cooperation to navigate a multipolar world, and help shape a more stable, inclusive and sustainable international order.

 

Introduction

The long history of European colonialism casts a persistent shadow over present-day relations between Southeast Asia and Europe, particularly in the case of Indonesia. The brutal legacy of exploitation and domination during colonial times shaped national identities through anti‑colonial resistance and struggle for independence, leaving residual resentments that complicate modern diplomatic and economic cooperation. At the same time, pragmatic considerations encourage both sides to move beyond historical grievances toward a relationship rooted in mutual respect, equitable engagement, and shared strategic interests. A nuanced recognition of this colonial legacy is therefore essential to building a stronger, more balanced, and forward‑looking partnership between ASEAN countries—especially Indonesia—as well as ASEAN as a bloc and the EU, in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

 

Historical Memory and Contemporary Discourse

On November 13, 2023, during a foreign‑policy event at Indonesia’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, then Minister of Defence and presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto invoked the colonial past while leveling criticism at European countries. He accused them of applying “double standards” in their environmental and trade policies—specifically regarding palm oil—and pointed out that Europeans had historically been responsible for ecological degradation in Southeast Asia, yet now reproach Indonesia for similar practices. He underscored the need for parity and fairness, comparing the forced plantation economy imposed during colonial times with current restrictions that he perceives as protectionist or hypocritical. Prabowo went as far as to suggest that Indonesia may no longer “need Europe” if this imbalance persisted, and argued for a foreign policy “rebalancing”—toward greater engagement with Eastern partners such as Japan, South Korea, China, and India.^[1] Then, on June 20, 2025 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum – SPIEF, St. Petersburg, Russia with Russian President Vladimir Putin present, President Prabowo praised Russia and China, stating that “They have stood by developing countries without double standards — and I say this from my heart.” This statement implicitly critiques Western nations for applying “double standards” in their interactions with developing countries. He also reiterated Indonesia’s non-aligned foreign policy, emphasising that Indonesia “respects all countries” and wants to be “friends with everybody”.^[2]

These statements highlight Prabowo’s consistent narrative that calls out what he perceives as Western hypocrisy, particularly in economic relations, environmental policies, and historical narratives. His criticisms often frame these issues within a broader context of anti-colonialism and Indonesia’s pursuit of a more independent and balanced foreign policy, a “bebas aktif” or “independent and active” foreign policy that often times lean towards closer ties with non-Western powers. Soon after Prabowo’s inauguration as president in October 2024, Indonesia applied to join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) grouping, seen as the Global South counter-weight to the G7 grouping of mostly western advanced economies, at its summit in Kazan, Russia in November 2024.  This move stood in stark contrast with Indonesia’s earlier refusal to join BRICS under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and President Joko Widodo (2014-2024). Indonesia was speedily granted BRICS’ full membership January 2025.^[3]

Yet in July 2025, during a series of high-level diplomatic engagements, including a state visit to Belgium and the EU headquarters in Brussels, culminating in the political breakthrough on the Indonesia–EU Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IU‑CEPA), President Prabowo had articulated a more reconciliatory tone. At a joint press event in Brussels on July 13, he praised Europe’s longstanding contribution to science, technology, and upholding democratic values, terming the relationship “mutually symbiotic.” He emphasized Indonesia’s appreciation for greater European economic participation and reiterated Indonesia’s own motto “Unity in Diversity” in parallel with the EU’s “United in Diversity.” He welcomed the conclusion of the landmark Indonesia–EU Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IEU‑CEPA) as a breakthrough, and framed Europe as an indispensable component of a multipolar global architecture essential for peace and stability.^[4]

This rhetorical shift—from invoking historical grievances to affirming shared values and interests—reflects Indonesia’s continuing “bipolar” attitude towards Europe and the West in general. Historical criticism remains not just as a rhetorical lever, but a widely-shared outlook among former colonised countries, but this is balanced with recognition of Western contributions to modern civilisations, as well as the pragmatic need for cooperation and strategic partnership, particularly for Indonesia’s economic development.

