This report examines the Netherlands’ Indo-Pacific approach following the adoption of its 2020 Indo-Pacific Guidelines and draws policy lessons for Italy. It argues that the Dutch Guidelines did not introduce new policies but instead reframed existing economic, maritime, and institutional ties within a coherent strategic framework that improved coordination, prioritisation, and political signalling. The Dutch experience demonstrates that European involvement in the Indo-Pacific is centred on economic security, maritime security, and institutional partnerships rather than sustained military presence. At the same time, it reveals structural limitations, including a capability-ambition gap and the risk of symbolic security engagement. The report argues that Italy should adopt a selective Indo-Pacific framework in the form of national guidelines, anchored in the Mediterranean-Red Sea-Indian Ocean corridor. Such an approach would strengthen policy coherence, reinforce Italy’s role within EU Indo-Pacific policy, and prioritise geoeconomic cooperation and institutional partnerships. More broadly, the report concludes that Indo-Pacific frameworks for European middle powers function primarily as instruments of coordination and strategic prioritisation rather than mechanisms of military power projection.

 

Introduction

Over the past decades, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as the central arena of global economic growth, geopolitical competition, and maritime connectivity. For European countries, the region is no longer geographically distant but economically and politically central. European prosperity depends heavily on maritime trade routes passing through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. European industries remain deeply integrated into Asian supply chains, particularly in sectors such as manufacturing, energy, and critical technologies. Recent disruptions in key maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz in 2026, highlight the extent of this interdependence. As one of the world’s most critical energy transit corridors, instability in this region has immediate consequences for global energy markets, maritime insurance, and supply chains. These developments illustrate how closely European economic security is tied to maritime routes linking the Indo-Pacific to the Mediterranean. From this perspective, the Indo-Pacific is better understood not as a distant geographic region but as part of an integrated maritime system that connects Europe to Asia through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific.

At the same time, intensifying geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States and China, has transformed the Indo-Pacific into a strategic theatre where economic security, technological standards, maritime stability, and the international legal order intersect. For European actors, the primary challenge lies in navigating this interdependence. This involves maintaining economic ties with Asia while managing strategic risks linked to supply chain dependencies, technological competition, and geopolitical rivalry.

Within this evolving strategic context, several European countries have adopted Indo-Pacific strategies, including France, Germany, and the Netherlands, followed by the European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2021.^[1] These strategies reflect a broader shift in European foreign policy from a primarily economic approach toward a more integrated geoeconomic and geopolitical perspective. However, European Indo-Pacific strategies differ significantly depending on national capabilities, geography, and strategic culture. For most European countries, the Indo-Pacific is defined more by economic interdependence rather than territorial presence. Except for France, European actors are not resident powers in the region. Their engagement is, therefore, shaped less by territorial defence considerations and more by trade, supply chains, maritime security, and institutional partnerships. In this context, European engagement in the Indo-Pacific can be understood through the lens of complex interdependence, where economic and security considerations are closely intertwined through maritime connectivity and supply chain resilience.^[2] Within this framework, neoliberal institutionalism explains how states seek to manage interdependence through cooperation, multilateral institutions, and rules-based arrangements aimed at reducing uncertainty and maintaining stability of global economic and security systems.^[3]

This report examines the Netherlands’ Indo-Pacific engagement since the launch of its 2020 Indo-Pacific Guidelines and develops policy lessons for Italy’s emerging approach to the region. The Dutch case is particularly relevant because the Netherlands, like Italy, is a trading nation without a permanent military presence in the Indo-Pacific, yet with significant economic exposure to the region and strong support for multilateralism and international law. The Dutch case, therefore, offers a practical example of how a European middle power can engage in the Indo-Pacific through functional cooperation, economic statecraft, and institutional partnerships rather than through sustained military power projection. The report argues that, for European middle powers such as Italy, effective Indo-Pacific engagement does not require expansive military commitments, but rather strategic coherence, prioritization, and sustained implementation within EU frameworks. The Dutch experience demonstrates that policy guidelines can serve as effective instruments for coordination and EU agenda-setting, provided they are linked to clearly defined and implementable priorities.

