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Emerging issues in international health governance: a Chinese view

Covid-19 offers an opportunity for rethinking the topic of China and global health governance. This paper first draws attention to the notion of “global health” by offering a brief contour of China’s contributions to solve the world’s health burden throughout modern history. The author argues that it may be wise for both developed and developing countries to view global health less as an extension of development aid and more as a public good. Assurance of health as a public good necessitates equity-based contributions by all. The paper then touches upon the renewed interest in linking health provision and national security, which pitches China as a competitor against established health industry leaders like the United States. International harmonization of the rules of trade in health products for emergency responses and the negative spillover effects produced on health provision by economic sanctions deserve continuous research attention.

Up or out: how China’s decarbonization will redefine trade, investments, and external relations

How are global trade and investments in energy likely to be impacted by China’s pledge to reach carbon dioxide neutrality before 2060? How will countries need to respond to stay ahead of the game, or simply not to miss trade and investment opportunities with a net zero carbon China? This paper argues that the impacts of China’s decarbonization in energy trade and investments will be felt differently across the globe depending on countries’ environmental performance, the profile of their energy exports to China, and the availability of decarbonization plans domestically. Countries that have already started to roll out their decarbonization and are supplying non-fossil fuels to China are more likely to level up their bilateral engagement. Countries that have not yet started to roll out their decarbonization plans and are supplying fossil fuels to China are more likely to restrain, if not phase out, their economic relations with the Asian giant. This paper concludes that China’s proposal to achieve net zero emissions by 2060 could be the turning point for fossil fuel markets and the global energy transition, creating a future of mutual adaptation for China and its sources of energy supply.

China’s ambition on climate change in a post-pandemic world

In the 21st century avoiding catastrophic climate change demands a more ambitious climate action agenda. Xi Jinping’s recent pledge to strive to reach carbon neutrality by 2060 signals a stronger commitment towards de-carbonising the Chinese economy while meeting enhanced obligations under the Paris Agreement. Whether China can increase the pace of its domestic energy transition while de-carbonising investments abroad remains a critical concern for its global climate leadership. Of equal importance, yet often overlooked, is the question of how China is responding to the climate emergency from a security perspective. The official line, repeatedly endorsed at the United Nations Security Council, is that climate change is essentially a development issue. In a post-pandemic world, this paper argues that China’s ambition on climate change can no longer be assessed simply on the basis of its national contribution alone. Instead, China’s climate actions need to be understood in a global context, taking into account the high stakes involved in managing the shift towards a green recovery while simultaneously preparing for a less stable strategic environment.

America’s tactical multilateralism for Asia and its consequences

The Biden administration has made building back confidence in the United States as a source of global security and stability a central goal of its foreign policy. As this objective is pursued in the Asia Pacific within the framework of the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it is closely intertwined with competition with China in the region and beyond. Biden officials have promised to engage vigorously in regional diplomacy and deepen the US role in regional multilateralism. However, the competitive thrust of the administration’s policies in the region make it prone to pursue coalitions of like- minded countries in activities that counter China’s regional initiatives. The risk is that this weakens the hard-won regionalism that enables regional collective action, ultimately leaving the region more vulnerable to exploitation by a regional hegemon.

New East Asian institutions could challenge the global economic order

Intra-regional economic interactions in East Asia were broadly compatible with the global liberal order from the late 1970s into the mid-2000s. Despite many national barriers to incoming trade and investment, more were coming down than going up. World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) rules and norms generally prevailed. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) adhering to longstanding global standards were the key sources of infrastructure loans. An array of challenges to that congruence between global and regional trade and finance have arisen within East Asia, particularly since the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 and the current Covid-19 pandemic. New institutions of trade and investment threaten to compete with one another and with existing global institutions in ways that pose challenges to the existing global liberal order and threaten the competitive opportunities for non-Asian corporations from both Europe and the United States. Whether policy-makers there can respond effectively to offset these challenges is a central question for near-term action.

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