 

Colonial Legacy: A Mixed Inheritance

The colonial period fundamentally reconfigured Southeast Asia’s political, economic, and social trajectories. European powers such as Spain in the Philippines, the Netherlands in Indonesia, Britain in Burma and Malaya, and France in Indo-China (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) imposed plantation economies, centralized bureaucracies, and commercial networks deeply entwined with imperial interests in their respective colonies.^[5] In the Indonesian case, Dutch rule entrenched an extractive economy, tight resource control, and a legal and institutional infrastructure largely inherited by the post‑colonial state. The Indonesian national revolution (1945–1949) and the struggle for recognition punctuated a painful transition to sovereignty.^[6]

The memory of colonial exploitation and the contested process of independence continue to underpin relations with Europe. Calls periodically arise in Indonesia for formal apologies or reparations for colonial atrocities, and nationalist narratives emphasize resistance figures like Diponegoro^[7] and Sukarno to reinforce ambivalent views of Europe. Coupled with economic disparities rooted in colonial economic structures, these narratives coalesce into a trust deficit. At the same time, legal systems, educational legacies, and institutional models left behind by European colonial powers—especially the Dutch—have become part of Indonesia’s governance apparatus, while academic, cultural, and people‑to‑people ties have fostered constructive engagement. The Netherlands’ expertise in water management and logistics, Germany’s industrial know‑how, and France’s defence technologies illustrate how colonial legacies have transformed into platforms for cooperation rather than just grievances.^[8]

 

Contemporary ASEAN–EU Relations: Tensions and Synergies

From the establishment of the ASEAN Brussels Committee in 1972 and the ASEAN–EEC Cooperation Agreement in 1980, relations have evolved from informal dialogue to formal strategic partnership. ASEAN–EU cooperation spans economic ties, political and security dialogue, sustainable development, cultural exchange, digital transformation, and regional integration. Yet structural and normative tensions endure.

One central point of friction remains the EU’s normative diplomacy—particularly on human rights, environmental standards, and democratic governance—which ASEAN states sometimes perceive as neo‑colonial or intrusive. The EU’s Renewable Energy Directive II (RED II) and Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), for instance, have drawn strong criticism from Indonesia and Malaysia, which view them as protectionist barriers targeting palm oil exporters and smallholder livelihoods. The palm oil issue has even been brought by Indonesia as the primary complainant before the WTO, with the WTO panel concluding in 2023 that the EU had discriminated against Indonesian-palm oil-based biofuels versus like products.^[9] Differences in governance philosophy—such as ASEAN’s principle of non‑interference and consensus‑based decision‑making versus the EU’s more legally binding and supranational approach—further complicate cooperation. Moreover, the lack of an ASEAN‑wide free‑trade agreement with the EU reflects internal disparities among ASEAN’s member states and undermines region‑to‑region integration.^[10]

However, the relationship also boasts substantial synergies. The EU remains one of ASEAN’s top trading partners and sources of investment. The EU is ASEAN’s 3^rd largest trade partner, representing around 10% of ASEAN trade in 2022, while ASEAN is the EU’s 3^rd biggest partner outside Europe, with €272 billion in goods trade.^[11] The EU has also been an important source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for ASEAN.  In 2022 FDI from the EU in ASEAN reached € 400.1 billion.^[12]

ASEAN states share with the EU strong commitments to multilateralism, the rules‑based international order, climate action, and supply‑chain resilience. Both blocs cooperate on marine security, digital transformation, humanitarian assistance, infrastructure connectivity, counter‑terrorism, and development cooperation in science and technology. The EU’s accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2012—and elevation to Strategic Partnership in 2020—signals its longstanding engagement and mutual commitment.^[13]

It is also important to note that while ASEAN has not tried to model its regional cooperation on Western European regional integration, ASEAN openly acknowledged that that it has looked to the European Union (EU) and its predecessor as an inspiration. ASEAN was initially designed as a loose and minimalist regional association which firmly rejected any forms of supranational authority. Yet, the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, which has given ASEAN a legal personality and introduced new values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law into ASEAN alongside the continuing emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference principles, has been seen as a major development in the “Europeanisation” of ASEAN.^[14]

 

Indonesia’s Bilateral Relations with EU Member States

Indonesia’s relations with individual EU countries reveal distinct dynamics shaped by history, economic complementarity, diaspora, and geopolitical interests. Among them, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Italy stand out.