 

The Netherlands as a Middle Power in the Indo-Pacific

In international relations literature, the Netherlands is often described as a middle power that relies on diplomacy, multilateral institutions, and economic statecraft rather than military power.^[4] Middle powers typically exercise influence through coalition-building, institutional engagement, and niche diplomacy.^[5] Rather than seeking dominance, they aim to shape international norms, institutions, and economic networks. In the Dutch case, this approach is reflected in a focus on areas of comparative advantage, including maritime law, water management, logistics, semiconductor supply chains, and international legal governance. The Netherlands is a major global logistics hub, centred around the Port of Rotterdam, and plays a key role in European trade flows. It is also home to advanced high-technology industries, most notably ASML, which occupies a critical position in global semiconductor supply chains.

These structural characteristics shape Dutch foreign policy and explain why economic security and maritime connectivity are central to its Indo-Pacific engagement. Unlike France, which is a resident Indo-Pacific power with overseas territories and a permanent military presence, the Netherlands is a non-resident actor. Its regional role relies on partnerships, economic linkages, and institutional frameworks. This makes the Dutch case particularly relevant for Italy, which also lacks a permanent territorial presence but maintains vital economic and maritime interests in the region.

From a theoretical perspective, Dutch Indo-Pacific engagement reflects the logic of complex interdependence and neoliberal institutionalism.^[6] As argued by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, interdependent systems increase the importance of cooperation, institutions, and rules-based arrangements for managing risks and reducing uncertainty. For middle powers, this functions as a force multiplier, enabling them to exercise influence beyond their material capabilities. Within this framework, the Dutch Indo-Pacific strategy can be understood as a middle power approach centred on multilateralism, economic statecraft and trade diplomacy, and functional cooperation in niche sectors.

The Dutch case illustrates these dynamics in practice. The Netherlands advances its Indo-Pacific engagement primarily through multilateral frameworks and structured partnerships aligned with the European Union (EU) strategy, alongside enhanced cooperation with actors such as ASEAN. Its emphasis on secure maritime trade routes, respect for international law, and the diversification of economic ties reflect a preference for managing interdependence and mitigating risks through cooperation rather than unilateral action. At the same time, Dutch cooperation in areas such as maritime security, climate policy, and sustainable connectivity underscores the role of institutionalised cooperation in addressing shared challenges and supporting regional stability.

 

Dutch Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: Continuity and Change

Dutch engagement in the Indo-Pacific predates the publication of the Indo-Pacific Guidelines in 2020.^[7]  The Netherlands had long-standing economic, development, and diplomatic ties across Asia and the Indian Ocean region, particularly with Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, India, and ASEAN countries. Dutch foreign policy toward Asia traditionally focused on trade, development cooperation, water management, maritime logistics, and multilateral diplomacy. The Indo-Pacific Guidelines, therefore, did not introduce entirely new policies but instead reframed existing Dutch activities within a broader strategic framework, improving coordination and political signalling.

Pre-2020: Economic and Institutional Engagement

Before 2020, Dutch involvement in Asia was substantial but not framed as part of an Indo-Pacific policy. Dutch activities in the region were primarily driven by economic diplomacy, institutional cooperation, and maritime security initiatives. First, the Netherlands maintained strong commercial and trade relations with Asian economies, reflecting its position as a trade-dependent economy and a major logistics hub in Europe. Dutch policy toward Asia was often pursued through EU trade frameworks, bilateral economic diplomacy, and investment promotion.

Second, Dutch engagement was characterised by functional and technocratic cooperation. Long-term partnerships with Indonesia in water management and climate adaptation represent a flagship example of sustained institutional collaboration. These partnerships developed over decades through memoranda of understanding, knowledge exchange programmes, and technical collaboration between Dutch and Indonesian institutions. Together, they created a durable Dutch presence in the region, even in the absence of a formal Indo-Pacific policy.

Third, the Netherlands participated in maritime security initiatives in Asia through multilateral frameworks such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which it joined in 2010. However, these activities were not yet embedded within a broader Indo-Pacific framework and were instead framed as sectoral contributions to regional security and international cooperation.

The defining feature of Dutch policy before 2020 was, therefore, not the absence of engagement, but the absence of strategic coherence. Dutch activities in the region existed across multiple policy domains but lacked a unifying strategic narrative.