The Netherlands, as Indonesia’s former colonial ruler, holds deep cultural and academic ties. A sizeable Indonesian diaspora resides in the Netherlands, and institutions such as Leiden University continue to anchor Southeast Asian scholarship. The Netherlands is the top trade partner for Indonesia among the EU countries, as well as a significant source of FDI. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached US 5.7 billion in 2024.^[15] The Port of Rotterdam serves as a key logistical gateway for Indonesian goods into Europe—a tangible legacy of historic interlinkages that now support modern trade and investment, and there is a long-standing cooperation between the Port of Rotterdam Authority with Indonesia Port Corporation (Pelindo) for sustainable port development.^[16]

Germany is the top EU investor in Indonesia as well as a leading trading partner, particularly in machinery, automotive, vocational training, and industrial engineering. Its emphasis on quality and sustainable development fits well with Indonesia’s infrastructure and labour priorities. Germany’s Global Gateway initiative, including infrastructure projects like the regional railway in Surabaya, underscores its ongoing engagement.^[17]

Besides being an important economic partner, France has emerged as a core defence partner of Indonesia. High-profile arms deals—including Indonesia’s order for 42 Rafale fighter jets from France in 2022 and 2 Scorpène submarines in 2024—and strategic dialogues underscore France’s Indo‑Pacific orientation.^[18] As the only EU country maintaining a constant military presence in the Indian Ocean, France’s defence cooperation with Indonesia signals a deepening strategic alignment. Exchange of state visits between President Emmanuel Macron and President Prabowo Subianto in 2025, the latter marked by Indonesian marching troops leading the July 14^th Bastille Day in Paris parade as the guest of honour, further cement the increasingly close bilateral relations between Indonesia and France.

Italy represents a newer yet growing partner. Yet, it is worthwhile to remember that the earliest recorded encounter between Europeans and Southeast Asia, predating formal colonialism, were three famous Italian explorers, who all visited areas which are now part of Indonesia and wrote about their travels. These were Marco Polo (1292), who reportedly sailed through the Strait of Malacca, stopping in Sumatra and possibly Java on his return home from China. Marco Polo described the region’s wealth, spice trade, and social customs in The Travels of Marco Polo (circa 1300), fuelling European imaginations of the “Spice Islands.” Niccolò de’ Conti (c. 1420s–1440s), an Italian merchant who travelled extensively in Asia and likely visited Sumatra, Java, and possibly Maluku, recording valuable details about trade, local customs, and political organisation. Ludovico di Varthema (1503–1506), an Italian adventurer visited Banda and Ternate just before the Portuguese conquest. His accounts, published in 1510, included references to the wealth of cloves and nutmeg, further encouraging European interest.^[19] Italy did not join in the colonisation of Southeast Asia and thus has no troubling historical legacy with the region.

Following its designation as an ASEAN Development Partner in 2020, Italy has expanded trade, investment, and cultural engagement with Southeast Asian countries.^[20] In 2024 Indonesia and Italy celebrated the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations, underscoring their long‑term commitment. Economic ties—though still lagging behind Germany, the Netherlands or France—span energy, machinery, agribusiness, digital technology, and consumer goods. Italy’s export plan for 2025 intensifies its focus on ASEAN as a strategic trade hub. Italy’s Indo‑Pacific strategy, regional cooperation, and support for renewable energy and digital transformation align with Indonesia’s development objectives.^[21]

 

The IEU‑CEPA: A Turning Point

While the bilateral relations between Indonesia and individual EU member countries have been relatively free of major obstacles, this has not been the case with Indonesia’s relations with the EU as a bloc.  Negotiations for the Indonesia–EU Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IEU-CEPA) began in mid‑2016 and required nearly nine years and some nineteen formal rounds to reach political agreement in 2025. Key sticking points included environmental and sustainability rules (especially palm oil) as already discussed earlier, local content requirements, investor protection provisions, mineral export limits, and technical issues such as rules of origin and services commitments. These problems caused negative sentiments between Indonesia and the EU, as can be seen from Prabowo’s scathing criticisms of the EU in 2023 quoted earlier, going so far as to say that Indonesia did not need Europe. The COVID‑19 pandemic caused delays between 2020 and 2022, but breakthroughs resumed in 2023, and by 2024–2025, major issues such as automotive market access, critical minerals, public procurement, and investor protections were resolved.

Once concluded, IEU‑CEPA offers phased or immediate zero tariffs on roughly 80 percent of Indonesia’s exports to the EU—including apparel, footwear, processed palm oil, fish products, and automotive components. Analysts forecast a 50 percent or more increase in Indonesian exports within three to four years, supporting downstream industrial upgrading, diversification beyond traditional partners, and job creation in labour‑intensive sectors.^[22] The agreement also brings enhanced investment certainty for EU firms in critical areas such as EV batteries, critical minerals, digital infrastructure, and renewable energy—aligning with Indonesia’s climate and development agenda.^[23]

For the EU, the FTA opens access to Indonesia’s fast‑growing consumer and industrial market, with improved conditions for machinery, chemicals, manufactured goods, services in telecom, finance, logistics, and more. Strategically, IEU‑CEPA diversifies EU trade across ASEAN, following agreements with Singapore and Vietnam, while embedding sustainability, labour rights, and environment protection into its architecture. The timing of the final announcement—on Sunday, July 13, 2025 and a single high‑visibility diplomatic occasion—reinforced a shared sense of urgency and convergence amidst global geopolitical volatility, including US President Trump’s punitive tariffs imposed on almost all countries wanting to trade with the United States.^[24] As mentioned earlier, the agreement on the Indonesia-EU CEPA has generated a much more positive outlook from President Prabowo and the Indonesian government as a whole towards the EU and Europe in general.

 

Perceptions and Trust: Public Attitudes in ASEAN and Indonesia towards the EU

Recent public opinion surveys conducted by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore since 2019 entitled “The State of Southeast Asia” highlight evolving attitudes toward the EU in Southeast Asia and Indonesia specifically. Between 2019 and 2021, ASEAN respondents’ confidence in the EU rose from around 41 percent to some 51 percent, making the EU the second most trusted power after Japan. In 2023, confidence remained relatively high, although concerns grew regarding the EU’s leadership capacity and perceptions of incompatible political values. Worry about the EU being distracted by internal matters decreased modestly, while some respondents raised alarms over the EU’s stances on environment and human rights threatening sovereignty. In 2024, ASEAN confidence in the EU’s capacity to champion global free trade dropped below 14 percent, although in 2025 it rose slightly to 15.6 percent.^[25]

In Indonesia, trust in the EU in 2019 stood at 45 percent, rising to 52.7 percent in 2020. However, by 2023, perceptions became more mixed: confidence in the EU’s global leadership declined, and concerns about the EU’s environmental and human‑rights positions increasing sovereignty risk rose sharply—from under 18 percent in 2022 to nearly 29 percent. Meanwhile, those who regarded the EU as unreliable increased to 17.2 percent. Trust in the EU declined steadily, reaching a record low in 2024, largely due to the EU’s stance on the Israel–Gaza conflict and environmental policies seen as coercive, though trust in the EU global leadership rose again in 2025. Although Indonesia’s trends broadly mirror ASEAN sentiment, the shift in perceptions regarding sovereignty and normative interference is especially notable.^[26]

The recent conclusion of the Indonesia-EU CEPA and the shifting position of several EU countries on the Israeli-Gaza conflict by supporting the Palestinian statehood, will likely further improve Indonesia’s and ASEAN’s overall perceptions of the EU in the next survey.

 

Indo‑Pacific Outlook: Convergence and Caution

In response to the emergence of various Indo-Pacific strategies of external powers, notably the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy introduced by President Donald Trump in 2017, which were seen to be primarily directed against China, Indonesia took a leading role in pushing ASEAN to take an active part in the discourse about this new ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategic concept. Because Southeast Asia is located at the geographic midpoint between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and all the lands around and within them, ASEAN must, in Jakarta’s view, continue to retain its centrality in the evolving Indo-Pacific construct. ASEAN’s centrality is regarded as essential for ensuring the development of a truly open, transparent and inclusive Indo-Pacific regional architecture that will try to bridge rather than accentuate differences.^[27] The ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo‑Pacific (AOIP), adopted in 2019, articulates core priorities that include an open and inclusive region, ASEAN centrality, rules‑based order rooted in UNCLOS 1982, and four pillars of cooperation—maritime security, connectivity, sustainable development goals (SDGs), and economic cooperation.