 

The 2020 Indo-Pacific Guidelines: Strategic Framing and Coordination

In November 2020, the Dutch government published the Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia.^[8] The publication of the Guidelines marked a significant shift in how the Netherlands conceptualised and articulated its role in the region. Rather than introducing entirely new policy priorities, the document provided a strategic framework that brought together existing strands of Dutch foreign policy. It linked trade, technology, maritime security, connectivity, and international law into a coherent narrative, thereby enhancing policy coordination and external visibility.

The Guidelines identified a set of priority areas that reflect both Dutch capabilities and broader European concerns. These include maritime security and freedom of navigation, supply chain resilience, cooperation with like-minded partners, climate and sustainable development, digital governance, and the strengthening of the international legal order. These priorities reflect a distinctly geoeconomic approach, in which economic interdependence, technological competition, and maritime connectivity are treated as interlinked dimensions of security.

An important aspect of the Dutch approach is the deliberate choice of the term ‘guidelines’ rather than ‘strategy’. This choice reflects a pragmatic assessment of national capabilities and signals an intention to provide direction and coherence without overstating ambition. In this sense, the Guidelines function less as a grand strategy and more as a coordination instrument that aligns policy across ministries and clarifies priorities for external partners. The document also serves an important signalling function, communicating Dutch commitment to the Indo-Pacific while maintaining flexibility in implementation.^[9]

The geographic scope of the Dutch Indo-Pacific concept is also notable. Defined as stretching ‘from Pakistan to the islands of the Pacific’, it is more limited than broader conceptualisations advanced by actors such as Japan or the EU.^[10] This narrower definition is strategically deliberate. By focusing on the main maritime routes linking Europe and Asia, the Netherlands anchors its approach in its identity as a maritime trading nation rather than a resident territorial power. This emphasis reinforces the centrality of shipping lanes, logistics networks, and economic flows in Dutch strategic thinking.

The Guidelines also explicitly align Dutch policy with the emerging EU Indo-Pacific strategy. This reflects a dual-track approach in which national initiatives are designed to complement and shape EU-level engagement. By positioning itself as an active contributor to European Indo-Pacific policy, the Netherlands enhances its influence within the EU while expanding its external reach. In this sense, the Dutch Guidelines function not only as a national policy document but also as a tool of European agenda-setting, demonstrating how middle powers can leverage EU frameworks to extend their strategic influence.

Post-2020: Naval Diplomacy and Strategic Signalling

After 2020, Dutch engagement in the Indo-Pacific combined selective naval deployments with long-term functional cooperation and institutional partnerships. One of the most visible demonstrations of Dutch involvement was the deployment of the Dutch frigate HNLMS Evertsen in 2021 as part of the United Kingdom-led Carrier Strike Group 21 deployment to the Indo-Pacific.^[11] The mission took the vessel through the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and into the Indo-Pacific, where it participated in joint exercises and operations with allies and partners. Politically, the mission signalled the Netherlands’ willingness to contribute to maritime security and freedom of navigation, despite its limited naval capacity. It also underscored the importance of allied integration as a means of extending Dutch strategic reach.

Building on this experience, the Netherlands announced in 2022 its intention to deploy a naval vessel to the Indo-Pacific every two years. This biennial deployment model was intended to introduce greater predictability and continuity in Dutch naval engagement while remaining compatible with existing resource constraints. The approach reflects a calibrated effort to balance ambition with capability. In 2024, the Dutch frigate HNLMS Tromp conducted a multi-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific, marking a further step in the institutionalisation of Dutch presence in the region.^[12] During this mission, the vessel participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises, conducted operations related to UN sanctions monitoring in East Asia, and carried out a series of high-profile port visits across Southeast Asia.^[13] These activities reinforced Dutch commitments to the rules-based order and strengthened operational cooperation with regional partners.