The European Union’s Indo-Pacific strategy, formally titled the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and released in September 2021, reflects the bloc’s growing recognition of the Indo-Pacific as a region of strategic economic and geopolitical importance. The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, bolstered by the individual strategies of key member states, represents an important step in Europe’s re-engagement with Southeast Asia. While differences in national priorities persist, the overarching trend is one of convergence around shared principles—support for multilateralism, ASEAN centrality, and sustainable development.^[28]

ASEAN has generally welcomed the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, along with those of its member states, provided they are inclusive, non-confrontational, and supportive of ASEAN’s own strategic autonomy. The EU’s emphasis on multilateralism, development cooperation, and ASEAN centrality has resonated well with Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, which values balanced engagement that does not force a choice between major powers. ASEAN’s cautious but open stance is rooted in its desire to avoid being drawn into rival strategic alignments, preferring initiatives that respect sovereignty, deliver concrete developmental benefits, and align with ASEAN’s own priorities in infrastructure, digital economy, and climate resilience.^[29]

The convergence between the EU’s and ASEAN’s regional visions has strengthened the basis for deeper cooperation. However, some divergence remains. The strategic ambitions of France, particularly in security and defence, may at times appear at odds with ASEAN’s preference for non-alignment and consensus-based diplomacy. Meanwhile, the diversity of approaches among EU member states could risk fragmenting the overall coherence of European engagement in the region unless efforts are made to coordinate and align national and EU-level strategies more closely.

Indonesia’s response to the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is nuanced and shaped by its long-standing “bebas aktif” or independent and active foreign‑policy doctrine which envisions a balanced, multipolar world underpinned by international law. Indonesia sees EU strategies as opportunities for enhanced economic cooperation, green transition, connectivity, and support for ASEAN’s institutional role. Indonesia remains cautious about defence cooperation and great‑power rivalry. It seeks diversified partnerships without excessive dependence on any single bloc or major power—a stance that dovetails with ASEAN’s multi‑alignment posture.

 

Conclusion

ASEAN and the EU confront a world defined by fragmentation, uncertainty, shifting power dynamics, and socio‑ecological imperatives. In this context, their strategic partnership offers a pragmatic model of cooperative regionalism grounded in inclusivity, multilateralism, rules‑based order, and sustainable development. For Indonesia, the challenge lies in navigating the dual inheritance of colonial legacies and diplomatic opportunity. As criticisms rooted in historical resentment persist—especially regarding trade restrictions or normative friction—the broader trajectory points toward constructive engagement and mutual benefit. The IEU‑CEPA, Indonesia’s evolving foreign‑policy stance, and ASEAN’s institutional maturity provide fertile ground for a transformed partnership.

By confronting the colonial past honestly, reaffirming shared values, and building cooperation on foundations of equity and reciprocity, ASEAN countries and the EU can forge a future partnership that transcends history while remaining informed by it. Such a relationship would not merely mitigate global uncertainties; it could help shape a more stable, inclusive, and sustainable international order as well as a more stable, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific regional order where ASEAN can ensure its strategic autonomy and centrality, without succumbing to the hegemonic ambitions of competing great powers.

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^[1] Starcevic, S. (2023) “Indonesia doesn’t need Europe anymore, presidential frontrunner says”, Politico, 13 November, available online.

^[2]  Tanamal, Y. (2025) “Following ‘the most powerful‘ is a mistake, Prabowo says in Russia”, The Jakarta Post, 21 June, available online.

^[3] Wardhana, A., Dharmaputra, R (2025) “What BRICS membership means for Indonesia”, The Diplomat, 24 January, available online.

^[4] Cabinet Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia (2025) “President Prabowo Subianto: Europe remains a pillar of global civilization and democratic values”, 13 July, available online.

^[5] Hall, D.G.E. (1981) A History of Southeast Asia, London: The Macmillan Press; Osborn, M. (2024) Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

^[6] Ricklefs, M.C. (2008) A History of Modern Indonesia c. 1300 to the present, London: The Macmillan Press; Kahin, G. McT. (2003) Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca-New York: Cornell University Press.

^[7] A lot of public forums, talk shows and exhibitions are being carried out in Indonesia in throughout 2025 to commemorate the Java War (1825-1830) led by Prince Diponegoro against the Dutch colonial rule, hailing Diponegoro as an inspirational leader who must be remembered and emulated by the current and future Indonesian generations. A film about Diponegoro is underway in 2025.