Looking ahead, Dutch policy continues to follow this pattern of periodic yet structured presence. In April 2026, the Dutch frigate HNLMS De Ruyter departed for a five-month Indo-Pacific deployment, reaffirming the Netherlands’ commitment to maintaining a recurring maritime presence in the region.^[14] During the mission, the vessel is expected to participate in exercises and operations with regional partners, contribute to maritime security initiatives, and conduct port visits across the Indo-Pacific. This deployment demonstrates the consolidation of the biennial model and reflects the gradual institutionalisation of Dutch maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

Collectively, these deployments reflect a form of naval diplomacy centred on strategic signalling, with the Netherlands relying on periodic deployments rather than maintaining a permanent presence in the Indo-Pacific. While missions such as Evertsen, Tromp, and De Ruyter indicate a growing degree of continuity and institutionalisation, Dutch policy remains anchored primarily in long-term institutional and functional cooperation. This combination of selective presence and sustained partnerships enables the Netherlands to maintain a credible role in the Indo-Pacific without overstretching its resources.

The Functional Core of the Dutch Indo-Pacific Engagement

The Dutch experience suggests that European involvement in the Indo-Pacific is driven less by military power projection than by geoeconomic interests, maritime connectivity, and institutional cooperation. The Dutch approach is centred on three interconnected areas: economic security, maritime security, and institutional partnerships. Together, these form the operational core of the Dutch Indo-Pacific approach and illustrate how a European middle power can maintain influence through coordination, specialisation, and long-term cooperation.

 

Economic Security and Supply Chain Resilience

Economic security constitutes a central driver of Dutch Indo-Pacific policy. As a major trading nation and logistics hub, the Netherlands is highly dependent on maritime trade routes passing through the Indo-Pacific. Disruptions along these routes would have immediate implications for both the Dutch and wider European economies. Consequently, Dutch policy has prioritised supply chain resilience, critical technologies, port infrastructure, maritime logistics, and digital standards. This reflects a broader European shift toward geoeconomics and economic statecraft, in which trade, technology, and infrastructure are increasingly linked to security concerns, particularly in the context of strategic competition with China. The Dutch approach has been described as ‘inclusive, but not value-neutral’, reflecting efforts to balance economic engagement with China alongside the protection of the rules-based international order.^[15]

The Netherlands has also played an active role in European debates on economic security and de-risking, particularly regarding critical technologies such as semiconductors and the role of ASML. More broadly, the Dutch case illustrates how middle powers can exert influence through economic, technological, and regulatory networks rather than through military power projection.

 

Maritime Security and Strategic Signalling

The Netherlands has expanded its maritime role in the Indo-Pacific through naval deployments and participation in joint exercises. These activities primarily serve as strategic signalling, demonstrating political commitment to maritime security and the rules-based international order rather than conventional power projection.^[16] At the same time, these deployments reveal the structural limits of European involvement in the region. Their episodic nature and limited scale mean that visibility does not necessarily translate into sustained influence. The Dutch case, therefore, highlights the distinction between symbolic visibility and long-term strategic influence, which depends on continuity, follow-up cooperation, and integration within broader institutional and security frameworks.

 

Institutional Partnerships and Issue-Based Cooperation

The third pillar of Dutch engagement lies in institutionalised cooperation rather than ad hoc initiatives. Long-term partnerships in areas such as water management with Indonesia, maritime information-sharing, and technical collaboration have created durable institutional linkages. These partnerships reflect a broader European approach based on capacity building, regulatory coordination, and development-oriented cooperation. Compared to episodic military deployments, such forms of issue-based cooperation generate longer-term influence by embedding relationships across ministries, agencies, and knowledge institutions.

Collectively, these three functional areas demonstrate that Dutch Indo-Pacific engagement is grounded in economic interdependence, strategic signalling, and institutional anchoring rather than territorial presence. This approach enables the Netherlands to maintain a credible role in the Indo-Pacific while remaining aligned with its capabilities and resources.

 

Assessing the Dutch Approach: Limits and Dilemmas

While the Dutch Indo-Pacific Guidelines provide a valuable model of middle power engagement, the Dutch experience also highlights several lessons that Italy should consider as it develops its own Indo-Pacific strategy. The Dutch case illustrates that effective management of strategic interdependence extends beyond strategic framing to encompass sustained resource allocation, institutional capacity, prioritisation, and long-term investment in specialised sectors.

The Capability-Ambition Gap

A central challenge is the gap between political ambition and available resources, often described as a capability-ambition gap. The Guidelines encompass a wide range of thematic priorities and geographic areas, but Dutch diplomatic, military, and financial resources remain limited. This creates a risk of strategic dispersion, where policy attention is spread too thinly across multiple policy domains and partners without sufficient strategic depth.

 

Symbolic vs Structural Presence

A related limitation concerns the risk that periodic naval deployments remain primarily symbolic rather than strategically transformative. While Dutch maritime activities have strengthened visibility and political signalling, their episodic nature limits their capacity to generate sustained regional influence. This illustrates a broader constraint of European Indo-Pacific engagement: without long-term institutional follow-up and sustained resource commitments, visibility alone does not necessarily translate into strategic weight.

 

The China Dilemma and European De-risking

The Dutch approach reflects a broader European dilemma in managing relations with China. China remains one of the Netherlands’ most important trading partners, while also increasingly being viewed as a ‘systemic rival’ and a source of strategic dependency in critical sectors.^[17] Dutch policy has responded to this tension through a focus on de-risking rather than decoupling, seeking to reduce strategic vulnerabilities while preserving economic ties. This balancing act is likely to shape European Indo-Pacific strategies in the coming decade and is highly relevant for Italy, which faces similar challenges in aligning economic interests with emerging European concerns about economic security.

Overall, these considerations suggest that while the Dutch approach functions effectively as a coordination framework, it reflects trade-offs between ambition, resources, and strategic focus.

Lessons for Italy: Adaptation and Strategic Prioritisation

The Dutch case offers important lessons for Italy, although these should be approached as requiring adaptation rather than direct policy transfer. The main value of the Dutch Indo-Pacific Guidelines lies less in the introduction of new policy instruments than in their role as a mechanism for coordination. In the Dutch context, the Guidelines improved coherence across ministries, linked economic and security policy domains, and provided a clearer framework for engagement with regional partners and the EU. For Italy, the central lesson is that an Indo-Pacific strategy can serve most effectively as a coordination framework. Its effectiveness is closely linked to the ability to define priorities, align policy across government, and embed national initiatives within broader EU frameworks. Without these functions, such a strategy risks remaining declaratory rather than operational.

The second lesson concerns the importance of selectivity. One of the limitations of the Dutch approach has been the breadth of its engagement and wide thematic ambition, which can create risks of strategic dispersion for a middle power with finite diplomatic and military resources. Italy should, therefore, adopt a more focused approach, concentrating on a smaller number of priority partners and policy areas where long-term political and economic cooperation can be sustained over time. Priority partnerships could focus on South Asia, ASEAN, and selected countries in the Western Indian Ocean where Italy’s diplomatic, economic, and maritime interests are most closely aligned. A more focused approach would help maintain continuity and prevent resources from being spread too thinly across multiple priorities.

The third lesson concerns the role of geography in shaping strategic engagement. While the Dutch approach is shaped primarily by maritime trade and supply chain linkages with Asia, Italy’s strategic position suggests a different orientation. For Italy, the maritime corridor linking the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea provides a natural strategic lens for Indo-Pacific engagement. This corridor encompasses critical chokepoints and energy routes that are central to Italian and European economic security. Anchoring Italy’s Indo-Pacific approach in this space could strengthen policy coherence by linking Indo-Pacific engagement with Italy’s existing Mediterranean priorities.

Finally, the Dutch case highlights the importance of institutional presence over episodic visibility. While naval deployments can strengthen political signalling, they do not necessarily generate sustained influence. Long-term impact is more likely to emerge through institutionalised cooperation, industrial partnerships, infrastructure development, and capacity-building initiatives. Italy possesses significant comparative advantages in sectors such as shipbuilding, energy infrastructure, port management, and maritime security, which could form the foundation of its Indo-Pacific engagement. In this sense, Italy’s role in the region should be defined less by military projection and more by geoeconomic and industrial partnerships.

Overall, these lessons suggest that Italy would benefit more from adapting the underlying logic of the Dutch model than from replicating it in line with its own capabilities, geographic position, and strategic priorities. Such an approach offers a means of strengthening policy coordination, maintaining strategic focus, and fostering durable partnerships, rather than expanding military presence in the region. In this context, Italy could further develop its role as a key maritime link between Europe and the wider Indo-Pacific.

 

Should Italy Adopt an Indo-Pacific Strategy?