^[8] Mishra, R., Hashim, A., Milner, A. (2021) Asia and Europe in the 21^st Century: New Anxieties, New Opportunities, London: Routledge.

^[9] World Trade Organisation (2023) Panel Report: European Union-Certain Measures Concerning Palm Oil and Oil Palm Crop-Based Biofuels (DS593), Geneva, 5 June, available online.

^[10] Djisman, S. (2017) “EU-ASEAN Relationship: Trends and Issues”, in Pacini, M., Yue, C.S., ASEAN in the New Asia, Singapore: ISEAS – Cambridge University Press.

^[11] Delegation of the European Union to ASEAN (2022) “The European Union and ASEAN”, available online.

^[12] ASEM (2024) “Topic of the Month. Trade and Investments”, August, available online.

^[13] EU-ASEAN Business Council (2025) Elevating EU-ASEAN Relations: Towards Moderns and Innovative Trade Agreements and Strategic Cooperation, Singapore: EU-ASEAN Business Council, March, available online.

^[14]  Ruland, J (2017) The Indonesian Way: ASEAN, Europeanization, and Foreign Policy Debates in a New Democracy, Stanford – California: Stanford University Press.

^[15] Antara News (2025) “Indonesia-Netherlands relations strengthened by major Dutch investment”, 17 June, available online.

^[16] Susanti, R., Simatupang, H.Y., Srifauzi, A. (2025) “Green Diplomacy: Indonesia-Netherlands Cooperation (Port of Rotterdam) to Realize the Green Port Concept in Indonesia”, PROIROFONIC, 1 (1).

^[17] EEAS (2025) “Global Gateway”,  available online.

^[18] Strangio, S. (2025) “France, Indonesia sign Agreement that could lead to further defense purchases”, The Diplomat, 29 May, available online.

^[19] Hester, N.C. (2019) “Italian Travel Writing”, in Das, N., Youngs, T., The Cambridge History of Travel Writing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 206-220.

^[20] ASEAN Secretariat Portal (2025) “Overview: ASEAN-Italy Development Partnership”, Jakarta, July, available online.

^[21] Nugraha, P.C. (2024) “A new horizon for closer Indonesia-Italy relations”, The Jakarta Post, 6 June, available online.

^[22] Saputra, G.T.P., Nooraeni, R (2020) The Impact of Indonesian-European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IEU-CEPA) on Indonesia’s Textile and Textile Products, Bangkok: ESCAP, available online.

^[23] Rafitrandy, D. (2025) “The Indonesia-European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (I-EU CEPA): Opportunity to Accelerate Green and Digital Transformation in Indonesia”, Indonesian Quarterly, 52 (2), 89-109.

^[24] Strangio, S. (2025) “Indonesia, EU Announce Agreement to Advance Trade Pact”, The Diplomat, 14 July, available online.

^[25] Tang, S. M., Moe, T., Hoang, T. H., Termsak, C., Pham, T. P. T., Anuthida, S. Q. (2019) The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online; Tang, S.M., Hoang, T.H., Anuthida, S.Q., Glenn, O., Pham, T.P.T. (2020)  The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Instituteavailable online; Seah, S., Ha, H. T., Martinus, M., Thao, P. T. P. (2021) The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online; Seah, S., Lin, J., Sithanonxay, S., Martinus, M., Pham, T.P.T., Farah, N.S., Hoang, T.H. (2022) The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online; Seah, S., Ha, H. T., Martinus, M. Thao, P. T. P. (2023) The State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online; Seah, S., Lin, J., Martinus, M., Fong, K., Aridati, I., Pham, T. P. T., Chee, D. (2024) The State of Southeast Asia: 2024 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online; Seah, S., Lin, J., Martinus, M. Fong, K., Pham, P. T. P., Indira, Z.A. (2025) The State of Southeast Asia: 2025 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, available online.

^[26] Ibidem.

^[27] Anwar, D.F. (2020) “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”,  International Affairs, 96 (1), January ,111–129,  available online.

^[28] Driesmans, I. (2021) “ASEAN at the Centre of EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy”, The ASEAN Post, 19 April, available online.

^[29] Lin, J. (2021) “The EU in the Indo-Pacific: A New Strategy with Implications for ASEAN”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, December, available online.

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• Indo-Pacific outlooks: implications for the EU-ASEAN relationship and Italy’s role in Southeast Asia