The key policy question is not whether Italy should increase its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, but whether this engagement should be formalised through a national strategy or guidelines document. Italy has already expanded its role in the region through naval deployments, defence cooperation, industrial partnerships, and diplomatic initiatives. This growing involvement, often described as a ‘quiet pivot’, reflects a gradual broadening of Italy’s strategic horizon.^[18] However, these activities remain fragmented across policy domains, highlighting the need for greater coherence and prioritisation.

Italy’s recent activities illustrate this trajectory. The deployment of the frigate Carabiniere in 2017, followed by the multipurpose frigate Francesco Morosini in 2023 and the Cavour Carrier Strike Group in 2024, signals a willingness to operate beyond the Mediterranean.^[19] Italian naval units have participated in multilateral exercises such as RIMPAC and Komodo, conducted sanctions monitoring operations, and carried out port visits across South and Southeast Asia.^[20] These initiatives suggest that Italy is already developing a security and industrial presence in the Indo-Pacific through naval diplomacy and defence cooperation, albeit without a unifying strategic framework.

The Dutch experience suggests that Indo-Pacific frameworks can serve as useful instruments for improving coordination, clarifying priorities, and positioning countries within broader EU strategies. In the Dutch context, the Indo-Pacific Guidelines enhanced coherence across ministries without fundamentally altering foreign policy. For Italy, adopting a similar framework could strengthen coordination and prioritisation while avoiding unrealistic great power ambitions.

At the same time, the Italian approach should reflect its own strategic geography. For Italy, the Indo-Pacific extends beyond East and Southeast Asia to include the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the maritime routes linking Asia to Europe through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. This perspective enables Italy to connect its Indo-Pacific role with its Mediterranean policy and broader European connectivity initiatives. Rather than representing a shift away from the Mediterranean, Italy’s Indo-Pacific approach is best viewed as an extension of its existing maritime and economic interests.

An Italian Indo-Pacific framework is likely to be most effective when it strengthens coordination across ministries, defines clear geographic and thematic priorities, and positions Italy within the broader EU Indo-Pacific strategy. At the same time, Italy should avoid adopting an overly ambitious approach that exceeds its capabilities. The Dutch experience underscores the importance of balancing strategic ambition with available capabilities and resources. A focused and flexible set of guidelines centred on coordination, prioritisation, and partnerships would provide a coherent basis for Italy to formalise its role, improve policy coherence, and avoid strategic overstretch.

 

Policy Recommendations for Italy

Drawing on the Dutch experience and Italy’s strategic position, the following recommendations outline how Italy could develop a selective and geographically anchored Indo-Pacific approach.

• Italy should adopt a concise Indo-Pacific guidelines document aimed at improving coordination across ministries, defining strategic priorities, and signalling sustained commitment to regional partners rather than announcing a major strategic shift.
• Italy’s Indo-Pacific approach should be anchored in the maritime corridor linking the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. This would allow Italy to align its Indo-Pacific priorities with its Mediterranean role and broader European connectivity and energy security initiatives.
• Italy should prioritise a limited number of strategic partners where long-term cooperation is sustainable. These should include India, Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam, Singapore, ASEAN, and selected partners in the Western Indian Ocean. Prioritisation is essential to ensure continuity and avoid strategic dispersion.
• Italy should leverage its comparative advantages in geoeconomic and industrial sectors, including shipbuilding, energy infrastructure, port management, and maritime technology. Its regional role should focus on industrial partnerships, connectivity projects, and energy cooperation rather than large-scale military deployments.
• Italy should align its regional approach with the broader EU Indo-Pacific strategy. By positioning itself as a bridge between the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific, Italy can maximise political and economic leverage while avoiding policy duplication.
• Italy should prioritise long-term institutional partnerships. Sustained influence in the Indo-Pacific is more likely to emerge from capacity building, development cooperation, and technical partnerships than from episodic naval deployment

Conclusion

The Dutch Indo-Pacific approach demonstrates how a European middle power can develop a strategic presence in the region through partnerships, economic engagement, and maritime security cooperation rather than through large-scale military power projection. The Dutch case shows that Indo-Pacific frameworks function primarily as tools of coordination, signalling, and partnership-building. Their purpose is not to transform foreign policy, but to organise it more strategically, prioritise resources, and position countries within broader European and international frameworks.

For Italy, engagement in the Indo-Pacific is less a question of expanding its regional role than of structuring existing activities in a way that reflects its strategic geography, economic interests, and institutional capacities. The Dutch experience suggests that a guidelines-based approach can improve coordination, clarify priorities, and signal long-term commitment to regional partners. Rather than mirroring the Dutch model, Italy could adapt its underlying logic to its own position as a Mediterranean country whose economic and energy security is closely linked to the maritime routes connecting Europe with Asia through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

From this perspective, the Indo-Pacific is not a distant region but part of a broader maritime system that directly shapes European and Italian economic security. Italy’s engagement should be understood not as a shift away from the Mediterranean, but as an extension of its existing maritime and economic interests. Its comparative advantage lies not in maintaining a permanent military presence in the Indo-Pacific but in leveraging its strengths in maritime security, industrial cooperation, infrastructure, and connectivity.

More broadly, the Dutch case illustrates that for European middle powers, the effectiveness of an Indo-Pacific strategy depends less on ambition than on focus, prioritisation, and institutionalisation. A selective and geographically anchored approach would allow Italy to contribute meaningfully to European Indo-Pacific policy while avoiding strategic overstretch. European countries have adopted distinct roles in the region: France operates as a resident power, Germany as a trade-oriented actor, and the Netherlands as a middle power coordinator within the EU framework. Italy, by contrast, could position itself as a maritime corridor connector linking Europe to the Indo-Pacific through the Mediterranean-Red Sea-Indian Ocean axis, a role that reflects both its geography and its economic profile. Ultimately, the lesson from the Dutch case is not that Italy should do more in the Indo-Pacific, but that it should act with greater strategic focus, selectivity, and consistency. For Italy, the Indo-Pacific does not begin in the South China Sea, but in the Suez Canal.

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^[1] European Commission (2021) “EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”, Joint Communication, September, available online.

^[2] Keohane, R. O.,  Nye, J. S. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

^[3] Keohane, R. O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

^[4] Abbondanza, G., Grgić, G. (2025) Europe’s Indo-Pacific Pivot: Navigating New Horizons, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

^[5] Cooper, A. F. (1997) Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, Macmillan.

^[6] For complex interdependence, see Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. For neoliberal institutionalism, see Keohane, R. O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

^[7] Government of the Netherlands (2020) Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online.

^[8] Ibidem.

^[9] Van Willigen, N., Blarel, N. (2024) “Why, how and to whom is the European Union signalling in the Indo-Pacific? Understanding the European Union’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific in the epicentre of multipolar competition”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 27(1), 69-90.

^[10] Heijmans, M. (2021) “The Netherlands and the EU turn to the Indo-Pacific”. Clingendael Institute, 14 July, available online.

^[11] Ministry of Defence (2021) “UK Carrier Strike Group to Sail with Netherlands Frigate on 2021 deployment”. GOV.UK, 31 March, available online.

^[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024) “Why is a Dutch Navy Ship Travelling the World Over?”. Government of the Netherlands, 27 June, available online.

^[13] Ibidem.

^[14] Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands (2026) “Marineschip naar Indo-Pacific”, available online.

^[15] Heijmans, M. (2021) “Netherlands and the Indo-Pacific: Inclusive, but not Value-Neutral”, Clingendael Institute, August, available online.

^[16] Kim, S., Van Hooft, P. (2023) Capability and Ambition Mismatch in the Indo-Pacific: A Middle Power Strategy for the EU, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, January, available online.

^[17] European Commission (2019) EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, Brussels: European Commission, available online.

^[18] Abbondanza, G. (2023) “Italy’s quiet pivot to the Indo-Pacific: towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy”, International Political Science Review, 45(5), 669-679.

^[19] Scott, D. (2025) “On Wider Seas: Italian Naval Deployments and Maritime Outreach to the Indo-Pacific” CIMSEC, 5 March, available online.

^[20] Defence Security Asia (2024) “Indonesia acquires two multi-role patrol ships from Italy worth RM5.9 billion”, Defence Security Asia, 29 March, available online.

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• The Indo-Pacific and the European Approaches to the Region